F-35 Cancelled, then what ?

[Tourist]

Originally Posted by Courtney Mil

On balance, maybe that's why a lot of nations like to have some runways that move and some that stay still.

What a grown up response. Are you sure you are RAF?

[Tourist]

Originally Posted by glad rag

What those those, clunk, "someone put some money in the meter"
ultra reliable T45's then??

We can all play that game with just about every aircraft, ship or tank ever produced.....

[Tourist]

Originally Posted by ORAC

There I would disagree Tourist.

An asset can be vulnerable or not depending on how, where and when you deploy it - and in the face of which threat.

So essentially you are saying as long as the Chinese don't intend to use their carriers, they are safer.

[LowObservable]

Tourist - If the Chinese intended to sail their carriers 200-300 nm off the West Coast and bomb the crap out of Las Vegas, they would of course be very vulnerable. They would be vulnerable in an all-out conflict anyway, but the idea is more show-of-force than anything else. Their best defense is the idea that if anyone sinks a Chinese carrier, they're apt to lose an asset of their own.

Which is where ASBM becomes a very interesting idea. Not particularly expensive to buy, very cheap to operate, extremely hard to destroy on the ground (the range vs. theater size gives you a lot of China to hide in). Developing the RV is the biggest job. The technology is only a step or so beyond Pershing II, and you can dial-in a lot of different effects, such as a load of deck-puncturers that would leave the CVN afloat but with the cats and elevators hosed.

The hard bit is the targeting, although these days even small UAS can do that, not to mention satellites like Kondor-E. (There was a model of a truck-mobile satellite launcher at Zhuhai in 2014.) Of course, your targeting isn't really credible until you've got a realistic target to practice on. Which China now has.

[KenV]

Which is where ASBM becomes a very interesting idea. Not particularly expensive to buy, very cheap to operate, extremely hard to destroy on the ground (the range vs. theater size gives you a lot of China to hide in). Developing the RV is the biggest job. The technology is only a step or so beyond Pershing II, and you can dial-in a lot of different effects, such as a load of deck-puncturers that would leave the CVN afloat but with the cats and elevators hosed.

The hard bit is the targeting, although these days even small UAS can do that, not to mention satellites like Kondor-E. (There was a model of a truck-mobile satellite launcher at Zhuhai in 2014.) Of course, your targeting isn't really credible until you've got a realistic target to practice on. Which China now has.

I've got a few caveats.

Drones: It would seem that using drones to do the targetting for a ballistic missile would not work. Drones are relatively easy to shoot down and being unmanned there would be no hesitation to shoot one down if the political/military climate between the shooter and the target nations got warm, never mind hot.

Satellite tracking: Yes, satellites can track a carrier. But carriers are mobile and satellites have only relatively small windows of opportunity to track any specific area. These windows are predictable and are spaced relatively widely apart. It would take a truly massive constellation of satellites to generate data sufficiently precise, accurate, and timely enough for weapon targeting of a mobile target like a carrier.

Deck Puncturers: A ballistic missile reentry vehicle with a terminal guidance system accurate and precise enough to track a mobile target and a maneuvering system able to hit such a target? Has anyone anywhere ever made one of those? The Pershing II that was referenced had active radar homing and a CEP of 30 meters against a fixed land target. And that radar system used scene correlation, which would be useless over the ocean and useless against a mobile target. And assuming such an RV was even possible, could a ship's close in defense system deal with it? And assuming such an attack could be done successfully, would the reaction/consequences to a deck punctured carrier be much less than a sunk carrier? If not, why bother?

Missile defense: The Aegis system with SM3 and SM2 block4 is quite competent at shooting down ballistic missiles. Both Japan and USA have them in that part of the world and Taiwan is reportedly getting some also. And it would seem that in the event a ballistic missile was fired at a carrier the assumption is going to be that it carries a nuke. And if such an attack failed it is going to result in an awful lot of hurt for the country that fired that missile.

[LowObservable]

Caveat away....

Drones are easy to shoot down once you get to them. The Saab EriEye radar is claimed to have a horizon-limited 190 nm range against jet-skis, which last time I looked were smaller than CVNs. So I should think that the Soar Dragon at FL500+ could easily carry a radar capable of detecting a large ship at 250 nm or so. I can send the CAP to run him down, but they may have to go to burner to get parameters on him, and if the UAV senses my lethal intent and beetles off, he can pull the range out a bit.

Satellites can't really track a carrier. But they can detect and ID it, and cue the UAV or even the missile. Depends how fast your kill-chain can work. And the swath is (again) hundreds of miles across, so it takes a finite formation of sats to sweep the S China Sea. I can make an evasive maneuver, but even in an hour the uncertainty circle is measures in tens of miles.

A ballistic missile reentry vehicle with a terminal guidance system accurate and precise enough to track a mobile target and a maneuvering system able to hit such a target? Has anyone anywhere ever made one of those?

The USN seems to think so...

And assuming such an attack could be done successfully, would the reaction/consequences to a deck punctured carrier be much less than a sunk carrier?

Yes, if you're not a complete lunatic.

Missile defenses are expensive and can quickly end up on the wrong end of a cost-imposition equation.

And it would seem that in the event a ballistic missile was fired at a carrier the assumption is going to be that it carries a nuke. And if such an attack failed it is going to result in an awful lot of hurt for the country that fired that missile.

I really hope you're not saying what I think you're saying.

[ORAC]

LO, IIRC, "Hack the Shad" was precisely the original rationale for the SHAR on a "thru-deck ASW escort carrier" - up threat and able to engage the Bear-D at short notice when it could slip in and out of radar cover of the CV before their onboard aircraft/CAPs could react and engage.

Oooooh - this is just like the good old days......

[KenV]

I can send the CAP to run him down

CVNs operate as part of a battle group. Said battle group includes anti-air assets, like Aegis, which can detect the drone and take it out. No CAP required. And with Hawkeyes in the air, the drone can be detected and killed long before the drone can detect the carrier.

The radar horizon of a radar at 50,000 ft is just under 275 NM.
Assuming the Hawkeye is at 30,000 ft and the drone is at 50,000 ft the Hawkeye's radar horizon to the drone is just under 450 NM. And that's assuming the Hawkeye is directly over the carrier. The Hawkeye will likely be stationed away from the carrier along the major threat axis. If the threat is China, that'd be between China and the carrier. And using cooperative engagement, the Hawkeye can guide a missile fired from an Aegis ship to a drone that's well beyond the ship's radar horizon. No CAP required.

So the battle group has the ability to take out the search drone long before it could track the carrier, and should that fail, to take out the missile in the exoatmosphere, and if that fails to take out the RV at high and medium altitude inside the atmosphere, and should that fail, assuming it's a deck puncher, to take it out in the terminal phase using close-in defense systems. So it's a very well layered defense.

And while it might take a finite number of sats to continuously cover the S. China Sea, it would still take quite a lot. And that assumes China would really focus that heavily on just the S. China Sea and not provide more global coverage.

And "complete lunatic?!!" Do you really think that if a nation punched a bunch of holes in a CVN that the reaction would be much less than if they had sunk it? Both are clearly acts of war, and once they've declared war in such a provocative way, all bets are off. And no matter how you look at it, a nation that declared war in such a fashion would be in a world of hurt. That does not mean a nuclear response (if that is what you were thinking), but their Navy is likely toast and their commercial sea commerce would be severely restricted if not outright cut off. And the base that launched the missile? Probably toast also.

And about your claim that USN believes China or somebody else has a ballistic missile with a deck punching warhead, care to share the source of that?

[LowObservable]

So the battle group has the ability to take out the search drone long before it could track the carrier,

Not unless the Aegis ship is well away from the carrier in the right direction. No Standard will get that far. Even the monster Typhon maxed out at 200 nm.

and should that fail, to take out the missile in the exoatmosphere, and if that fails to take out the RV at high and medium altitude inside the atmosphere,

Possibly, but the Navy's palpable nervousness about ASBM says that it's not a slam-dunk. And every BMD interceptor is one less SAM.

and should that fail, assuming it's a deck puncher, to take it out in the terminal phase using close-in defense systems.

Phalanx and RAM? GLWT, dude.

Sorry for being unclear - I was talking about a guided RV rather than payloads. Although once you have that, the exact damage mechanism is up to the user and is not a difficult challenge.

[KenV]

Not unless the Aegis ship is well away from the carrier in the right direction. No Standard will get that far. Even the monster Typhon maxed out at 200 nm.

As I said, if the threat is China, keeping an Aegis ship between China and the carrier is not a big deal. Either the drone or the missile would have to overfly the Aegis ship, making both vulnerable to intercept long before they reached the carrier.

I was talking about a guided RV rather than payloads

A guided RV with terminal guidance capable of hitting a mobile target? Care to share the source of that?

[LowObservable]

Apparently (as noted above) the USN thinks it is real enough.

[KenV]

Yeah, you've claimed that a couple of times now. Care to provide the source?

[Courtney Mil]

Ken, going back a few posts. I agree with all your points bar one.

Originally Posted by KenV

Satellite tracking: Yes, satellites can track a carrier. But carriers are mobile and satellites have only relatively small windows of opportunity to track any specific area. These windows are predictable and are spaced relatively widely apart. It would take a truly massive constellation of satellites to generate data sufficiently precise, accurate, and timely enough for weapon targeting of a mobile target like a carrier.

Absolutely not true. Twenty years ago that would have been correct, although even then satellites could be reassigned and their orbits altered to add coverage to an area of interest.

Now, with huge extra numbers of surveillance satellites coverage is close to continuous and minor reassignment can create local coverage with small gaps in the order of minutes. That may be an issue for tracking a terror group in an urban area, it is not a problem for tracking a task group in open water.

Additionally, and perhaps more crucially, the large military satellites have now been supplemented by hundreds of small, civilian, low resolution polar orbit units who's data is relatively easy to access. The places to hide are rapidly running out.

[LowObservable]

China is fielding a growing number of conventionally armed MRBMs, including the CSS-5 Mod 5 (DF-21D) anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM). The CSS-5 Mod 5, with a range of 1,500 km and maneuverable warhead, gives the PLA the capability to attack ships in the western Pacific Ocean.

http://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Doc...wer_Report.pdf

And please can the defensive tone. There's no reason for it at all. You've been called on dubious information, which is quite right.

[a1bill]

The island reclamation and weaponising isn't making the pacific any safer either. It might be a bit soon for doom and gloom though. Although I have started taking chinese language lessons, as the US pivot to asia turned out to be a quick look and back home.

Talking about what weapons and true effects that are out there can be hard. Even little old australia has black stuff and I'm sure china would be the same.

LO, as I said at the time about all the canada doom and gloom. 'let me know when they write the letter withdrawing'
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/...ticle28897002/
The Canadian government intends to make a payment this spring to remain part of the consortium of F-35 Lightning fighter-jet buyers, despite a Liberal election promise to exclude the aircraft when selecting this country’s next warplane.

[glad rag]

No surprises there A1 no surprise at all.


Justin Trudeau vows to scrap F-35 fighter jet program - Politics - CBC News

[ORAC]

Times change glad rag......

Canada to stay in program of F-35 jet buyers despite pledge to withdraw

[LowObservable]

Being fairly close to the Canada situation...

The political intention is clearly to not buy the F-35. However, since the pre-election rush, the view has prevailed that to exclude the F-35 from the contest is no more rational than the Conservatives' attempt to exclude everything else.

Also, the decision to pay the dues protects what manufacturing work has been awarded to Canada - with the F-35 program frantic to close partner/FMS contracts, which are already lagging 2014 projections, that work could otherwise be given away.

And there's no need to bar the door to the F-35 - just include some sensible, logical and universally applicable language in the RFP (as opposed to the bogus F-35-only clauses in the fake SOR), calling for firm fixed-price contracts and guarantees on CPFH. Since we're talking air defense they could throw 4 x Meteors in there as well.

And let's not forget that the almost-real F-35 (not the superplane of pre-2010 propaganda) is 0:1 in open, rules-based competitions.

I like Rafale's chances in Canada. Two engines, lots of range and Dassault is a big partner to Canadian industry. And Bombardier could run the FACO.

[sandiego89]

I do find it interesting to note that with all this talk about the vulnerability and by some the obsolecense of the modern carrier, a historical review really shows that the last time there was a real peer-to-peer shooting war with a US carrier was perhaps 1945 off Okinawa. Yes I fully understand there were other threats and actual attacks, but not a real a real death match attack from missiles, aircraft, submarines, or other ships from a peer threat. The Falklands for a few months in 1982 was another venue where carriers were actually targetted in a shooting war.

So while the modern carrier (or battle group) has been equipped to fight and defend itself in a major peer threat environement- this thankfully has never been tested. The overwhelming use of the carrier has been to provide power projection in peacetime and limited wars. I do understand that the math might change in a major conflict, but history has shown how they have been used and they seem to be quite useful for the few nations that can make the investment. I would not write off the carrier yet.

[KenV]

Additionally, and perhaps more crucially, the large military satellites have now been supplemented by hundreds of small, civilian, low resolution polar orbit units who's data is relatively easy to access. The places to hide are rapidly running out.

Excellent point! On the other hand......

Please consider the following: What military planner in a kill chain is going to rely on uncertain data from an uncertain random civilian source with uncertain propagation delay, to launch a ballistic missile at a moving target in a sea filled with lots of other moving targets? And knowing that their action will be an act of war against a nation with the certain ability to cause devastating harm to their nation. And knowing that the S. China Sea is the most densely navigated bit of water on the planet, with many of those "targets" being their own. I believe these are all considerations that need to be included in the overall equation.

I may be wrong, but I believe there's a big difference between generally keeping tabs on a battle group, and generating actionable targeting coordinates in real time of a mobile target amidst many other mobile targets, even ignoring night and uncooperative weather. These are international waters with countless other nations operating in them, mostly commercial, but more than a few military. It's a very complex problem. I welcome corrections to this view.