Remember Pearl Harbor
In Malaya, (as elsewhere), the Japanese specialised in sending small parties, sometimes of not more then ten men, with a machine gun behind the British front line, where they would set up on the British lines of communication and kill rear echelon troops supplying the front line. Invariably, in Malaya, this would cause the British leadership, schooled in the fixed line trench warfare of WW1 France, to call a retreat - (or for neighbouring units to do so, leaving the flanks exposed of units in contact with the Japanese who sometimes had successfully beaten off the Japanese).
Incidentally, there was sporadic guerrilla warfare waged against the Japanese in Malaya preying on their long supply lines. Such techniques were proposed prior to the commencement of hostilities, but pretty much dismissed by the establishment.
One Brit carved up the Japs for days with tommy guns and grenades. I just read his book but I can't recall the title.
As a rule he said, the Japs were afraid of the jungle!
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Could it have been "The Jungle is Neutral" by (Lt Col, DSO and Bar) F Spencer Chapman (published 1948)? His main effort was operating behing enemy lines in Malaya coducting multi-ethnic guerrilla operations (for just about the duration), with some training of Aus/NZ special ops forces in those tactics.
Mister B
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Freddie Spencer-Chapman was indeed a one-man army who initiated and operated the 'Stay behind' plan (Force 101) shortly before the fall of Malaya and Singapore - with the constant threat of being betrayed to
the enemy by some Malayans - Leading a lonely spartan semi starved life of sabotage against the Japanese for almost 4 years in the Malayan Jungle with the occassional assistance of small parties of Chinese Communists - who after the war the British knew would also become our enemy. (My self with many thousands of N/S and regular troops would later be involved against them in the the late 40s and 50s)
Freddie was a forgotten hero and after the war went back to teaching.
For reasons never explained sometime in the 60s he drove into the Surrey
countryside and shot himself dead.
...
the enemy by some Malayans - Leading a lonely spartan semi starved life of sabotage against the Japanese for almost 4 years in the Malayan Jungle with the occassional assistance of small parties of Chinese Communists - who after the war the British knew would also become our enemy. (My self with many thousands of N/S and regular troops would later be involved against them in the the late 40s and 50s)
Freddie was a forgotten hero and after the war went back to teaching.
For reasons never explained sometime in the 60s he drove into the Surrey
countryside and shot himself dead.
...
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It might not be Malaysia but these amazing soldiers fought in the jungles of Burma.
Brave men that did NOT get the recognition they so rightly deserved. My uncle's health was effected by the conditions they had to endure and I guess he was never A1 fit again after surviving that campaign.
As I said on another post we are so wrong to try to put any one individual service on a pedestal. EVERYONE that contributed to the war effort is a hero and we must NEVER forget the Merchant Navy...... As soon as their ship was sunk....their pay stopped!!!! This changed in mid 1941, but they would still not receive any pay when on leave. But that is another story for perhaps a different forum!
Brave men that did NOT get the recognition they so rightly deserved. My uncle's health was effected by the conditions they had to endure and I guess he was never A1 fit again after surviving that campaign.
As I said on another post we are so wrong to try to put any one individual service on a pedestal. EVERYONE that contributed to the war effort is a hero and we must NEVER forget the Merchant Navy...... As soon as their ship was sunk....their pay stopped!!!! This changed in mid 1941, but they would still not receive any pay when on leave. But that is another story for perhaps a different forum!
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Just a small digression for people of a certain age - 'The Jungle is Neutral', 'The Cruel Sea' and 'Henry IV Part One' were all GCE English Lit O-Level books in the mid '60s (the odd one out being 'The Good Companions'); do you see a trend in these set works?
Mister B
Mister B
I spent time working in the Solomon Islands and whilst I was there I read some books on the Guardacanal Campaign and walked the walk, as it were. It became pretty apparant that the Japanese as expert jungle fighters was a complete myth. Admittedly they had not provided a credible defence for their engineers building an airfield but after the intitial convention skirmishes Japanese afforts to use the jungle to attack the invading American were comical.
They were launched on expeditions with each soldier carrying three days ration of rice and be then expected to live off the land afterwards. Their only maps were old British Admiralty charts that had little or no topgraphical information on them. Their sense of direction was hopeless and even the direction that water flowed in a river was totally incomprehensable. They would march downstream, cross the river a couple of times and then march upstream to where they started. On at least one occasion two Japanese units charged each other.
The jungle was littered with dead and dying through starvation, sickness or a combination of both. On the final retreat sick and injured soldiers were being propped up against trees, given a gun and left behind.
The same inept behaviour was repeated across the Pacific and Burma. The responsibility for the fall of Malaya and Singapore was nothing to do with superior skills or intellect; it was the abject failure of the British Command.
They were launched on expeditions with each soldier carrying three days ration of rice and be then expected to live off the land afterwards. Their only maps were old British Admiralty charts that had little or no topgraphical information on them. Their sense of direction was hopeless and even the direction that water flowed in a river was totally incomprehensable. They would march downstream, cross the river a couple of times and then march upstream to where they started. On at least one occasion two Japanese units charged each other.
The jungle was littered with dead and dying through starvation, sickness or a combination of both. On the final retreat sick and injured soldiers were being propped up against trees, given a gun and left behind.
The same inept behaviour was repeated across the Pacific and Burma. The responsibility for the fall of Malaya and Singapore was nothing to do with superior skills or intellect; it was the abject failure of the British Command.
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On a geographical note, Japanese may or may not have been good jungle fighters, but even here in the north, in summer the terrain is mountains covered in dense forest with an under-story choked with bamboo and vines. Also, in Japan, streets have no names and houses no numbers. Navigation is by mud-maps. Be cautious of claims about lack of jungle experience or map reading skill. They may be based in ignorance and hyperbole. Just sayin'.
Jungle fighters they may not have been....but they whupped the Brits in multiple jungledly countries. It took the Chinese and Indians to beat them in Burma. Malaya and Singapore, if my memory serves me right, the Brits outnumbered the Japanese in land forces deployed. They out fought the Americans in the Philippines on the Bataan Pennisula.
I would suggest it was not the lack of ability or will power that defeated the Japanese Army but rather the power of logistics, manufacturering, and sheer numbers arrayed against them by the Allies. That takes nothing away from the courage and tenacity of the Allied troops fighting them....but in the end it did come down to who had the most kit in the long run.
Yamamoto warned his seniors of the situation before they kicked off the entire thing....he warned he could run rampant for six months then the Awakened Tiger would overwhelm them.
I would suggest it was not the lack of ability or will power that defeated the Japanese Army but rather the power of logistics, manufacturering, and sheer numbers arrayed against them by the Allies. That takes nothing away from the courage and tenacity of the Allied troops fighting them....but in the end it did come down to who had the most kit in the long run.
Yamamoto warned his seniors of the situation before they kicked off the entire thing....he warned he could run rampant for six months then the Awakened Tiger would overwhelm them.
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The same inept behaviour was repeated across the Pacific and Burma. The responsibility for the fall of Malaya and Singapore was nothing to do with superior skills or intellect; it was the abject failure of the British Command.
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...Yes - in Malaya/Singapore Brits outnumbered Jap ground forces at something like two or three to one - However prior to Dec 8 while the British forces had in the main led a soft life - untrained in jungle warefare overnightthey were to become face to face with a a cruel barbaric bestial enemy - fully battle trained, hardened and backed up with superior air and naval power.
Of the British forces more than a third were composed of Indian troops
only recenly arrived from India where anti British feeling was at a peak towards attaining Independance - Consequently in Malaya Indian troops began shooting their British officers - resulting in an entire Indian Regiment being withdrawn from the battle line.
Of other non UK troops who composed about one fifth of the British forces -
while in the main they fought bravely - their reputation was somewhat sullied
when in the final days many threw away their arms and were to be seen
in large groups wandering drunkenly around Singapore city- answerable to no authority.
Prior to final surrender the GOC Malaya General Percival issued an order prohibiting any troops from making any attempt to evacuate or leave the island.
...
Of the British forces more than a third were composed of Indian troops
only recenly arrived from India where anti British feeling was at a peak towards attaining Independance - Consequently in Malaya Indian troops began shooting their British officers - resulting in an entire Indian Regiment being withdrawn from the battle line.
Of other non UK troops who composed about one fifth of the British forces -
while in the main they fought bravely - their reputation was somewhat sullied
when in the final days many threw away their arms and were to be seen
in large groups wandering drunkenly around Singapore city- answerable to no authority.
Prior to final surrender the GOC Malaya General Percival issued an order prohibiting any troops from making any attempt to evacuate or leave the island.
...
Of other non UK troops who composed about one fifth of the British forces -
while in the main they fought bravely - their reputation was somewhat sullied
when in the final days many threw away their arms and were to be seen
in large groups wandering drunkenly around Singapore city- answerable to no authority.
while in the main they fought bravely - their reputation was somewhat sullied
when in the final days many threw away their arms and were to be seen
in large groups wandering drunkenly around Singapore city- answerable to no authority.
4C Special: No Prisoners: Viewpoints: Lynette Silver
Jungle fighters they may not have been....but they whupped the Brits in multiple jungledly countries. It took the Chinese and Indians to beat them in Burma. Malaya and Singapore, if my memory serves me right, the Brits outnumbered the Japanese in land forces deployed. They out fought the Americans in the Philippines on the Bataan Pennisula.
Soon after, when you look at the first US Marine and Australian infantry victories, the Japanese suffered very high levels of attrition almost unnecessarily.
Freddie was a forgotten hero and after the war went back to teaching.
For reasons never explained sometime in the 60s he drove into the Surrey
countryside and shot himself dead.
For reasons never explained sometime in the 60s he drove into the Surrey
countryside and shot himself dead.
Regarding Admiral Ernest King:
He was no Anglophile.
He was also not CINC PAC.
He was the head Naval Officer in Washington DC and sat on the Joint Chiefes of Staff organization peopled with US and British high ranking flag officers.
He is famously quoted, or attributed, the following bon mot (roughly recalled), regarding the infamous "Europe First Strategy" and the imbalance of men and equipment being assigned to the Pacific Theater and European Theater. Directed at one of the British generals, if I recall this correctly ...
"We have a war in the Pacific as well, against somebody who actually attacked us."
King also bickered considerably within the US defence and military establishment, and in political halls, regarding how under resourced the Pacific Theater was and why that needed to change.
He was no Anglophile.
He was also not CINC PAC.
He was the head Naval Officer in Washington DC and sat on the Joint Chiefes of Staff organization peopled with US and British high ranking flag officers.
He is famously quoted, or attributed, the following bon mot (roughly recalled), regarding the infamous "Europe First Strategy" and the imbalance of men and equipment being assigned to the Pacific Theater and European Theater. Directed at one of the British generals, if I recall this correctly ...
"We have a war in the Pacific as well, against somebody who actually attacked us."
King also bickered considerably within the US defence and military establishment, and in political halls, regarding how under resourced the Pacific Theater was and why that needed to change.
A few years ago I took up an invitation to visit Hawaii and stay with friend's parents who live on Ford Island. Amazing. You walked out the front door and strolled over to USS Arizona.
I thought this shot was from the shoreline but I am not so sure now.
Very nice married quarters. Captain and above from memory.
USN tour of Pearl.
I thought this shot was from the shoreline but I am not so sure now.
Very nice married quarters. Captain and above from memory.
USN tour of Pearl.
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Hi Lonewolf,
In my post I referred to the 'Commander in Chief' who at that specific time I believe was indeed Admiral King??
I do wish you folks could learn to spell 'harbour'
Questions:
I am surprised you are suggesting he was not an Anglophile as that goes against all historical records? I am NOT criticising this man for his views and I guess we all have our prejudices but are we honest enough to admit them?
Jac Cherac..... The only thing Great Britain has given Europe is Mad Cow disease.
Napaleon... Zee English are a Nation of shoppe keepuhs (Said in my 'ullo, ullo accent)
Freech National Rugby Coach... We don't like the English and it is best to say so rather than be hypocritical.
I hate folks that act shocked when we make jokes about other nations, or maybe show a prejudice, we are who we are and at least we are proud of our own country and hopefully when push comes to shove we do respect other nations.
My understanding of just a few of the many issues with King and in particular the Royal Navy was that the British Government wanted her forces to be treated as an equal on the Pacific front whereas King felt this was his conflict but the Royal Navy could assist! Am I correct to say that both Australian and New Zealand warships were merged into US Battle Groups, but Great Britain wanted its own Battle Groups?
Rumour has it that King was seconded to the Royal Navy for short periods during the First World War and it has been suggested that this may have been contributory to his dislike of that service?? I cannot find any reference to what ships he served with, location or durations of time aboard.
All sorts of arguments were put forward by King including those of logistics, refuelling etc. Roosevelt eventually over-ruled the Admiral but that man was 'not for turning'
(I am a huge Margaret Thatcher fan) yes he was given certain orders by Roosevelt but he was the Admiral in Command. The bottom line to me was that we eventually all succeeded in ending a very ugly period of our past and the Royal Navy did take an active role in the defeat of the Japanese.
I am however in full agreement with SASLess
Would I be right to suggest the Japanese believed in total war and none of this Geneva Convention, or even surrender?
Whilst talking about this Admiral I note he was awarded the Navy Cross. I was under the impression that this medal was awarded for:
Can you please direct me to this man's citation for that medal, all I can find is a bland notation of time spent on Royal navy ships?? (I blame my inept Googling abilities)
My thoughts regarding Admiral King are best summed up by this reference:
HumoUr
In my time period we had a saying... US Navy = Biggest in the World, Royal Navy = Best in the World!
I now say, Wot Royal Navy??
In my post I referred to the 'Commander in Chief' who at that specific time I believe was indeed Admiral King??
Following Pearl Harbour, King assumed the positions of commander in chief of the U.S. Fleet and chief of Naval Operations.
Questions:
I am surprised you are suggesting he was not an Anglophile as that goes against all historical records? I am NOT criticising this man for his views and I guess we all have our prejudices but are we honest enough to admit them?
Jac Cherac..... The only thing Great Britain has given Europe is Mad Cow disease.
Napaleon... Zee English are a Nation of shoppe keepuhs (Said in my 'ullo, ullo accent)
Freech National Rugby Coach... We don't like the English and it is best to say so rather than be hypocritical.
I hate folks that act shocked when we make jokes about other nations, or maybe show a prejudice, we are who we are and at least we are proud of our own country and hopefully when push comes to shove we do respect other nations.
My understanding of just a few of the many issues with King and in particular the Royal Navy was that the British Government wanted her forces to be treated as an equal on the Pacific front whereas King felt this was his conflict but the Royal Navy could assist! Am I correct to say that both Australian and New Zealand warships were merged into US Battle Groups, but Great Britain wanted its own Battle Groups?
Rumour has it that King was seconded to the Royal Navy for short periods during the First World War and it has been suggested that this may have been contributory to his dislike of that service?? I cannot find any reference to what ships he served with, location or durations of time aboard.
All sorts of arguments were put forward by King including those of logistics, refuelling etc. Roosevelt eventually over-ruled the Admiral but that man was 'not for turning'
(I am a huge Margaret Thatcher fan) yes he was given certain orders by Roosevelt but he was the Admiral in Command. The bottom line to me was that we eventually all succeeded in ending a very ugly period of our past and the Royal Navy did take an active role in the defeat of the Japanese.I am however in full agreement with SASLess
Originally Posted by SASLess
I would suggest it was not the lack of ability or will power that defeated the Japanese Army but rather the power of logistics, manufacturering, and sheer numbers arrayed against them by the Allies. That takes nothing away from the courage and tenacity of the Allied troops fighting them....but in the end it did come down to who had the most kit in the long run.
Yamamoto warned his seniors of the situation before they kicked off the entire thing....he warned he could run rampant for six months then the Awakened Tiger would overwhelm them.
Yamamoto warned his seniors of the situation before they kicked off the entire thing....he warned he could run rampant for six months then the Awakened Tiger would overwhelm them.
Whilst talking about this Admiral I note he was awarded the Navy Cross. I was under the impression that this medal was awarded for:
Extreme gallantry and risk of life in actual combat with an armed enemy force and going beyond the call of duty.
My thoughts regarding Admiral King are best summed up by this reference:
The importance of King's overall contribution should not be underestimated. Starting with the devastated fleet and shattered morale following Pearl Harbour, he directed the expansion of the U.S. Navy into the mightiest fleet in world history.
In my time period we had a saying... US Navy = Biggest in the World, Royal Navy = Best in the World!
I now say, Wot Royal Navy??
Last edited by glojo; 17th Dec 2011 at 10:01. Reason: Slight inaccuracy :(
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Admiral King Citation of the Navy Cross
"The President of the United States of America takes pleasure in presenting the Navy Cross to Captain Ernest Joseph King, United States Navy, for distinguished service in the line of his profession during World War I, as Assistant Chief of Staff of the Atlantic Fleet during World War I.Action Date: World War I
Service: Navy
Rank: Captain
Company: Assistant Chief of Staff
Division: Atlantic Fleet"
glojo
As much as I am not a fan of Wiki for it's lack of accuracy, it does lead or reference numerous articles at the bottom of the pages, especially someone with a career like an Admiral. If you are interested, see notation 7 on Admiral King's wiki page, then from the web page that link sent you to you find a link to ALL citations for every medal awarded by the US.
Hope that helps.
"The President of the United States of America takes pleasure in presenting the Navy Cross to Captain Ernest Joseph King, United States Navy, for distinguished service in the line of his profession during World War I, as Assistant Chief of Staff of the Atlantic Fleet during World War I.Action Date: World War I
Service: Navy
Rank: Captain
Company: Assistant Chief of Staff
Division: Atlantic Fleet"
glojo
As much as I am not a fan of Wiki for it's lack of accuracy, it does lead or reference numerous articles at the bottom of the pages, especially someone with a career like an Admiral. If you are interested, see notation 7 on Admiral King's wiki page, then from the web page that link sent you to you find a link to ALL citations for every medal awarded by the US.
Hope that helps.
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Hi 500N
Thanks for that and yes the wiki thing is not the best source of information but then again mine was not perfect.
When we read about the Navy Cross it is one of the highest awards granted to mainly the US Navy and Marines and when we read of all the other holders they have displayed degrees of bravery or courage that goes well beyond the call of duty. I accept at least here in the UK certain acts or deeds cannot be made public but is Admiral King's award in that category?
I am NOT on a witch hunt, I am not out to score points, this man has my respect and I am just curious about how a medal of this stature was earned..
Thanks for that and yes the wiki thing is not the best source of information but then again mine was not perfect.
When we read about the Navy Cross it is one of the highest awards granted to mainly the US Navy and Marines and when we read of all the other holders they have displayed degrees of bravery or courage that goes well beyond the call of duty. I accept at least here in the UK certain acts or deeds cannot be made public but is Admiral King's award in that category?
I am NOT on a witch hunt, I am not out to score points, this man has my respect and I am just curious about how a medal of this stature was earned..
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glojo
"I am NOT on a witch hunt, I am not out to score points, this man has my respect and I am just curious about how a medal of this stature was earned.."
As much as I don't like Wiki, it is a good source for general run of the mill stuff like this - as long as it's notated !!!!
In answer to your question, because the criteria according to Wiki was changed from one type of award to another and went up in order of precedence.
"Originally, the Navy Cross was lower in precedence than the Navy Distinguished Service Medal, because it was awarded for both combat heroism and for "other distinguished service." [1] Congress revised this on 7 August 1942, making the Navy Cross a combat-only award and second only to the Medal of Honor."
so he got his for "other distinguished service" even though it may have been "in combat" as in at war, it wasn't an eact act of combat heroism by the looks of it. Not that I am in any way qualified to pass judgement !
"I am NOT on a witch hunt, I am not out to score points, this man has my respect and I am just curious about how a medal of this stature was earned.."
As much as I don't like Wiki, it is a good source for general run of the mill stuff like this - as long as it's notated !!!!
In answer to your question, because the criteria according to Wiki was changed from one type of award to another and went up in order of precedence.
"Originally, the Navy Cross was lower in precedence than the Navy Distinguished Service Medal, because it was awarded for both combat heroism and for "other distinguished service." [1] Congress revised this on 7 August 1942, making the Navy Cross a combat-only award and second only to the Medal of Honor."
so he got his for "other distinguished service" even though it may have been "in combat" as in at war, it wasn't an eact act of combat heroism by the looks of it. Not that I am in any way qualified to pass judgement !
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Re Admiral King NOT being an Anglophobe, their is a quote out there which was the President of the US even saying that he was Anti British / an Anglophobe.
I just can't find it.
I just can't find it.
Last edited by 500N; 17th Dec 2011 at 10:45.
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A fairly interesting summary !
Lessons in Coalition Warfare: Admiral Ernest King and the British Pacific Fleet
The genesis and strategy of British Royal Navy’s participation in the Pacific in 1945 is a little studied aspect of the Pacific campaign. Prior to 1945 the participation of the Royal Navy in the Pacific ended at the Battle of the Java Sea. After that the Royal Navy operated in the Indian Ocean in support of British operations in Burma and against German surface raiders. Michael Coles in “Ernest King and the British Pacific Fleet: The Conference at Quebec, 1944 (Octagon) published in The Journal of Military History January 2001, 65, 1 Research Library pp. 105-129 provides a good analysis of the Allied decision to allow the Royal Navy a role in the Pacific and the objections of Admiral Ernest King to the proposal.
The renewal of the Royal Navy’s Pacific role began at the 1944 Octagon Conference where the Allied Joint Staff made the decision to bring the Royal Navy back to the Pacific. Admiral Ernest King was the only dissenter in the question of Royal Navy operations in the Pacific. The strategic aspects of this decision are seldom addressed by most who chronicle the Pacific war.[i] William Kimball in “Forged in War: Roosevelt Churchill and the Second World War” never mentions the naval strategy discussed at the Octagon conference. Samuel Elliott Morison in “The Two-Ocean War” described the decision for the Royal Navy to enter the Pacific as “important” and outlines King’s opposition to it without addressing strategic considerations.[ii] John Costello in “The Pacific War” described how Churchill insisted on the Royal Navy being committed to operations against Japan and how Roosevelt’s agreed to “to avoid a bitter clash.”[iii] Likewise Williamson Murray and Allen R. Millett in “War to Be Won” note that one of the goals of Octagon was “to determine the level and nature of British in the air-naval war in the Pacific.” However they do so as do the others without addressing the naval strategy.[iv] Max Hastings mentions Octagon in “Retribution: The Battle for Japan, 1944-1945” again without specific reference to naval strategy. However later in the book later discusses the Royal Navy’s limitations in ships, manning, logistics and operational art as it entered the Pacific campaign.[v] Other writers chronicle British operations in the Pacific but usually focus in the gallantry and determination of the Royal Navy and not its weaknesses.[vi]
Coles’ article is invaluable to understand the decision in relation to the political, military and economic considerations which influenced both King’s opposition to the deployment and the performance of the British fleet in the Pacific. Coles analyzes tensions between King and the other participants at Octagon. He judges King to be more realistic and informed regarding Royal Navy capabilities and more importantly its limitations than British leaders especially Churchill.[vii]
King was surprised at Roosevelt’s decision to accept Churchill’s offer of the Royal Navy without prior discussion by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. Coles notes that King may have kept silent at subsequent meetings of the Combined Chiefs, because he either assumed that his positions were logical and apparent to all or that he believed that Churchill was lying about his navy’s capabilities. Of course it was politically impossible for King to suggest such.[viii]
King’s realism on the subject was a directly related to the political tensions between American and British visions for the outcome of the Pacific war, and the pressing strategic considerations necessitated by Japanese offensives in Burma and China. The British goal of re-establishing colonial rule in Southeast Asia was a major bone of contention. Many Americans believed that the British goals were “aimed primarily at the resurgence of British political and economic ascendancy in South East Asia and restoration of British prestige.”[ix] Yet the US wanted to defeat Japan’s formidable Army in Asia without the sacrifice of large numbers of American troops or material which necessitated British participation.[x] The introduction of large numbers of American troops on the Asian continent was impossible due to the lineation of the US Army to 90 divisions, most of which were engaged in Europe. Likewise US domestic issues regarding war production and the Navy’s share of it in relations to changing wartime conditions was a major concern for King. King and the Navy argued for high naval production while others including George Marshall were beginning to question it, especially if the British could provide “make substantial Naval forces available in the Pacific.”[xi]"
Lessons in Coalition Warfare: Admiral Ernest King and the British Pacific Fleet
The genesis and strategy of British Royal Navy’s participation in the Pacific in 1945 is a little studied aspect of the Pacific campaign. Prior to 1945 the participation of the Royal Navy in the Pacific ended at the Battle of the Java Sea. After that the Royal Navy operated in the Indian Ocean in support of British operations in Burma and against German surface raiders. Michael Coles in “Ernest King and the British Pacific Fleet: The Conference at Quebec, 1944 (Octagon) published in The Journal of Military History January 2001, 65, 1 Research Library pp. 105-129 provides a good analysis of the Allied decision to allow the Royal Navy a role in the Pacific and the objections of Admiral Ernest King to the proposal.
The renewal of the Royal Navy’s Pacific role began at the 1944 Octagon Conference where the Allied Joint Staff made the decision to bring the Royal Navy back to the Pacific. Admiral Ernest King was the only dissenter in the question of Royal Navy operations in the Pacific. The strategic aspects of this decision are seldom addressed by most who chronicle the Pacific war.[i] William Kimball in “Forged in War: Roosevelt Churchill and the Second World War” never mentions the naval strategy discussed at the Octagon conference. Samuel Elliott Morison in “The Two-Ocean War” described the decision for the Royal Navy to enter the Pacific as “important” and outlines King’s opposition to it without addressing strategic considerations.[ii] John Costello in “The Pacific War” described how Churchill insisted on the Royal Navy being committed to operations against Japan and how Roosevelt’s agreed to “to avoid a bitter clash.”[iii] Likewise Williamson Murray and Allen R. Millett in “War to Be Won” note that one of the goals of Octagon was “to determine the level and nature of British in the air-naval war in the Pacific.” However they do so as do the others without addressing the naval strategy.[iv] Max Hastings mentions Octagon in “Retribution: The Battle for Japan, 1944-1945” again without specific reference to naval strategy. However later in the book later discusses the Royal Navy’s limitations in ships, manning, logistics and operational art as it entered the Pacific campaign.[v] Other writers chronicle British operations in the Pacific but usually focus in the gallantry and determination of the Royal Navy and not its weaknesses.[vi]
Coles’ article is invaluable to understand the decision in relation to the political, military and economic considerations which influenced both King’s opposition to the deployment and the performance of the British fleet in the Pacific. Coles analyzes tensions between King and the other participants at Octagon. He judges King to be more realistic and informed regarding Royal Navy capabilities and more importantly its limitations than British leaders especially Churchill.[vii]
King was surprised at Roosevelt’s decision to accept Churchill’s offer of the Royal Navy without prior discussion by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. Coles notes that King may have kept silent at subsequent meetings of the Combined Chiefs, because he either assumed that his positions were logical and apparent to all or that he believed that Churchill was lying about his navy’s capabilities. Of course it was politically impossible for King to suggest such.[viii]
King’s realism on the subject was a directly related to the political tensions between American and British visions for the outcome of the Pacific war, and the pressing strategic considerations necessitated by Japanese offensives in Burma and China. The British goal of re-establishing colonial rule in Southeast Asia was a major bone of contention. Many Americans believed that the British goals were “aimed primarily at the resurgence of British political and economic ascendancy in South East Asia and restoration of British prestige.”[ix] Yet the US wanted to defeat Japan’s formidable Army in Asia without the sacrifice of large numbers of American troops or material which necessitated British participation.[x] The introduction of large numbers of American troops on the Asian continent was impossible due to the lineation of the US Army to 90 divisions, most of which were engaged in Europe. Likewise US domestic issues regarding war production and the Navy’s share of it in relations to changing wartime conditions was a major concern for King. King and the Navy argued for high naval production while others including George Marshall were beginning to question it, especially if the British could provide “make substantial Naval forces available in the Pacific.”[xi]"
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Have to be careful we do not get too involved with the 'Dark blue' and all I will say is that when a Kamikaze aircrfat crashed on the wooden flight decks of a US carrier it would cause severe damage. When they crashed on the armoured decks of British carrier we would get our the 'broom wallahs' to sweep off the mess.Any contributions regarding Pearl Harbour?
If the Japanese were so ruthless then why not hammer home that attack, and then at the same time.... When they sunk the two British capital ships, why leave the screening destroyers? When a man is down, the best bet is to make sure he is down AND out!