Getting the Baseline Right
Ppruners,
GETTING THE BASELINE RIGHT
I am going to presume to take us all back to basics in this debate so that, hopefully, when you decide to write to the press or to your MP you will consider reminding your reader/s of such basics. MoD appears to have forgotten or disregarded some of them. I see the basics as:-
1. Our armed forces represent one of several tools that the Government uses to ensure that Britain’s interests at home and abroad are protected (other tools include politics, diplomacy, economic devices, counter-intelligence, etc.).
2. The foundation for the make-up of our armed forces is Defence Policy as given in the Strategic Defence Review (and follow-up amendments such as DP2001). It is against this Policy that decisions should be taken concerning the effective equipping of each of the three Services.
3. When a major shift in Defence Policy occurs (e.g. following the end of the Cold War) and because Defence spending is always tightly controlled, a review of existing assets should be made and balanced against the needs of the new Policy.
4. It is very clear that “offensive expeditionary force operations” are at the forefront of current Government Policy. As such, this JTF capability should be given high priority by our Service Chiefs and, where shortfalls in JTF funding occur, lesser priority projects/capabilities should be critically examined with a view to making any necessary financial savings. The last place that cuts in vital operational capability should be made is, logically, in the stated priority area -JTF weapon systems and personnel.
5. Too often, the different Services have to fight for limited funds – and frequently, the one with the loudest voice (the most desk officers in Whitehall) wins the day. Such inter-service funding battles often obscure the main issues of Policy. These lead not only to “empire building/conservation” but they can arguably become a tool for changing stated Government Policy via the back door (something which should be anathema to the House of Commons).
6. What then of the Central Staffs? Are they not there to moderate the otherwise adverse effects of inter-service funding battles and to ensure that MoD spending does indeed match the stated needs of Government Policy? If that is the case, then the Chief of Defence Staff and his “Central” subordinates have been suspiciously silent during the current FA2 debate. Could this be because CDS, Admiral Sir Michael Boyce, does not wish to be seen in any way biased towards the needs of the Navy? Or, is it more likely that the partisan Financial/Empire Building squabbles between the three services have contaminated Central Staff judgement?
I trust that the above represents a reasonably accurate summary of the basics affecting this debate. Add to the above, the need to preserve the lives of our servicemen, to spend tax-payers’ money wisely and to protect our expensive equipment investments and you are then in the a position to analyse more accurately the MoD statement released at the time that the FA2 decision was made public – and to judge whether this decision was indeed as misguided as I believe it was.
I shall forward parts of that MoD statement with appropriate comment in my next post. Later, I shill look at expanding this debate to take a critical/clinical look at lesser priority projects/capabilities that should be examined with a view to making the essential financial savings needed to secure the future of the FA2.
Final Comment: “What Mr Ingram should have said concerning the FA2 decision.”
It could be concluded that the UK Armed Forces Minister, Adam Ingram, intentionally misled the Nation when making his announcements concerning the demise of the Sea Harrier. His statement is damning more by what he didn’t say than what he did. Let us review what he should have said but left out:
a. Elimination of the Sea Harrier FA2 force from Joint Force Harrier will deny the Fleet at large and its JTF operations its first line of air defence for at least 8 and probably more than 10 years.
b. The loss of this first line of air defence will be compounded by a gap in service between the current Type 42 Air Defence Destroyers and the new Type 45 Air Defence Destroyers; leaving the Fleet at sea vulnerable to even the least sophisticated air to surface weapon systems for up to 10 years.
c. The Harrier GR7 and GR9 do not have any form of Air-to-Air radar and will be fitted with a short range, fire and forget, Air-to-Air missile. These Harrier versions are very slow compared with any other fast jet attack/fighter aircraft. They will therefore be unable to get close to an attacking aircraft in order to engage it and will be unable to run away from any fast jet fighter aircraft. With their lack of radar and without a Beyond Visual Range weapon system (like the Sea Harrier FA2 Blue Vixen/AMRAAM system) they will be unable to provide the Fleet with a first line of air defence beyond the radar horizon.
d. Operational experience since 1980 has shown that Low Level Ground Attack Aircraft such as the Harrier GR7/9 and the Tornado GR1/4 are extremely vulnerable to ground fire. Without true stand-off SMART weapons and Airborne Electronic Warfare (Jamming) support, the GR7/9 force will not endow a JTF with any “credible expeditionary offensive capability”.
e. The Government is spending a large amount of money on the latest update to the Tornado F3. This update may at last, after twenty years in service endow the Tornado with a working Air-to-Air weapon system. However, the Euro-fighter is soon to enter service and will replace the Tornado. The money that is being spent on Tornado is therefore being wasted and it should be taken out of service. As neither Tornado nor Euro-fighter are capable of defending the Fleet at sea, the money being wasted on Tornado should be applied to running the Sea Harrier FA2 force on until the Future Joint Combat Aircraft (JSF) enters service.
f. The Nimrod is not an effective Anti-Submarine Warfare vehicle. Even with better avionic systems that may allow it to detect and prosecute a submarine threat, this will be of limited use to the Nation because:
i. The agreed submarine threat against the UK mainland is now low (Strategic Defence Review);
ii The Nimrod is a land based aircraft with limited range and can not therefore support Fleet/JTF operations away from the UK base “without prepositioning” (Defence Policy 2001 Statement).
The £3 billion (US$4.3 billion) being spent on the Nimrod upgrade would therefore be better spent on maintaining an effective first line of air defence for the Fleet and on upgrading the already proven Fleet Anti-Submarine Warfare systems.
g. The RAF have three types of attack/reconnaissance fighters in service: the Tornado GR4, the Harrier GR7 and the Jaguar. If money has to be saved and spent on realistic military capability, the Jaguar should be withdrawn from service now and the strengths of the GR4 fleet and the Harrier GR7 fleets rationalised.
Logical thinkers, strategists and tacticians might well have formed the view that the UK Air Staff had not given up their efforts to deprive the Fleet of Organic Air Defence. Is this still their aim? And will the present UK Government now address these scandalous issues and begin to demonstrate a true intention to follow the principles laid down in Defence Policy 2001 Statement?
The UK has been lucky to survive without any real mainland air defence for over twenty years. Now that Euro-fighter is being procured to correct that situation, let us not now denude our Fleet of the capability to defend itself. “Maximising investment in one aircraft type” (Harrier GR7/9) will definitely bring “greater certainty” to JTF operations prior to the Future Joint Combat Aircraft and Britain’s two new aircraft carriers. That certainty will be the inability of a JTF to defend itself from air attack and the possible loss of many lives and ships in any limited war engagement.