OK, I've read it.
Big Pat-On-Back to the SI Panel, it's clear and doesn't pull any punches.
The crucial stuff on CWS seems to start around 1.4.6 (Other) (Continued), second part.
For a very abbreviated look, try the following paras:
1.4.6.442, 453, 471-497, including the timelines on p259
My $0.05 (Canada no longer has pennies!)
Intra-Squadron Range Booking procedures (if they were any good) could potentially have deconflicted the aircraft. Nevertheless, both a/c were outside booked slots. This kind of thing happens. I almost had a mid-air in 1987 near a SAP target.
A TCAS simulation seems to show that a Tornado CWS would have prevented the collision.
The BoI shows the big decision on Tornado CWS was in 2005 that delayed the program to 2010. It was then later continually delayed. The original report from Plans to the Defence Management Board (DMB) which led to the delay can, unsurprisingly, not be found. It would appear on first reading that the DMB were badly advised. DG Resources & Plans (who prepared the brief for them) has a lot to answer for. It would appear the RAF bods were quite clear about the importance of CWS, and RP rewrote their stuff in several ways without any reference to them (or reality). However, DMB also delayed it in 2002, 2003, 2004 and 2007 despite strong advice about not delaying it.
It was scrapped in 2011. After much aggro, CAS wrote to SoS and said 'on your head be it'. Liam Fox wrote back 6 days later and said it was unscrapped and accelerated.
At all stages and dates, the threat of punitive legal action was highlighted, including reminders that having a program didn't count as having the equipment.
The MoD are going to get their @sses sued for this one, and rightly so.