Decision to axe Harrier is "bonkers".
lj - landing distance is not an issue. The OEU trialled MOS ops years ago, averaging around ~X000ft stopping distance, which is a small number, believe me.
Take-off is another thing however, as you allude to. Fortunately, DMS, PWIV & Litening III don't weigh that much, so a light fuel load may see a relatively short take-off distance. But someone would need to type in the figues and I suspect the output would be a little classified (Restricted, possibly Confidential).
Why do we keep up this pi$$ing contest? It is a little childish.
Take-off is another thing however, as you allude to. Fortunately, DMS, PWIV & Litening III don't weigh that much, so a light fuel load may see a relatively short take-off distance. But someone would need to type in the figues and I suspect the output would be a little classified (Restricted, possibly Confidential).
Why do we keep up this pi$$ing contest? It is a little childish.
Join Date: Oct 2009
Location: Midlands
Posts: 252
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
The Tornado can use quite a small MOS anyway with thrust reverse and using AAR (ie. Not getting airborne with full gas and going to the Texaco). 4-5000ft of concrete is quite manageable (with increased risk).
...you forgot GR4 with ASRAAM, a radar and (soon) Link 16. So it can kinda use the ASRAAM BVR.
JAJ
I just don't like to see opinions that are based on "hoop"...that's all. On the hot weather stuff, I can remember getting airborne with 1200kgs of missiles, a gun load and the 1500L tanks at PSAB at ISA+20 in about 7000ft. If we'd left the tanks empty and gone with half fuel to rendezvous with a tanker up to 30mins away (about the safe range at 1/2 fuel) then I would hazard that we could make a 4-5000ft take off run.
You're right about the exact figures but estimates are hardly classified - you could watch us from the spotters car park and get a good idea from the runway distance to go markers!
BTW I'm not saying that the GR9 was a bad aircraft, it's just that GR4 has more "clubs in the golf bag".
LJ
I just don't like to see opinions that are based on "hoop"...that's all. On the hot weather stuff, I can remember getting airborne with 1200kgs of missiles, a gun load and the 1500L tanks at PSAB at ISA+20 in about 7000ft. If we'd left the tanks empty and gone with half fuel to rendezvous with a tanker up to 30mins away (about the safe range at 1/2 fuel) then I would hazard that we could make a 4-5000ft take off run.
You're right about the exact figures but estimates are hardly classified - you could watch us from the spotters car park and get a good idea from the runway distance to go markers!
BTW I'm not saying that the GR9 was a bad aircraft, it's just that GR4 has more "clubs in the golf bag".
LJ
Justanopinion
Definately only one-trip only carrier-trap capable! The landing gear would be knackered and if the puny hook managed to survive the extra stresses of a carrier trap (which I doubt).
As for catapult launch, it would probably tear the nose leg off and throw it off the front of the boat - at least the crew wouldn't need a set of steps to get out of the jet that would remain on the deck!
So "no" definately not carrier capable.
LJ
Definately only one-trip only carrier-trap capable! The landing gear would be knackered and if the puny hook managed to survive the extra stresses of a carrier trap (which I doubt).
As for catapult launch, it would probably tear the nose leg off and throw it off the front of the boat - at least the crew wouldn't need a set of steps to get out of the jet that would remain on the deck!
So "no" definately not carrier capable.
LJ
No, the F3 is a bit pokier but they aren't that far different.
Edit - top trumps anyone?
RB199-34R 101 (GR1) dry power 3,650kg/8,090lb reheat 7,253kg/15,950lb
RB199-34R 103 (GR4) dry power 4,380kg/9,656lb reheat 7,675kg/16,920lb
RB199-34R 104 (F3) dry power 4,079kg/9,000lb reheat 7,706kg/17,000lb
Nerd Alert
Edit - top trumps anyone?
RB199-34R 101 (GR1) dry power 3,650kg/8,090lb reheat 7,253kg/15,950lb
RB199-34R 103 (GR4) dry power 4,380kg/9,656lb reheat 7,675kg/16,920lb
RB199-34R 104 (F3) dry power 4,079kg/9,000lb reheat 7,706kg/17,000lb
Nerd Alert
Last edited by Lima Juliet; 14th Apr 2011 at 20:54.
Leon - I was pointing out that the true figures are classified, irrespective that one could watch from outside the fence. I do happen to agree with you otherwise though!
There are far too many ill-informed opinions on here, but sadly that is the direction this place has fallen.
There are far too many ill-informed opinions on here, but sadly that is the direction this place has fallen.
Leon
Bugger .... specsavers again tomorrow then. Liking the Top Trumps stuff. A whole new thread perhaps - FSTA vs VC10/Tri*, F35B v F35C, Typhoon v Rafale, A400 v C17, Regt v Para, Jaguar v Everthing (
), MRA4 v P8, the RAF of yesterday v the RAF of tomorrow (scratch that one - we've had that thread many a time ....!).
JAO
That'll have the Daily Telegraph defence correspondant choking on his cornflakes!
Bugger .... specsavers again tomorrow then.
Liking the Top Trumps stuff. A whole new thread perhaps - FSTA vs VC10/Tri*, F35B v F35C, Typhoon v Rafale, A400 v C17, Regt v Para, Jaguar v Everthing (), MRA4 v P8, the RAF of yesterday v the RAF of tomorrow (scratch that one - we've had that thread many a time ....!).JAO
the GR4 can actually do everything. Who needs Typhoon/F18/Rafale. Possibly carrier capable too?
I just don't like to see opinions that are based on "hoop"...that's all. On the hot weather stuff, I can remember getting airborne with 1200kgs of missiles, a gun load and the 1500L tanks at PSAB at ISA+20 in about 7000ft. If we'd left the tanks empty and gone with half fuel to rendezvous with a tanker up to 30mins away (about the safe range at 1/2 fuel) then I would hazard that we could make a 4-5000ft take off run.
Join Date: Jan 2008
Location: Lancashire
Age: 48
Posts: 550
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
There are far too many ill-informed opinions on here, but sadly that is the direction this place has fallen.
Why even bother posting???
Your lot didn't depart PSAB like the F-15C's and F-16CJ's that's for certain
Brig Gen made him confess to the whole Coalition Air Wing, followed by a "Gentlemen, knock this sh!t off!" debrief to us all. Sadly for us we had no choice but to get some "smash on" at low level and then to expedite climb above the MANPADS threat whereas those with more poke in their Eagles could accelerate in vertical from rotation within the airfield boundary - b¥gger!
So the sh!t was definately not knocked off by the F3 det
LJ
Nope, especially for the poor young 2nd Lt F16 driver who had to confess that he'd porked trying to do an F3 style departure at PSAB - mini rotation followed by landing gear and accel to 600kts at low level. Sadly for the poor 2nd Lt copying he forgot that the F16 has autoflap with gear and so on raising his gear he sank back onto the runway for a bit on his rear fuselage strakes - impressive set of sparks though!
Brig Gen made him confess to the whole Coalition Air Wing, followed by a "Gentlemen, knock this sh!t off!" debrief to us all. Sadly for us we had no choice but to get some "smash on" at low level and then to expedite climb above the MANPADS threat whereas those with more poke in their Eagles could accelerate in vertical from rotation within the airfield boundary - b¥gger!
So the sh!t was definately not knocked off by the F3 det
LJ
Brig Gen made him confess to the whole Coalition Air Wing, followed by a "Gentlemen, knock this sh!t off!" debrief to us all. Sadly for us we had no choice but to get some "smash on" at low level and then to expedite climb above the MANPADS threat whereas those with more poke in their Eagles could accelerate in vertical from rotation within the airfield boundary - b¥gger!
So the sh!t was definately not knocked off by the F3 det
LJ
To be honest the people who are complaning about Typhoon not desigating its own targets or not being able to use anything smaller are talking out of their hoops. You have an airframe that can carry 1000 lb bombs and both the in service AAMs, plus an good AD Radar. You also have an airframe that can carry everything else. Why on earth don't you send a pair of each up in one mission, Let the Tiffys bomb first, then they can bug off and do No-fly CAP, while the Tonka's with their longer endurance carry on with the armed recce. Ok it's a liitle more invovled than self desigation, but we have done it in most of the wars in which we have used LGB's. The one plus of this plan is that every RAF FJ sortie could get at least two weapons on to ground targets and its the sort of improvisation that the RAF is good at.
Why did the Typhoon not get multi role from the git go???? My reply will be directly from a Tiffy Pilot who's last tour had been on GR9's "There was no need to spend the money on getting Typhoon bombed up to the hilt straight away to do Afgan, as we have two excellant GR aircraft that are fully capable of doing the task right now".
Pious...if you are going to throw stones, at least throw them accurately. Check out any of my previous posts, it's quite simple!
Or if you can't be arsed, I'd suspect >20 years flying the GR1/4, >3000hours on type, GW1/2/Herrick.....
Your choice.
Or if you can't be arsed, I'd suspect >20 years flying the GR1/4, >3000hours on type, GW1/2/Herrick.....
Your choice.
Join Date: Feb 2006
Location: North West England
Age: 54
Posts: 136
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Top trumps!
21 years fixing and developing GR1/F3/GR4!
Christ, I need a rest.............
With regards to Typhoon "des or no-des" question, if the pod is carried and cleared, it is a relatively simple matter to integrate into the system (it was on GR4 - we even trialled SNIPER in a matter of days). That being the case - why shouldn't it be used? I cannot offer a definitive answer, but any self respecting trials organisation would not fly a functioning pod without trying to make it work - waste of a sortie. The austere A-G capability has been on Typhoon since 2009, the only reason not to self-des would be to let GR4 do it - as they have more experience in the role. No-one moaned when Buccs were designating for GR1 in the first (dependent on viewpoint) unpleasantness in the GAFA. Equally no-one trumpeted the success of TIALD flying out of Tabuk. If you base your arguments/discussions/opinions on what you glean from our beloved media you are on a hiding to nothing.
I was sad to see Harrier go, but the lack of SS carriage ultimately killed it.
And I still can't find any mention of Harrier firing brimstone apart from the wrongly reported Guardian article. Then again I haven't worked on Harrier and am basing my assumptions on what I learn from the media.
21 years fixing and developing GR1/F3/GR4!
Christ, I need a rest.............
With regards to Typhoon "des or no-des" question, if the pod is carried and cleared, it is a relatively simple matter to integrate into the system (it was on GR4 - we even trialled SNIPER in a matter of days). That being the case - why shouldn't it be used? I cannot offer a definitive answer, but any self respecting trials organisation would not fly a functioning pod without trying to make it work - waste of a sortie. The austere A-G capability has been on Typhoon since 2009, the only reason not to self-des would be to let GR4 do it - as they have more experience in the role. No-one moaned when Buccs were designating for GR1 in the first (dependent on viewpoint) unpleasantness in the GAFA. Equally no-one trumpeted the success of TIALD flying out of Tabuk. If you base your arguments/discussions/opinions on what you glean from our beloved media you are on a hiding to nothing.
I was sad to see Harrier go, but the lack of SS carriage ultimately killed it.
And I still can't find any mention of Harrier firing brimstone apart from the wrongly reported Guardian article. Then again I haven't worked on Harrier and am basing my assumptions on what I learn from the media.
Join Date: Sep 2004
Location: oxford
Posts: 469
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
FLYER Forums • View topic - The Harrier GR.9 and Operation Herrick
May be of interest for some - not all obviously.
May be of interest for some - not all obviously.
Join Date: Feb 2006
Location: North West England
Age: 54
Posts: 136
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Might have been done before:-
STAFF GUIDANCE ON DEFENCE RESTRUCTURING
1. This guidance is being issued to remedy a perceived difficulty experienced by Staff at all levels in
understanding the rationale behind recent Defence re-structuring. In particular many Staff Officers seem
not to understand how reducing the numbers of aircraft, ships, tanks, artillery and soldiers results in a more
flexible, robust and effective fighting force.
2. In particular it seems that much of the confusion stems from a systemic misunderstanding of the
correct use of military terminology. A list of common terms and actual meanings follows.
3. In addition there follows an explanation of the key assumptions embedded within the Defence
Review. All Staff Officers are encouraged to seek clarification through their Chain of Command if they still
have any questions.
Staff Terminology used in the new Defence Plan:
Term MOD meaning
Flexible a. Smaller
b. Unable to operate unless under US protection
Robust a. Smaller
b. Lacking reserves or regeneration capability
Networked Smaller, but still unable to talk to each other
Capable Smaller
Agile Really, really small
Deployability Method of making the Forces, primarily the Army, able to send higher percentages
of their manpower to a distant location. This is achieved by reducing the overall
numbers involved, i.e. “In future the Army will be able to send 50% of it’s
manpower to Africa in the back of a Cessna, thus achieving greater deployability”.
Reach The distance the American’s are willing to fly us
Efficient Much, much smaller
Streamlined Just unbelievably small
Just in time For the funeral.
Integrated Process by which all three services get to brief against each other in public leaks,
attempting to justify and defend their own budget against cuts, thereby doing the
Treasury’s work for them. Taken to extremes by the Army in which Corps and
Regiments fight each other, and perfected within the Infantry.
Technically ambitious a. Slang, as in “He was being a bit technically ambitious when he tried to drive
that car through the wall” (cf, “To propose a Bowman”)
b. Description of the far future
Reserves Integral part of current Operational Manning.
Rationalisation a. Cuts
b. Psychological term, meaning to use complicated arguments to avoid facing
unpalatable truths, i.e., “we don’t need to pay for both expensive servicemen and
equipment, because we will be networked, agile, and technically ambitious”.
Rapid Used in a comparative sense, as in “The rapid erosion of the Himalayan
Mountains…”
Modernisation Cuts
Radical Deep Cuts
Transformation Really Deep Cuts
Sustainable Assuming zero casualties, no leave and no emergencies.
Sentences such as “these proposals capture our aim for a speedy deployable, agile, joint and integrated,
technically ambitious defence capability” will make more logical sense to the experienced Staff Officer once
the above definitions are applied.
4. It will also help if Staff Officer’s bear in mind the following Planning Principles. Point C will be of
particular relevance in explaining the rationale behind restructuring to Junior Staff.
a. Use of Special Forces. No one in the general Public has a clue how many there are, so they
can be announced as deploying to every country in the world.
b. Aggressive use of terminology can compensate for lack of actual forces. For example in the
past effective deterrence of a reasonably capable Maritime threat would require the despatch of a
task force, consisting of destroyers, frigates, submarines and possibly even a carrier. In the future
this task will still be achieved by a task force; but task-force will be the new description for a minesweeper.
c. The new Defence Plan was not resource driven. A comprehensive strategic estimate was
conducted, from first principles, identifying the current and potential threats to the UK and it’s
interests, allowing a reserve for the unexpected, and also allowing for recurrent non-warfighting
tasks such as Fire Strike cover and Foot and Mouth disease. Against the tasks identified an ideal
manpower establishment and Task Org was then identified. By an amazing coincidence it
happened to fit almost exactly within current Treasury MOD expenditure plans, and even allow the
MOD to carry half the costs of Iraq and Afghanistan.
d. Much of the current crisis in Defence Spending can be directly traced to the high costs of
legacy equipments. These were ordered at a time of ignorance in the past when Planners naively
seemed to believe that the threat they identified as imminent would remain the same for the 20-30
year service life of the equipment they were ordering. The assumption in the 1980’s and 90’s that
tanks, artillery, and aircraft would be needed in the future was ridiculous, as none of these
equipments have been used by the British Armed forces to any degree since the Falklands war.
However, current planners possess better foresight and are able to predict future threats for at
least the next 40 years. We are therefore able to be certain that Britain is unlikely to need any
tanks, aircraft, submarines etc. past about 2015.
e. Britain no longer needs a significant anti-submarine capability. No other nation possesses
submarines in any numbers, submarine technology is unlikely to advance at all over the next few 30
years, and should anti-submarine technology or skills be required at any point in the future they
can be reconstituted overnight from the reserves. (Once the reserves have been reconstituted). In
any case by 2020 the UK will be fully integrated into mainland Europe, and will therefore no longer
have a coastline to defend or be reliant upon sea-supply.
f. Similar arguments apply to air defence.
g. The Regimental System. In the past the Regimental System has been seen as the cornerstone
of British Military success, creating a system in which the individual is made to feel part of a
greater family, often stretching back hundreds of years, in which he is nurtured and developed, and
to which he feels such great loyalty that he is inspired to sacrifice himself if need be for his
Regimental comrades. However, the British youth of today are so naturally self-sacrificing and
community spirited that additional incentives are now unnecessary, and in any case the threat to
soldiers on the ground has been assumed away. There is therefore no further need for a system
whose main purpose is to generate fighting spirit, and it can be safely emasculated to achieve
administrative efficiency (see “Efficient” above).
h. High divorce rates within the Services will solve manpower crises, by ensuring all service
personnel will be happy to conduct back-to-back tours forever, as no one will have any families or
friends to miss.
i. Savings will be ploughed into the purchase of large numbers of hats. This will be essential
as in future everyone will be at least treble or quadruple hatted. Wars will be fought in rotation on
a strict “first come, first served” basis.
k. Future savings will be made by abolishing all training for the Chiefs of Staff. After all they
haven’t proven remotely as effective at manoeuvre warfare, disruption, dislocation or divide-andrule
as the Treasury.
l. Successive efficiency measures can be made to reinforce each other. For example, each
time troop numbers are cut, a unit can then be tasked to conduct the same jobs as before.
Provided there are no actual massacres of Friendly Forces, the new troop numbers can be seen to
have been fully as effective as the previous numbers, and so can form a baseline for achieving
efficiency cuts to new troop numbers. Savings can then be invested in new equipment, in the same
way that British Airways fires half its pilots every time it needs to buy a new plane. The ultimate
aim is to have one man, but equipped like Dr Octopus. He will sleep with one eye open at all times
to replicate full manning.
m. Key Assumptions: Current levels of operations are an aberration, will never be repeated,
and should form no guide to current manning requirements, let alone future ones. Gerry Adams
has embraced peace, there is no more requirement for crowd control in Northern Ireland, the FBU
have forsworn strikes along with all other key public workers, Osama Bin Laden is about to hand
himself in and the Easter Bunny will be providing Area Air Defence for London.
5. More detailed guidance can be found in JSP 4708- “Magic Mushrooms, their consumption, effects
and results in the MOD” and Minister Hoon’s Autobiography “What Colour is the Sky in My World?”
STAFF GUIDANCE ON DEFENCE RESTRUCTURING
1. This guidance is being issued to remedy a perceived difficulty experienced by Staff at all levels in
understanding the rationale behind recent Defence re-structuring. In particular many Staff Officers seem
not to understand how reducing the numbers of aircraft, ships, tanks, artillery and soldiers results in a more
flexible, robust and effective fighting force.
2. In particular it seems that much of the confusion stems from a systemic misunderstanding of the
correct use of military terminology. A list of common terms and actual meanings follows.
3. In addition there follows an explanation of the key assumptions embedded within the Defence
Review. All Staff Officers are encouraged to seek clarification through their Chain of Command if they still
have any questions.
Staff Terminology used in the new Defence Plan:
Term MOD meaning
Flexible a. Smaller
b. Unable to operate unless under US protection
Robust a. Smaller
b. Lacking reserves or regeneration capability
Networked Smaller, but still unable to talk to each other
Capable Smaller
Agile Really, really small
Deployability Method of making the Forces, primarily the Army, able to send higher percentages
of their manpower to a distant location. This is achieved by reducing the overall
numbers involved, i.e. “In future the Army will be able to send 50% of it’s
manpower to Africa in the back of a Cessna, thus achieving greater deployability”.
Reach The distance the American’s are willing to fly us
Efficient Much, much smaller
Streamlined Just unbelievably small
Just in time For the funeral.
Integrated Process by which all three services get to brief against each other in public leaks,
attempting to justify and defend their own budget against cuts, thereby doing the
Treasury’s work for them. Taken to extremes by the Army in which Corps and
Regiments fight each other, and perfected within the Infantry.
Technically ambitious a. Slang, as in “He was being a bit technically ambitious when he tried to drive
that car through the wall” (cf, “To propose a Bowman”)
b. Description of the far future
Reserves Integral part of current Operational Manning.
Rationalisation a. Cuts
b. Psychological term, meaning to use complicated arguments to avoid facing
unpalatable truths, i.e., “we don’t need to pay for both expensive servicemen and
equipment, because we will be networked, agile, and technically ambitious”.
Rapid Used in a comparative sense, as in “The rapid erosion of the Himalayan
Mountains…”
Modernisation Cuts
Radical Deep Cuts
Transformation Really Deep Cuts
Sustainable Assuming zero casualties, no leave and no emergencies.
Sentences such as “these proposals capture our aim for a speedy deployable, agile, joint and integrated,
technically ambitious defence capability” will make more logical sense to the experienced Staff Officer once
the above definitions are applied.
4. It will also help if Staff Officer’s bear in mind the following Planning Principles. Point C will be of
particular relevance in explaining the rationale behind restructuring to Junior Staff.
a. Use of Special Forces. No one in the general Public has a clue how many there are, so they
can be announced as deploying to every country in the world.
b. Aggressive use of terminology can compensate for lack of actual forces. For example in the
past effective deterrence of a reasonably capable Maritime threat would require the despatch of a
task force, consisting of destroyers, frigates, submarines and possibly even a carrier. In the future
this task will still be achieved by a task force; but task-force will be the new description for a minesweeper.
c. The new Defence Plan was not resource driven. A comprehensive strategic estimate was
conducted, from first principles, identifying the current and potential threats to the UK and it’s
interests, allowing a reserve for the unexpected, and also allowing for recurrent non-warfighting
tasks such as Fire Strike cover and Foot and Mouth disease. Against the tasks identified an ideal
manpower establishment and Task Org was then identified. By an amazing coincidence it
happened to fit almost exactly within current Treasury MOD expenditure plans, and even allow the
MOD to carry half the costs of Iraq and Afghanistan.
d. Much of the current crisis in Defence Spending can be directly traced to the high costs of
legacy equipments. These were ordered at a time of ignorance in the past when Planners naively
seemed to believe that the threat they identified as imminent would remain the same for the 20-30
year service life of the equipment they were ordering. The assumption in the 1980’s and 90’s that
tanks, artillery, and aircraft would be needed in the future was ridiculous, as none of these
equipments have been used by the British Armed forces to any degree since the Falklands war.
However, current planners possess better foresight and are able to predict future threats for at
least the next 40 years. We are therefore able to be certain that Britain is unlikely to need any
tanks, aircraft, submarines etc. past about 2015.
e. Britain no longer needs a significant anti-submarine capability. No other nation possesses
submarines in any numbers, submarine technology is unlikely to advance at all over the next few 30
years, and should anti-submarine technology or skills be required at any point in the future they
can be reconstituted overnight from the reserves. (Once the reserves have been reconstituted). In
any case by 2020 the UK will be fully integrated into mainland Europe, and will therefore no longer
have a coastline to defend or be reliant upon sea-supply.
f. Similar arguments apply to air defence.
g. The Regimental System. In the past the Regimental System has been seen as the cornerstone
of British Military success, creating a system in which the individual is made to feel part of a
greater family, often stretching back hundreds of years, in which he is nurtured and developed, and
to which he feels such great loyalty that he is inspired to sacrifice himself if need be for his
Regimental comrades. However, the British youth of today are so naturally self-sacrificing and
community spirited that additional incentives are now unnecessary, and in any case the threat to
soldiers on the ground has been assumed away. There is therefore no further need for a system
whose main purpose is to generate fighting spirit, and it can be safely emasculated to achieve
administrative efficiency (see “Efficient” above).
h. High divorce rates within the Services will solve manpower crises, by ensuring all service
personnel will be happy to conduct back-to-back tours forever, as no one will have any families or
friends to miss.
i. Savings will be ploughed into the purchase of large numbers of hats. This will be essential
as in future everyone will be at least treble or quadruple hatted. Wars will be fought in rotation on
a strict “first come, first served” basis.
k. Future savings will be made by abolishing all training for the Chiefs of Staff. After all they
haven’t proven remotely as effective at manoeuvre warfare, disruption, dislocation or divide-andrule
as the Treasury.
l. Successive efficiency measures can be made to reinforce each other. For example, each
time troop numbers are cut, a unit can then be tasked to conduct the same jobs as before.
Provided there are no actual massacres of Friendly Forces, the new troop numbers can be seen to
have been fully as effective as the previous numbers, and so can form a baseline for achieving
efficiency cuts to new troop numbers. Savings can then be invested in new equipment, in the same
way that British Airways fires half its pilots every time it needs to buy a new plane. The ultimate
aim is to have one man, but equipped like Dr Octopus. He will sleep with one eye open at all times
to replicate full manning.
m. Key Assumptions: Current levels of operations are an aberration, will never be repeated,
and should form no guide to current manning requirements, let alone future ones. Gerry Adams
has embraced peace, there is no more requirement for crowd control in Northern Ireland, the FBU
have forsworn strikes along with all other key public workers, Osama Bin Laden is about to hand
himself in and the Easter Bunny will be providing Area Air Defence for London.
5. More detailed guidance can be found in JSP 4708- “Magic Mushrooms, their consumption, effects
and results in the MOD” and Minister Hoon’s Autobiography “What Colour is the Sky in My World?”
Join Date: Mar 2005
Location: flatlands
Posts: 4
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Gaz
As one who has flown 13 different Harrier types as was very close to the old girl before she was sadly withdrawn from us, I can offer the following.
Cap Eb testing which had begun and was to be integrated included Brimstone and in a mixed configuration too which is still unmatched by any current UK airframe.
Additionally, I have seen the GR9/ SS report too and anyone who says SS cannot go onto Harrier is being somewhat economical with the truth.
The point is we have moved on from SDSR debates. Gr4 was kept but the truth about what GR9 could carry if it was decided it should do so was swept under the carpet. Both Brimstone and SS could go onto Harrier and those in town know it too as I know the report was given to the seniors during the review. I for one minute am not saying that GR9 is better than GR4 I just get fed up with people saying it cant when clearly the research was done to say it can!
With respect to Typhoon and spiking for it, I agree with your comments but again get fed up with spin. The comments coming out lead you to believe that Typhoon is doing it all when it is not. Once fully integrated the system will provide a good a-g capability. Right now it is in its embryonic stages despite declaring a capability in 2009. It does not come close to Harrier or GR4 so lets not pretend it does and just come out and say it dropped and weapon spiked in. No harm in that just as you say. But the pressure to say it it is delivering in theatre must be huge on a programme that is late, over budget and of limited utility in the current crisis. It will have its day once all the integration is complete by which time it will be very good but at what cost and what other options could we have had! Hey ho support BAE at all costs!!!!
As one who has flown 13 different Harrier types as was very close to the old girl before she was sadly withdrawn from us, I can offer the following.
Cap Eb testing which had begun and was to be integrated included Brimstone and in a mixed configuration too which is still unmatched by any current UK airframe.
Additionally, I have seen the GR9/ SS report too and anyone who says SS cannot go onto Harrier is being somewhat economical with the truth.
The point is we have moved on from SDSR debates. Gr4 was kept but the truth about what GR9 could carry if it was decided it should do so was swept under the carpet. Both Brimstone and SS could go onto Harrier and those in town know it too as I know the report was given to the seniors during the review. I for one minute am not saying that GR9 is better than GR4 I just get fed up with people saying it cant when clearly the research was done to say it can!
With respect to Typhoon and spiking for it, I agree with your comments but again get fed up with spin. The comments coming out lead you to believe that Typhoon is doing it all when it is not. Once fully integrated the system will provide a good a-g capability. Right now it is in its embryonic stages despite declaring a capability in 2009. It does not come close to Harrier or GR4 so lets not pretend it does and just come out and say it dropped and weapon spiked in. No harm in that just as you say. But the pressure to say it it is delivering in theatre must be huge on a programme that is late, over budget and of limited utility in the current crisis. It will have its day once all the integration is complete by which time it will be very good but at what cost and what other options could we have had! Hey ho support BAE at all costs!!!!
Join Date: Feb 2006
Location: North West England
Age: 54
Posts: 136
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Herbie ,
From one of my previous ramblings:-
"Gents,
Having been involved with PW4 for a long while, it does depend on the platform as to how easy it is to integrate MIL-STD-1760 weapons. Harriers' integration did not use the full interface and was done fast and dirty. GR4 did use the recommended interface, and indeed got the weapon on in quick time, albeit not with a full release capability - I'm talking in terms of release sequencing and targeting..
The eternal problem has always been the tweaking of display software, allied with sytem platform computers to eke the most out of the weapon(s) deployed. The longterm stuff will get done in the background while UOR capability can be done quicker.
Large chunks of time/effort are spent examining weapon configurations that are suitable to be carried/released/jettisoned/operated with each other. Harrier stores management is/was a fairly groovy system in that it retained a mixed load capability second to none. Basically you can hang anything off it and the armament control computer wouldn't care. GR4 SMS is a bit more finicky and would have to be tested a lot more to generate a workable clearance.
Not being privy to Typhoons' workings (info was a news release - not tub-thumping), I can only imagine the super-computers involve in release and jettison of ordnance from a plane that is highly agile/unstable would involve a lot more work than throwing it on. For instance GR4 never needed the Flight Control System updated - even with 4 Storm Shadow slung under it. I would hazard that Typhoon does or the FCS is going to go potty with a new weapon/weight/drag on whatever pylon."
And:-
"To re-iterate for the ill-informed/un-initiated oh, and dear Sharkey:-
Typhoon has replaced Tornado F3 and Jaguar.
Primary role is Air Defence with secondary Air to Ground capability, currently PW2 and Litening 3 capable, along with a working 27mm cannon.
Paveway 4, Brimstone (dual and single mode),E/PW 3, and Storm Shadow are in development for future upgrades.
Harrier was trialled for Brimstone carriage but never fired it (contrary to some media reports that it was fired in AFG, it was a Tornado).
Harrier can carry one Storm Shadow but is un-balanced and requires a 540lb on the other pylon.
Tornado GR4 is due to be replaced by JSF/Lightning originally 2025, but now sooner.
GR4 currently is the only aircraft capable of the Deep Strike mission. Typhoon is scheduled to acheive this in 2018. Problem is the Flight Control System software has to be modified to each particular munition, as Typhoon is a computer-controlled unstable aircraft. This is safety-critical software and takes time to test and approve.
Sharkey Ward is silly. "
I fully agree Harrier could have received clearance for carriage, release and jettison of SS and Brimstone - it's just a question of who was willing to pay for it. I believe SS carriage was a bit tricky due to size constraints, and would have involved an airfrane mos with all its attendant costs and risks. Again, I'm sad to see Harrier go - a great plane and it's the politicos who did it, not the operators maintainers or developers.
From one of my previous ramblings:-
"Gents,
Having been involved with PW4 for a long while, it does depend on the platform as to how easy it is to integrate MIL-STD-1760 weapons. Harriers' integration did not use the full interface and was done fast and dirty. GR4 did use the recommended interface, and indeed got the weapon on in quick time, albeit not with a full release capability - I'm talking in terms of release sequencing and targeting..
The eternal problem has always been the tweaking of display software, allied with sytem platform computers to eke the most out of the weapon(s) deployed. The longterm stuff will get done in the background while UOR capability can be done quicker.
Large chunks of time/effort are spent examining weapon configurations that are suitable to be carried/released/jettisoned/operated with each other. Harrier stores management is/was a fairly groovy system in that it retained a mixed load capability second to none. Basically you can hang anything off it and the armament control computer wouldn't care. GR4 SMS is a bit more finicky and would have to be tested a lot more to generate a workable clearance.
Not being privy to Typhoons' workings (info was a news release - not tub-thumping), I can only imagine the super-computers involve in release and jettison of ordnance from a plane that is highly agile/unstable would involve a lot more work than throwing it on. For instance GR4 never needed the Flight Control System updated - even with 4 Storm Shadow slung under it. I would hazard that Typhoon does or the FCS is going to go potty with a new weapon/weight/drag on whatever pylon."
And:-
"To re-iterate for the ill-informed/un-initiated oh, and dear Sharkey:-
Typhoon has replaced Tornado F3 and Jaguar.
Primary role is Air Defence with secondary Air to Ground capability, currently PW2 and Litening 3 capable, along with a working 27mm cannon.
Paveway 4, Brimstone (dual and single mode),E/PW 3, and Storm Shadow are in development for future upgrades.
Harrier was trialled for Brimstone carriage but never fired it (contrary to some media reports that it was fired in AFG, it was a Tornado).
Harrier can carry one Storm Shadow but is un-balanced and requires a 540lb on the other pylon.
Tornado GR4 is due to be replaced by JSF/Lightning originally 2025, but now sooner.
GR4 currently is the only aircraft capable of the Deep Strike mission. Typhoon is scheduled to acheive this in 2018. Problem is the Flight Control System software has to be modified to each particular munition, as Typhoon is a computer-controlled unstable aircraft. This is safety-critical software and takes time to test and approve.
Sharkey Ward is silly. "
I fully agree Harrier could have received clearance for carriage, release and jettison of SS and Brimstone - it's just a question of who was willing to pay for it. I believe SS carriage was a bit tricky due to size constraints, and would have involved an airfrane mos with all its attendant costs and risks. Again, I'm sad to see Harrier go - a great plane and it's the politicos who did it, not the operators maintainers or developers.