Remember Pearl Harbor
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If the Japanese were so ruthless then why not hammer home that attack, and then at the same time.... When they sunk the two British capital ships, why leave the screening destroyers? When a man is down, the best bet is to make sure he is down AND out!"
I believe even though both Admiral's agreed on no third attack for various reasons, one of them later regretted not pressing home. I THINK even the American's agreed that a 3rd attack would have been devistating.
I also think they were extremely wary of losing any of their carriers but someone with more detailed knowledge may be able to provide the reasons. One I think was they wanted to preserve their capital ships instead of making them vulnerable by waiting for the planes from a 3rd attack.
Here is a question for you to continue the discussion on Pearl.
What IF the US Aircraft Carriers had been at Pearl on the 7th and ALL of them had been sunk or severely damaged ? (I assume the japs would have gone for the carriers first, then the Battleships).
What do you think the course of the war would have been then ?
How long would it have taken the US to get up and going again with 3 carriers ?
It's an interesting thought.
If the Japanese were so ruthless then why not hammer home that attack, and then at the same time.... When they sunk the two British capital ships, why leave the screening destroyers? When a man is down, the best bet is to make sure he is down AND out!"
I believe even though both Admiral's agreed on no third attack for various reasons, one of them later regretted not pressing home. I THINK even the American's agreed that a 3rd attack would have been devistating.
I also think they were extremely wary of losing any of their carriers but someone with more detailed knowledge may be able to provide the reasons. One I think was they wanted to preserve their capital ships instead of making them vulnerable by waiting for the planes from a 3rd attack.
Here is a question for you to continue the discussion on Pearl.
What IF the US Aircraft Carriers had been at Pearl on the 7th and ALL of them had been sunk or severely damaged ? (I assume the japs would have gone for the carriers first, then the Battleships).
What do you think the course of the war would have been then ?
How long would it have taken the US to get up and going again with 3 carriers ?
It's an interesting thought.
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Regarding Fodplod's comment I guess we are all guilty as charged and what a pity that very learned gentleman did not answer your post.
I totally agree with your reasons regarding why those extra attacks were not carried out but it does go against the way they appeared to fight on the ground. was there a different ideology between Army and Navy.
Attacking the ships at Pearl harbour had a slight flaw in so far as most ships that were severely damaged or even sunk were subsequently salvaged and repaired. Sink them at sea and it removes the ship plus it will probably kill off a significant number of the crew. Hitting them in harbour at a weekend did neither!. If the carriers were in harbour then I am guessing they would have, or should have been the main targets and if it were at all possible then they would also have been salvaged and no doubt the dockyards would have worked twenty four hours a day getting those things back into service. I am guessing the US would very quickly move the Atlantic carriers across to the Pacific and may even have asked Great Britain to consider deploying a carrier or two??
I still maintain, contrary to what is being suggested here that the Japanese knew full well what ships were in harbour.
I would further suggest or perhaps ask this:
Pilots would be briefed on what ships they were to attack, the locations or berth of their target plus all the other details required to carry out a coordinated attack. To me it makes no sense whatsoever to sail all the way across the Pacific on the off chance that the fleet may or may not be in harbour or indeed the carriers may or may not be present, but I do bow to those who are far more knowledgeable on this topic..
Could I tactfully say that it was a well planned, well coordinated attack that may not have been aggressive enough? Hitting the fuel dumps, repair facilities and anything else that was a target of value. If you are going to slap a tiger then you had better hit him with all your might otherwise the thing will bite and bite back hard!
America can rightly complain about the lack of any declaration of war but they have to remember the same applies for all the other locations that Japan attacked during those early days of December.
500N
thank you very much for that research regarding the Navy Cross and I guess there is a probability that he did get that award for 'services rendered' which as you point out in accordance with the original requirements.
I totally agree with your reasons regarding why those extra attacks were not carried out but it does go against the way they appeared to fight on the ground. was there a different ideology between Army and Navy.
Attacking the ships at Pearl harbour had a slight flaw in so far as most ships that were severely damaged or even sunk were subsequently salvaged and repaired. Sink them at sea and it removes the ship plus it will probably kill off a significant number of the crew. Hitting them in harbour at a weekend did neither!. If the carriers were in harbour then I am guessing they would have, or should have been the main targets and if it were at all possible then they would also have been salvaged and no doubt the dockyards would have worked twenty four hours a day getting those things back into service. I am guessing the US would very quickly move the Atlantic carriers across to the Pacific and may even have asked Great Britain to consider deploying a carrier or two??
I still maintain, contrary to what is being suggested here that the Japanese knew full well what ships were in harbour.
I would further suggest or perhaps ask this:
Pilots would be briefed on what ships they were to attack, the locations or berth of their target plus all the other details required to carry out a coordinated attack. To me it makes no sense whatsoever to sail all the way across the Pacific on the off chance that the fleet may or may not be in harbour or indeed the carriers may or may not be present, but I do bow to those who are far more knowledgeable on this topic..
Could I tactfully say that it was a well planned, well coordinated attack that may not have been aggressive enough? Hitting the fuel dumps, repair facilities and anything else that was a target of value. If you are going to slap a tiger then you had better hit him with all your might otherwise the thing will bite and bite back hard!
America can rightly complain about the lack of any declaration of war but they have to remember the same applies for all the other locations that Japan attacked during those early days of December.
500N
thank you very much for that research regarding the Navy Cross and I guess there is a probability that he did get that award for 'services rendered' which as you point out in accordance with the original requirements.
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My understanding was this, but I read a fair bit a long time ago.
The Japs definitely knew that the carriers were not in the harbour (as was said by another poster on a previous post).
That if the Japs had pressed home the third attack, the oil storage, docks and repair facilities that would have been bombed would have had a big effect on how quickly the US could get back into the war in strength. I THINK even a US Admiral admitted that if the 3rd attack would have been devastating.
My view re sinking in harbour / sinking at sea - it would have been a lot harder to do it at sea.
Re "If you are going to slap a tiger then you had better hit him with all your might otherwise the thing will bite and bite back hard!", I agree which is why my name is 500N which means 500 Nitro which is what I carry. We always say that Dangerous Game is not down until you put a finishing "security" shot through the head
Same applies to the enemy IMHO. The Japs didn't do it for whatever reason.
I think these are some orders of the attack. It still has the first targets listed as 4 Battleships and 4 carriers.
http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/myths/jm-097.html
.
The Japs definitely knew that the carriers were not in the harbour (as was said by another poster on a previous post).
That if the Japs had pressed home the third attack, the oil storage, docks and repair facilities that would have been bombed would have had a big effect on how quickly the US could get back into the war in strength. I THINK even a US Admiral admitted that if the 3rd attack would have been devastating.
My view re sinking in harbour / sinking at sea - it would have been a lot harder to do it at sea.
Re "If you are going to slap a tiger then you had better hit him with all your might otherwise the thing will bite and bite back hard!", I agree which is why my name is 500N which means 500 Nitro which is what I carry. We always say that Dangerous Game is not down until you put a finishing "security" shot through the head
Same applies to the enemy IMHO. The Japs didn't do it for whatever reason.I think these are some orders of the attack. It still has the first targets listed as 4 Battleships and 4 carriers.
http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/myths/jm-097.html
.
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A nice link and it makes you wonder when those orders were actually first drafted.The first circulation date was the 5th November 1941 (Guy Fawkes night) there is then further dates going on from the 23rd November 1941 but when did the planners actually start writing up these orders? Yes they mention the carriers but they were part of that huge fleet. I was surprised that they prioritized the US Battleships over carriers, it goes to show that even the Japanese had sill not realised what a huge game changer the carrier was.
It also shows quite clearly that a third attack was indeed planned for:
Using Google we can also see that a submarine from the attacking squadron actually located and followed the USS Lexington and this was the day before the attack.
Link here
The link supplied by 500N also confirms what I was saying about the fate of HMS Prince of Wales, that ship was going nowhere apart from the sea bed. She was clearly in the wrong place at the wrong time. If she had not been sunk when she was then she would have been sunk within days:
A few months ago I watched a very interesting documentary about the Japanese submarine contribution at Pearl harbour and it stated that the first vessel sunk at Pearl was actually a JAPANESE submarine. From memory I believe a US destroyer had seen this vessel on the surface and engaged it with her guns. With the power of Google that has also been confirmed.
This happened over an hour before the first US casualties
It also shows quite clearly that a third attack was indeed planned for:
After the launching of the second attack units is completed, the task force will withdraw northward at a speed of about 24 knots. The first attack units are scheduled to return between 0530 and 0600 hours and the second attack units are scheduled to return between 0645 and 0715 hours.
Immediately after the return of the first and second attack units, preparations for the next attack will be completed. At this time, carrier attack planes capable of carrying torpedoes will be armed with such as long as the supply lasts.
[7]. General outline. [Page 14]
If the destruction of enemy land-based air strength progresses favorably, repeated attacks will be made immediately and thus decisive results will be achieved.
Immediately after the return of the first and second attack units, preparations for the next attack will be completed. At this time, carrier attack planes capable of carrying torpedoes will be armed with such as long as the supply lasts.
[7]. General outline. [Page 14]
If the destruction of enemy land-based air strength progresses favorably, repeated attacks will be made immediately and thus decisive results will be achieved.
In Hawaiian waters the submarines floated on the sea in the night, and in the daytime they submerged to periscope depth. The schedule of Pearl Harbor attack at 0300 on December 8th was transmitted to the submarine fleet two or three days beforehand. On 7th "I No. 74" sighted the carrier Lexington but no trouble ensued.
The link supplied by 500N also confirms what I was saying about the fate of HMS Prince of Wales, that ship was going nowhere apart from the sea bed. She was clearly in the wrong place at the wrong time. If she had not been sunk when she was then she would have been sunk within days:
1. With the forces of the Second Fleet, Third Fleet, First Expeditionary Fleet and Eleventh Air Fleet as a nucleus destroy enemy fleets and air forces in the Philippines, British Malay, and Netherlands Indies. In cooperation with the Army, take the initiative in attacks on air forces and fleets in the Philippines and Malaya.
06:37. Ward sees conning tower between Antares (AKS-14) and her tow, apparently headed for Pearl Harbor.
06:45. Ward fires on mini-sub with a hit, attempts to ram, depth charges and sinks it.
06:45. Ward fires on mini-sub with a hit, attempts to ram, depth charges and sinks it.
If the Japanese Sub spotted the Lexington....thus knowing the location of the carrier fleet....and the Japanese Admiral ordered the withdrawal of the attack forces based upon his being concerned about "not knowing" the location of the American Carriers....why did not the the Sub issue a sighting report?
It was routine for the Subs to make such reports was it not. The US Navy derived good intellligence from those reports as they had Radio Intercept Units (RIU's) on major fleet units to include the carriers at that time.
At one time in the battle of the Coral Sea (just prior actually) Halsey was instructed to "Be Seen" by the enemy and did so....and did not depart the area he was in until an RIU confirmed overhearing the Spot Report made by a Japanese Flying Boat.
The Fog of War covers all participants does it not?
It was routine for the Subs to make such reports was it not. The US Navy derived good intellligence from those reports as they had Radio Intercept Units (RIU's) on major fleet units to include the carriers at that time.
At one time in the battle of the Coral Sea (just prior actually) Halsey was instructed to "Be Seen" by the enemy and did so....and did not depart the area he was in until an RIU confirmed overhearing the Spot Report made by a Japanese Flying Boat.
The Fog of War covers all participants does it not?
SASless
Surely the sub would have been ordered to maintain radio silence, to preserve the element of surprise, unless certain situations arose...
Such as maybe the sub thought the attack had been compromised. As it was, all they knew was that 1 carrier wasn't in harbour, important yes, but enough to potentially compromise the whole mission? I doubt it.
Surely the sub would have been ordered to maintain radio silence, to preserve the element of surprise, unless certain situations arose...
Such as maybe the sub thought the attack had been compromised. As it was, all they knew was that 1 carrier wasn't in harbour, important yes, but enough to potentially compromise the whole mission? I doubt it.
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Re the many "what ifs" posted here (my own included): I recall reading the two volumes of the official history of the Royal Australian Air Force in the Pacific theatre (written by George Odgers) and having read them, coming to the conclusion that if the winner of a war is indeed the side that makes the fewer mistakes, the men running the Japanese war effort must have been, indeed, total clusterf**ks, because our leaders, both political and military, were certainly guilty of mega error after mega error -and not just at the beginning of hostilities, when there might have been an excuse for such errors.
Someone made the comment about the ineptness of the Japanese in not adequately supplying their fighting troops with food in the field at Guadalcanal. Exactly the same could be said of their operations in New Guinea and Burma - in both those campaigns, they hoped to feed their troops from captured enemy food stocks (and in both campaigns, to some degree, succeeded in doing so).
However, in both Burma (in particular, at Kohima in April 1944) and in New Guinea, on the Kokoda Track in 1942, their troops quite literally starved - while continuing to fight with incredible resolve. In New Guinea, there are well-documented reports saying that they resorted to cannibalism on quite a few occasions, including references in individual Japanese soldiers' diaries.
Someone made the comment about the ineptness of the Japanese in not adequately supplying their fighting troops with food in the field at Guadalcanal. Exactly the same could be said of their operations in New Guinea and Burma - in both those campaigns, they hoped to feed their troops from captured enemy food stocks (and in both campaigns, to some degree, succeeded in doing so).
However, in both Burma (in particular, at Kohima in April 1944) and in New Guinea, on the Kokoda Track in 1942, their troops quite literally starved - while continuing to fight with incredible resolve. In New Guinea, there are well-documented reports saying that they resorted to cannibalism on quite a few occasions, including references in individual Japanese soldiers' diaries.
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I see subs mentioned quite a bit including Pearl Harbour.
I get the perception that the Japs never really nailed this mini sub activity,
they seemed to get there but didn't do a whole amount of damage.
The same with the sub attacks on Sydney (Australia) and I think Newcastle (Australia), made a big bang, killed a few people, put the wind up everyone but no long term strategic military damage ecept making Australia defend the North which in itself might have been enough.
Where as the plane attacks on Pearl and Darwin were devastating, Darwin especially.
Any thoughts ?
I get the perception that the Japs never really nailed this mini sub activity,
they seemed to get there but didn't do a whole amount of damage.
The same with the sub attacks on Sydney (Australia) and I think Newcastle (Australia), made a big bang, killed a few people, put the wind up everyone but no long term strategic military damage ecept making Australia defend the North which in itself might have been enough.
Where as the plane attacks on Pearl and Darwin were devastating, Darwin especially.
Any thoughts ?
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If I can lighten the debate for one moment, the Japanese mini-submarine attack on Sydney Harbour had a huge effect on the demographics of Sydney's exclusive harbourside eastern suburbs.
Immediately after the attack, the largely Protestant... let's call a spade a *** shovel: the wholly Protestant Sydney Establishment bailed out of the waterfront eastern suburbs in droves, to the point where, in June/July 1942, a harbourside mansion could be purchased for a couple of hundred Pounds. A large number of recently (and not so recently) arrived Europeans, predominately of the Jewish persuasion, not cowed by the Japanese attack, snapped up the prime real estate for a proverbial song - and to this day, a large proportion of the residents of those prime areas of Sydney is Jewish, to the point where prestigious Rose Bay is almost universally known to Sydneysiders as 'Nose Bay', and the nearby Double Bay as 'Double Pay'.
Immediately after the attack, the largely Protestant... let's call a spade a *** shovel: the wholly Protestant Sydney Establishment bailed out of the waterfront eastern suburbs in droves, to the point where, in June/July 1942, a harbourside mansion could be purchased for a couple of hundred Pounds. A large number of recently (and not so recently) arrived Europeans, predominately of the Jewish persuasion, not cowed by the Japanese attack, snapped up the prime real estate for a proverbial song - and to this day, a large proportion of the residents of those prime areas of Sydney is Jewish, to the point where prestigious Rose Bay is almost universally known to Sydneysiders as 'Nose Bay', and the nearby Double Bay as 'Double Pay'.
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Andu
That is interesting. Had never heard or read that before. Thanks for posting.
If you are ever in Sydney, apart from doing the usual touristy things,
visit the MV KRAIT which is moored in the harbour at the Australian National Maritime Museum.
Encyclopedia | Australian War Memorial
MV Krait - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
That is interesting. Had never heard or read that before. Thanks for posting.
If you are ever in Sydney, apart from doing the usual touristy things,
visit the MV KRAIT which is moored in the harbour at the Australian National Maritime Museum.
Encyclopedia | Australian War Memorial
MV Krait - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Biggus,
Thus...the Sub (I-6) I think it was....one of the over thirty Japanese Submarines involved in the cordon effort around the Hawaiian Islands during the attack....did not report the Lexington's position...and took no action against the Carrier or its escorts on the 6th....due to orders (we assume), thus one the attack took place the Admiral in charge of the operation...being worried about the location of the American Carriers....called off the follow-up raids which would have been the most devastating to the Americans.
Makes one wonder why he did not break radio silence on the 7th after the attack kicked off? Surely, the location of the carriers was of such significance they should be have been reported as soon as possible.
An interesting source of information on Pearl Harbor and later events.....
Attack on Pearl Harbor | World War II Database
Thus...the Sub (I-6) I think it was....one of the over thirty Japanese Submarines involved in the cordon effort around the Hawaiian Islands during the attack....did not report the Lexington's position...and took no action against the Carrier or its escorts on the 6th....due to orders (we assume), thus one the attack took place the Admiral in charge of the operation...being worried about the location of the American Carriers....called off the follow-up raids which would have been the most devastating to the Americans.
Makes one wonder why he did not break radio silence on the 7th after the attack kicked off? Surely, the location of the carriers was of such significance they should be have been reported as soon as possible.
An interesting source of information on Pearl Harbor and later events.....
Attack on Pearl Harbor | World War II Database
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500N MV Krait
What an excellent link and thanks for making us aware of the exploits of these EXTREMELY brave men, it reminds me in a small way of the daring do of our Cockleshell Heroes. Another Link
Once again I agree with points raised by SASLess regarding radio silence etc.
Would it be correct to suggest that once the Japanese hit Pearl Harbour the aircraft aboard the US carriers became an instant threat?
However Admiral Glojo who has 20/20 hindsight may well have smashed the bee-gee-bees out of this new threat!!!!
We know Lexington had been sighted by the Japanese, but what did they see or perhaps what did they NOT see? Did Lexington have any aircraft on her decks? We could ask, Was she carrying ANY aircraft?
The American were still officially a Neutral country and at week-ends I am guessing most of the crew would be stood down and maybe even playing sports on her deck.. This is just me throwing in my two penarth and I guess there is a significant possibility that she may have been closed up at defence watches. My money would be on the former and what a juicy target that ship would have been. Especially for a submarine.
Until the attack there had been huge emphasis placed on maintaining radio silence and avoiding the 'enemy' AT ALL COSTS. Once the attack started then I guess the submariners had decisions to make regarding this valuable information.
Could it bed that the Japanese submarine commander saw what he wanted to see? In other words, I see an aircraft carrier, therefore it must have aircraft. How was he to know this ship was ferrying aircraft to Midway.
If the admiral of the attacking force was simply told at least one US carrier had been sighted then I stick with the post by LessSAS. The Japanese would possibly be low on munitions and probably low on aviation fuel, under these circumstances would taking on the US carriers a dumb idea?.
Finally Admiral King had made it clear how he did not want to operate with Royal Navy ships, a major argument being their method of refuelling... He intimated how that Navy preferred??? refuelling from astern of the tanker and this method was way too slow!!!
I will not wittle on about refuelling but suffice it to say that the preferred method of the Royal Navy was EXACTLY the same as the USN. This image was taken in March of 1942 in a much colder climate and shows a Royal Navy ship refuelling in the method preferred by the US Commander in Chief Navy.
Makes me cold just looking at that picture 
What an excellent link and thanks for making us aware of the exploits of these EXTREMELY brave men, it reminds me in a small way of the daring do of our Cockleshell Heroes. Another Link
Once again I agree with points raised by SASLess regarding radio silence etc.
Would it be correct to suggest that once the Japanese hit Pearl Harbour the aircraft aboard the US carriers became an instant threat?
However Admiral Glojo who has 20/20 hindsight may well have smashed the bee-gee-bees out of this new threat!!!!
the Aircraft Carriers and one of the Battleships were not in port. (The USS Enterprise was returning from Wake Island , where it had just delivered some aircraft. The USS Lexington was ferrying aircraft to Midway, and the USS Saratoga and USS Colorado were undergoing repairs in the United States
The American were still officially a Neutral country and at week-ends I am guessing most of the crew would be stood down and maybe even playing sports on her deck.. This is just me throwing in my two penarth and I guess there is a significant possibility that she may have been closed up at defence watches. My money would be on the former and what a juicy target that ship would have been. Especially for a submarine.
Until the attack there had been huge emphasis placed on maintaining radio silence and avoiding the 'enemy' AT ALL COSTS. Once the attack started then I guess the submariners had decisions to make regarding this valuable information.
Could it bed that the Japanese submarine commander saw what he wanted to see? In other words, I see an aircraft carrier, therefore it must have aircraft. How was he to know this ship was ferrying aircraft to Midway.
If the admiral of the attacking force was simply told at least one US carrier had been sighted then I stick with the post by LessSAS. The Japanese would possibly be low on munitions and probably low on aviation fuel, under these circumstances would taking on the US carriers a dumb idea?.
Finally Admiral King had made it clear how he did not want to operate with Royal Navy ships, a major argument being their method of refuelling... He intimated how that Navy preferred??? refuelling from astern of the tanker and this method was way too slow!!!
I will not wittle on about refuelling but suffice it to say that the preferred method of the Royal Navy was EXACTLY the same as the USN. This image was taken in March of 1942 in a much colder climate and shows a Royal Navy ship refuelling in the method preferred by the US Commander in Chief Navy.
Makes me cold just looking at that picture
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glojo
Some of the original M and Z soldiers are still around, I used to work with one in a job and he knew what I did but never said what he did until he turned up at my unit for an Anzac Day Parade.
Apart form being into everything war like when a kid, Cockleshell Heroes was one of the films that made me think of one of the specialist units, Paras, Marines etc. Those canoes, we called them Klepper Canoes were amazing considering how long ago they were designed. We still used them in the late 80's.
Sadly, I think I read in my last Association newsletter that due to the lack of M & Z members still alive the M and Z Association would be incorporated into the Commando Association. At least the MV Krait will always be maintained and looked after as a permanent memorial to them.
Re the Aircraft carrier, would a commander not assume it carried aircraft unless told otherwise ? A bit like saying I saw the Tirpitz but was she carrying any ammunition ? The other thing with an aircraft carrier even if it didn't have aircraft, unless under 24 hour observation, new aircraft could land on it.
It would only take 1 bomb to slow up one of his ships and that could have put the who,e task force at risk.
I believe they were also short of fuel so didn't want to steam around for no reason.
Some of the original M and Z soldiers are still around, I used to work with one in a job and he knew what I did but never said what he did until he turned up at my unit for an Anzac Day Parade.
Apart form being into everything war like when a kid, Cockleshell Heroes was one of the films that made me think of one of the specialist units, Paras, Marines etc. Those canoes, we called them Klepper Canoes were amazing considering how long ago they were designed. We still used them in the late 80's.
Sadly, I think I read in my last Association newsletter that due to the lack of M & Z members still alive the M and Z Association would be incorporated into the Commando Association. At least the MV Krait will always be maintained and looked after as a permanent memorial to them.
Re the Aircraft carrier, would a commander not assume it carried aircraft unless told otherwise ? A bit like saying I saw the Tirpitz but was she carrying any ammunition ? The other thing with an aircraft carrier even if it didn't have aircraft, unless under 24 hour observation, new aircraft could land on it.
It would only take 1 bomb to slow up one of his ships and that could have put the who,e task force at risk.
I believe they were also short of fuel so didn't want to steam around for no reason.
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Raid on Singapore Harbour
Further to 5000Ns mention of Operation Jaywick - The cockleshell style raid on Singapore harbour in 1943 led by Ivan Lyon in 1943 and mention of the fishing boat Krait - While no doubt being aware of the second raid
on Singapore some months later that tragically ended in disaster for the entire raiding party - I came by the following book while in Singapore which I am sure that if not already aware of then he and others will find greatly interesting -
' The Heroes of Rimau '
by Lynette Ramsay Silver via research of Major Tom Hall
Highly recommended to all having an interest in the Malayan/Singapore
WW2 war in the Far East.
...
on Singapore some months later that tragically ended in disaster for the entire raiding party - I came by the following book while in Singapore which I am sure that if not already aware of then he and others will find greatly interesting -
' The Heroes of Rimau '
by Lynette Ramsay Silver via research of Major Tom Hall
Highly recommended to all having an interest in the Malayan/Singapore
WW2 war in the Far East.
...
Glojo,
Several War Warnings had been issued to Cincpac by Cominch (now CNO). The Pacific fleet was being deployed pretty much in two task units for three day at sea deployments per week. The at sea periods generally began on Tuesday and ended on Friday....with Sunday being the most common time for all of the ships to be in port. It was not they were in stand down....as much as they were becoming predictable and did so by trying to adhere to a Peace Time routine more or less. The crews were short handed and the watch standing requirments was imposing a hardship on the crews. Admiral Stark was trying to balance operational needs against crew rest and morale.
One of the contributing factors to the Pacific Fleet being caught in Port as they were....was the turf war Navy War Plans (Adimiral Kelly Turner), had going with Navy Radio Communications and Navy Intelligence over who would control the analyssis and dissemination of sigint and other intell. There had been some compromises of security re "Ultra"/"Magic" by several parties to include the British in the months preceding the Pearl Harbor attack. This lead to CincPac being deprived of the results of the intercept and decoding of the Japanese Diplomatic Code which up to that point had been passed along for use by Fleet Intell Officers.
Had the Fleet Officers been provided the intercepts they would have been in a much better position to compare their own Navy Intell to what was trending in the Diplomatic intercepts.
The cover up by Turner and other culpable individuals during investigations into the Pearl Harbor disaster is a whole different discussion.
Fast forward to the months just before 9-11 and we can see things have not improved all that much since the early 1940's. Those that have the information are loath to turn loose of it for any number of good and valid reasons but also for some very bad reasons.
Several War Warnings had been issued to Cincpac by Cominch (now CNO). The Pacific fleet was being deployed pretty much in two task units for three day at sea deployments per week. The at sea periods generally began on Tuesday and ended on Friday....with Sunday being the most common time for all of the ships to be in port. It was not they were in stand down....as much as they were becoming predictable and did so by trying to adhere to a Peace Time routine more or less. The crews were short handed and the watch standing requirments was imposing a hardship on the crews. Admiral Stark was trying to balance operational needs against crew rest and morale.
One of the contributing factors to the Pacific Fleet being caught in Port as they were....was the turf war Navy War Plans (Adimiral Kelly Turner), had going with Navy Radio Communications and Navy Intelligence over who would control the analyssis and dissemination of sigint and other intell. There had been some compromises of security re "Ultra"/"Magic" by several parties to include the British in the months preceding the Pearl Harbor attack. This lead to CincPac being deprived of the results of the intercept and decoding of the Japanese Diplomatic Code which up to that point had been passed along for use by Fleet Intell Officers.
Had the Fleet Officers been provided the intercepts they would have been in a much better position to compare their own Navy Intell to what was trending in the Diplomatic intercepts.
The cover up by Turner and other culpable individuals during investigations into the Pearl Harbor disaster is a whole different discussion.
Fast forward to the months just before 9-11 and we can see things have not improved all that much since the early 1940's. Those that have the information are loath to turn loose of it for any number of good and valid reasons but also for some very bad reasons.
Join Date: Apr 2011
Location: Torquay, England
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Hi 500N I totally agree with what you are saying and sadly I did not make myself very clear 
My bad
I guess we are singing from that same hymn sheet
In those days flying out to the mid pacific in the hope of finding an aircraft carrier to land on would be an interesting job offer.
regarding your klepper canoe, we called it the cockle mk II, I guess that may well be how they decided on the title of the film. my thoughts regarding that 'beast' of a canoe was the thing was quite heavy and hard work to use for its size. It was however quite sturdy. happy days indeed. I used it in the 60's and being so tall I always sat in the front which might explain why sometimes it may have been such hard work paddling that thing.
Hi SASloss,
Interesting information, Lexington was ferrying aircraft between Pearl harbour and Midway, would this be a single leg of about 5 - 6 days? Then the same coming back . Would they have crossed the International date line?
Boy do I ask some silly questions.. 
Just had a quick check and it looks like the line is about 150 miles to the west?? Knowing me I got that wrong. it's something we tend not to think about here in 'sunny' Torquay
My bad
Originally Posted by me in my previous post
Could it be that the Japanese submarine commander saw what he wanted to see? In other words, I see an aircraft carrier, therefore it must have aircraft
Originally Posted by 500N
Re the Aircraft carrier, would a commander not assume it carried aircraft unless told otherwise ? A bit like saying I saw the Tirpitz but was she carrying any ammunition ? The other thing with an aircraft carrier even if it didn't have aircraft, unless under 24 hour observation, new aircraft could land on it.
regarding your klepper canoe, we called it the cockle mk II, I guess that may well be how they decided on the title of the film. my thoughts regarding that 'beast' of a canoe was the thing was quite heavy and hard work to use for its size. It was however quite sturdy. happy days indeed. I used it in the 60's and being so tall I always sat in the front which might explain why sometimes it may have been such hard work paddling that thing.
Hi SASloss,
Interesting information, Lexington was ferrying aircraft between Pearl harbour and Midway, would this be a single leg of about 5 - 6 days? Then the same coming back . Would they have crossed the International date line?
Boy do I ask some silly questions.. Just had a quick check and it looks like the line is about 150 miles to the west?? Knowing me I got that wrong. it's something we tend not to think about here in 'sunny' Torquay
if the winner of a war is indeed the side that makes the fewer mistakes, the men running the Japanese war effort must have been, indeed, total clusterf**ks
PS What's wrong with using the -or spelling of Pearl Harbor? As well as being correct for the Americans (who own it!) it also follows the original Latin spelling (cf armor, color etc)
