The Shar Decision - Questioning "Their Lordships"`
Ppruners!
Sea Harrier FA2 withdrawal from Service: the Decision
I have followed this debate with considerable interest and I note with great approval that there is overwhelming support for reversing the Sea Harrier FA2 withdrawal decision. That “approval” is a result of my background as a professional aviator and an acknowledged Air Warfare expert with considerable active experience.
The Sea Harrier FA2 is by the US and NATO as one of the most capable all weather BVR fighters in the world. It represents the first line of air defence for the Fleet and for Joint Task Force operations. It may also be seen as the eyes of the Task Force Commander, able to see all types of air movement within its extended radar coverage over land or sea. It is the one weapons system in UK service today that has the proven ability to detect, intercept and destroy all known air threats that might menace Task Force units – whether naval or on land.
But its most important capability is the ability to deter such threats. As such, it most definitely qualifies as an air superiority fighter that can deny the use of airspace to threat aircraft. Arguably, it is therefore an indispensable constituent of the expeditionary force policy that has been laid down by the Government in Defence Policy Statement 2001. (If you haven’t read this, you should do so – ask and I’ll send!)
What then is the operational argument for this FA2 withdrawal decision? Our Naval and Air Staff Chiefs have combined to support it strongly. They talk about learning from experience and applying the lessons learned from that experience.
Let us briefly examine their personal experience in the context of the last twenty years or so.
First Sea Lord (1SL), Admiral Sir Nigel Essenhigh has served with distinction as a Hydrographer. And he also served with “the grey funnel line” in the Gulf during the Kuwait crisis. That was when there was zero actual threat to our ships from Iraqi aircraft and when the US Navy and US Air Force had established air superiority over the Gulf area. (At the time, the RAF Tornado F3 flew CAP missions over the water well clear of hostilities – it didn’t have an effective weapon system, couldn’t fly high enough and is still the same on both counts.) This “active” experience obviously convinced 1SL that modern expeditionary force operations will always take place in a benign environment – i.e. when nestled under the umbrella of US firepower. His operational experience and, probably, his judgement rests on that Kuwait experience and, perhaps, because of that one might excuse his part in this appalling defence decision.
Chief of the Air Staff (CAS), Air Chief Marshal Sir Peter Squire is a very different animal. An ex Harrier GR3 pilot, he is a “mud-mover” and as such he flew several exacting war missions in the Falklands. (The GR3s flew 157 sorties when down South of which only about 59 were active missions over enemy territory. They lost 6 aircraft, five to enemy action. The Sea Harrier flew about 1600 missions, 90% of which were against the enemy. They lost six aircraft, two to enemy ground fire, three from pressing too hard and one just fell off the deck. Mind you it was rough!) So for every 12 low-level attack missions, one GR3 was lost to enemy fire. For every 800 Sea Harrier missions, one was lost to enemy fire – and none air-to-air. These statistics speak volumes about the outdated practice of low-level direct attack missions in the face of relatively simple ground-to-air defences.
None of Sir Peter’s missions were flown with any real threat of attack by enemy fighters. That was because the Sea Harrier deterred such attacks – just as it turned away 453 Argentinean attack missions that were destined to deliver their war load against our ships and ground forces.
In the light of this and of other MoD-accepted statistics from the Falklands campaign, one might justifiably assume the following to be true:
a. Sir Peter and his GR3 boys faced and put aside considerable personal danger when doing their gallant work down South;
b. In spite of this, and apart from a staged fire power demo over Goose Green in support of the Paras, in real military terms the GR3 did not destroy/achieve much (their contribution to the success of the campaign was therefore small but welcome);
c. The Sea Harrier knocked down a couple of dozen enemy aircraft;
d. The Sea Harrier prevented more than 450 enemy attack aircraft from reaching their targets and delivering up to 1,800 HEMC bombs against our Task Force Units;
e. The Sea Harrier provided a relatively benign air environment in which the GR3 could operate;
f. The Sea Harrier delivered at least as much ordnance against enemy ground targets as the GR3 (mainly from medium level);
g. The multi-role Sea Harrier achievements and presence made a most significant contribution to the Campaign success, facilitating the eventual victory by our ground forces.
Perhaps you can see a pattern emerging here. The Sea Harrier was vital to the success of the Falklands Task Force campaign. The GR3 was not.
Since then, the Sea Harrier has been involved in every expeditionary force type operation conducted by British forces. It has acquitted itself with distinction in Bosnia, Kosova, Sierra Leone and in policing the “No fly zone” over Iraq (F3s have also done this Iraq task – but only when escorted by proven all weather BVR fighters). It has successfully carried out air space denial, reconnaissance and ground attack missions.
In stark contrast and through no fault of its pilots (genuinely the “cream of the Royal Air Force”), the “chosen son” of 1SL and CAS, the Ground Attack Harrier (GR3/7) has not actually achieved very much at all. It hardly ever embarks in Her Majesty’s carriers and when it does, it faces many problems such as not being able to find its way back to the ship (Sierra Leone). This is hardly an enviable track record in Task Force terms compared to the FA2.
Yet 1SL and CAS have for reasons best known to themselves (but not enunciated publicly – one must ignore the verbage on financial imperatives and jointery – neither hold water) taken the operational judgement to throw away the FA2 and to keep the GR7. This judgement must be described as “appalling” especially when measured against CAS’ personal operational experience.
In very simple terms, the decision taken represents a very real threat to the security and survival of our Joint Task Force personnel (including the GR7 boys). It is not backed by operational experience, expertise or logic. As such it must be viewed as unacceptable.
It is my impression that 1SL and CAS are not paid to be politicians. They are paid to honour the Queen, defend her dominions and to provide our military personnel with the proper wherewithal to wage war without unnecessary loss of life.
Quite clearly they are failing to do this.
There is no doubt that when at the top in the MoD one faces many pressures. Some of these, I am acquainted with and some, perhaps not. But one should not attribute “black magic powers” to those who loftily tread the hallowed corridors of Whitehall. Instead, we should remind them that the decisions they take can indeed cost lives and that when alternative courses are open to them that provide much less risk to our servicemen and women, these are the courses that should be chosen.
With the threat to the homeland base being rated as very small in the SDR and DP2001, is it not illogical to be spending a lot of money on upgrading the impotent F3 when its successor, the Euro-fighter will enter service at about the same time that its upgrade is complete. And could we not “make do” with say, 250 Euro-fighters instead of about 330 in this low threat environment. Either or both options would easily release adequate funding to keep the FA2 in service and to ensure the viability and survivability of “Expeditionary Task Force Operations”.
Please reply if you would like to hear more!