Decision to axe Harrier is "bonkers".

[WE Branch Fanatic]

But the current campaign in Libya would appear to suggest that the UK does indeed need shipborne air power. Ocean was designed to carry a few hundred Bootnecks, a dozen or so commando Sea Kings, and small landing craft. She is currently being used to fly strikes from, as a subsitute carrier.

The Apache strikes have been supported by ASaCs Sea Kings, one squadron of which is aboard, another is in Afghanistan. How will we deploy more of them to support Apache operations in x months time? The Apaches themselves are an issue - I believe only a certain number were marinised. A squadron of Harriers would prevent this issue from arising.

Could six to ten Harrier GR9s do a better job than five Apaches? I would suggest so, due to have greater range, greater speed, greater payload, and presumably needing less support from other assets for ISTAR purposes, such as the ASaCs cabs or warships firing starshells for illumination.

The retention of Harrier was the most likely SDSR option until the weekend before the annoucement - a decision made by the Prime Minister himself against the advice of the First Sea Lord. Apart from the shipborne airpower issue, there is the problem of people having the skills to operate fixed wing aircraft from a ship in a decade

[Neartheend]

The retention of Harrier was the most likely SDSR option until the weekend before the annoucement - a decision made by the Prime Minister himself against the advice of the First Sea Lord. Apart from the shipborne airpower issue, there is the problem of people having the skills to operate fixed wing aircraft from a ship in a decade

WEBF - With respect sir, you are now in danger of repeating yourself. Too late!!

[Backwards PLT]

But the current campaign in Libya would appear to suggest that the UK does indeed need shipborne air power.

No - it suggests that it would be an advantage to have, not a need to have and that is the whole issue. We don't need a carrier, but if we want to project power around the globe it would be really, really useful.

[Foghorn Leghorn]

Actually, WEBF, the decision was to keep GR4 until quite close to the announcement, then it switched to Harrier, but was sensibly changed back even closer to the announcement. As has already been stated by Backwards PLT, the carrier/Harrier combo is a bonus. If we had kept Harrier, we would have no deep target attack capability as Stormshadow would have gone out with GR4.

[Two's in]

Could six to ten Harrier GR9s do a better job than five Apaches? I would suggest so, due to have greater range, greater speed, greater payload,

Remind me again what the effective range of the Harrier's 30mm cannon is when in a hover behind hard cover? I don't dispute the value of the Harrier, but its capability complements that of the Apache, it doesn't replace it.

[Engines]

Foghorn and others,

Have to come in here. The 'GR4 or Harrier' line is one being pushed by those who were quite prepared to ditch a number of commitments and promises made to the RN, over a number of years, to maintain the maritime strike capability.

There was an option to maintain reduced GR4 plus Harrier, but it was ditched early on in the process. Not by the RN. To Glojo and others - the RN was not given the chance to present its case - CDS went solo on this one.

Deep target attack capability with Stormshadow - yes, but is that actually 'essential'? Don't know what SDSR thought. And TLAM couldn't substitute? (and yes I know the differences between the two). If it was so essential, maintain a reduced number of GR4s to deliver it. However, academic now.

What isn't academic is that despite the best efforts of our enduringly professional and committed Air Force crews and ground crews (and I actually really mean that), the physics of trying to apply 'air power' from 600 miles away with short range jets (and compared with a real strike aircraft like Buccaneer, they are short on legs - not bad aircraft, but short of range by design) is limiting our contribution to the Libya campaign.

Yes, we are no doubt meeting the ATO - but that ATO will have been drawn up to match the numbers of aircraft and what the aircraft can do. It will reflect what aircraft can do from 600 miles off. If we'd had aircraft 20 miles off, the ATO would have been profoundly different.

I repeat, I'm not denigrating the Air force crews - they are doing the very best they can with what they have. But this campaign is showing, once again, the limits of land based air power when closer facilities (e.g Malta) are denied, and you've built a force of short(ish) range aircraft.

Properly deployed, a CVS with a full squadron of GR7s would have provided more air over target for hours flown/crew time/fuel cost, choose your parameter. Distance does that. Once again - not an anti-RAF rant. Just physics.

Key thing now is to support all our people out there in theatre, support the campaign and get that murdering snivelling idiot out of power. Anything that helps is the right thing to do.

Best regards as ever to all

Engines

[Foghorn Leghorn]

Engines, yes, the deep target attack capability with Stormshadow is essential and is recognised as such.

[Jimlad1]

"Properly deployed, a CVS with a full squadron of GR7s would have provided more air over target for hours flown/crew time/fuel cost, choose your parameter. Distance does that. Once again - not an anti-RAF rant. Just physics."

Right up until the point where the CVS needed to go into dock for essential repairs following 6 months on station, and the aircrew who were carrier qualified ran out and we suddenly realised that while we may have had X harriers, not having many carrier qualified pilots due to the constant run of operations in HERRICK with the GR9 force meant that we'd have probably been scraping the barrel right about now.

The harrier fleet was knackered, and more importantly there were (according to my understanding and very happy to be corrected) not that many carrier qualified pilots out there by late 2010. There had been a reduction in emphasis on FW ops on carriers during the HERRICK years, and I suspect if we'd gone down that route, we'd be seeing the CVS pulled off station by now as we realised we had few planes, fewer pilots and a nearly 30 year old carrier needing repairs and her sistership still ironing out post refit bugs.

[Engines]

Jimlad,

Unless the force collapsed in the three years after I left it, the GR7 fleet was not 'knackered'. You want tired? Try the GR4s. Or Nimrods. or Chinooks. (Of course, we did miss a trick by retiring the youngest FW fleet apart from Typhoon - SHAR, but hey). Sorry, but I suspect that we just lost the edge and desire to get aircraft to sea. We gave up 'routine embarkations' and went for 'occasional detachments' which required weeks of prep to get 5 aircraft on board. Personal experience there.

Agree that the CVS skills (aircrew and maintainers) had been eroded, but that was another effect of binning SHAR (which reduced numbers of available aircraft for the decks) and RAF focus on land ops. I don't dispute that key RN officers also took their eye off the ball. Results were not good at the end and we may have deserved to lose fixed wing air at sea. (and by heck it pains me to say that).

Again, not an anti-RAF rant. Plenty of RN blame to go around. Again, I don't buy the 'GR4 or Harrier, but not both' line. Nor a 'land or sea based but not both' argument. We could always have paired Typhoons from Italy with GR7s from the deck - couldn't we?

Foghorn, can't see how SS was 'essential' if binning the GR4 was even considered. As I argue, a reduced GR4 fleet could have provided that specialist role. But hey...

Again, full support to the crews now doing the stuff over Libya. A great Air Force, great people.

Best regards to all as ever

Engines

[Wrathmonk]

There was an option to maintain reduced GR4

maintain a reduced number of GR4s to deliver it

Please don't forget the TGRF did not go unscathed. Two squadrons have been disbanded (the same number as the Harrier Force ....) leaving 5 squadrons to maintain the two ops.

Maximum savings will always be achieved by removing a fleet from service (particularly if it means closing stations without having to move units around). Salami slicing both ac types, or just reducing the TGRF, would not have achieved the required savings in the short term. The full pain of the 'salami slicing' mentality of previous planning rounds (across Defence) has yet to be felt (and sadly I think it will be the RN who will feel it the most). As ever, IMHO of course!

[Engines]

Wrathmonk,

Good point and thank you. Salami slicing is always a pain.

On the station closures side, I was of the opinion that once SHARs had gone, JFH should have offered up Cott or Witt of their own volition to save taxpayer cash. I could not see (and knew the layouts and facilities) why 4 squadrons needed 2 air stations.

Best regards as ever

[Jimlad1]

Hi Engines,

You said "Unless the force collapsed in the three years after I left it, the GR7 fleet was not 'knackered'?"

I've never worked on the GR7/9 fleet, but had been told by others who had that by the end the fleet was pretty much gone after supporting HERRICK etc - the combination of lack of money for upgrades plus tired frames means despite how good the maintenance guys are (and this is not an attack on the people!), the perception was of tired frames. Very happy to stand corrected though.

[Wrathmonk]

Engines

I could not see (and knew the layouts and facilities) why 4 squadrons needed 2 air stations

I agree - and I asked that very question of a senior (RAF) Harrier operator (who may or may not have had an agenda!). I was led to believe that Wittering was too small for 3 front line sqns plus the OCU (also bear in mind as well how much the MOD had paid in damages to the owner of the hall on the approach to Wittering - any substantial increase in noise may have led to a return to the High Court!) As for Cottesmore there would have been the potential expense of installing the hover pads at Cottesmore for the OCU to use (as a side note I was also led to believe that the height above sea level at Cottesmore (400+ ft) made it problematic for the initial hovering sorties on the OCU - would love to know if that really was the case or whether I was well and truly duped!).

[just another jocky]

Originally Posted by Wrathmonk

.....(as a side note I was also led to believe that the height above sea level at Cottesmore (400+ ft) made it problematic for the initial hovering sorties on the OCU - would love to know if that really was the case or whether I was well and truly duped!).

Crikey. I thought the new engines were better than that, or was it because it was a T-bird and therefore heavier then a GR9/9a? Still difficult to believe. Maybe you was duped.

[DITYIWAHP]

High temperatures were more of an issue than reducing ambient pressure. The change in QFE that you got between Witt and Cott was about 6 millibars, which would equate to approx only 200 lbs of performance change (if my knackered old brain can still remember my weeds brief). On a GR that was negligible, but on the T10: every pound of performance could be critical for getting an OCU DCO.

In the 'heat' of summer (even in the UK) the old girl would be wet committed at best and, with no dry performance to speak of, we sometimes had to do the early B Flt VSTOL press-ups etc just after dawn. If the water did run out then it wasn't the end of the world (providing you had an option to RVL); however, it would be advisible to try and sign the jet in and hide the number of engine counts from the JEngO....

Now, the 'big' engines were something else..... There was a 5 min limit to doing VSTOL (due to heating of the ducts that fed the reaction controls) and it would be easy to sit in the hover and exceed this limit even with stores on board . And the JEngO would be happy - probably 1 or 2 engine counts max if you really abused it....

[Engines]

The Cott/Witt issue was a teaser for us when setting up JFH. While the two stations were supposed to be 'linked' they were actually two halves of one station, but with the 'benefit' of two separate and complete sets of command from CO down. Some facilities shared, others duplicated. Both stations pretty run down (especially quarters and other ranks workspaces) and limited to a single runway.

Dispassionately, the best location for JFH would have been Yeovilton - once the SHAR had gone, plenty of quarters, space, two runways, hover pads, ski jump, new hangars, offices, clear airspace, etc. etc. However, inter service politics got in the way, as is often the case. Installing hover pads at Cott would have been a trivial exercise.

T10 hovering? Marginal. But not so marginal that Cott counted as a high airfield. Reason it was marginal was that the RAF loaded it up with weapons and NVG stuff to claim it was an operational aircraft and get it cleared past the Treasury, having originally said they didn't need a trainer for the Harrier II aircraft. .A one star bragged to me how clever they had been in town to 'get that one past the bean counters'. Result - a severly restricted and very expensive trainer. T12 with bigger engine fixed most of that, as stated earlier.

Best regards as ever

Engines

[SammySu]

The harrier fleet was knackered, and more importantly there were (according to my understanding and very happy to be corrected) not that many carrier qualified pilots out there by late 2010.

Apart from all of 1 Sqn who had just spent 2 months on ARKR. And the majority of 800NAS who had spent the spring on the same. Not all current, but very few in the Force were not CVS qualified.
Night qualifications? Now that was a pinch point.

I've never worked on the GR7/9 fleet, but had been told by others who had that by the end the fleet was pretty much gone after supporting HERRICK etc - the combination of lack of money for upgrades plus tired frames means despite how good the maintenance guys are (and this is not an attack on the people!), the perception was of tired frames. Very happy to stand corrected though.

Lack of money for upgrades? Apart from the hundreds of millions spent on the GR9 programme to get to Cap E(B)?
Airframes had stacks of fatigue left. In no way tired, spares and manpower, like all fleets were the big issue.

T12 with bigger engine fixed most of that, as stated earlier.

Indeed, shame the second big engined T12 didn't make it onto the OCU being finished by BAe but not flight tested out of Depth.

Out of interest I hear the jets are being ground run at the beginning of August to keep them serviceable for sale.

[FODPlod]

Originally Posted by SammySu

...Out of interest I hear the jets are being ground run at the beginning of August to keep them serviceable for sale.

I don't suppose that includes the babies in the photo at the bottom of this article.

Navy News 22 July 2011: Crowds - and clouds - at a rain-affected Culdrose Air Day

According to another source, I believe they are:

XZ440 Sea Harrier F/A2
ZD579 Sea Harrier F/A2
ZE692 Sea Harrier F/A2
ZH796 Sea Harrier F/A2
ZH797 Sea Harrier F/A2
ZH803 Sea Harrier F/A2

[WE Branch Fanatic]

It is me, or are some people saying that all the skills and experience needed for Harrier have been lost in a few months, but losing skills and experience (see my comments here or here, or perhaps those of Bismark or Not_a_boffin) amongst carrier personnel over the next decade will present no problem?

We need to carry on embarking jets as often as we can. The Future Reserves 2020 paper mentions the RNR Air Branch being expanded to support FAA activities. Sadly it makes no mention of the RNR/Harrier proposal. It does talk about using Reserves for the regeneration of capabilities and the whole force concept.

FODPlod

Noooooo! The Sea Harriers at the RNSFDO Dummy Deck now provide our only means of training chockheads. After March 2006 (when the Sea Jet ceased flying) there was speculation from some about whether they could be regenerated is a crisis - this of course depended on the UK operating other Harriers. Oddly, when the Indian Navy wanted to buy some stored Sea Harriers in early 2009, MOD said no.

During the discussion over the Sea Harrier some argued that as the future was going to involve ground attack it was the GR7/9 that we needed, not the Sea Harrier. Some of the same people are now saying we saying we should get rid of Harrier GR9 as it is not a real fighter.

Engines/SammySu

Thank you for helping to address some of the myths regarding this subject, on both the physical state of the aircraft and on the level of CVS experience amongst Harrier pilots. I wonder if these myths played a part in decision making?

Out of interest I hear the jets are being ground run at the beginning of August to keep them serviceable for sale.

If they are as knackered as some suggest, who would want to buy them? Perhaps they really are going to the US as a spares source, in which case I might raise my suggestion again.

It occurs to me that if we could supply a number (most of them?) of our now stored Harrier GR9s to the US, and continue to offer the USMC a chance to carry out embarkations of a dozen or so Harriers, we may be able to purchase or lease a number of AV8B (AV8B+ if we're lucky) aircraft in a quid pro quo type arrangement. Hopefully any such deal would include some sort of MOU in order to prevent the UK to incur major support costs, but would offer the following advantages:

1. The UK would still be able to respond to crises in which carrier aviation is useful.
2. The RN would maintain the skills needed to run a carrier with jets on deck, and would maintain a cadre of both Pilots and Engineers to work with these aircraft, avoiding the need to start from scratch later on this decade.
3. If we could get AV8B+s then it would give the Navy a capability that it lost when the Sea Harrier was retired in 2006. We would therefore be in a far better position to provide air defence for a maritime task group, or to participate in policing a no fly zone.
4. We would no longer have to pay for storing retired aircraft, and the Government would be justified in portraying this as a step forward.
5. Our potential adversaries would have something to think about - prevention (deterrence) being better than cure.
6. The defence relationship with the US would be strengthened, as would the defence relationship with France as Illustrious would be able to relieve Charles De Gaulle in x months time.

The use of Ocean as a platform for Apaches operating in a strike role seems to show that a maritime strike capability is needed for what the Government wants the Armed Forces to be capable of doing. Now there is talk of Illustrious relieving Ocean - for which her post refit work up will need to be rushed, with Apaches embarking and learning to operate from her deck. Note the use of the word STRIKE.

As far as I am aware, the Apache has mostly used the Hellfire missile against regime targets. However, the limited range and higher level vulnerability of a helicopter (compared to a fast jet) has meant it has not gone too far inshore. Harrier would bring extra speed and range to the mission, and greater firepower - Maverick and Paveway IV. With Sidewinders it could also play a part in looking out for rogue aircraft.

I was in Portsmouth the other week and saw Illustrious entering harbour with at least one Apache on deck and I thought "Libya". I have seen/heard other things which suggest MOD is expecting a long campaign in Libya.

[jamesdevice]

if the object is simply to retain skills, then the obvious solution is to reactivate Ark Royal, regenerate a squadron of Sea Harriers, loan them to the Indians with a joint manning agreement to act as a ship protection force off Somalia
With the Indians pro-active take on the piracy problem, and the coming need for air support in protecting aid supplies into Somalia I can see this as a cost-effective way of helping the UN aid effort
The Al-Quaeda affiliates threats re supplying aid suggest that this time around serious air support is going to be needed in getting food into the starving parts of Somalia