How much fast air to support 1) a Brigade, 2) a Division
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Unfortunately, it seems to me that a given amount of cloth was available, overall, for suits in three colours for three customers.
There was sufficient cloth for three three piece suits.
It appears to me that the customer with most 'sway' over the tailor ordered himself a natty little number in brown, three piece, with two spare pairs of trousers, and two jackets, one single- one double-breasted. He would no doubt complain that he did not also get plus fours.
There was sufficient cloth for three three piece suits.
It appears to me that the customer with most 'sway' over the tailor ordered himself a natty little number in brown, three piece, with two spare pairs of trousers, and two jackets, one single- one double-breasted. He would no doubt complain that he did not also get plus fours.
Thread Starter
S41,
Yes indeed. The claim that Kosovo was won by air power alone may be a tad ambitious, and of course, ground forces were vital in Granby/Storm. But it is fair to say that air power was the dominant means of delivering decisive effect in both campaigns, and I would suggest that the quoted claims for the import of air in Afghanistan are not unduly exaggerated or over-optimistic.
I guess my starting point is that in a world that is admitted and acknowledged to be unpredictable, dangerous and ever-changing, I can't really grasp the wisdom of taking the most recent real world examples of when we have needed military force (within or just outside the last decade) and then deciding that we need just a little less than that today.
How is that alright? What has changed to warrant such a scaling back? How can we be sure that we won't need to do something similar (or even bigger) again? When did we last predict a threat developing far enough ahead to re-equip to meet it? Not in Iraq, not in the Balkans, not with Al Qaeda. Not in Sierra Leone, not even in the Falklands.
It would therefore not be unreasonable to assume that the next contingency might actually require just a little more effort, rather than a little less.
It's not as though either Telic or Deliberate Force were 'once in a generation' large scale wars that were somehow the 'war to end all wars.' These are operations of a scale that we might easily have to undertake again.
I may be being stupid or obtuse, but to look at these ops and then conclude:
"We need to be able to do today two-thirds of what we did yesterday".
Just seems to be insane, or at least recklessly irresponsible, to me.
Now clearly, we're never going to go back to the force structure that allowed us to mount a 'Granby' sized op, and no-one is seriously suggesting that we should go back to 30 Fast Jet Squadrons.
But 18 really doesn't seem excessive. 12 seemed like too few, and 6-8 feels like the 1920s all over again.
And the Army and Navy have not trimmed down by anything like the same amount, so it looks as though we no longer have 'balanced' forces.
Clockwork Mouse,
Intelligence, commonsense and wisdom are always welcome - especially when a journo is trying to get his head around an issue that he feels passionate about. S41's contribution is therefore most welcome. As would yours be should you choose to deploy or display any of those three attributes on this thread.
Yes indeed. The claim that Kosovo was won by air power alone may be a tad ambitious, and of course, ground forces were vital in Granby/Storm. But it is fair to say that air power was the dominant means of delivering decisive effect in both campaigns, and I would suggest that the quoted claims for the import of air in Afghanistan are not unduly exaggerated or over-optimistic.
I guess my starting point is that in a world that is admitted and acknowledged to be unpredictable, dangerous and ever-changing, I can't really grasp the wisdom of taking the most recent real world examples of when we have needed military force (within or just outside the last decade) and then deciding that we need just a little less than that today.
How is that alright? What has changed to warrant such a scaling back? How can we be sure that we won't need to do something similar (or even bigger) again? When did we last predict a threat developing far enough ahead to re-equip to meet it? Not in Iraq, not in the Balkans, not with Al Qaeda. Not in Sierra Leone, not even in the Falklands.
It would therefore not be unreasonable to assume that the next contingency might actually require just a little more effort, rather than a little less.
It's not as though either Telic or Deliberate Force were 'once in a generation' large scale wars that were somehow the 'war to end all wars.' These are operations of a scale that we might easily have to undertake again.
I may be being stupid or obtuse, but to look at these ops and then conclude:
"We need to be able to do today two-thirds of what we did yesterday".
Just seems to be insane, or at least recklessly irresponsible, to me.
Now clearly, we're never going to go back to the force structure that allowed us to mount a 'Granby' sized op, and no-one is seriously suggesting that we should go back to 30 Fast Jet Squadrons.
But 18 really doesn't seem excessive. 12 seemed like too few, and 6-8 feels like the 1920s all over again.
And the Army and Navy have not trimmed down by anything like the same amount, so it looks as though we no longer have 'balanced' forces.
Clockwork Mouse,
Intelligence, commonsense and wisdom are always welcome - especially when a journo is trying to get his head around an issue that he feels passionate about. S41's contribution is therefore most welcome. As would yours be should you choose to deploy or display any of those three attributes on this thread.
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Oh Jacko! It would appear from your final sentence that my comment about the quality of the posts on this thread has wounded you! Do you assume I was referring to you?
Thread Starter
Not at all. I have the hide of a rhino. But having read and enjoyed many of your posts in the past, and knowing that you devoted a lifetime to military aviating, I'd have expected something a bit more thought provoking. Something that added to the debate.
Even a reasoned argument as to why Fast Air is no longer relevant, or as to why the proposed force size will be adequate, and how the reductions make no difference to the aims of policy (as outlined in SDSR) would be rather better than anything I've read by Richards and Houghton.
Even a reasoned argument as to why Fast Air is no longer relevant, or as to why the proposed force size will be adequate, and how the reductions make no difference to the aims of policy (as outlined in SDSR) would be rather better than anything I've read by Richards and Houghton.
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CM - thank you, I think I'm blushing... 
Jacko,
I think that we're closer to agreeing than it appears. I am a vociferous critic of the SDSR process, precisely because it was rushed and did not lay out a credible foreign policy framework; instead, we got a pile of warmed-up woolly thinking that didn't help at all because it provided almost no direction.
This woolly thinking then led to yet more salami slicing to meet the HMT budgetary envelope, whereas a strategic approach would have taken the view that its better to make 20% savings by taking - as far as possible - 100% of the least useful 20% of the budget rather than 20% across the board.
So, we have a level of tasking and op tempo that would've astonished RAFG and, probably the SDR98 planners. And we have a much smaller force to deliver this, retrenching all the time.
My principal criticism is that we've always gone for the best equipment specification we can reasonably conjure up (or, to the cynic, the most expensive option BAES presents
) and for the same money we could have more less sophisticated but more than adequate platforms - eg Gripen viz Typhoon, Horizon or Arleigh Burke viz T45 - the list goes on. And it is from this tyranny of the fleet size numbers that the problems you allude to arise. (That, and a propensity for service chiefs to focus on their home turf toys - e.g. FJ, CVF, rather than other capabilities, eg FW MPA.)
Is 6 FJ Sqns the right answer? No, probably not even in theoretical terms, let alone current op tempo terms. But if I had a little more funding or flexibility, I'd add FW MPA and save ASTOR before I added another FJ Sqn.
S41
Jacko,
I think that we're closer to agreeing than it appears. I am a vociferous critic of the SDSR process, precisely because it was rushed and did not lay out a credible foreign policy framework; instead, we got a pile of warmed-up woolly thinking that didn't help at all because it provided almost no direction.
This woolly thinking then led to yet more salami slicing to meet the HMT budgetary envelope, whereas a strategic approach would have taken the view that its better to make 20% savings by taking - as far as possible - 100% of the least useful 20% of the budget rather than 20% across the board.
So, we have a level of tasking and op tempo that would've astonished RAFG and, probably the SDR98 planners. And we have a much smaller force to deliver this, retrenching all the time.
My principal criticism is that we've always gone for the best equipment specification we can reasonably conjure up (or, to the cynic, the most expensive option BAES presents
) and for the same money we could have more less sophisticated but more than adequate platforms - eg Gripen viz Typhoon, Horizon or Arleigh Burke viz T45 - the list goes on. And it is from this tyranny of the fleet size numbers that the problems you allude to arise. (That, and a propensity for service chiefs to focus on their home turf toys - e.g. FJ, CVF, rather than other capabilities, eg FW MPA.)Is 6 FJ Sqns the right answer? No, probably not even in theoretical terms, let alone current op tempo terms. But if I had a little more funding or flexibility, I'd add FW MPA and save ASTOR before I added another FJ Sqn.
S41
Jacko, I think that "The claim that Kosovo was won by air power alone may be a tad ambitious" is very understated. My recollection of the post conflict BDA is that despite the massive claims to the contrary, very few Serbian AFV were destroyed despit that being one of the aims.
From a US Army War College Paper:
"Independent accounts from reporters covering the battle for Kosovo offered an entirely different set of battle damage statistics from those offered by either General Clark or the Pentagon. Their perspective is interesting for it is offered from firsthand, on-the-ground analysis, just like the latter NATO and Pentagon estimates.
The first newspaper reports on battle damage appeared at the end of June. Indications were that only 13 Serb tanks and fewer than 100 armored personnel carriers had been destroyed. Reporters noted the ruins of many different types of decoys hit by NATO forces (e.g., rusted tanks with broken parts, wood or canvas mock-ups). Carlotta Gall of The New York Times, a veteran war correspondent from the first Russian war in Chechnya, saw little damage. Newsweek reporter Mark Dennis found only one destroyed tank after driving around Kosovo for ten days. Did the Serbs manage to extricate all of their destroyed vehicles during their publicly filmed withdrawal, did they hide them, or did they really experience much less damage than NATO sources declared?
In late July, Aviation Week and Space Technology reported that NATO had dropped 3,000 precision-guided weapons that resulted in 500 hits on decoys, but destroyed only 50 Yugoslav tanks. ....
U.S. News and World Report, in its 20 September 1999 edition, stated that a NATO team visited 900 "aim points" targeted by NATO in Kosovo and found only 26 tank and similar-looking self-propelled-artillery carcasses. This would again throw NATO's revised number of 93 tanks out the window. However, how many tank carcasses were in Serbia, where the NATO team did not visit, is not known, making this figure less provocative and contradictory than it originally appears. The article also reported increased friction between General Clark and his NATO air operations chief, Lieutenant General Michael Short, over target selection and strategy (mobile targets such as tanks versus infrastructure, respectively). The article concluded that it was not air power but Russia's withdrawal of support for Serbia that probably brought an end to the air war in Kosovo. The article noted that in future conflicts, the most merciful way to end them may be to conduct them swiftly and violently instead of by the trial-and-error, phased approach used in Kosovo.[19]
Finally, several British officers, both retired and serving, also noted that damage was much less than originally stated. One newspaper report, citing British Ministry of Defense sources, stated that the damage done to tanks was perhaps even less than the lowest quoted figure of 13 tank kills.[20] But the most damning comment could prove to be from an International Herald Tribune article on 1 October. Written by Frederick Bonnart, the editorial director of the independent but highly authoritative NATO's Nations, the article discusses how NATO "propaganda" was used against the West. He notes:
From a US Army War College Paper:
"Independent accounts from reporters covering the battle for Kosovo offered an entirely different set of battle damage statistics from those offered by either General Clark or the Pentagon. Their perspective is interesting for it is offered from firsthand, on-the-ground analysis, just like the latter NATO and Pentagon estimates.
The first newspaper reports on battle damage appeared at the end of June. Indications were that only 13 Serb tanks and fewer than 100 armored personnel carriers had been destroyed. Reporters noted the ruins of many different types of decoys hit by NATO forces (e.g., rusted tanks with broken parts, wood or canvas mock-ups). Carlotta Gall of The New York Times, a veteran war correspondent from the first Russian war in Chechnya, saw little damage. Newsweek reporter Mark Dennis found only one destroyed tank after driving around Kosovo for ten days. Did the Serbs manage to extricate all of their destroyed vehicles during their publicly filmed withdrawal, did they hide them, or did they really experience much less damage than NATO sources declared?
In late July, Aviation Week and Space Technology reported that NATO had dropped 3,000 precision-guided weapons that resulted in 500 hits on decoys, but destroyed only 50 Yugoslav tanks. ....
U.S. News and World Report, in its 20 September 1999 edition, stated that a NATO team visited 900 "aim points" targeted by NATO in Kosovo and found only 26 tank and similar-looking self-propelled-artillery carcasses. This would again throw NATO's revised number of 93 tanks out the window. However, how many tank carcasses were in Serbia, where the NATO team did not visit, is not known, making this figure less provocative and contradictory than it originally appears. The article also reported increased friction between General Clark and his NATO air operations chief, Lieutenant General Michael Short, over target selection and strategy (mobile targets such as tanks versus infrastructure, respectively). The article concluded that it was not air power but Russia's withdrawal of support for Serbia that probably brought an end to the air war in Kosovo. The article noted that in future conflicts, the most merciful way to end them may be to conduct them swiftly and violently instead of by the trial-and-error, phased approach used in Kosovo.[19]
Finally, several British officers, both retired and serving, also noted that damage was much less than originally stated. One newspaper report, citing British Ministry of Defense sources, stated that the damage done to tanks was perhaps even less than the lowest quoted figure of 13 tank kills.[20] But the most damning comment could prove to be from an International Herald Tribune article on 1 October. Written by Frederick Bonnart, the editorial director of the independent but highly authoritative NATO's Nations, the article discusses how NATO "propaganda" was used against the West. He notes:
In democracies, it is the duty of the public services to present the truth even in wartime, and particularly when they are in sole control of the information. If it is deliberately designed to engender fear and hate, then the correct term is propaganda.[21]
In particular, Bonnart believes the armored vehicle totals did not properly represent the vehicles actually destroyed, and that NATO deliberately used the West's reputation for truth and fairness to carry out a highly charged information policy against the Serbs. This made NATO's information policy rife with propaganda, Bonnart contends
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As an engineer whose closest contact with an enemy was a surprised sea lion on Sealion Island, I am definitely no expert on this war or the next. But humour me and suppose we wanted or felt we needed to intervene in somewhere like Somalia or Yemen. I hope we don't, but if we did, I think perhaps the aim of such an intervention might be to keep a lid on things without getting any more involved than we had to, much like NATO's limited involvement in Pakistan with Reaper etc. If we we going to do that then surely our aim has to be monitoring or taking out key people, communications and supply routes. Or something like that but I haven't read AP3000 recently... So we become the embuggerence factor to the bad guys and not the other way round. To do that is somewhere like Somalia or Yemen perhaps it would be nice to have:
1. Some good Int
2. A Navy to control the sea lanes
3. Some good ISTAR (perhaps even some MR...)
4. Persistent or fast air (ISTAR-integrated) to do what needs doing
5. Substantial SF to do the many bits air can never do
6. Some rotary and tac AT to support the SF
7. All the bits needed to support the above
8. A government with a clearly defined strategy
I can see more of a role for typhoon in this particular scenario than infantry.
1. Some good Int
2. A Navy to control the sea lanes
3. Some good ISTAR (perhaps even some MR...)
4. Persistent or fast air (ISTAR-integrated) to do what needs doing
5. Substantial SF to do the many bits air can never do
6. Some rotary and tac AT to support the SF
7. All the bits needed to support the above
8. A government with a clearly defined strategy
I can see more of a role for typhoon in this particular scenario than infantry.
Last edited by Clearedtoroll; 19th Jan 2011 at 13:11. Reason: Typos
By Clearedtoroll:
As an engineer whose closest contact with an enemy was a surprised sea lion on Sealion Island, I am definitely no expert on this war or the next. But humour me and suppose we wanted or felt we needed to intervene in somewhere like Somalia or Yemen. I hope we don't, but if we did, I think perhaps the aim of such an intervention might be to keep a lid on things without getting any more involved than we had to, much like NATO's limited involvement in Pakistan with Reaper etc. If we we going to do that then surely our aim has to be monitoring or taking out key people, communications and supply routes. Or something like that but I haven't read AP3000 recently... So we become the embuggerence factor to the bad guys and not the other way round. To do that is somewhere like Somalia or Yemen perhaps it would be nice to have:
1. Some good Int So keeping ASTOR might be useful in this scenario
2. A Navy to control the sea lanes & to provide logistic support, C3, the rotary assets "home", the "jumping off point" for SF etc, all without the need for HNS
3. Some good ISTAR (perhaps even some MR...) AGREED, inc UAV maybe
4. Persistent or fast air (ISTAR-integrated) to do what needs doing Doesn't need to be fast air, Reaper might be enough
5. Substantial SF to do the many bits air can never do
6. Some rotary and tac AT to support the SF
7. All the bits needed to support the above Yes, a full amphibious/ Carrier task group
8. A government with a clearly defined strategy Good grief, now your asking....
I can see more of a role for typhoon in this particular scenario than infantry. I can't - Harrier, maybe! F/A-18, Rafale. You can't rely on HNS in this scenario
Of course, other scenarios will require adifferent asset mix!
As an engineer whose closest contact with an enemy was a surprised sea lion on Sealion Island, I am definitely no expert on this war or the next. But humour me and suppose we wanted or felt we needed to intervene in somewhere like Somalia or Yemen. I hope we don't, but if we did, I think perhaps the aim of such an intervention might be to keep a lid on things without getting any more involved than we had to, much like NATO's limited involvement in Pakistan with Reaper etc. If we we going to do that then surely our aim has to be monitoring or taking out key people, communications and supply routes. Or something like that but I haven't read AP3000 recently... So we become the embuggerence factor to the bad guys and not the other way round. To do that is somewhere like Somalia or Yemen perhaps it would be nice to have:
1. Some good Int So keeping ASTOR might be useful in this scenario
2. A Navy to control the sea lanes & to provide logistic support, C3, the rotary assets "home", the "jumping off point" for SF etc, all without the need for HNS
3. Some good ISTAR (perhaps even some MR...) AGREED, inc UAV maybe
4. Persistent or fast air (ISTAR-integrated) to do what needs doing Doesn't need to be fast air, Reaper might be enough
5. Substantial SF to do the many bits air can never do
6. Some rotary and tac AT to support the SF
7. All the bits needed to support the above Yes, a full amphibious/ Carrier task group
8. A government with a clearly defined strategy Good grief, now your asking....
I can see more of a role for typhoon in this particular scenario than infantry. I can't - Harrier, maybe! F/A-18, Rafale. You can't rely on HNS in this scenario
Of course, other scenarios will require adifferent asset mix!
Last edited by andyy; 19th Jan 2011 at 16:18.
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Fast Air.
Just to throw the obvious in the works, especially for those who assert that "Reaper can do that" with abandon.
FAST Air.
SPEED, Reach, Ubiquity.
Anyone getting it now?
Just to throw the obvious in the works, especially for those who assert that "Reaper can do that" with abandon.
FAST Air.
SPEED, Reach, Ubiquity.
Anyone getting it now?
Speed - certainly but that might not be needed in the scenario painted
Reach - yes, to a certain extent.
Ubiquity - I don't think so. On call, maybe, depending on basing, but omnipresent?
Reach - yes, to a certain extent.
Ubiquity - I don't think so. On call, maybe, depending on basing, but omnipresent?
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I agree with your points on carriers... In Somalia we might make use of friendly neighbours (or at least neighbours who might grudgingly not notice a small det) and in Yemen we almost certainly would, but who knows about elsewhere. Even with HNS, I agree carriers would be helpful, and without it essential. Carriers make sense to me and having a reasonable chunk of the UK's FJs able to operate off them would seem sensible too.
My point was more that sizing air (and sea) capabilities based upon everything existing to support a land deployment was a bit blinkered (perhaps deliberately so in MoD). I picked the Yemen/Somalia scenario to illustrate that point and in that particular context I think Typhoons for speed and reach (with Reapers for persistence) would still prove more useful than infantry. That's not to say carrier-capable ac would not be as good or better, but I'll leave that to another thread!
My point was more that sizing air (and sea) capabilities based upon everything existing to support a land deployment was a bit blinkered (perhaps deliberately so in MoD). I picked the Yemen/Somalia scenario to illustrate that point and in that particular context I think Typhoons for speed and reach (with Reapers for persistence) would still prove more useful than infantry. That's not to say carrier-capable ac would not be as good or better, but I'll leave that to another thread!
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OK, so let's admit here what we all know to be true - the Review was financially driven. If the Government had come out and said so, what do we think the reaction on this site would have been? What would the post Review RAF have looked like if it had been designed by PPruners? Tin (or should that be Kevlar) hat on and and waiting for incoming - bit like Basra really! Should be an interesting discussion.
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Jacko, whom I respect and admire, quite understandably tore me off a strip for commenting on others' posts while not putting forward my own cunning plan for military aviation and in particular fast air, so here goes!
There is a widespread public misconception that the punch-up in Afghanistan in which we are currently involved is a war. Despite the scale of the fighting and of casualties on both sides, it is not. It is a COIN operation in support of and at the request of the (legitimate) government in Kabul. We are not at war with Afghanistan or the Afghans. Any lasting solution must be political. The scale and nature of our military involvement needs to keep this in mind.
Success in a COIN campaign can only be achieved by winning the hearts and minds of the populace among whom the insurgents live and hide. If there is no likelihood of that outcome, then it is a lost cause and we should pull out without delay. Winning hearts and minds requires feet on the ground, maximum stroking of the locals and minimum bashing them. When they have to be bashed, it must be seen to be necessary and proportionate. Collateral damage must be avoided if at all possible.
Fast air can only provide kinetic effect (things that go bang) or the threat of it in order to influence what happens on the ground. Understandably the locals’ hearts and minds tend not to respond positively to being attacked indiscriminately (as they are likely to perceive it) from the air. If fast air intervention is required to save lives, then of course it must be available and be used. However, as an indicator, the less that fast air is needed to protect the ground forces, the greater the likelihood that we are winning the contest.
After the traumatic recent experiences of the Blair decade, I think (and hope) that it is most unlikely that British forces will get involved in another substantial conventional punch-up in the foreseeable future. The people and politicians no longer have the stomach for it. I can, however, envisage the possibility of limited small scale and low risk COIN and intervention operations in support of our true friends and allies, similar to that in Sierra Leone, but anything more serious and larger than brigade level is most unlikely.
I am therefore not overly concerned at the anticipated (temporary?) shortage of land based fast air. The availability of sufficient effective AT and SH are a greater concern, but my greatest concern is the loss of our maritime capabilities. We are an island nation but we no longer have the means to patrol and protect our own waters, let alone project force at a distance. The ability to demonstrate an effective deterrence of foreign aggression against our overseas interests and territories is an important component of our sovereignty, and I do not believe that we possess the means to deter convincingly any more. No MPA; no carriers with any fixed wing aircraft; no air support for our surface ships or submarines; reduced ISTAR. These are real causes for concern. Shortage of land based fast air, especially if it is optimised for air to air as seems to be the intention with Typhoon, is the least of our worries. Mine anyway.
Those aviators who maintain that fast air will be more useful in future conflicts than infantry have my pity. Please don’t aspire to air rank!
Though I will humbly admit to my own ignorance of the employment of airpower (I am after all only a pongo, and ex-infantry too), I would set our national priorities for aviation capabilities in these straightened times as:
1. CC and ISTAR, including UAVs
2. MPA
3. SH
4. Carrier based attack and AD
5. AT
6. Land based CAS, including UAVs
7. Land based AD
There now, that’s opened a can of worms! Weapons free!
There is a widespread public misconception that the punch-up in Afghanistan in which we are currently involved is a war. Despite the scale of the fighting and of casualties on both sides, it is not. It is a COIN operation in support of and at the request of the (legitimate) government in Kabul. We are not at war with Afghanistan or the Afghans. Any lasting solution must be political. The scale and nature of our military involvement needs to keep this in mind.
Success in a COIN campaign can only be achieved by winning the hearts and minds of the populace among whom the insurgents live and hide. If there is no likelihood of that outcome, then it is a lost cause and we should pull out without delay. Winning hearts and minds requires feet on the ground, maximum stroking of the locals and minimum bashing them. When they have to be bashed, it must be seen to be necessary and proportionate. Collateral damage must be avoided if at all possible.
Fast air can only provide kinetic effect (things that go bang) or the threat of it in order to influence what happens on the ground. Understandably the locals’ hearts and minds tend not to respond positively to being attacked indiscriminately (as they are likely to perceive it) from the air. If fast air intervention is required to save lives, then of course it must be available and be used. However, as an indicator, the less that fast air is needed to protect the ground forces, the greater the likelihood that we are winning the contest.
After the traumatic recent experiences of the Blair decade, I think (and hope) that it is most unlikely that British forces will get involved in another substantial conventional punch-up in the foreseeable future. The people and politicians no longer have the stomach for it. I can, however, envisage the possibility of limited small scale and low risk COIN and intervention operations in support of our true friends and allies, similar to that in Sierra Leone, but anything more serious and larger than brigade level is most unlikely.
I am therefore not overly concerned at the anticipated (temporary?) shortage of land based fast air. The availability of sufficient effective AT and SH are a greater concern, but my greatest concern is the loss of our maritime capabilities. We are an island nation but we no longer have the means to patrol and protect our own waters, let alone project force at a distance. The ability to demonstrate an effective deterrence of foreign aggression against our overseas interests and territories is an important component of our sovereignty, and I do not believe that we possess the means to deter convincingly any more. No MPA; no carriers with any fixed wing aircraft; no air support for our surface ships or submarines; reduced ISTAR. These are real causes for concern. Shortage of land based fast air, especially if it is optimised for air to air as seems to be the intention with Typhoon, is the least of our worries. Mine anyway.
Those aviators who maintain that fast air will be more useful in future conflicts than infantry have my pity. Please don’t aspire to air rank!
Though I will humbly admit to my own ignorance of the employment of airpower (I am after all only a pongo, and ex-infantry too), I would set our national priorities for aviation capabilities in these straightened times as:
1. CC and ISTAR, including UAVs
2. MPA
3. SH
4. Carrier based attack and AD
5. AT
6. Land based CAS, including UAVs
7. Land based AD
There now, that’s opened a can of worms! Weapons free!
Last edited by Clockwork Mouse; 21st Jan 2011 at 21:58.
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No incoming from me, it's your opinion. Perhaps would beg to differ on the issue of defence of the Homeland, with land based AD coming at the bottom of your list though.
Thread Starter
That's the point exactly.
If anyone had said in 1972 that Argentina would invade the Falklands, or in 1980 that Iraq would invade Kuwait, or in 1979 that the Berlin Wall would topple, or in 1929 that the Germans would invade Poland, or that Yugoslavia was going to violently break apart, then you'd have been rightly scornful.
The politicians keep telling us that this is a dangerous and unstable world, in which the threat is changing and dynamic.
And so we scale our defences to be able to cope with 2/3 of what we've most recently had to deal with.
Bloody madness. It's like the post Great War 'Ten Year Rule' all over again.
And with that in mind, I'd invert your list of air power priorities, because it looks like one that has been drawn up by someone viewing the requirement through the prism of the expeditionary war requirements of 1995-2005, and I'm not confident that they are necessarily the only future threat.
1. Land based AD1. You need to defend the UK and Falklands, and defence of the UK has to be the primary duty of Government. Whatever else you do, you might need to defend the forces you deploy.
2. CC and ISTAR, though UAVs are niche, and I'd sacrifice them if required
2nd equal. Land based CAS/BAI/Interdiction, though UAVs are niche, and I'd sacrifice them if required. Land-based because if Host Nation Support isn't available, my guess is that the op isn't politically tenable anyway, and if you can't get HNS, your carriers are going to be screwed for their port facilities, resupply, ISTAR and AAR.
4. AT/AAR.
5. SH. Mobility for whatever you deploy.
6. MPA/ASW.
7. Carrier based attack and AD, if and only if I can have enough of everything else, because while it's sometimes useful, it's niche, and seldom essential.
If anyone had said in 1972 that Argentina would invade the Falklands, or in 1980 that Iraq would invade Kuwait, or in 1979 that the Berlin Wall would topple, or in 1929 that the Germans would invade Poland, or that Yugoslavia was going to violently break apart, then you'd have been rightly scornful.
The politicians keep telling us that this is a dangerous and unstable world, in which the threat is changing and dynamic.
And so we scale our defences to be able to cope with 2/3 of what we've most recently had to deal with.
Bloody madness. It's like the post Great War 'Ten Year Rule' all over again.
And with that in mind, I'd invert your list of air power priorities, because it looks like one that has been drawn up by someone viewing the requirement through the prism of the expeditionary war requirements of 1995-2005, and I'm not confident that they are necessarily the only future threat.
1. Land based AD1. You need to defend the UK and Falklands, and defence of the UK has to be the primary duty of Government. Whatever else you do, you might need to defend the forces you deploy.
2. CC and ISTAR, though UAVs are niche, and I'd sacrifice them if required
2nd equal. Land based CAS/BAI/Interdiction, though UAVs are niche, and I'd sacrifice them if required. Land-based because if Host Nation Support isn't available, my guess is that the op isn't politically tenable anyway, and if you can't get HNS, your carriers are going to be screwed for their port facilities, resupply, ISTAR and AAR.
4. AT/AAR.
5. SH. Mobility for whatever you deploy.
6. MPA/ASW.
7. Carrier based attack and AD, if and only if I can have enough of everything else, because while it's sometimes useful, it's niche, and seldom essential.
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Jack
Pretty much spot on with my thoughts; defence of the Homeland just has to be the No 1 priority - who would have predicted 9/11? WRT "what's the realistic threat"; with the benefit of several years experience since 9/11one would like to think that the warnings and indicators would now be in place to give us the "heads up" and posture accordingly and, from experience, I do think there is a threat, albeit relatively small - but that's all it takes if you are not prepared. However, that does not detract from CM's opinion.
CB
Pretty much spot on with my thoughts; defence of the Homeland just has to be the No 1 priority - who would have predicted 9/11? WRT "what's the realistic threat"; with the benefit of several years experience since 9/11one would like to think that the warnings and indicators would now be in place to give us the "heads up" and posture accordingly and, from experience, I do think there is a threat, albeit relatively small - but that's all it takes if you are not prepared. However, that does not detract from CM's opinion.
CB
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Just to throw a spanner in from a very different angle....and this is very relevant to the RAF.....
Apart from the nuclear submarine fleet, all other capabilities across the 3 Services require us to burn oil in one form or another.
Given the RAF uses over 60% of all fuel burned in the MoD (the largest carbon emitter of any govt dept) and carbon limits will be applied as part of UK law (already passed), coupled with the increased cost and scarcity of fuel, can you see us being able to fly those jets to meet any task?
Real world stuff we will see in most of our Service careers - not tree-hugging pish either - real operational limits.
Apart from the nuclear submarine fleet, all other capabilities across the 3 Services require us to burn oil in one form or another.
Given the RAF uses over 60% of all fuel burned in the MoD (the largest carbon emitter of any govt dept) and carbon limits will be applied as part of UK law (already passed), coupled with the increased cost and scarcity of fuel, can you see us being able to fly those jets to meet any task?
Real world stuff we will see in most of our Service careers - not tree-hugging pish either - real operational limits.
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Perhaps I am like like the single-service focussed soldier who is the current CDS and who apparently believes in a boots-and-bayonet centric strategy. However, as a veteran of 34 years military experience and several staff colleges, not all of them British, I think I will stick to my guns on this.
Of course air defence of the homeland must be assured. However, the REALISTIC threat is minimal and easily countered. It is the least likely capability of them all to be put to the test for real, and I don't accept intercepting the odd Russian recce aircraft as a real test. It is also the only one that has not been put to the test since WW2. Therefore to limit all the shiny new Typhoons we are getting to a single AD capability, which is apparently now the case, defies reason and perhaps says something about the focus of the top brass in the RAF.
The defence of the Falklands would be far better assured by the threat posed by the existence of a quickly deployable carrier force with multi-role fast jets embarked than by a handful of land based AD Typhoons with little realistic prospect of support or reinforcement.
No. I'll go for carriers before, though not instead of please note, land based AD. But ISTAR comes first. The general who can see over the hill holds the initiative.
And by the way, the Argies had been threatening the Falklands for years, Saddam had been claiming Kuwait for ever and Hitler made no secret (though admittedly not in 1929) of his ambitions for Lebensraum in the East. Unfortunately the governments of the time chose to disregard the indicators. The fall of the Berlin wall came as a bit of a shock though.
Of course air defence of the homeland must be assured. However, the REALISTIC threat is minimal and easily countered. It is the least likely capability of them all to be put to the test for real, and I don't accept intercepting the odd Russian recce aircraft as a real test. It is also the only one that has not been put to the test since WW2. Therefore to limit all the shiny new Typhoons we are getting to a single AD capability, which is apparently now the case, defies reason and perhaps says something about the focus of the top brass in the RAF.
The defence of the Falklands would be far better assured by the threat posed by the existence of a quickly deployable carrier force with multi-role fast jets embarked than by a handful of land based AD Typhoons with little realistic prospect of support or reinforcement.
No. I'll go for carriers before, though not instead of please note, land based AD. But ISTAR comes first. The general who can see over the hill holds the initiative.
And by the way, the Argies had been threatening the Falklands for years, Saddam had been claiming Kuwait for ever and Hitler made no secret (though admittedly not in 1929) of his ambitions for Lebensraum in the East. Unfortunately the governments of the time chose to disregard the indicators. The fall of the Berlin wall came as a bit of a shock though.