Jacko, whom I respect and admire, quite understandably tore me off a strip for commenting on others' posts while not putting forward my own cunning plan for military aviation and in particular fast air, so here goes!
There is a widespread public misconception that the punch-up in Afghanistan in which we are currently involved is a war. Despite the scale of the fighting and of casualties on both sides, it is not. It is a COIN operation in support of and at the request of the (legitimate) government in Kabul. We are not at war with Afghanistan or the Afghans. Any lasting solution must be political. The scale and nature of our military involvement needs to keep this in mind.
Success in a COIN campaign can only be achieved by winning the hearts and minds of the populace among whom the insurgents live and hide. If there is no likelihood of that outcome, then it is a lost cause and we should pull out without delay. Winning hearts and minds requires feet on the ground, maximum stroking of the locals and minimum bashing them. When they have to be bashed, it must be seen to be necessary and proportionate. Collateral damage must be avoided if at all possible.
Fast air can only provide kinetic effect (things that go bang) or the threat of it in order to influence what happens on the ground. Understandably the locals’ hearts and minds tend not to respond positively to being attacked indiscriminately (as they are likely to perceive it) from the air. If fast air intervention is required to save lives, then of course it must be available and be used. However, as an indicator, the less that fast air is needed to protect the ground forces, the greater the likelihood that we are winning the contest.
After the traumatic recent experiences of the Blair decade, I think (and hope) that it is most unlikely that British forces will get involved in another substantial conventional punch-up in the foreseeable future. The people and politicians no longer have the stomach for it. I can, however, envisage the possibility of limited small scale and low risk COIN and intervention operations in support of our true friends and allies, similar to that in Sierra Leone, but anything more serious and larger than brigade level is most unlikely.
I am therefore not overly concerned at the anticipated (temporary?) shortage of land based fast air. The availability of sufficient effective AT and SH are a greater concern, but my greatest concern is the loss of our maritime capabilities. We are an island nation but we no longer have the means to patrol and protect our own waters, let alone project force at a distance. The ability to demonstrate an effective deterrence of foreign aggression against our overseas interests and territories is an important component of our sovereignty, and I do not believe that we possess the means to deter convincingly any more. No MPA; no carriers with any fixed wing aircraft; no air support for our surface ships or submarines; reduced ISTAR. These are real causes for concern. Shortage of land based fast air, especially if it is optimised for air to air as seems to be the intention with Typhoon, is the least of our worries. Mine anyway.
Those aviators who maintain that fast air will be more useful in future conflicts than infantry have my pity. Please don’t aspire to air rank!
Though I will humbly admit to my own ignorance of the employment of airpower (I am after all only a pongo, and ex-infantry too), I would set our national priorities for aviation capabilities in these straightened times as:
1. CC and ISTAR, including UAVs
2. MPA
3. SH
4. Carrier based attack and AD
5. AT
6. Land based CAS, including UAVs
7. Land based AD
There now, that’s opened a can of worms! Weapons free!
Last edited by Clockwork Mouse; 21st Jan 2011 at 21:58.