Remember Pearl Harbor

[Andu]

The Malayan campaign had an interesting result in that the commander of the Australian 8th Division escaped from Singapore after the surrender in rather questionable circumstances while leaving his troops to be captured.

His career suffered as a consequence - he was given a backwater command in Perth and never commanded fighting troops again. Australian overall commander Thomas Blamey, (possibly because Bennett's escape from Singapore resembled a little too much for comfort Blamey's own escape from Greece a year earlier, where Blamey controversially included his son among the very small party (of 8?) that departed with him on a Sunderland flying boat), really had it in for Bennett after Bennett's return to Australia.

However, Bennett provided what proved to be invaluable intelligence to both Australian and American commanders who were soon to face the (at that stage of the war, seemingly indefeatable) Japanese. He wrote a handbook that was widely distributed among Australian and American forces in the Pacific (and among the British forces in Burma too, I understand), where he came up with what then, was an enormously novel idea - the 'harbour', or all-round defence.

In Malaya, (as elsewhere), the Japanese specialised in sending small parties, sometimes of not more then ten men, with a machine gun behind the British front line, where they would set up on the British lines of communication and kill rear echelon troops supplying the front line. Invariably, in Malaya, this would cause the British leadership, schooled in the fixed line trench warfare of WW1 France, to call a retreat - (or for neighbouring units to do so, leaving the flanks exposed of units in contact with the Japanese who sometimes had successfully beaten off the Japanese).

A succession of such small unit penetration actions by the Japanese was the main reason for the succession of increasingly rapid retreats of the British towards Singapore in December/January 1941.

Bennett's handbook counselled not retreating, but 'harbouring', i.e., adopting all-round defence, if a unit found its lines of communication broken, then sending out strong patrols to deal with the Japanese penetrating parties. I've read of the Americans at Guadalcanal acknowledging the value of Bennett's booklet in teaching them tactics that would defeat the Japanese. It sounds utterly logical to someone today, but in 1942, it was a whole new concept, at least for the British army.

[500N]

Andu

Very interesting, especially the booklet part.

"i.e., adopting all-round defence, if a unit found its lines of communication broken, then sending out strong patrols to deal with the Japanese penetrating parties."

I wonder if this was the start of Australian's becoming very well known for strong, aggressive patrols, culminating in their success of Vietnam against the VC by patrolling hard and denying the enemy the ground, resulting in the captured signals saying to the effect of move on because they are good - and of course the term "Phantoms of the Jungle".
.

[Fubaar]

Gordon Bennett wasn't without his failings in Malaya. He refused to demolish the towers in Johore overlooking the Singapore straits (which proved to be invaluable to the Japanese) because they belonged to his good mate, the Sultan of Johore. The British were party to a similar imbecility in refusing to destroy a large number of motor launches at Penang and other ports in northern Malaya 'because they were private property'.

The Japanese used these launches to great effect in putting the 'penetration parties' referred to in Andu's post behind the British front lines and accelerating their advance south.

It was another time... and I can just picture some long term colonial tea planter or official spluttering in indignation at the very thought of some junior military type suggesting that they destroy his floating gin palace.

Some indication of out of touch with relity they were might be gained by the fact that they held a bloody ball at Raffles the night before the surrender!

[Mike7777777]

In 1941, I doubt if the Allies recognised the capability and potential of the Japanese armed forces, particularly with regards to fighting in the jungle.

In 1945, the Japanese were in no doubt as to the capability and potential of the Allied armed forces, particularly with regards to fighting in the jungle.

With hindsight, victory over Japan could have been achieved earlier with a submarine blockade, island hopping kept to a minimum.

[pasir]

Regarding any suggested submarine blockade of Japan - by 1944 the Allied command of the Pacific was dominated by the US Navy who by then had so decimated Japanese shipping that even lowly rice carrying barges
were considered a worthy target. RN offers to assist the USN were
bluntly ignored or turned down by the US CinC of the Pacific Theatre of War (beleived Admiral King who was extremely anti-British) In addition
the Allies were faced with realising that the Japanese code of honour
meant they could be counted on to fight to the death - together with Kami Kaze attacks resulting in huge US casualties.

A tragic result of the American success in destroying and sinking vast numbers of Japanese shipping being that often their darkened holds contained hundreds of half starved skeletal Allied POWs on their way to work as slaves in Japanese coal mines or factories etc who would suffer
death blown to pieces or would drown in their battened down prison holds.

...

[glojo]

Wittering again

Originally Posted by SASLess

Not that it would matter....news did not travel that fast anyway!

I think it fair to say that 'news' travelled fast enough but when this news arrived then with 20/20 hindsight, was it either ignored, not understood or appreciated and finally and I guess most importantly not given to those that most needed it?

I doubt very much that the timing of attacks in the Far East were 'early' or ahead of schedule, but some interesting explanations have been put forward.

Has anything been learnt regarding the dissemination of intelligence?

Do we still gather too much tittle tattle and then not have the means to sort the wheat from the chaff?

Did we all know about an attack on Pearl Harbour and was it in everyone's interest to get the USA to take a more active role in this World War??

Were the Japanese wrong to not go after the US carriers or return back to Pearl Harbour and finish the job off completely? Should they not have carried out surprise attacks on the carriers whilst they were at sea and sunk them?

The Japanese showed the World how to wage war using aircraft carriers, yet they opted to hit battleships, ships of a previous age, ships that played a secondary role to the new 'Head of the Family'. Japan was surely a nation that was fully aware of the need to have carriers, they were really the only means of waging this type of long distance war.

Should the US carriers have been hit by submarines at the same time as the attacks on Pearl and should those attacks on Pearl have been far more aggressive? I guess it was lucky they did not do that although I still believe the end result would have been no different.

How many British and American very senior generals abandoned their soldiers for the so called greater good? An admiral has no choice, he fights the good fight and to the victor goes the spoils, the looser is definitely on a very sticky wicket with no 1st class ticket out of Dodge!

The war in the Far East was perhaps fought in a manner which was alien to all our generals and as I said earlier, they fought the same way as they fought previous wars and flatly refused to accept an enemy would not do likewise!!

A final thought... By declaring war on the USA did Japan seriously think they could travel all the way across the Pacific and conquer such a vast country, or did they expect its citizens to just forgive and forget? Yes there was an embargo on oil, but declaring war on such a huge nation was possibly a major, major cluster cluck.

[His dudeness]

A final thought... By declaring war on the USA did Japan seriously think they could travel all the way across the Pacific and conquer such a vast country, or did they expect its citizens to just forgive and forget? Yes there was an embargo on oil, but declaring war on such a huge nation was possibly a major, major cluster cluck.

I doubt that there was a 'way back' from what both, Japan and German had done and set in motion by that time. Certainly the German economy would have stalled within probably a year because of the astronomic debts Hitler had amassed. I guess it was basically the same for Japan and their expansion/aggression into China etc. They had to do it, otherwise the loss of face would have been devastating. And i think the Japanese never thought they could win against the US, but dictate a peace agreement which would have given them the opportunity to have their Empire in the Pacific.

Hitler OTOH couldn`t possibly have explained to the Germans why the 'Herrenrasse' fails economically. (In 1940 or 41)

[TorqueOfTheDevil]

I doubt that there was a 'way back' from what both, Japan and German had done and set in motion by that time

True, but it still seems daft for Hitler to initiate war against the USA when he was already fighting the USSR, not to mention us!

The Japanese showed the World how to wage war using aircraft carriers, yet they opted to hit battleships

Surely this was because the carriers weren't in harbour to be hit? They didn't set out to launch an attack on battleships, but in the absence of the carriers, they hit the biggest ships they could find.

[His dudeness]

True, but it still seems daft for Hitler to initiate war against the USA when he was already fighting the USSR, not to mention us!

Technically he just declared war after the Pearl Harbour attack. Practically the US were in the war already (lend and lease, 30W anti submarine etcetc)

At that point it didnīt make a difference anyhow, the USSR was WAY more any German leader would have been able to swallow. The 2 front war was a trauma Hitler always told his Generals he would avoid at any price. His word on this proofed to be as trustworthy as usual...and the Russian 'Untermenschen' gave our troops quite some fights. (an uncle of mine was on one of the last Ju52s out of Stalingrad...he still shook 40 years after this experience when talking about the experience)

Now for the UK, I wouldnīt mind being the Gauleiter for, say, Wales, but then in Autumn 1940 it was absolutely clear 'we' could not win over the RAF. Without the air supremacy in invasion would simply not been possible. The plan to rely on the subs was doomed, since we simply didnīt have enough at the time. Would there have been 500-600 of em in 1940, then... maybe...

[con-pilot]

Surely this was because the carriers weren't in harbour to be hit? They didn't set out to launch an attack on battleships, but in the absence of the carriers, they hit the biggest ships they could find.

The most current intelligence report the attacking Japanese force had, showed that the carriers were in the harbor. So when the first reports came back from the attack that the carries were not there, they had no idea where the US carriers had gone. Because of that, the striking force withdrew and no second attack was launched.

From some of the research I have done it, was obvious that the Japanese were expecting much greater losses than that they actually received, but aircraft losses were acceptable and expected, the lost of any of their carriers was not acceptable, thus the early withdrawal when it was discovered the US carriers were not in Pearl Harbour.

[glojo]

From some of the research I have done it, was obvious that the Japanese were expecting much greater losses than that they actually received, but aircraft losses were acceptable and expected, the lost of any of their carriers was not acceptable, thus the early withdrawal when it was discovered the US carriers were not in Pearl Harbour. 15th Dec 2011 15:40

The Japanese had a number of intelligence agents working in Hawaii\Pearl harbour, they knew exactly what ships were in port, there locations etc. Hence the instant internment of those Japanese that were resident on the islands.

We have to remember that America and Great Britain still believed the battleship was king. The battleship until that attack was still considered the capital ship of any major Navy. We all now know with hind sight that the real clout was and I guess still is the aircraft carrier.

Originally Posted by His dudey ness

i think the Japanese never thought they could win against the US, but dictate a peace agreement which would have given them the opportunity to have their Empire in the Pacific.

I understand what you are saying and agree with you, but their logic was in my eyes 'illogical! What leader would broker a peace treaty with a nation that in cold blood launches an unprovoked attack on its sovereign soil, sinks a number of capital ships from its prestigious Pacific fleet and also kills thousands of US citizens. Did Japan seriously think that the USA would say, 'We forgive you!'

This is a historical event and we do have to be careful what we are talking about but suffice it to say that the way the Japanese fought and treated their prisoners of war made a brokered deal impossible for any leader to accept.

My thoughts are that America tried desperately to keep Great Britain on the peripherals because they felt so aggrieved?? (One of my uncles was in the Chindits but just like my father he would never talk about this period of his life and sadly I will now never know the exact details of what he did)

[500N]

"What leader would broker a peace treaty with a nation that in cold blood launches an unprovoked attack on its sovereign soil, sinks a number of capital ships from its prestigious Pacific fleet and also kills thousands of US citizens. Did Japan seriously think that the USA would say, 'We forgive you!'"

Along similar lines, Bush / the UN did with Iraq after GW1.



glojo

What do you mean by this ?


"My thoughts are that America tried desperately to keep Great Britain on the peripherals because they felt so aggrieved?? "

"on the peripherals" of what ?

The Pacific War ?

[Mike7777777]

Regarding any suggested submarine blockade of Japan

No suggestion about it, US boats were very effective at blockading Japan. RN boats were not suitable for the Pacific, with the possible exception of the "T" class; range and air conditioning being primary requisites.

The plan to rely on the subs was doomed, since we simply didnīt have enough at the time. Would there have been 500-600 of em in 1940,

There was no plan to rely on subs, the Wehrmacht reached the Channel Coast and then what? Doenitz aspired to 100 boats on patrol, 100 in transit and 100 in port, he had about 60 in total at the start of WW2. Perversely, 60 Type XX1 in 1943 could have defeated the UK (snorkel, hydraulic reload, ability to catch a convoy whilst submerged, ability to run under a convoy whilst submerged, ability to flee Fido whilst submerged, ability to flee most escorts whilst submerged). Several other factors to throw in eg cut the Enigma chatter, use FW200 purely for reconnaissance, JU88s to intercept Coastal Command over the Bay of Biscay. But the end result is the same: Soviet tanks roll into Berlin.

For Pearl Harbour, if the USN carriers were sunk it makes no difference to the end game: American industrial power destroys Japan. The concept of the Americans negotiating a compromise after PH is a nonsense.

[Biggus]

Don't forget that the Japanese had planned to inform the US that peace negotiations were over prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor, it was just that they got their timing wrong - therefore they probably saw a negotiated peace later on as possible when they were initially planning their strategy.....

[con-pilot]

The Japanese had a number of intelligence agents working in Hawaii\Pearl harbour, they knew exactly what ships were in port, there locations etc. Hence the instant internment of those Japanese that were resident on the islands.

Very correct, but it was too late by the time that information reached the attack force. Personally I don't think it would have made any difference, the attack would have proceeded as planned, but with no thought of a second attack.

[glojo]

Hi 500N,
In answer to your question then apologies for any confusion and I guess my brain told me Pacific war but my hands may not have made that clear.

We have to be careful what we say as I do not want to get involved in a 'My country did this.... blah de blah de blah.'

I will tactfully suggest that the American Commander in Chief was not happy with the suggested role of the Royal Navy, there were heated discussions during which I believe the President of the US over-ruled the Admiral (but when the boss is away, the boys play to there own rules!!)

This situation was handled as best it could and the Royal Navy made the best of the situation... I could ramble on and on about RAS issues but I will shut up now

[500N]

glojo
Thanks. Don't worry, I am from the UK anyway.

I had a read up on that US Admiral who was very anti British, it said he was but no real reasons. Must have been from his time serving with / on British ships.


And re the "I do not want to get involved in a 'My country did this.... blah de blah de blah.'" I only challenge those who state facts that are wrong or totally out of whack, neither of which applies to you

.

[glojo]

Thanks 500N
I must confess to enjoying my time on this forum and apologies if 'mouth overtakes brain' and that then leads to going off topic. I get so engrossed and feel I have to get folks to contribute more to these excellent debates. You guys are great company and thank you one and all for putting up with my ramblings\witterings.

[500N]

I have enjoyed this thread as well. Forums / threads always deviate, sometimes for the better.

Check out the Big Blu thread in 4 - 6 hours or so, you might get a laugh.

[Gnadenburg]

I had a read up on that US Admiral who was very anti British, it said he was but no real reasons. Must have been from his time serving with / on British ships.

Actually, from books I've read, the Americans were more anti-colonial British and had different ambitions for the Far East post WW2. I suppose the Empire was dead.

For example, British policy on Hong Kong probably interfered with the greater US ambitions for China. This US-British tension preceded Pearl Harbour!

On the troop ships, Lisbon Maru was a British tragedy. Those who do the HKG-PVG run ( 29 57 00 / 122 56 00 ) is her resting place. 2000 British POW's were aboard. The tragedy was the torpedoing by a US submarine. What happened afterwards was murder by the Japanese. The locking down of the ship as it sunk, machine gunning those on deck, rescuing those in the water and then murdering them. Another disgraceful act by the Japanese - and I have to say they got off lightly in war crimes trials!