How much fast air to support 1) a Brigade, 2) a Division
Thread Starter
How much fast air to support 1) a Brigade, 2) a Division
In their recent optimistic paeans to the SDSR, Generals Richards and Houghton outlined a future UK defence posture that would allow us to: "retain the ability to operate independently or in support of the US across the full spectrum of domains and capabilities."
We will, they say, remain a "first-rate military power, capable of conducting a full-spectrum of operations."
In terms of scale this means a) the "deploying and sustaining indefinitely a brigade sized force in a stabilisation and counter insurgency operation", autonomously if necessary, and b) of being able to "liberate an ally from an occupying state alone or with allies. Here we judged that we need to be capable of putting a divisional sized force in the field with substantial maritime and air support."
The SDSR factsheets give more detail for option b), outlining the following: "for a limited time, and with sufficient warning, committing all our effort to a one-off intervention of up to three brigades, with maritime and air support (around 30,000, two-thirds of the force deployed to Iraq in 2003)."
How much fast air might such a force require? Does the ability to deploy one Typhoon squadron on an enduring op cut the mustard for option a), and does a six squadron force give enough potential to support b), especially when a proportion of that force will be tied down in UK and Falklands AD, QRA, etc.?
Since Telic saw the deployment of 30 GR4s, 20 Harriers, and 14 F3s (drawn from 11 squadrons), it would follow that a 2/3 of Telic force would require the deployment of about 40 fast jets......... always assuming that the RAF would not have deployed more in 2003 had it been able to do so.
Have we made the mistake of retaining a 'first rate Army', scaled for these sizes of operation, but with a 'second rate Air Force' that's too small to do either?
We will, they say, remain a "first-rate military power, capable of conducting a full-spectrum of operations."
In terms of scale this means a) the "deploying and sustaining indefinitely a brigade sized force in a stabilisation and counter insurgency operation", autonomously if necessary, and b) of being able to "liberate an ally from an occupying state alone or with allies. Here we judged that we need to be capable of putting a divisional sized force in the field with substantial maritime and air support."
The SDSR factsheets give more detail for option b), outlining the following: "for a limited time, and with sufficient warning, committing all our effort to a one-off intervention of up to three brigades, with maritime and air support (around 30,000, two-thirds of the force deployed to Iraq in 2003)."
How much fast air might such a force require? Does the ability to deploy one Typhoon squadron on an enduring op cut the mustard for option a), and does a six squadron force give enough potential to support b), especially when a proportion of that force will be tied down in UK and Falklands AD, QRA, etc.?
Since Telic saw the deployment of 30 GR4s, 20 Harriers, and 14 F3s (drawn from 11 squadrons), it would follow that a 2/3 of Telic force would require the deployment of about 40 fast jets......... always assuming that the RAF would not have deployed more in 2003 had it been able to do so.
Have we made the mistake of retaining a 'first rate Army', scaled for these sizes of operation, but with a 'second rate Air Force' that's too small to do either?
Last edited by Jackonicko; 17th Jan 2011 at 20:10. Reason: in the light of Sammy Su's post!
Thread Starter
and at what point do senior officers have the honesty to stand up and say that:
"No, this latest defence review was not 'policy led', it's a cynical exercise in cost cutting, and the result is that we can no longer fulfil the missions that we could before it."
Rather than all of the usual 'stretched but not over-stretched', 'yes we can, albeit at risk' nonsense that just encourages the politicians to take more and more and more?
"No, this latest defence review was not 'policy led', it's a cynical exercise in cost cutting, and the result is that we can no longer fulfil the missions that we could before it."
Rather than all of the usual 'stretched but not over-stretched', 'yes we can, albeit at risk' nonsense that just encourages the politicians to take more and more and more?
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First problem:
Fine me more than one senior officer at 2* or above who understands what
actually mean to the RAF.
Then we'll talk.
Fine me more than one senior officer at 2* or above who understands what
deploying and sustaining
Then we'll talk.
There were alot more than 10 Harriers deployed on Telic, with the same number again as in Kuwait in Harrier Force South, deployed in another ME country as Harrier Force North.
That means the 2/3rds force required now is even larger than you suggest. However how much of that FJ support is now provided by Reaper, which we didn't have back then?
We are too small to do much more than an enduring small commitment with another SSFI op for surge periods though. And one day we are probably going to lose instead of win or withdraw.
Tough times.
That means the 2/3rds force required now is even larger than you suggest. However how much of that FJ support is now provided by Reaper, which we didn't have back then?
We are too small to do much more than an enduring small commitment with another SSFI op for surge periods though. And one day we are probably going to lose instead of win or withdraw.
Tough times.
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My understanding is that, post SDSR and Harrier draw down, 60% of CAS tasking (training of course) is going un-supported. Draw from that what you will.
This is just the tip of the iceberg. I fear we will see this type of occurrence going on a lot more. Of course our dark green colleagues will simply blame us for not turning up, conveniently forgetting of course that we have been forced to cut way too much of their 'enabling assets'.
This is just the tip of the iceberg. I fear we will see this type of occurrence going on a lot more. Of course our dark green colleagues will simply blame us for not turning up, conveniently forgetting of course that we have been forced to cut way too much of their 'enabling assets'.
Here we judged that we need to be capable of putting a divisional sized force in the field with substantial maritime and air support."
At some point.....professionalism, stout hearts, and good kit are all trumped by numbers are they not?
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Jacko,
Generic answer that the cynic is probably looking for is "Yes".
But the more interesting question is what the opposition is, and how that plays out - ie, if you're going to deploy a battle group to Trashcanistan to do peace support operations, then the FJ requirement is rather different that if you're going to take on the Berzerkistani's 3 Guards Tank Army with organic SA-15/SA-17/SA-20/SA-12 and a shedload of Su-30MKs with PL-12.
So the better answer is that it is "threat dependent".
S41
Generic answer that the cynic is probably looking for is "Yes".
But the more interesting question is what the opposition is, and how that plays out - ie, if you're going to deploy a battle group to Trashcanistan to do peace support operations, then the FJ requirement is rather different that if you're going to take on the Berzerkistani's 3 Guards Tank Army with organic SA-15/SA-17/SA-20/SA-12 and a shedload of Su-30MKs with PL-12.
So the better answer is that it is "threat dependent".
S41
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So the better answer is that it is "threat dependent".
At some point.....professionalism, stout hearts, and good kit are all trumped by numbers are they not?
And the Paddies don't kick off, cos we are bit short of enablers to cover 2 theatres. Which is probably the more important discussion: do we have enough of the non-sexy stuff to ensure that the sexy stuff CAN support whoever CJO has been told that HMT can afford to deploy? No comms, no bombs! etc.
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orgASMic
Sorry, I wasn't trying to be flippant - and "threat dependant" in the wrong hands does feel like the slippery w
k words one revolts at when spouted by ambitious SO1s at Northwood. (Hypothetically speaking, you understand). 
My point is simply is that Jacko asked a nearly meaningless question.
The problem is that we largely have only meaningless answers left.
S41
Sorry, I wasn't trying to be flippant - and "threat dependant" in the wrong hands does feel like the slippery w
k words one revolts at when spouted by ambitious SO1s at Northwood. (Hypothetically speaking, you understand). My point is simply is that Jacko asked a nearly meaningless question.
The problem is that we largely have only meaningless answers left.
S41
Thread Starter
Yes of course the need for air support is a bit of a "how long is this piece of string" question, but there must be an answer to a) assuming that it's a similar requirement (if not scale) to Afghanistan, and to b) assuming that your enemy is an Iraq 2003 level of threat.
As soon as an enemy has a functional IADS and significant AD aircraft, presumably it's now a 'No Can Do', as an autonomous op.
If you prefer, you could answer a different question.
How realistic is it to assume that a six squadron FJ force would be adequate to support a) or b)? How limited would those ops have to be for that size force to be adequate?
Is the force size commensurate with the size of the Army, or with stated UK aspirations?
As soon as an enemy has a functional IADS and significant AD aircraft, presumably it's now a 'No Can Do', as an autonomous op.
If you prefer, you could answer a different question.
How realistic is it to assume that a six squadron FJ force would be adequate to support a) or b)? How limited would those ops have to be for that size force to be adequate?
Is the force size commensurate with the size of the Army, or with stated UK aspirations?
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S41 - I am in complete agreement. My quoting Blackadder was to illustrate the pointlessness of our position post SDSR. Our lords and masters have taken 'do more with less' to its logical conclusion.
Neither, IMHO. There was no Defence Estimate prior to SDSR so our size and capability compared to what the Army is expected to do has not been worked out; there was no guidance from the FCO as to what our posture in the World order was to be, so none of the Services knows exactly what they are supposed to be able to achieve. We have merely had our suit cut to fit the cloth that HMT has made available. That suit might look nice in Town but will not last 5 minutes on safari, though we should get some use out of it in the country.
Don't forget that the remainder of the '6 sqn FJ force' still has to train, work up for ops, contribute to NATO and defend the home base whilst whatever portion of the force is deployed. That suit is starting to look a little threadbare already, isn't it?
(I have flogged that metaphor to death now, haven't I?)
Is the force size commensurate with the size of the Army, or with stated UK aspirations?
Don't forget that the remainder of the '6 sqn FJ force' still has to train, work up for ops, contribute to NATO and defend the home base whilst whatever portion of the force is deployed. That suit is starting to look a little threadbare already, isn't it?
(I have flogged that metaphor to death now, haven't I?)
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Jacko asked
Excuse the cynicism but I would answer yes. The American's don't need allies with high tech navies and airforces, the have those in abundance. What they do need are foreign troops on the ground incurring their share of casualties, the politically unacceptable face of war for those voters back at home.
As others have picked up, there doesn't seem to be any serious provision for the other scenarios outlined in the SDSR other than taking action within a US led coalition.
Have we made the mistake of retaining a 'first rate Army', scaled for these sizes of operation, but with a 'second rate Air Force' that's too small to do either?
As others have picked up, there doesn't seem to be any serious provision for the other scenarios outlined in the SDSR other than taking action within a US led coalition.
Thread Starter
Unfortunately, it seems to me that a given amount of cloth was available, overall, for suits in three colours for three customers.
There was sufficient cloth for three three piece suits.
It appears to me that the customer with most 'sway' over the tailor ordered himself a natty little number in brown, three piece, with two spare pairs of trousers, and two jackets, one single- one double-breasted. He would no doubt complain that he did not also get plus fours.
The next customer got the same dark blue suit as he had bought last time, though he was not allowed a waistcoat or a spare pair of trousers, and he got home to find it all a little skimpy.
Unfortunately, with the cloth remaining, the final customer had no waistcoat, a rather tight fitting blue grey jacket with Normal Wisdom sleeves, and a pair of shorts. Because these had no seat, and because the jacket had no back, he was advised not to stand up on public transport.
There was sufficient cloth for three three piece suits.
It appears to me that the customer with most 'sway' over the tailor ordered himself a natty little number in brown, three piece, with two spare pairs of trousers, and two jackets, one single- one double-breasted. He would no doubt complain that he did not also get plus fours.
The next customer got the same dark blue suit as he had bought last time, though he was not allowed a waistcoat or a spare pair of trousers, and he got home to find it all a little skimpy.
Unfortunately, with the cloth remaining, the final customer had no waistcoat, a rather tight fitting blue grey jacket with Normal Wisdom sleeves, and a pair of shorts. Because these had no seat, and because the jacket had no back, he was advised not to stand up on public transport.
Thread Starter
As others have picked up, there doesn't seem to be any serious provision for the other scenarios outlined in the SDSR other than taking action within a US led coalition.
Why then are Richards and Houghton quoting these elements of SDSR as though it were all still achievable with the resulting force structure?
I ask the question again: at what point do senior officers have the honesty and/or the moral fibre to stand up and say that:
"After this cost cutting the result is that we can no longer fulfil the missions that we could before it, and the scenarios outlined in SDSR are not realistically achievable."
Is it really the job of senior officers to be complicit in spinning this as being something that is perfectly alright? Is defence of the politicians' reputations more important than the defence of the realm?
At what point do they stop pushing out the tired optimistic 'stretched but not over-stretched' claptrap and the gung ho, can-do 'yes we can, albeit at risk' nonsense that just encourages the politicians to take more and more?
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I think Billy Connolly answers the question quite succinctly.
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Six sqns could barely mount 3 x 24 hr CAPs around UK (oops sorry, we don't defend UK any more) never mind mount OOA.
Am I the only one who is scratching my head that we can still talk this up?
Am I the only one who is scratching my head that we can still talk this up?
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Interestingly, Jacko's question asks how much fast air we need to support land forces. Quite rightly that's exactly what the GR4s are doing and Harriers have been doing of late... But, that's 'just' CAS and we don't do ourselves any favours if we forget to argue that air can act independently of land forces quite effectively. I find it interesting how much gets done in Pakistan with UAVs... Of course, there is stuff we can't do without boots on the ground and we can't make an exact comparison, but it has been safer, cheaper and less politically awkward to use Reapers to achieve some of the same ends. Even if we insist on dismissing the possibility of a high intensity state-on-state conflict anytime soon, offensive fast air and UAVs without boots on the ground (or at least our own boots on the ground) could still be exactly what we need in the next war.
Thread Starter
Clearly winning a war with Air Power alone, or as the dominant means of delivering decisive effect, is no longer an ambition of the UK (or at least not as expressed under the SDSR).
It's as though Granby and Kosovo never happened.
(Keegan said of Kosovo that it marked a real turning point in the history of warfare. It "proved that a war can be won by air power alone." Diplomacy was tried before the war and didn't work, and Slobodan Milošević caved in weeks before the deployment of the large ground force.)
A charismatic senior RAF officer pointed out that "A lot of people forget how we ended up getting into Afghanistan, and it was through overwhelming firepower from the air." He explained succinctly and persuasively that we wouldn't have the foothold that we have today if that hadn't worked so spectacularly well. That Air Power was what ripped apart the Taliban regime to the point that we could walk in and begin the campaign as it is now. He said that this had been rather conveniently forgotten today, in the mantra of 'boots on the ground'.
He also pointed out that even today the very heavily specialised employment of air power is still playing a very important part in the campaign, and that Air Power is our key advantage. He suggested that the Taliban fight the way they do because we have air superiority, and that the Taliban's reliance on IEDs is largely due to the success of air power, because that’s the only tactic they’ve got left. If we did not hold them at threat from the air 24 hours per day, they would operate differently,
I would have thought that this was all pretty self-evident. But perhaps a soldier ignores or overlooks the mere 'enablers'?
Perhaps it's unsurprising that General Richards should have viewed the analysis in the National Security Strategy as "excellent", and as being an "impressive piece of work."
It's perhaps understandable that the more single-service focused soldier would believe that this 'boot-and-bayonet centric' Strategy should be "given more prominence", and that it represents a "balanced strategy to deal with a wide range of diverse threats."
It's as though Granby and Kosovo never happened.
(Keegan said of Kosovo that it marked a real turning point in the history of warfare. It "proved that a war can be won by air power alone." Diplomacy was tried before the war and didn't work, and Slobodan Milošević caved in weeks before the deployment of the large ground force.)
A charismatic senior RAF officer pointed out that "A lot of people forget how we ended up getting into Afghanistan, and it was through overwhelming firepower from the air." He explained succinctly and persuasively that we wouldn't have the foothold that we have today if that hadn't worked so spectacularly well. That Air Power was what ripped apart the Taliban regime to the point that we could walk in and begin the campaign as it is now. He said that this had been rather conveniently forgotten today, in the mantra of 'boots on the ground'.
He also pointed out that even today the very heavily specialised employment of air power is still playing a very important part in the campaign, and that Air Power is our key advantage. He suggested that the Taliban fight the way they do because we have air superiority, and that the Taliban's reliance on IEDs is largely due to the success of air power, because that’s the only tactic they’ve got left. If we did not hold them at threat from the air 24 hours per day, they would operate differently,
I would have thought that this was all pretty self-evident. But perhaps a soldier ignores or overlooks the mere 'enablers'?
Perhaps it's unsurprising that General Richards should have viewed the analysis in the National Security Strategy as "excellent", and as being an "impressive piece of work."
It's perhaps understandable that the more single-service focused soldier would believe that this 'boot-and-bayonet centric' Strategy should be "given more prominence", and that it represents a "balanced strategy to deal with a wide range of diverse threats."
Last edited by Jackonicko; 18th Jan 2011 at 20:26.
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Jacko,
Interesting. As one of a light blue persuasion, I've always though this quote from Keegan is politely, hoop.
Rather Op ALLIED FORCE / Op NOBLE ANVIL demonstrated the reverse: a modern state with ostensibly lots of a juicy targets can hold out for 79 days as long as there was no credible ground threat to their territory. It was precisely the deployment of the ARRC with 4th Armoured and 5th Airborne Bdes under Mike Jackson that tipped the balance and forced Milošević to withdraw.
Similarly, it's not clear to me that the decisive effect in GRANBY was delivered by air power - land was clearly the supported commander, not air. Air was an enabler in Gulf I and Gulf II, but it was never going to force the Iraqi army from Kuwait or remove Saddam's regime from power (even if we'd have killed him directly - Dos Gringos notwithstanding). And please don't forget that both of the conflicts you cite we were hardly acting alone - many (most?) of the most important multipliers were Allied, not RAF/RN.
Can we do the highest intensity stuff by ourselves now? Probably not (or not without significantly higher risk appetite than currently exists). But let's remember that we haven't been in a position to do this by ourselves for many years - probably, arguably, since V-Force with Blue Steel (hurrah for whizzy standoff nuclear rocket bombski).
I'm not for one second saying that I'm happy with the immediate future of the RAF FJ force, but then I'm pretty unimpressed with the number of FF/DD, SH, AT/AAR etc etc and the imbalance of force multipliers across the three environments. But unless you can show that there is a serious chance of us doing something like GRANBY again (where?) then it's awfully hard to justify a force structure able to do GRANBY when we are cutting everything else.
We're not in the mid-80s of spending 5% of GDP on defence. And it's not going to be much above 2% for as far ahead as I can see - so it's not going to be much better for a long time - the 2020 in "Future Force 2020" seems about as optimistic as the 2000 in "Nimrod 2000".
And on that happy note,
S41
(Keegan said of Kosovo that it marked a real turning point in the history of warfare. It "proved that a war can be won by air power alone." Diplomacy was tried before the war and didn't work, and Slobodan Milošević caved in weeks before the deployment of the large ground force.)
Rather Op ALLIED FORCE / Op NOBLE ANVIL demonstrated the reverse: a modern state with ostensibly lots of a juicy targets can hold out for 79 days as long as there was no credible ground threat to their territory. It was precisely the deployment of the ARRC with 4th Armoured and 5th Airborne Bdes under Mike Jackson that tipped the balance and forced Milošević to withdraw.
Clearly winning a war with Air Power alone, or as the dominant means of delivering decisive effect, is no longer an ambition of the UK (or at least not as expressed under the SDSR). It's as though Granby and Kosovo never happened.
Can we do the highest intensity stuff by ourselves now? Probably not (or not without significantly higher risk appetite than currently exists). But let's remember that we haven't been in a position to do this by ourselves for many years - probably, arguably, since V-Force with Blue Steel (hurrah for whizzy standoff nuclear rocket bombski).
I'm not for one second saying that I'm happy with the immediate future of the RAF FJ force, but then I'm pretty unimpressed with the number of FF/DD, SH, AT/AAR etc etc and the imbalance of force multipliers across the three environments. But unless you can show that there is a serious chance of us doing something like GRANBY again (where?) then it's awfully hard to justify a force structure able to do GRANBY when we are cutting everything else.
We're not in the mid-80s of spending 5% of GDP on defence. And it's not going to be much above 2% for as far ahead as I can see - so it's not going to be much better for a long time - the 2020 in "Future Force 2020" seems about as optimistic as the 2000 in "Nimrod 2000".
And on that happy note,
S41
