BOI into the 2012 Tornado Collision over the Moray Firth
Section 1.3.55 says the CSW contains a fastfind beacon, Is this not 406Mhz?
Not wanting to throw the conversation off topic, however, it did strike me that the SAR crews did a brilliant job under difficult circumstances. Just seems a shame they may well end up being contracted out!
Not wanting to throw the conversation off topic, however, it did strike me that the SAR crews did a brilliant job under difficult circumstances. Just seems a shame they may well end up being contracted out!
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The 406 beacon would not have been automatically initiated in the same way that 121.5 and 243.0 are.
Contractorised SAR crews will still have the ability to recover downed aircrew. However, training for such an occurrence may not be as high on the priority list as it is for RAF SAR crews for whom recovery of ejectees would be considered their primary task.
Contractorised SAR crews will still have the ability to recover downed aircrew. However, training for such an occurrence may not be as high on the priority list as it is for RAF SAR crews for whom recovery of ejectees would be considered their primary task.
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Vin rouge that exactly illustrates the problem. Yes an auto mode would be great. But someone has to design build and test one. Then somebody wants it EMP resistant. Or bulletproof. So we get it years and £millions later.
Or more likely, never!
Or more likely, never!
EulOgy
It is at the moment over the UK. The weekend flyers usually get quick a response from the fine folks in Distress and Diversion (D&D) to their practise "Pan"/real "Pan" calls on 121.5, and commercial traffic with the luxury of multiple radios will have usually have one set up on 121.5 (as mentioned in report).....oh, and various USAF european bases still insist on running a "dawn chorus" check on the frequency.
However whether the equipment used is still fit for military purpose in the 21st century is one for the experts.
I thought 121.5 was still monitored
However whether the equipment used is still fit for military purpose in the 21st century is one for the experts.
Last edited by wiggy; 2nd Jul 2014 at 14:48. Reason: Spolling
A bit like mode S - 4 years warning for that one I think, and still not all aircraft have it.
And 8.33 radios ...
And ....
A bit like mode S - 4 years warning for that one I think, and still not all aircraft have it.
And 8.33 radios ...
And 8.33 radios ...
Mode S Elementary Surveillance implementation was 31st March 2008, although this might have slipped I don't know. This was known to MoD in the late 90s, maybe 1998. I only did one tour in Shabbeywood and it was at this time and was sent to a briefing.
8.33 has been known about for over 20 years. Surely its in service?
That is one looooong document!
So, I've finally finished reading the report and I have two observations to add.
Firstly (we don't tend to give credit where it's due often enough frankly) but I think the ATC Supervisor did a great job in getting SAR airborne when she did and for calmly confirming the facts. Good to see some balls (you know what I mean) when they were needed.
Secondly, I will need some convincing that politicians and MOD are acting in anyone's best interests. How can a project be repeatedly delayed to the point that it actually takes an accident to galvanise the system into action?
I know how it happens (cost benefit analysis is the key term here) but it still makes me sick. With their figures and probabilities there is unlikely to be another Tornado mid air before the platform OSD so some could argue that spending the money on a CWS is just a waste of money now.
The whole process reeks.
BV
Firstly (we don't tend to give credit where it's due often enough frankly) but I think the ATC Supervisor did a great job in getting SAR airborne when she did and for calmly confirming the facts. Good to see some balls (you know what I mean) when they were needed.
Secondly, I will need some convincing that politicians and MOD are acting in anyone's best interests. How can a project be repeatedly delayed to the point that it actually takes an accident to galvanise the system into action?
I know how it happens (cost benefit analysis is the key term here) but it still makes me sick. With their figures and probabilities there is unlikely to be another Tornado mid air before the platform OSD so some could argue that spending the money on a CWS is just a waste of money now.
The whole process reeks.
BV
Last edited by Bob Viking; 2nd Jul 2014 at 19:14.
there is unlikely to be another Tornado mid air before the platform OSD so some could argue that spending the money on a CWS is just a waste of money now.
Now we are probably in the worst possible situation; where it now won't prevent another accident, but we've lost 3 guys and 1 VSI, 2 jets, the MoD will get its ass sued off, AND the SoS will insist on buying CWS to make it look like he's done something.
The process as BV says is the problem.
Chances of the entire MoD/DE&S getting sacked and starting again? Sadly zero, but it is probably the only answer.
I think the evidence shows it is the process, but all they ever change is the implementation.
It's too slow,
there are too many layers,
the aims and objectives of the individual layers are too different in practice
there is zero transparency until accident inquiries (and not much then)
It's too slow,
there are too many layers,
the aims and objectives of the individual layers are too different in practice
there is zero transparency until accident inquiries (and not much then)
It's too slow,
there are too many layers,
the aims and objectives of the individual layers are too different in practice
there are too many layers,
the aims and objectives of the individual layers are too different in practice
I was thinking of CWS. I've seen similar omissions solved, but don't ask me how. I mean when there is an obvious requirement and OR have given their endorsement but some VSO has stopped it, which is what seems to have happened here. Another part of an established process has kicked in and the kit has been procured. I'm not talking about UORs. I'm trying to say that, if this can be achieved, then there must be a process that works, if followed. A procurer will explain it better.
I read the report as the Defence Management Board who stopped CWS, and it is largely civilian.
The objectives are the problem. In WW2 we had relatively efficient systems, largely I feel because if the committees didn't do their job promptly and properly, everybody got bombed.
The objectives of senior politicians, senior civil servants and VSOs are far too different. In terms of careers, the defence procurement chief isn't affected at all if two tornados collide off Tain, but he is if he doesn't deliver the savings the SoS (or more likely the Chancellor of the Exchequer) demands.
The objectives are the problem. In WW2 we had relatively efficient systems, largely I feel because if the committees didn't do their job promptly and properly, everybody got bombed.
The objectives of senior politicians, senior civil servants and VSOs are far too different. In terms of careers, the defence procurement chief isn't affected at all if two tornados collide off Tain, but he is if he doesn't deliver the savings the SoS (or more likely the Chancellor of the Exchequer) demands.
Fox3 & Dervish
You’re both right.
Lack of CWS will have been recorded by OR as an Operational Constraint in the aircraft Constraints Document – a process that OR manages. Only an idiot would categorise it as anything other than “Critical” and “Safety” related. Even without the latter, OR would be duty bound to run an Alternative Assumption to fund the programme. In this case it is clear they did, because by 1996 the CWS programme had matured to such a degree that, on MoD’s own admission, much of what used to be called Development was no longer required. That is, the technology had matured.
Then, we have a 1998 Board Submission to OR(RAF) himself seeking approval to proceed. (Again, withheld from SI). Depending on cost, OR (a 1 Star) may have had to escalate this - around this time all our financial delegations had been slashed and his probably had too. This cutting of delegated powers is what causes many of the delays Fox3 mentioned. It is a stealth savings measure (at the expense of safety). Note: I’m simplifying it a bit as the RAF’s Resources and Programmes beancounters would be involved. All R&P branches saw it as their job to waive the red card, and withdraw only if OR had someone good enough to argue the case and the balls to stick their neck out. This is THE major flaw in the process; made worse because it relies on civilian staffs that no longer exist. Your own people should be there to help, not hinder and cost lives.
The gap between 1996 and 1998 is as yet unexplained but I’ve seen worse, due to OR usually being pretty busy (and seldom trained for the job!). Also, in the late 90s, it had been 10 years since the process Dervish talks of had been widely implemented, which is 4 or 5 generations in terms of tour lengths, training and experience. What you saw in the late 90s was probably someone who knew the proper process and was still around. I can guess the job you’re thinking of.
Another factor is the implementation of this process (i.e. to clear Constraints, if possible, even if higher level committees haven’t approved them) was a function of civilian “Requirements Managers” when these posts were in HQs, not DPA/DE&S. The posts were progressively militarised from 1988, and then disappeared as a savings in about 1991; so, again, you rely on the odd civilian who used to do these jobs. The last one retired a few years ago. The “Requirements Managers” you see nowadays do about 10% of the original job, and aren’t taught the other 90% so don’t know it isn’t being done.
What you experienced in the late 90s (Dervish) would be a rare event by then. But it is easy enough to do; a major problem in today’s DE&S would be finding someone junior enough with the right experience. In the 80s it was a routine competence before you were senior enough to get a junior job in MoD(PE). At the beginning of every reporting year you’d be given a list of “Special Tasks” in addition to your normal TORs, which would mainly consist of uncleared Constraints. Someone mentioned £50M. I don’t know if that is what CWS would have cost in Tornado, but that kind of figure would be routine to (what is now called) a civilian Grade D. Today, that concept would frighten almost every member of DE&S, up to and including Bernard Gray. This was all the subject of a submission to DPA Deputy Chief Executive (a 3 Star, David Gould) in January 2000. He didn’t reply. It came about as a result of the Public Accounts Committee criticising DPA, and our senior staffs (3 and 4 Stars) not understanding their own processes sufficiently well to know what their answer should be.
Clearly, all this has been withheld from the SI because they, and of course the MAA (who would be party to the withholding), get these dates and history completely and utterly wrong. This gives you a major clue. Someone is being protected. The key is that the SI, as usual, isn’t allowed to dig deeper, and the MAA is there to make sure they don’t get very far if they do. As a result, there are major holes in the report; which looks good but has little substance. There are many recommendations, but no understanding of why they became necessary. Again, this is a recurring theme. Rafts of recommendations that can be summarised as “implement mandated policy”. In other words, the perpetrators are free to carry on and do it again.
And we haven’t even discussed the fact that all this should be in the Risk Register and Safety Case, and reflected in a very restrictive Release to Service. Funny how the MAA don’t mention this.
As ever, the above comes with a health warning. MoD has dumbed down so much you’ll be hard pressed to find anyone left who understands it.
Hope this helps!
You’re both right.
Lack of CWS will have been recorded by OR as an Operational Constraint in the aircraft Constraints Document – a process that OR manages. Only an idiot would categorise it as anything other than “Critical” and “Safety” related. Even without the latter, OR would be duty bound to run an Alternative Assumption to fund the programme. In this case it is clear they did, because by 1996 the CWS programme had matured to such a degree that, on MoD’s own admission, much of what used to be called Development was no longer required. That is, the technology had matured.
Then, we have a 1998 Board Submission to OR(RAF) himself seeking approval to proceed. (Again, withheld from SI). Depending on cost, OR (a 1 Star) may have had to escalate this - around this time all our financial delegations had been slashed and his probably had too. This cutting of delegated powers is what causes many of the delays Fox3 mentioned. It is a stealth savings measure (at the expense of safety). Note: I’m simplifying it a bit as the RAF’s Resources and Programmes beancounters would be involved. All R&P branches saw it as their job to waive the red card, and withdraw only if OR had someone good enough to argue the case and the balls to stick their neck out. This is THE major flaw in the process; made worse because it relies on civilian staffs that no longer exist. Your own people should be there to help, not hinder and cost lives.
The gap between 1996 and 1998 is as yet unexplained but I’ve seen worse, due to OR usually being pretty busy (and seldom trained for the job!). Also, in the late 90s, it had been 10 years since the process Dervish talks of had been widely implemented, which is 4 or 5 generations in terms of tour lengths, training and experience. What you saw in the late 90s was probably someone who knew the proper process and was still around. I can guess the job you’re thinking of.
Another factor is the implementation of this process (i.e. to clear Constraints, if possible, even if higher level committees haven’t approved them) was a function of civilian “Requirements Managers” when these posts were in HQs, not DPA/DE&S. The posts were progressively militarised from 1988, and then disappeared as a savings in about 1991; so, again, you rely on the odd civilian who used to do these jobs. The last one retired a few years ago. The “Requirements Managers” you see nowadays do about 10% of the original job, and aren’t taught the other 90% so don’t know it isn’t being done.
What you experienced in the late 90s (Dervish) would be a rare event by then. But it is easy enough to do; a major problem in today’s DE&S would be finding someone junior enough with the right experience. In the 80s it was a routine competence before you were senior enough to get a junior job in MoD(PE). At the beginning of every reporting year you’d be given a list of “Special Tasks” in addition to your normal TORs, which would mainly consist of uncleared Constraints. Someone mentioned £50M. I don’t know if that is what CWS would have cost in Tornado, but that kind of figure would be routine to (what is now called) a civilian Grade D. Today, that concept would frighten almost every member of DE&S, up to and including Bernard Gray. This was all the subject of a submission to DPA Deputy Chief Executive (a 3 Star, David Gould) in January 2000. He didn’t reply. It came about as a result of the Public Accounts Committee criticising DPA, and our senior staffs (3 and 4 Stars) not understanding their own processes sufficiently well to know what their answer should be.
Clearly, all this has been withheld from the SI because they, and of course the MAA (who would be party to the withholding), get these dates and history completely and utterly wrong. This gives you a major clue. Someone is being protected. The key is that the SI, as usual, isn’t allowed to dig deeper, and the MAA is there to make sure they don’t get very far if they do. As a result, there are major holes in the report; which looks good but has little substance. There are many recommendations, but no understanding of why they became necessary. Again, this is a recurring theme. Rafts of recommendations that can be summarised as “implement mandated policy”. In other words, the perpetrators are free to carry on and do it again.
And we haven’t even discussed the fact that all this should be in the Risk Register and Safety Case, and reflected in a very restrictive Release to Service. Funny how the MAA don’t mention this.
As ever, the above comes with a health warning. MoD has dumbed down so much you’ll be hard pressed to find anyone left who understands it.
Hope this helps!
Indeed tuc, your usual dose of reality that checkmates the complacent "excellent SI, well done!" postings of others. This SI, in concert with most of the others, has been nobbled. Why? Simply because it could be. The only investigation that it can do is what it is allowed to do, in the same way that the only Regulation that the MAA can do is what it is allowed to do.
We desperately need an Investigator that is able to investigate everything and everybody, including the Military Regulator.
We desperately need a Military Regulator that has the Authority to ensure that UK Military Aircraft are Airworthy and Fit for Purpose.
If the MAAIB and MAA fitted the above descriptions then these two aircraft would almost certainly not have collided, as they would have been fitted with CWS and have been aware of each others close proximity.
If the MAAIB and MAA fitted the above descriptions many other avoidable accidents and needless loss of life would not have occurred, both in the Tornado fleet and others.
If the MAAIB and MAA fitted these descriptions we would have saved money and operational capability rather than wasted them.
Time to free both from the dead hands of the MOD and VSOs.
Self Regulation Doesn't Work and...well, you know the rest!
We desperately need an Investigator that is able to investigate everything and everybody, including the Military Regulator.
We desperately need a Military Regulator that has the Authority to ensure that UK Military Aircraft are Airworthy and Fit for Purpose.
If the MAAIB and MAA fitted the above descriptions then these two aircraft would almost certainly not have collided, as they would have been fitted with CWS and have been aware of each others close proximity.
If the MAAIB and MAA fitted the above descriptions many other avoidable accidents and needless loss of life would not have occurred, both in the Tornado fleet and others.
If the MAAIB and MAA fitted these descriptions we would have saved money and operational capability rather than wasted them.
Time to free both from the dead hands of the MOD and VSOs.
Self Regulation Doesn't Work and...well, you know the rest!
Thank you, Tuc. An education, as ever. Would a FAI have the authority to get down to the depths/time periods you describe?
Chugalug. Excellent Effort by the Panel and Excellent SI are not synonymous. If the Panel have info deliberately concealed from them, it explains the difference.
Chugalug. Excellent Effort by the Panel and Excellent SI are not synonymous. If the Panel have info deliberately concealed from them, it explains the difference.