Why no helo transport? Are we condemning our diggers to an easy victimology?
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Pilatus Porter in SVN
Bushranger 71 is wrong. 161 recce flight used Porters with the 2 x 18 tube rocket pods. They even tested them on the C-180, however although the aircraqft could handle them, they normaly used the 4 tube set-up. The Porter proved excellent in this role - a role forbidden by the RAAF, however by this time the army was fed up with RAAF posturing and doing what it had to do to be able to engage the enemy when they found them, rather than the RAAF's perception that they should always wait for support to arrive. As B71 has obviously rarely been involved with VR of the nature that 161 performed, tree top level and below, he probably doesn't realise that when you find the enemy (or they find you..) and have the opportunity to engage, that one needs immediate response rather than waiting round for help to arrive (the RAAf was at Vung Tau remember...) . It was a logical development that army recon aircraft should be armed, and one that the RAAF continually tried to deny the army claiming the ground support role as exclsuively theirs.
Maybe if he'd flown the type of mission 161 flew, unarmed and in Sioux or C180's at tree top level, he'd realise this.
And re the Mirage - again B71 misses the point - the French threatened a spares embargo and complained about using the Mirages in a war they didn't approve of (ironic isn't it since French obstinancy by De Gaul in returning SVN to independency after WW2 precipitated the conflict) as soon as they learned that the RAAF was considering deploying them to UBON for Mig Cap. They weren't being considered for use in the ground support role for obvious reasons.
Also according to the official history, the Canberras did not support operations in Phouc Tuy province as B71 suggests:
Perhaps he should read this paper originally printed in the Defence Journal 1992. An excellent read.
Fourays - The Australian Army Aviation Association Inc
See extract below:
"A request from COMAFV for RAAF Canberras, based at Phan Rang, to perform a photo-reconnaissance of Phuoc Tuy province was rejected by Department of Air on the grounds that 'the Canberras were there (in Vietnam) to give the pilots combat experience before they went to the United States to convert to Phantoms'. The Canberra squadron was effectively part of the USAF's strategic arm, in that service's often remote and unsynchronised operational environment which fitted the RAAF's strategic role perception of how a war should be fought.. "
Maybe if he'd flown the type of mission 161 flew, unarmed and in Sioux or C180's at tree top level, he'd realise this.
And re the Mirage - again B71 misses the point - the French threatened a spares embargo and complained about using the Mirages in a war they didn't approve of (ironic isn't it since French obstinancy by De Gaul in returning SVN to independency after WW2 precipitated the conflict) as soon as they learned that the RAAF was considering deploying them to UBON for Mig Cap. They weren't being considered for use in the ground support role for obvious reasons.
Also according to the official history, the Canberras did not support operations in Phouc Tuy province as B71 suggests:
Perhaps he should read this paper originally printed in the Defence Journal 1992. An excellent read.
Fourays - The Australian Army Aviation Association Inc
See extract below:
"A request from COMAFV for RAAF Canberras, based at Phan Rang, to perform a photo-reconnaissance of Phuoc Tuy province was rejected by Department of Air on the grounds that 'the Canberras were there (in Vietnam) to give the pilots combat experience before they went to the United States to convert to Phantoms'. The Canberra squadron was effectively part of the USAF's strategic arm, in that service's often remote and unsynchronised operational environment which fitted the RAAF's strategic role perception of how a war should be fought.. "
Last edited by Shark Zero Six; 23rd Jun 2011 at 03:03.
Once again a good thread descends into a few people with a grudge going into this RAAF vs Army thing.
Its no wonder that there are still young officers out there who succumb to this petty stuff and then go on to be a thorn in the side of joint ops and become poorer officers because of being exposed to bias and old venom.
Its no wonder that there are still young officers out there who succumb to this petty stuff and then go on to be a thorn in the side of joint ops and become poorer officers because of being exposed to bias and old venom.
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I watch all the bickering going on about who is the greatest and I feel that little is achieved. Most of this being done by officers who held the queens commision, and should have been leading.
The RAAF had the sad task of bring home over 500 men who never saw Australia and their loved ones again. The also had the task of bring home the sick and wounded many of which will never live a normal life. As a ex SNCO I cannot understand what the pissing in the wind is proving. What I do know is alot of us were proud of what we did and further more under some very trying conditions.
Maybe all of this is a smoke screen to cover the fact that the army has bought some preety average equipment, when we should have had the experience to know and do better. Too many pipe dreams and the servicemen of Australia deserve better and are not getting it.
I will not sit idealy by whilst the arm chair staff try to justify their mistakes instead of taking action so they do not occur again.
Those of us who served are unlikely to allow you to steal ourservice. The sacrafices made should not be painted over so the aces of today look better.
We should move on, equip our ADF staff with better equipment and allow them to get on with the job with plenty of support.
Regards
Col
The RAAF had the sad task of bring home over 500 men who never saw Australia and their loved ones again. The also had the task of bring home the sick and wounded many of which will never live a normal life. As a ex SNCO I cannot understand what the pissing in the wind is proving. What I do know is alot of us were proud of what we did and further more under some very trying conditions.
Maybe all of this is a smoke screen to cover the fact that the army has bought some preety average equipment, when we should have had the experience to know and do better. Too many pipe dreams and the servicemen of Australia deserve better and are not getting it.
I will not sit idealy by whilst the arm chair staff try to justify their mistakes instead of taking action so they do not occur again.
Those of us who served are unlikely to allow you to steal ourservice. The sacrafices made should not be painted over so the aces of today look better.
We should move on, equip our ADF staff with better equipment and allow them to get on with the job with plenty of support.
Regards
Col
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Well said Col.
I really hope that with their draw down in Afghanistan - against the advice of his military advisors and only so Mr Obama can get himself re-elected - the Americans have enough helo support on hand for our guys should a major crisis occur that finds the Australians needing helicopter support 'stat', to borrow a medical term.
Let's all hope and pray it never comes to that, for if it does, there are quite a few who should squirm over the part they have played in the sorry state our armed forces find themselves in today in regard to its lack of helicopter support. 45 years ago, we could provide indigenous helo support to our troops. Not so today.
And before someone goes off at those comments, please look again at the title of this thread.
I really hope that with their draw down in Afghanistan - against the advice of his military advisors and only so Mr Obama can get himself re-elected - the Americans have enough helo support on hand for our guys should a major crisis occur that finds the Australians needing helicopter support 'stat', to borrow a medical term.
Let's all hope and pray it never comes to that, for if it does, there are quite a few who should squirm over the part they have played in the sorry state our armed forces find themselves in today in regard to its lack of helicopter support. 45 years ago, we could provide indigenous helo support to our troops. Not so today.
And before someone goes off at those comments, please look again at the title of this thread.
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Sorry; but I have to counter some more personal sledging.
Vietnam tours in 1968, 1969, 1971; 4,360 sorties and much of it at low level, which was my preferred method of operating. Also spent a few months at Nui Dat in the 1ATF Command Post.
I assure you Shark 06 that RAAF Canberras did sometimes operate in Phuoc Tuy Province using the 'Combat Skyspot' radar bombing system that was located at Bien Hoa; but also some FAC directed close air support (see: RAAF Association National Council - Special Topics - 2 SQN Canberras in Vietnam). Like Air Force Caribous, they functioned as part of USAF tactical air resources and were not under OPCON of 1ATF.
There are quite a few inaccuracies in accounts by so-called historians and other writers, such as in the paper to which you refer. As Joseph Goebbels opined: 'The essence of propaganda consists in winning people over to an idea so sincerely, so vitally, that in the end they succumb to it utterly and can never again escape from it.' Anti-RAAF misinformation has more or less become folklore now and no amount of evidence in rebuttal, presented by myself or anybody else, will sway false beliefs.
Vietnam tours in 1968, 1969, 1971; 4,360 sorties and much of it at low level, which was my preferred method of operating. Also spent a few months at Nui Dat in the 1ATF Command Post.
I assure you Shark 06 that RAAF Canberras did sometimes operate in Phuoc Tuy Province using the 'Combat Skyspot' radar bombing system that was located at Bien Hoa; but also some FAC directed close air support (see: RAAF Association National Council - Special Topics - 2 SQN Canberras in Vietnam). Like Air Force Caribous, they functioned as part of USAF tactical air resources and were not under OPCON of 1ATF.
There are quite a few inaccuracies in accounts by so-called historians and other writers, such as in the paper to which you refer. As Joseph Goebbels opined: 'The essence of propaganda consists in winning people over to an idea so sincerely, so vitally, that in the end they succumb to it utterly and can never again escape from it.' Anti-RAAF misinformation has more or less become folklore now and no amount of evidence in rebuttal, presented by myself or anybody else, will sway false beliefs.
Last edited by Bushranger 71; 23rd Jun 2011 at 22:19.
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B71 gets it wrong again...
As usual B71 tap dances around the truth.
Low level I said "unarmed VR" - unarmed due RAAF policy prohibiting weapons to be fitted to army aircraft (except for marker rockets..even that was a battle to obtain). Your low level transits weren't unarmed. The army's recons were - especially their OH-13 RW.
see video of part of a recon at low level here.
Fourays - The Australian Army Aviation Association Inc
Sorties...ah yes, having been there and knowing how your lot fudged statistics...two sorties per day transiting to and from Nui Dat. Multiply that by aircraft used and leght of engagement. And Kanga Pad to Nadzab pad,,,,400 metres - one sortie. Nadzab to the refuel point, 300 meters, another sorties and so on.
Canberras: Combat skyspot was not direct support of the ground troops. Radar directed bombing from 20-30,000 ft.
For those expressing dismay about old farts having a pissing contest, remember this, the truth of the RAAF involvement in SVN should not be hidden otherwise it can happen again ie the service (including army aviation) becomes remote and detached from the realities of the ground war as happened in SVN.
And BD, we met in SVN at Nui Dat.
Low level I said "unarmed VR" - unarmed due RAAF policy prohibiting weapons to be fitted to army aircraft (except for marker rockets..even that was a battle to obtain). Your low level transits weren't unarmed. The army's recons were - especially their OH-13 RW.
see video of part of a recon at low level here.
Fourays - The Australian Army Aviation Association Inc
Sorties...ah yes, having been there and knowing how your lot fudged statistics...two sorties per day transiting to and from Nui Dat. Multiply that by aircraft used and leght of engagement. And Kanga Pad to Nadzab pad,,,,400 metres - one sortie. Nadzab to the refuel point, 300 meters, another sorties and so on.
Canberras: Combat skyspot was not direct support of the ground troops. Radar directed bombing from 20-30,000 ft.
For those expressing dismay about old farts having a pissing contest, remember this, the truth of the RAAF involvement in SVN should not be hidden otherwise it can happen again ie the service (including army aviation) becomes remote and detached from the realities of the ground war as happened in SVN.
And BD, we met in SVN at Nui Dat.
Shark 06: "Canberras: Combat skyspot was not direct support of the ground troops. Radar directed bombing from 20-30,000 ft."
I too was there Shark, flying Canberras on FAC directed bombing and CAS. You are right the low-birds would get down into the trees to look down at the bunkers and trenchlines for the Jade FACs. Not much of my work was conducted around the 1ATF area, as the Canberra were tasked ('fragged') - as has been noted - centrally by the ATM from 7th AF. And, we didn't do many, if any, radar-directed CSS in that area.
Also, the quoted 'history' is wrong:
"A request from COMAFV for RAAF Canberras, based at Phan Rang, to perform a photo-reconnaissance of Phuoc Tuy province was rejected by Department of Air on the grounds that 'the Canberras were there (in Vietnam) to give the pilots combat experience before they went to the United States to convert to Phantoms'."
I know that is clearly crap. Initially the crews sent over 1967-68 only did a 6-month tour in preparation of the F-111 pick-up in 1968. That was postponed. By the time I went to SVN in 1969, we were all on 12-month tours. With delays in the F-111, in 1970 the Govt made a snap decision to lease F-4Es, and the crews that went to get them in 1970 were the guys at Amberley that had down SVN tours over 67-68. No-one ever went "...to give the pilots combat experience before they went to the United States to convert to Phantoms'."
I want to correct those errors...and I do not see the need for the vitriol you are pouring out to B71.
I too was there Shark, flying Canberras on FAC directed bombing and CAS. You are right the low-birds would get down into the trees to look down at the bunkers and trenchlines for the Jade FACs. Not much of my work was conducted around the 1ATF area, as the Canberra were tasked ('fragged') - as has been noted - centrally by the ATM from 7th AF. And, we didn't do many, if any, radar-directed CSS in that area.
Also, the quoted 'history' is wrong:
"A request from COMAFV for RAAF Canberras, based at Phan Rang, to perform a photo-reconnaissance of Phuoc Tuy province was rejected by Department of Air on the grounds that 'the Canberras were there (in Vietnam) to give the pilots combat experience before they went to the United States to convert to Phantoms'."
I know that is clearly crap. Initially the crews sent over 1967-68 only did a 6-month tour in preparation of the F-111 pick-up in 1968. That was postponed. By the time I went to SVN in 1969, we were all on 12-month tours. With delays in the F-111, in 1970 the Govt made a snap decision to lease F-4Es, and the crews that went to get them in 1970 were the guys at Amberley that had down SVN tours over 67-68. No-one ever went "...to give the pilots combat experience before they went to the United States to convert to Phantoms'."
I want to correct those errors...and I do not see the need for the vitriol you are pouring out to B71.
Last edited by BBadanov; 24th Jun 2011 at 04:54.
What some of these posts have achieved is to narrow down where this cancer of feuding stems from and in some cases even give names of those who created it.
Fortunately only the immature carry it on and only the stupid believe it.
Apart from friendly banter and the odd plonker people just get on with the job.
As for sortie stats from Vietnam, caution handbags at 20 feet ladies.....
(in regards to how many T/O and LDGs that is and distance between them, the details of actual sorties I could listen to all day, example visit the Falklands thread where old enemies conduct themselves in a much more Gentlemanly way)
Fortunately only the immature carry it on and only the stupid believe it.
Apart from friendly banter and the odd plonker people just get on with the job.
As for sortie stats from Vietnam, caution handbags at 20 feet ladies.....
(in regards to how many T/O and LDGs that is and distance between them, the details of actual sorties I could listen to all day, example visit the Falklands thread where old enemies conduct themselves in a much more Gentlemanly way)
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It would seem Bushranger 71 isn't alone in thinking the current ADF policy on helicopters isn't the way to go.
http://elpdefensenews.b l o g s p o t.com/2011/06/useful-helicopters-needed-for-defence.html (Remove the spaces to make the link work.)
http://elpdefensenews.b l o g s p o t.com/2011/06/useful-helicopters-needed-for-defence.html (Remove the spaces to make the link work.)
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I know the main thrust is related to ships but some interesting comments about the process.
Ship-buying method haphazard: auditor
Dan Oakes
DEFENCE'S method of buying ships and other navy assets is disjointed and haphazard, causing confusion, delays and cost blowouts, according to the government auditor.
The audit, which cost almost half a million dollars, examined the labyrinthine process of procuring ships, helicopters and other equipment.
It assessed 20 projects costing more than $23 billion, including a $7.9 billion warship contract, the upgrade of navy frigates worth $1.5 billion, and two helicopter projects worth a combined $5.8 billion.
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It came as Defence took its first step towards building a new fleet of 12 submarines, putting out a tender for a blueprint of how to avoid the problems that have bedevilled the Collins-class boats.
The auditor found that lack of communication between the Navy, the arm of Defence that identifies what equipment is needed, and the arm that buys the equipment, can result in the later stage of a project becoming a ''voyage of discovery''.
''Opportunities to identify and mitigate cost, schedule and technical risks have been missed, resulting in chronic delays,'' the auditor says.
''Experience in the USA and the UK underscores the importance of the acquisition organisation and navy working together to ensure that handoffs to navy do not become 'voyages of discovery' in the final stages of the project.''
Over the past three decades, the responsibility for choosing and buying equipment has been taken away from the Navy and handed over to other Defence agencies formed specifically for the purpose. The auditor found that the business case and planning for some projects do not make clear what the government's time and cost limits are, which means Defence does not know whether it is complying with the government's wishes.
Records of testing are not properly kept by the Defence Materiel Organisation - which buys everything from paper clips to helicopters - potentially putting Defence personnel, the public and the environment at risk, the auditor found.
Criticism has been building over the perceived lack of progress on the future submarine project. There was no funding for the project in May's federal budget, which was shaped by the government's determination to bring the budget back into surplus. The project was a product of the 2009 Defence white paper, which also included fighter jets and warships on its ambitious wish list.
Cost estimates for the future submarines range from $9 billion for an off-the-shelf option to $36 billion for an Australian designed and built boat.
However, Defence has asked companies to suggest the best way to test a propulsion system for the new submarines. ''The government announced with great fanfare over two years ago that we're going to have a fleet of 12 new submarines, and publicly hasn't done much to make that happen, but now there's some movement,'' the Australian Strategic Policy Institute's Andrew Davies said yesterday.
''What they're talking about doing is setting up a testing facility so all [the components] can be … bolted together on dry land, to test how they work together.''
Read more: Ship-buying method haphazard: auditor
Ship-buying method haphazard: auditor
Dan Oakes
DEFENCE'S method of buying ships and other navy assets is disjointed and haphazard, causing confusion, delays and cost blowouts, according to the government auditor.
The audit, which cost almost half a million dollars, examined the labyrinthine process of procuring ships, helicopters and other equipment.
It assessed 20 projects costing more than $23 billion, including a $7.9 billion warship contract, the upgrade of navy frigates worth $1.5 billion, and two helicopter projects worth a combined $5.8 billion.
Advertisement: Story continues below
It came as Defence took its first step towards building a new fleet of 12 submarines, putting out a tender for a blueprint of how to avoid the problems that have bedevilled the Collins-class boats.
The auditor found that lack of communication between the Navy, the arm of Defence that identifies what equipment is needed, and the arm that buys the equipment, can result in the later stage of a project becoming a ''voyage of discovery''.
''Opportunities to identify and mitigate cost, schedule and technical risks have been missed, resulting in chronic delays,'' the auditor says.
''Experience in the USA and the UK underscores the importance of the acquisition organisation and navy working together to ensure that handoffs to navy do not become 'voyages of discovery' in the final stages of the project.''
Over the past three decades, the responsibility for choosing and buying equipment has been taken away from the Navy and handed over to other Defence agencies formed specifically for the purpose. The auditor found that the business case and planning for some projects do not make clear what the government's time and cost limits are, which means Defence does not know whether it is complying with the government's wishes.
Records of testing are not properly kept by the Defence Materiel Organisation - which buys everything from paper clips to helicopters - potentially putting Defence personnel, the public and the environment at risk, the auditor found.
Criticism has been building over the perceived lack of progress on the future submarine project. There was no funding for the project in May's federal budget, which was shaped by the government's determination to bring the budget back into surplus. The project was a product of the 2009 Defence white paper, which also included fighter jets and warships on its ambitious wish list.
Cost estimates for the future submarines range from $9 billion for an off-the-shelf option to $36 billion for an Australian designed and built boat.
However, Defence has asked companies to suggest the best way to test a propulsion system for the new submarines. ''The government announced with great fanfare over two years ago that we're going to have a fleet of 12 new submarines, and publicly hasn't done much to make that happen, but now there's some movement,'' the Australian Strategic Policy Institute's Andrew Davies said yesterday.
''What they're talking about doing is setting up a testing facility so all [the components] can be … bolted together on dry land, to test how they work together.''
Read more: Ship-buying method haphazard: auditor
Saw this clip on the news last. Looks like the Tigers are supporting the soldiers, well at least in Australia.
6.30 with George Negus | Channel Ten - Watch Full Episodes and Video
Subversive 1's comment about them soon being declared operational must mean they are ready. Hopefully the Australian government will provide their soldiers with the support they need as capabilities become available.
Doors Off
6.30 with George Negus | Channel Ten - Watch Full Episodes and Video
Subversive 1's comment about them soon being declared operational must mean they are ready. Hopefully the Australian government will provide their soldiers with the support they need as capabilities become available.
Doors Off
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Let's hope Subversive's announcement about the Tigers being ready to go operational isn't like the last half dozen 'done and (definitely NOT) dusted' announcements our esteemed Prime Minister has given us on a succession of not done and dusted government programmes.
Last time I was at Shoalwater Bay, (a very long time ago, I'll admit), the operative word in far too many instances was 'notional', from fighter support to fuel supplies. I'm sure I'm not the only one who hopes that's not the case with the Tigers.
Last time I was at Shoalwater Bay, (a very long time ago, I'll admit), the operative word in far too many instances was 'notional', from fighter support to fuel supplies. I'm sure I'm not the only one who hopes that's not the case with the Tigers.
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See this for a possible knee jerk reaction to flawed hardware acquisition planning:
Defence holds fire sale to fund new projects
Defence holds fire sale to fund new projects
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The guns will be crushed or handed to an overseas country (PNG/Timor) as part of an "aid" package as the Gov't won't let them onto the market here.
How many of the ships have US hardware / software on them which
requires US Gov't approval prior to export ?
The same goes for the planes and helicopters, how much paperwork needs
to be done for a sale to go ahead to a foreign country ?
How many of the ships have US hardware / software on them which
requires US Gov't approval prior to export ?
The same goes for the planes and helicopters, how much paperwork needs
to be done for a sale to go ahead to a foreign country ?
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No problemo, senor.... They can all go the way of our Mirages and Hercs - to Pakistan. Or if not Pakistan, then to the Pakistani Intelligence Agency.
I'm sure they have a client or two (if not necessarily a client state or two) they'd be happy to hand our weapons and comms gear on to, where they'd be put very quickly to good use.
Shades of 'Pig Iron Bob' Menzies.
I'm sure they have a client or two (if not necessarily a client state or two) they'd be happy to hand our weapons and comms gear on to, where they'd be put very quickly to good use.
Shades of 'Pig Iron Bob' Menzies.
We gave 50 Mirages away at a cost of $1m each, what a deal.
Then the Paks left us with the shipping bill. What great negotiators we are.
Last I had heard, about 40 of the 50 went through the Kamra rework facility to become fully operational - and with the Rose III mod they got a good radar and some have been modded for AAR.
Then the Paks left us with the shipping bill. What great negotiators we are.
Last I had heard, about 40 of the 50 went through the Kamra rework facility to become fully operational - and with the Rose III mod they got a good radar and some have been modded for AAR.
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Our Gov't procurement sounds like a case of "Can't buy and can't sell" 
Is Smith just posturing with all this media hype or is he really tearing apart procurement once and for all with the hope that good processes are put in place so these stuff ups don't happen again.
After all, it's often said that DoD always outlast Def Ministers !!!
IMHO, we'll see when we get close to a Federal or State Election !
Is Smith just posturing with all this media hype or is he really tearing apart procurement once and for all with the hope that good processes are put in place so these stuff ups don't happen again.
After all, it's often said that DoD always outlast Def Ministers !!!
IMHO, we'll see when we get close to a Federal or State Election !
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Something in one of the numerous articles at the moment on the Australian Procurement cock ups and cost over runs over the last 10 years or so (cost over runs by us adding extra whatever to the requirements and then being the guenea pigs)
If you take the TOTAL cost of these cock ups and cost over runs and then over this period do a list of "if we purchased this, this and this off the shelf, got it in service and it did 90% of what we wanted" then 3 questions.
1. In reality, by choosing something OTS that did 90% of what we thought we wanted, is that supposed 10% loss of capability such a loss considering a lot less heart ache occurred in bringing the item into service.
2. How much would we have saved over all or how many more of an item (ie Chinook, Blackhawk or whatever) could we have had.
3. And IMHO importantly, how many extra flying hours would have been available for the Helos, planes etc with the flow on effect of the people who use them (ie troops) get to actually practice with them.
In regards to the equipment such as Subs, well maybe we could have had more out there on patrol when they should have been.
Anyway, just food for thought.
.
If you take the TOTAL cost of these cock ups and cost over runs and then over this period do a list of "if we purchased this, this and this off the shelf, got it in service and it did 90% of what we wanted" then 3 questions.
1. In reality, by choosing something OTS that did 90% of what we thought we wanted, is that supposed 10% loss of capability such a loss considering a lot less heart ache occurred in bringing the item into service.
2. How much would we have saved over all or how many more of an item (ie Chinook, Blackhawk or whatever) could we have had.
3. And IMHO importantly, how many extra flying hours would have been available for the Helos, planes etc with the flow on effect of the people who use them (ie troops) get to actually practice with them.
In regards to the equipment such as Subs, well maybe we could have had more out there on patrol when they should have been.
Anyway, just food for thought.
.