BOI into the 2012 Tornado Collision over the Moray Firth
Just watched BBC Scotland news, doesn't sound great for MOD. Squabbling, delays, cutbacks and poor management all mentioned. Relatives pushing for fatal accident enquiry. Also mentioned delay in fitting CWS due to cutbacks, not a great advert.
ISTR AP3207 having something about Inquiries needing to be timely to be effective, and I don't remember anything about massive delays for the purpose of arse-covering 
Just checked. Still there: para 12.
Just checked. Still there: para 12.
Full, open, timely and accurate reporting of aviation occurrences
is essential to the maintenance of good flying safety.
is essential to the maintenance of good flying safety.
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It does seem that MoD has had a change of heart on this one; thank God. Their original stance was to withhold the report until after the FAI, if one took place, or a soon as it was decided not to hold one. I understand that the FAI issue has yet to be resolved.
I also understand that the MAA and the Crown office of Scotland have never been opposed to this report being issued.
DV
I also understand that the MAA and the Crown office of Scotland have never been opposed to this report being issued.
DV
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Could be a bad week for MOD, but will anyone be held accountable?
BBC News - Jets collision warning system 'would have saved lives'
DV
BBC News - Jets collision warning system 'would have saved lives'
DV
Deliverance
That might seem an acceptable risk but the point being made is the MoD porky machine was in overdrive on this one. It was claiming CWS was only considered recently but was actually rejected in the 90s. I don't know why but that would be a good question if a fatal accident inquiry is held here. Looks like MoD is resisting.
That might seem an acceptable risk but the point being made is the MoD porky machine was in overdrive on this one. It was claiming CWS was only considered recently but was actually rejected in the 90s. I don't know why but that would be a good question if a fatal accident inquiry is held here. Looks like MoD is resisting.
Forgive me, but isn't the issue here that the RAF / MoD have been dishonest, rather than the suitability or otherwise of CWS?
Didn't the RAF/MoD at some point in the past state that, after previous BoI recommendations, CWS would be fitted (SDR 1998 according to DV); then quietly scrap it but not tell anybody? And they scrapped it for budgetary reasons rather than making a case that it wasn't suitable? And they scrapped it by simply not prioritising it 13 times in a row.
If CWS turned out not to be viable after further investigation, then they should have said so, but they never did.
In Hansard 3rd Dec 2013, Sec Def said:
Which seems to imply that it wasn't ever rejected; it's just taken 15 years to finish being considered.
In everybody except the MoD's head, delaying it for 13 years in a row, then suddenly deciding it's a priority after another fatal is scrapping it but not telling anybody.
And 13 years worth of Air Force Boards have some questions to answer, as do the Sec Defs.
Can we take their pensions away? Maybe give them to the widows?
Didn't the RAF/MoD at some point in the past state that, after previous BoI recommendations, CWS would be fitted (SDR 1998 according to DV); then quietly scrap it but not tell anybody? And they scrapped it for budgetary reasons rather than making a case that it wasn't suitable? And they scrapped it by simply not prioritising it 13 times in a row.
If CWS turned out not to be viable after further investigation, then they should have said so, but they never did.
In Hansard 3rd Dec 2013, Sec Def said:
A Tornado traffic collision avoidance system (TCAS) has been developed which is expected to achieve initial operating capability by the end of next year.
In everybody except the MoD's head, delaying it for 13 years in a row, then suddenly deciding it's a priority after another fatal is scrapping it but not telling anybody.
And 13 years worth of Air Force Boards have some questions to answer, as do the Sec Defs.
Can we take their pensions away? Maybe give them to the widows?
F3WMB, some of them deserve losing their liberty never mind their pensions, but the essential thing to take completely away from them is Regulatory Authority. That should reduce the number of future widows markedly.
That would mean that the Regulatory Authority, ie the MAA, and the Accident Investigator, ie the MAAIB, should both be made independent of the MOD and of each other, and both should be headed up by civilian DG's.
...or leave the same old incestuous arrangements in place whereby Investigator is controlled by Regulator is controlled by MOD and up the widows' pensions as you suggest...
Self Regulation Doesn't Work and in Aviation It Kills!
That would mean that the Regulatory Authority, ie the MAA, and the Accident Investigator, ie the MAAIB, should both be made independent of the MOD and of each other, and both should be headed up by civilian DG's.
...or leave the same old incestuous arrangements in place whereby Investigator is controlled by Regulator is controlled by MOD and up the widows' pensions as you suggest...
Self Regulation Doesn't Work and in Aviation It Kills!
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The BBC report states that the Typhoon has no CWS, surely the MOD isn't going to fund a CWS for a fleet shortly going out of service while not fitting one to Typhoon.
Anybody know if Typhoon is also getting equipped with a CWS?
Anybody know if Typhoon is also getting equipped with a CWS?
A three phase Technical Demonstration Programme (TDP) for a discrete Fast Jet CWS was completed in 1996 (the civilian TCAS concept was considered unsuitable for FJs). The trials were consider to be so succesful that in 1997/98 DOR(Air) recommended the trials equipment should proceed "straight into prototype/C model production". The ISD for Tornado was set for 2004, with the equipment being fitted during an already planned SIFF installation programme. This was a piece of kit for all FJs.
An earlier paper, dated Oct 1994, which was procuded at the end of Phase 2 of the TDP, made it clear that no aspect of the TD design or implemention should preclude eventual fit on Tornado, Jaguar, Harrier, Hawk and EF2000 (Typhoon).
We now know that this Fast Jet CWS was never developed, but the Moray Firth accident has forced MoD to do something for Tornado; namely fitting a piece of Off-The-Shelf equipment TCAS. It is unlikely that they will purchase the same kit for Typhoon, because they know that it is not ideal for FJs, having rejected it back in 1991.
Over to you MoD.
DV.
Last edited by Distant Voice; 30th Jun 2014 at 09:42. Reason: Corrections
So, un-surprisingly, there were multiple contributory factors to this incident.
Instead of stating the blindingly obvious what about some constructive or knowledgeable comment?
I read the recommendations and convening authority comments first. The former very disturbing because it is the same old failings yet again. The latter dreadful as it doesn't acknowledge the similarities between this and other accidents. Everything's ok, it'll never happen again now we have the MAA. How long can they sustain that line?
Distant Voice
A three phase Technical Demonstration Programme (TDP) for a discrete Fast Jet CWS was completed in 1996
BTW, well done persisting with this one.
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CWS in military aircraft goes back quite a bit further than 1996/8, as does the CVR discussion.
Having quickly scanned the report (bedtime reading tonight), hats off to the SAR chaps for making sense out of confusing information and, as ever, doing a stirling job that many of us would shy away from.
Having quickly scanned the report (bedtime reading tonight), hats off to the SAR chaps for making sense out of confusing information and, as ever, doing a stirling job that many of us would shy away from.
I'm sure those more closely involved with the Chinook/Nimrod campaigns will not be surprised by Para 1.4.7.84 :
Some might say 'how convenient'....unless I have misunderstood what the panel meant by this observation.
The review of the planning and programming situation that led to Tor CWS being deleted as directed by 2nd PUS could not be provided by MoD
OK, I've read it.
Big Pat-On-Back to the SI Panel, it's clear and doesn't pull any punches.
The crucial stuff on CWS seems to start around 1.4.6 (Other) (Continued), second part.
For a very abbreviated look, try the following paras:
1.4.6.442, 453, 471-497, including the timelines on p259
My $0.05 (Canada no longer has pennies!)
Intra-Squadron Range Booking procedures (if they were any good) could potentially have deconflicted the aircraft. Nevertheless, both a/c were outside booked slots. This kind of thing happens. I almost had a mid-air in 1987 near a SAP target.
A TCAS simulation seems to show that a Tornado CWS would have prevented the collision.
The BoI shows the big decision on Tornado CWS was in 2005 that delayed the program to 2010. It was then later continually delayed. The original report from Plans to the Defence Management Board (DMB) which led to the delay can, unsurprisingly, not be found. It would appear on first reading that the DMB were badly advised. DG Resources & Plans (who prepared the brief for them) has a lot to answer for. It would appear the RAF bods were quite clear about the importance of CWS, and RP rewrote their stuff in several ways without any reference to them (or reality). However, DMB also delayed it in 2002, 2003, 2004 and 2007 despite strong advice about not delaying it.
It was scrapped in 2011. After much aggro, CAS wrote to SoS and said 'on your head be it'. Liam Fox wrote back 6 days later and said it was unscrapped and accelerated.
At all stages and dates, the threat of punitive legal action was highlighted, including reminders that having a program didn't count as having the equipment.
The MoD are going to get their @sses sued for this one, and rightly so.
Big Pat-On-Back to the SI Panel, it's clear and doesn't pull any punches.
The crucial stuff on CWS seems to start around 1.4.6 (Other) (Continued), second part.
For a very abbreviated look, try the following paras:
1.4.6.442, 453, 471-497, including the timelines on p259
My $0.05 (Canada no longer has pennies!)
Intra-Squadron Range Booking procedures (if they were any good) could potentially have deconflicted the aircraft. Nevertheless, both a/c were outside booked slots. This kind of thing happens. I almost had a mid-air in 1987 near a SAP target.
A TCAS simulation seems to show that a Tornado CWS would have prevented the collision.
The BoI shows the big decision on Tornado CWS was in 2005 that delayed the program to 2010. It was then later continually delayed. The original report from Plans to the Defence Management Board (DMB) which led to the delay can, unsurprisingly, not be found. It would appear on first reading that the DMB were badly advised. DG Resources & Plans (who prepared the brief for them) has a lot to answer for. It would appear the RAF bods were quite clear about the importance of CWS, and RP rewrote their stuff in several ways without any reference to them (or reality). However, DMB also delayed it in 2002, 2003, 2004 and 2007 despite strong advice about not delaying it.
It was scrapped in 2011. After much aggro, CAS wrote to SoS and said 'on your head be it'. Liam Fox wrote back 6 days later and said it was unscrapped and accelerated.
At all stages and dates, the threat of punitive legal action was highlighted, including reminders that having a program didn't count as having the equipment.
The MoD are going to get their @sses sued for this one, and rightly so.
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If a 3 phase TDP was completed in 1996, why does the convening authority say the CWS issue only began in 1998? Am I correct in saying this is exactly what Hadden-Cave did, saying nothing was wrong before 1998 despite evidence to the contrary?
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I'm not quite sure I fully understand the situation with the WSO.
I haven't read the report but the BBC seem to suggest that the aircraft was crewed by someone who had a phobia about flying at medium level.
I presume this is some sort of exaggeration?
I haven't read the report but the BBC seem to suggest that the aircraft was crewed by someone who had a phobia about flying at medium level.
I presume this is some sort of exaggeration?
Genuine question and not suggesting the current way of doing things is wrong.
Why are board members names redacted as well as the names of those who are nominated advisors or 'in attendance'?
Would accident investigator names in a civilian incident/accident also be hidden?
Why are board members names redacted as well as the names of those who are nominated advisors or 'in attendance'?
Would accident investigator names in a civilian incident/accident also be hidden?
Given the crap (in the press and elsewhere) that was recently foisted onto a friend of mine who headed up a Court Martial, and when all was said and done in a follow up civilian court case he was seen to be dead right on all counts, I can see why names are redacted. I am not aware that the civvies release Investigators names on specific accidents either.
Personally I think the Panel members did a very thorough job; hats off to them.
Strake: - anxiety, it happens, and in many forms - flying FJ tests limits and human mental issues most people are unaware of. He was under treatment, all supervisors were well aware, and he was cleared to fly. With the withdrawal of specialist RAF mental health services, the Panel criticised the lack of an organised system to return him to full operations, which seems perfectly valid.
One of the points of having a Duty Auth before each flight is to assess fitness to fly.
Personally I think the Panel members did a very thorough job; hats off to them.
Strake: - anxiety, it happens, and in many forms - flying FJ tests limits and human mental issues most people are unaware of. He was under treatment, all supervisors were well aware, and he was cleared to fly. With the withdrawal of specialist RAF mental health services, the Panel criticised the lack of an organised system to return him to full operations, which seems perfectly valid.
One of the points of having a Duty Auth before each flight is to assess fitness to fly.