Decision to axe Harrier is "bonkers".
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Indeed. Quoting oneself at such length is considered by many as the internet equilivant of masturbation.
Foghorn is right. Stop bleating on and on about the puffa jet. Its gone, get over it!
U hung anything like a war load under a harrier, it was going to a rwy, simple as.
JFH and FARP
Says it all..bye boys!
U hung anything like a war load under a harrier, it was going to a rwy, simple as.
JFH and FARP
Says it all..bye boys!
Anyone who tries to argue that Tornadoes and Typhoons (+ huge support tail) based 1200 miles away in Gioia is more effective than carrier based air 20nm off Libya is nuts.
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Economically astute; well done HMG/MOD! Now that the monstrously expensive harrier is gone, at least we have succeeded in selling these unique and previously useful assets to recoup some of their cost. With such a good return on our investment and after years of developmental hard work by many people, we can now buy or cover off the following (approx):
OK I’m bored of doing more maths for this but you get the idea. After such a long term investment in the harrier by the UK I cannot find the words to do this justice. However, I was intrigued to learn that the UK also subsidises the EU to the tune of about 100 bn Euro per year (and receives about 40 bn Euros in return) – so there’s no money available for UK defence? Suffice to say that the money managing lunatics are in control of the asylum and defence is not as high on the agenda as ensuring one’s nest is feathered. An old squadron boss of mine said a few years ago that the wheels were coming off the bus – he was right, big time.
- - 1.5 x Hawk T2s (almost)
- - 5 x PC-21s
- - 1 month of Libya ops
- - 4% the cost of procuring Brimstone (since 1996)
- - 30 x Litening pods (good!)
- - 0.4% of the foreign aid budget for 2011
OK I’m bored of doing more maths for this but you get the idea. After such a long term investment in the harrier by the UK I cannot find the words to do this justice. However, I was intrigued to learn that the UK also subsidises the EU to the tune of about 100 bn Euro per year (and receives about 40 bn Euros in return) – so there’s no money available for UK defence? Suffice to say that the money managing lunatics are in control of the asylum and defence is not as high on the agenda as ensuring one’s nest is feathered. An old squadron boss of mine said a few years ago that the wheels were coming off the bus – he was right, big time.
Last edited by DITYIWAHP; 16th Jun 2011 at 13:02.
It looks as though the First Sea Lord is not the only one with reservations about being able to sustain operations against Gaddafi for more than six months without a drastic rethink:
Senior figures across Nato are expressing growing concerns that the alliance lacks the military capabilities to complete a successful mission against Colonel Muammer Gaddafi in Libya, despite the continuing degradation of his forces on the ground...
In Paris, Admiral Pierre-François Forissier, head of the French Navy, said the aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle, now deployed off Libya, would be “unable to play any operational role in 2012” if it was kept off Libya until the end of the year. In Brussels, General Stéphane Abrial, the man in charge of managing the alliance’s logistical capabilities, also said that the “resource issue will become critical” for Nato if the Libya operation continued for much longer.
Military experts say one way of gauging the lack of firepower in the Libya operation is to compare it to Nato’s 1999 air war over Kosovo. The Libya operation on Thursday entered its 78th day – exactly the length of time it took for Nato to remove Serbian forces from Kosovo. But Nato has flown only one-third the number of air sorties over Libya that it did over Kosovo – and hit only a fraction of the targets...
In France, some figures in the military establishment believe the British could do more. “The UK are not really putting enough assets into Libya,” says a senior French official. “We are daily putting between 30 and 35 aircraft into the operation but the British are putting in far less.”...
Ultimately, the fundamental question is whether anything can be done to ramp up European resources before the autumn, when a continuing mission is likely to be seriously questioned by politicians in the UK, US and France.
I'd be surprised if the French are giving any consideration at all to extending the carrier Charles de Gaulle until the end of the year. Before she began contributing more than a quarter of the NATO strike sorties over Libya, she and her air group had been providing CAS for ground forces (mainly Brits) in Afghanistan since Oct 2010, her fifth such mission in nine years.
CdG and her air group have now achieved eight months of almost continuous flying operations and must be sorely in need of some maintenance and leave. The question is, what is going to fill the significant gap when she goes? The tragedy is that the RN doesn't have a carrier to relieve her. Even Ark Royal with a dozen or more Harrier GR9s would have mitigated this situation enormously. If the performance of USS Kearsarge and her Harrier AV-8Bs is anything to go by (before they were withdrawn from operations), the GR9s would have flown at least two sorties for every one flown by land-based aircraft. All we can offer now is our only LPH with a few helicopters.
At least some NATO countries are stepping up to the plate:
In the Libya operation, Norway and Denmark, have provided 12 percent of allied strike aircraft yet have struck about one third of the targets. Belgium and Canada are also making major contributions to the strike mission...
Originally Posted by Financial Times 15 Jun 2011
Senior figures across Nato are expressing growing concerns that the alliance lacks the military capabilities to complete a successful mission against Colonel Muammer Gaddafi in Libya, despite the continuing degradation of his forces on the ground...
In Paris, Admiral Pierre-François Forissier, head of the French Navy, said the aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle, now deployed off Libya, would be “unable to play any operational role in 2012” if it was kept off Libya until the end of the year. In Brussels, General Stéphane Abrial, the man in charge of managing the alliance’s logistical capabilities, also said that the “resource issue will become critical” for Nato if the Libya operation continued for much longer.
Military experts say one way of gauging the lack of firepower in the Libya operation is to compare it to Nato’s 1999 air war over Kosovo. The Libya operation on Thursday entered its 78th day – exactly the length of time it took for Nato to remove Serbian forces from Kosovo. But Nato has flown only one-third the number of air sorties over Libya that it did over Kosovo – and hit only a fraction of the targets...
In France, some figures in the military establishment believe the British could do more. “The UK are not really putting enough assets into Libya,” says a senior French official. “We are daily putting between 30 and 35 aircraft into the operation but the British are putting in far less.”...
Ultimately, the fundamental question is whether anything can be done to ramp up European resources before the autumn, when a continuing mission is likely to be seriously questioned by politicians in the UK, US and France.
CdG and her air group have now achieved eight months of almost continuous flying operations and must be sorely in need of some maintenance and leave. The question is, what is going to fill the significant gap when she goes? The tragedy is that the RN doesn't have a carrier to relieve her. Even Ark Royal with a dozen or more Harrier GR9s would have mitigated this situation enormously. If the performance of USS Kearsarge and her Harrier AV-8Bs is anything to go by (before they were withdrawn from operations), the GR9s would have flown at least two sorties for every one flown by land-based aircraft. All we can offer now is our only LPH with a few helicopters.
At least some NATO countries are stepping up to the plate:
Originally Posted by Wall Street Journal 10 Jun 2011
In the Libya operation, Norway and Denmark, have provided 12 percent of allied strike aircraft yet have struck about one third of the targets. Belgium and Canada are also making major contributions to the strike mission...
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During PMQs yesterday, the PM mentioned that he'd 'interviewed' the 1st Sea Lord and the outcome of the interview was that the 1st Sea Lord now agrees with the PM and the CDS that the Op is sustainable indefinitely. Whilst I'm sure the comments by Stanhope were made in good faith, it was naive for him to think that after all the posturing over Libya by the PM, the comments were sensible to make.
Guess the next CDS won't be Dark Blue .....
FB
Originally Posted by Justanopinion
Sortie rate is not irrelevant unless you are trying to ignore the usefulness of the carrier, how can it be when one carrier is providing one quarter of all missions. Time on task is important but not much use when you're Winchester. Anyone can spend hours over the target with a tanker, the carrier gives another string to the bow which we are worse off without
Storm off the coast, ship moves. Storm at Gioia, yours..
Storm off the coast, ship moves. Storm at Gioia, yours..
I (and most of the light blue on here) agree wholeheartedly with the last sentence of your first para (even the 2nd part
).
FL/THS et al, you are not the target audience for my qoutes, visiting journalists and political types are. With this in mind, and the need to press home key issues (and a sense of loyalty to 1SL)...
After all, nobody answered my points. And that didn't hurt, did it? My comments about skills are highly relevant to the next bit of news. We know that Admiral Stanhope's French counterpart agrees with him. So does the American Chief of Naval Operations: US Navy will help No.1 ally to train next-generation carrier crews
Meanwhile: the MOD denies the story about the stored Harriers being flogged for spares for £34 million or so. My earlier comments are relevant to this too.
The following Telegraph stories are worth a read:
Reversing the defence cuts is one U-turn Cameron should take
Review the review
Lord West: Government 'stupid' not to review defence
One of the blogs I look at, the Daly History Blog, also covers the disagreement between an experienced naval officer and a PR Spiv:
First Sea Lord – Royal Navy ‘in a very bad way’
Admiral Sir Jock Slater was First Sea Lord during the earlier 1998 Strategic Defence Review:
The position the First Sea Lord and the chief of staffs is very difficult indeed because if you want to retain the confidence of ministers you should not speak directly to the press about your concerns. But the fact remains that the navy is in a very bad way. The loss of Ark Royal and the Harriers was the worst decision by a government for many, many years. I think what Mark Stanhope has done is to state the obvious. You can’t carry on doing more with less.’
Naval Historian and analst Professor Andrew Lambert, of Kings College London, had this to say:
I think what the First Sea Lord has said in a very quiet and polite way is what everyone else has been saying in a very loud and aggressive way for a considerable period of time. The government has committed themselves to doing something when we have not got the equipment to do the job. The problem is the government has not got the political courage to admit they have made a mistake and as a result we are spending vast amounts of money doing things inefficiently and ineffectively. We’re getting laughed at by the French for not having a carrier off Libya. It’s hard enough when they beat us at rugby or football but when they beat us at carrier aviation it is unacceptable.’
‘It’s not the business of government to make perfect decisions all the time. It’s their business to run the country and respond to events. They have held their hands up when they got things wrong with the NHS reforms and sentencing but they seem unable to do the same with defence. It’s gone beyond a joke really. I know governments will stick to their own rhetoric but this is costing us too much and may even end up costing lives and that’s why the First Sea Lord was right to speak out because the situation is unacceptable.’
This Rum Ration thread is worth a read too.
The First Sea Lord was also worried (and I guess still is) about skills loss post Harrier - see here.
Quoting myself again....
Go on journos, get stuck in...
Quoting myself again....
If the Royal Navy has no capacity to operate fixed wing aircraft at sea for a decade, then all the skills that are needed will be lost. It is generally reckoned that building these skills up from being non existent to the level we currently have would take approximately ten years – maybe longer. Of course, the pilots can be sent to work with the US Navy or someone else, to build up experience of carrier operations. However, operating fixed wing aircraft (and helicopters to a certain extent) is a whole ship activity. It does not only involve the aircrew and flight deck personnel, but virtually everyone. There is no way we can send hundreds of sailors to work in American carriers, and most of these specialist skills need to be maintained by constant practice. Many are carrier specific.
On the flight deck, aircraft handlers need to be able to speedily and safely move aircraft around the flight deck, both by giving visual cues to pilots and by using vehicles. They also need to be able to deal with any fires or other incidents that might occur. The RN School of Flight Deck Operations at RNAS Culdrose has a dummy deck, dubbed HMS Siskin, where aircraft handlers learn their trade. Real aircraft, including a number of retired Sea Harriers, are used and move under their own power to simulate a carrier deck. However, they cannot simulate the movement of a ship at sea in variable sea conditions, pitching and rolling. Nor can they simulate things such the carrier increasing speed to launch aircraft and the sudden wind over the deck. Getting experience of these things and building experience and confidence requires people to spend time at sea working with aircraft for real. This is a key skill area that will decline very rapidly if we have no flying from carriers.
Other personnel may also need to work on the flight deck, amongst the aircraft. These include the people who maintain the aircraft, and those who fuel and arm them. They too need experience of doing it for real.
Beyond the flight deck, lots of other personnel in different parts of the ship are involved. These include the Navigating Officer and the Officer of the Watch and his/her team on the bridge, who must ensure that the ship is on the right heading for flying operations. The Commander (Air) and his team are responsible for running aviation activities. The marine engineering watchkeepers in the Ship Control Centre are responsible for increasing the speed of the carrier’s engines when needed for launching aircraft, they also carry out adjustments to things such as the ship’s trim, so as to maintain a level deck for flying. There are various sensors, communications systems and landing aids that need to be maintained and operated. All of these are things that demand time spent practising at sea.
Air Traffic Control is of critical importance, as are others who are involved in airspace management. A carrier is unlike any airfield in that she moves. Land based ATC cannot provide the same experience. Her command team must also consider the constraints put on her movements by the maritime environment, by her escorts, and by the need to be aware of the existence of things such as merchant shipping or fishing boats. The aircrew that fly from the deck also need to have an understanding of all these issues. They must also understand how they fit in with the rest of the ship and task group. Finally, no carrier operations mean that in ten years time, there will be no senior naval officers with experience or understanding of these complex issues.
Most of these things cannot be taught on a dummy deck, or in a simulator, but need developing by real flying aboard real decks. The RN has been doing this for many decades, and the experience and expertise, much of it won at great cost, handed down. It seems unlikely that the body of experience would survive a ten year gap of non use. Interestingly, young officers entering the training pipeline to become pilots or observers have been told that to go from scratch to the level of expertise we currently have would take ten years – this is based on the experience of others Navies like those of Spain and Italy who have gained carriers more recently than us.
Some of my comments here are based on what I was fortunate to witness aboard HMS Illustrious in late 2007. Although I had a pretty good idea of what to expect, the number of different parts of ship involved in maintaining safe and effective flying operations took me by surprise. The teamwork was impressive. If a mere [me - a Reservist junior rate] can see this, why does the review turn a blind eye? Whilst in the dinner queue one evening I looked in a magazine I found loafing, there was an article in which a senior aviator (ex Sea Harrier) commented on the danger of future Fleet Air Arm personnel becoming unfamiliar with the shipboard environment and deck operations. My path has crossed with aviation connected personnel at other times, and they have all expressed similar views.
And....I would suggest that basics are basics, regardless of whether the future is V/STOL or involves "Cats and traps". Will there be exchanges for lots of chockheads - moving live jets on deck 24 hours a day in all weather in rough sea states, the people who fuel, arm and work on aircraft on deck - amongst jet blast (and FOD issues) the OOW and bridge team - who have to put the ship in the right place, direction and speed for aircraft to take off or land, Ops Room personnel - who have to operate sensors/weapons and talk to aircraft, maintainers of this equipment, landing aids maintainers, the ME watchkeepers keeping a nice level deck and increasing speed when needed, ATC types, Fighter Controllers, senior Officers in the carrier (Cdr(Air), Lt Cdr(Flying), Captain, XO) - they need to know how to run things, senior Officers elsewhere (MOD, Navy Command, task group commanders) who need to know how aircraft are used as task group weapons, etc?
Have these issues been picked up by the media? Somehow I don't think so, mind you they don't seem to have picked up on the deployment of the Cougar task group to Libya. Are there any journalists looking at this thread?
Air Forces Monthly have produced a special publication, UK Airpower 2011, which shows the Sea Harriers sent to the SFDO Dummy Deck at Culdrose as the only RN fast jets, it comments that they are still in service although no longer flying, and are the only way that aircraft handlers will have any experience of working with jet aircraft this decade, and provide the means to embark US, Italian, or Spanish Harriers this decade. What a shocking state of affairs!
Back to the topic of Libyan operations. This report suggests that the Apaches from Ocean have been fired upon on their first mission. Elsewhere, Dr Fox says that the use of Apache is not plan B - Liam Fox denies Apache strikes are a change of tactics:
The use of the attack helicopters is a logical extension of we have already been doing. We already have fast jets in action, this gives us a chance to target new targets in a way we weren't able to do.
What does that mean? That Apache is better suited to dealing wih the current target set than Tornado/Typhoon? Or that a slower aircraft based close to the action is more responsive than a faster one based 600 nautical miles away?
On the flight deck, aircraft handlers need to be able to speedily and safely move aircraft around the flight deck, both by giving visual cues to pilots and by using vehicles. They also need to be able to deal with any fires or other incidents that might occur. The RN School of Flight Deck Operations at RNAS Culdrose has a dummy deck, dubbed HMS Siskin, where aircraft handlers learn their trade. Real aircraft, including a number of retired Sea Harriers, are used and move under their own power to simulate a carrier deck. However, they cannot simulate the movement of a ship at sea in variable sea conditions, pitching and rolling. Nor can they simulate things such the carrier increasing speed to launch aircraft and the sudden wind over the deck. Getting experience of these things and building experience and confidence requires people to spend time at sea working with aircraft for real. This is a key skill area that will decline very rapidly if we have no flying from carriers.
Other personnel may also need to work on the flight deck, amongst the aircraft. These include the people who maintain the aircraft, and those who fuel and arm them. They too need experience of doing it for real.
Beyond the flight deck, lots of other personnel in different parts of the ship are involved. These include the Navigating Officer and the Officer of the Watch and his/her team on the bridge, who must ensure that the ship is on the right heading for flying operations. The Commander (Air) and his team are responsible for running aviation activities. The marine engineering watchkeepers in the Ship Control Centre are responsible for increasing the speed of the carrier’s engines when needed for launching aircraft, they also carry out adjustments to things such as the ship’s trim, so as to maintain a level deck for flying. There are various sensors, communications systems and landing aids that need to be maintained and operated. All of these are things that demand time spent practising at sea.
Air Traffic Control is of critical importance, as are others who are involved in airspace management. A carrier is unlike any airfield in that she moves. Land based ATC cannot provide the same experience. Her command team must also consider the constraints put on her movements by the maritime environment, by her escorts, and by the need to be aware of the existence of things such as merchant shipping or fishing boats. The aircrew that fly from the deck also need to have an understanding of all these issues. They must also understand how they fit in with the rest of the ship and task group. Finally, no carrier operations mean that in ten years time, there will be no senior naval officers with experience or understanding of these complex issues.
Most of these things cannot be taught on a dummy deck, or in a simulator, but need developing by real flying aboard real decks. The RN has been doing this for many decades, and the experience and expertise, much of it won at great cost, handed down. It seems unlikely that the body of experience would survive a ten year gap of non use. Interestingly, young officers entering the training pipeline to become pilots or observers have been told that to go from scratch to the level of expertise we currently have would take ten years – this is based on the experience of others Navies like those of Spain and Italy who have gained carriers more recently than us.
Some of my comments here are based on what I was fortunate to witness aboard HMS Illustrious in late 2007. Although I had a pretty good idea of what to expect, the number of different parts of ship involved in maintaining safe and effective flying operations took me by surprise. The teamwork was impressive. If a mere [me - a Reservist junior rate] can see this, why does the review turn a blind eye? Whilst in the dinner queue one evening I looked in a magazine I found loafing, there was an article in which a senior aviator (ex Sea Harrier) commented on the danger of future Fleet Air Arm personnel becoming unfamiliar with the shipboard environment and deck operations. My path has crossed with aviation connected personnel at other times, and they have all expressed similar views.
And....I would suggest that basics are basics, regardless of whether the future is V/STOL or involves "Cats and traps". Will there be exchanges for lots of chockheads - moving live jets on deck 24 hours a day in all weather in rough sea states, the people who fuel, arm and work on aircraft on deck - amongst jet blast (and FOD issues) the OOW and bridge team - who have to put the ship in the right place, direction and speed for aircraft to take off or land, Ops Room personnel - who have to operate sensors/weapons and talk to aircraft, maintainers of this equipment, landing aids maintainers, the ME watchkeepers keeping a nice level deck and increasing speed when needed, ATC types, Fighter Controllers, senior Officers in the carrier (Cdr(Air), Lt Cdr(Flying), Captain, XO) - they need to know how to run things, senior Officers elsewhere (MOD, Navy Command, task group commanders) who need to know how aircraft are used as task group weapons, etc?
Have these issues been picked up by the media? Somehow I don't think so, mind you they don't seem to have picked up on the deployment of the Cougar task group to Libya. Are there any journalists looking at this thread?
Air Forces Monthly have produced a special publication, UK Airpower 2011, which shows the Sea Harriers sent to the SFDO Dummy Deck at Culdrose as the only RN fast jets, it comments that they are still in service although no longer flying, and are the only way that aircraft handlers will have any experience of working with jet aircraft this decade, and provide the means to embark US, Italian, or Spanish Harriers this decade. What a shocking state of affairs!
Back to the topic of Libyan operations. This report suggests that the Apaches from Ocean have been fired upon on their first mission. Elsewhere, Dr Fox says that the use of Apache is not plan B - Liam Fox denies Apache strikes are a change of tactics:
The use of the attack helicopters is a logical extension of we have already been doing. We already have fast jets in action, this gives us a chance to target new targets in a way we weren't able to do.
What does that mean? That Apache is better suited to dealing wih the current target set than Tornado/Typhoon? Or that a slower aircraft based close to the action is more responsive than a faster one based 600 nautical miles away?
After reading the Sun story back in April I couldn't resist having a little more correspondence with my MP/MinAF over the Harrier issue.
Basically I said that I was not surprised and realised that the RNR operated Harrier idea was a long shot, but noted that we could continue to embark USMC Harriers aboard Illustrious/Queen Elizabeth, which would not only help maintain the skills needed for the future (see above) but also strengthen our relationship with the US Marine Corps. I suggested that some or most of our redundant Harriers could be sent to the US (there was a rumour they were going Stateside anyway) for spares/training/attrition replacements in exchange a smaller number (twelve?) of AV8Bs - and an MOU in exchange for continued USMC embarkations. Apart from filling the gap in fixed wing carrier aviation, this would allow us to retain not only the skills aboard the carrier, it would enable to RN to retain a cadre of both Pilots and Air Engineers - instead of having to start almost from scratch on a few years time. See also this earlier post.
I finished by noting the Telegraph story about the Charles De Gaulle being moved closer to the Libyan shore, and noted the high sortie rates achieved not only by the Charles De Gaulle but also by AV8Bs from the USS Kearsarge. I noted that Charles De Gaulle will have to leave the theatre sometime, perhaps a post refit Lusty (with Harriers) could relieve her?
Got a reply on Thursday, though it was dated the end of May. Basically the party line again. The letter said that we need to work with allies to regenerate the skills needed in the future, including working closely with allies, particularly the US and France. HMS Illustrious is coming out of refit in an amphibious role, and that the Harrier pilots and other personnel needed to support carrier operations have been re-employed, including postings to the US or France. No comment was made about the stored Harriers - due to potential buyers(??), but Libya was mentioned, as basing and overflight tights were expected. It was stressed that it was down to money.
With respect to the ongoing Libyan operations, I see that the Minehunter HMS Bangor has been sent to the Mediterranean, at the request of NATO, to replace HMS Brocklesby. Does this mean that NATO expects to be in it for the long haul? If so, it raises some questions:
1. The First Sea Lord said that the commitment of a frigate/destroyer and a MCMV would cause problems with other commitments if it became a long term thing.
2. Many of the arguments against a CVS with Harriers have focussed on the cost of the task group, yet we do seem to have a task group in the Gulf of Sirte, and the RAF participation is not without cost - discussed here and here.
3. Charles De Gaulle cannot stay on station forever. However, about a quarter of NATO sorties have been flown from her (noted here)- how will she be relieved?
4. If operations continue so long that Ocean is relieved by Illustrious, could Harriers (US perhaps?) embark on her? If only we had our own..
5. I believe the number of Apaches that were marinised was low, so does that mean that the Apache can only be committed to ship based operations for limited periods?
One last thing. Very basic Queueing theory shows what should be obvious - the a fast food restaurant can serve the same number of eating in customers as a conventional one. Likewise other situations where there is a time delay in achieving an objective and being able to achieve another. Applied to aircraft - the ones nearer the target have shorter transit time, and hence higher sortie rates. For Italy based jets to be able to respond as fast as carrier based ones would mean travelling at about Mach 5! This ignores the need for tanking and other support.
Of course, this sort of logical analysis is different to the last minute political interference that took place just before SDSR was announced.
What will NATO do when Charles de Gaulle has to leave the area of operations?
I wonder if our politicians are able to learn..... Maybe there is something in my suggestion of leasing a dozen or so AV8Bs in exchange for (most of if not all) our now disused (still with support costs) Harriers (plus continued USMC embarkations aboard Lusty/QE - which would be useful to us too). Someone please suggest this to Their Lordships and to the Government - it would solve both problems (lack of carrier aviation in a crisis AND skill loss pre CVF) and could be legitimately viewed as a positive outcome. It would also be cheaper than bringing the previous Joint Force Harrier set up back into service, and mean that we are no longer paying for disused Harriers under the RAB system.
Basically I said that I was not surprised and realised that the RNR operated Harrier idea was a long shot, but noted that we could continue to embark USMC Harriers aboard Illustrious/Queen Elizabeth, which would not only help maintain the skills needed for the future (see above) but also strengthen our relationship with the US Marine Corps. I suggested that some or most of our redundant Harriers could be sent to the US (there was a rumour they were going Stateside anyway) for spares/training/attrition replacements in exchange a smaller number (twelve?) of AV8Bs - and an MOU in exchange for continued USMC embarkations. Apart from filling the gap in fixed wing carrier aviation, this would allow us to retain not only the skills aboard the carrier, it would enable to RN to retain a cadre of both Pilots and Air Engineers - instead of having to start almost from scratch on a few years time. See also this earlier post.
I finished by noting the Telegraph story about the Charles De Gaulle being moved closer to the Libyan shore, and noted the high sortie rates achieved not only by the Charles De Gaulle but also by AV8Bs from the USS Kearsarge. I noted that Charles De Gaulle will have to leave the theatre sometime, perhaps a post refit Lusty (with Harriers) could relieve her?
Got a reply on Thursday, though it was dated the end of May. Basically the party line again. The letter said that we need to work with allies to regenerate the skills needed in the future, including working closely with allies, particularly the US and France. HMS Illustrious is coming out of refit in an amphibious role, and that the Harrier pilots and other personnel needed to support carrier operations have been re-employed, including postings to the US or France. No comment was made about the stored Harriers - due to potential buyers(??), but Libya was mentioned, as basing and overflight tights were expected. It was stressed that it was down to money.
With respect to the ongoing Libyan operations, I see that the Minehunter HMS Bangor has been sent to the Mediterranean, at the request of NATO, to replace HMS Brocklesby. Does this mean that NATO expects to be in it for the long haul? If so, it raises some questions:
1. The First Sea Lord said that the commitment of a frigate/destroyer and a MCMV would cause problems with other commitments if it became a long term thing.
2. Many of the arguments against a CVS with Harriers have focussed on the cost of the task group, yet we do seem to have a task group in the Gulf of Sirte, and the RAF participation is not without cost - discussed here and here.
3. Charles De Gaulle cannot stay on station forever. However, about a quarter of NATO sorties have been flown from her (noted here)- how will she be relieved?
4. If operations continue so long that Ocean is relieved by Illustrious, could Harriers (US perhaps?) embark on her? If only we had our own..
5. I believe the number of Apaches that were marinised was low, so does that mean that the Apache can only be committed to ship based operations for limited periods?
One last thing. Very basic Queueing theory shows what should be obvious - the a fast food restaurant can serve the same number of eating in customers as a conventional one. Likewise other situations where there is a time delay in achieving an objective and being able to achieve another. Applied to aircraft - the ones nearer the target have shorter transit time, and hence higher sortie rates. For Italy based jets to be able to respond as fast as carrier based ones would mean travelling at about Mach 5! This ignores the need for tanking and other support.
Of course, this sort of logical analysis is different to the last minute political interference that took place just before SDSR was announced.
What will NATO do when Charles de Gaulle has to leave the area of operations?
I wonder if our politicians are able to learn..... Maybe there is something in my suggestion of leasing a dozen or so AV8Bs in exchange for (most of if not all) our now disused (still with support costs) Harriers (plus continued USMC embarkations aboard Lusty/QE - which would be useful to us too). Someone please suggest this to Their Lordships and to the Government - it would solve both problems (lack of carrier aviation in a crisis AND skill loss pre CVF) and could be legitimately viewed as a positive outcome. It would also be cheaper than bringing the previous Joint Force Harrier set up back into service, and mean that we are no longer paying for disused Harriers under the RAB system.
Meanwhile: the MOD denies the story about the stored Harriers being flogged for spares for £34 million or so. My earlier comments are relevant to this too.
The following Telegraph stories are worth a read:
Reversing the defence cuts is one U-turn Cameron should take
Review the review
Lord West: Government 'stupid' not to review defence
One of the blogs I look at, the Daly History Blog, also covers the disagreement between an experienced naval officer and a PR Spiv:
First Sea Lord – Royal Navy ‘in a very bad way’
Admiral Sir Jock Slater was First Sea Lord during the earlier 1998 Strategic Defence Review:
The position the First Sea Lord and the chief of staffs is very difficult indeed because if you want to retain the confidence of ministers you should not speak directly to the press about your concerns. But the fact remains that the navy is in a very bad way. The loss of Ark Royal and the Harriers was the worst decision by a government for many, many years. I think what Mark Stanhope has done is to state the obvious. You can’t carry on doing more with less.’
Naval Historian and analst Professor Andrew Lambert, of Kings College London, had this to say:
I think what the First Sea Lord has said in a very quiet and polite way is what everyone else has been saying in a very loud and aggressive way for a considerable period of time. The government has committed themselves to doing something when we have not got the equipment to do the job. The problem is the government has not got the political courage to admit they have made a mistake and as a result we are spending vast amounts of money doing things inefficiently and ineffectively. We’re getting laughed at by the French for not having a carrier off Libya. It’s hard enough when they beat us at rugby or football but when they beat us at carrier aviation it is unacceptable.’
‘It’s not the business of government to make perfect decisions all the time. It’s their business to run the country and respond to events. They have held their hands up when they got things wrong with the NHS reforms and sentencing but they seem unable to do the same with defence. It’s gone beyond a joke really. I know governments will stick to their own rhetoric but this is costing us too much and may even end up costing lives and that’s why the First Sea Lord was right to speak out because the situation is unacceptable.’
This Rum Ration thread is worth a read too.
Last edited by WE Branch Fanatic; 12th Aug 2011 at 10:04.
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WEBF, what are you not getting about this. Yes, some of your points are valid and some aren't. However, your puerile and pathetic attempts to garner support from passing journalists just demote any credibility that your points carry. This forum is not for directly passing on information to journalists. If you wish to do that then might I suggest you put pen to paper and send to the media. Once again, stop quoting yourself, you aren't going to change a single thing and you are insulting people's intelligence by thinking they can't figure out how to view previous posts you have made.
I acknowledge your loyalty to the RN and the 1SL, but give it a rest now.
I acknowledge your loyalty to the RN and the 1SL, but give it a rest now.
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Maybe WEBF is a spam-bot whose real objective to fill the pprune servers with repetitive self-hugging RN nonesense?
Last edited by DITYIWAHP; 16th Jun 2011 at 20:06.
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For the first time since I've used Pprune I've resorted to using the 'ignore' function.
It is amazing how much it has de-cluttered this thread.
It is amazing how much it has de-cluttered this thread.