Haddon-Cave, Airworthiness, Sea King et al (merged)
Military Aviation Authority
Secretary of State for Defence has announced, in a Commons Statement, the formation, by next April, of a Military Aviation Authority, to be headed by a 3-star.
airsound
I see we've now got another thread
airsound
I see we've now got another thread
New military aviation 'body' to set up.
Last edited by airsound; 16th Dec 2009 at 16:47. Reason: add new thread detail
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OFO
I think you must have been watching during PM's Questions, at the end of which many left the Chamber. I counted 7 on the Govt. benches and about 18-20 on the other side during Ainsworth's statement, many of whom had questions to ask regarding their constituences.
PWA
edited for spelling error
PWA
edited for spelling error
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Unacceptable
Sqidlord,
You are right, of course. It is many moons since I read 00-56. It needs a rewrite.
As for unacceptable - it seems to me that advising the Secretary of State that it is safe to fly an aircraft that you have determined has a flawed design and that you have stated has been maintained and supported by a failed organisation is unacceptable. The Nimrod should be grounded immediately.
So should a number of other aircraft and if that means that we cannot impress the world with our contribution to the Afghanistan adventure with as much capability as we would like - tough. Ground the aircraft, hire some civil aircraft to supply the troops or bring them home and then sort out the air power bit - in that order.
You are right, of course. It is many moons since I read 00-56. It needs a rewrite.
As for unacceptable - it seems to me that advising the Secretary of State that it is safe to fly an aircraft that you have determined has a flawed design and that you have stated has been maintained and supported by a failed organisation is unacceptable. The Nimrod should be grounded immediately.
So should a number of other aircraft and if that means that we cannot impress the world with our contribution to the Afghanistan adventure with as much capability as we would like - tough. Ground the aircraft, hire some civil aircraft to supply the troops or bring them home and then sort out the air power bit - in that order.
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The Nimrod should be grounded immediately
nigegilb said on 14 November:
I see the two biggest problems as the legacy fleets at Brize Norton, namely VC10 and Tri Star. I suspect airworthiness concerns may well swing in their direction when the response to H-C is worked through.
The tear down of the Nimrod frame and the XV230 explosion has led to the virtual grounding of the fleet. One wonders what the tear down of the VC10 and TriStar might reveal........
The tear down of the Nimrod frame and the XV230 explosion has led to the virtual grounding of the fleet. One wonders what the tear down of the VC10 and TriStar might reveal........
To my mind I can now understand how easy it may have become to decide to retire the Sea King fleet. Two questions arise, though:
1) would the Puma upgrade contract have actually been awarded if H-C had come out earlier?
2) What chance that a purchase of 40-something year old Rivet Joints looks a considerably higher risk for a Minister and PUS today than a couple of months ago?
Hmmm..
By my reckoning there are many Tornadoes that are fast approaching 40. And certainly the Frame design and technology is based in that of the deep 1960's.
On the plus side; they're mostly very low hours and cycles for their years and only have small pressure cabins with relatively low stresses. I would assume they are more likely to have electrical/loom issues rather than structural issues.
But who proves they're all okay?
By my reckoning there are many Tornadoes that are fast approaching 40. And certainly the Frame design and technology is based in that of the deep 1960's.
On the plus side; they're mostly very low hours and cycles for their years and only have small pressure cabins with relatively low stresses. I would assume they are more likely to have electrical/loom issues rather than structural issues.
But who proves they're all okay?
OOPS! too much red vine again! Fancy - them only being 30 an' all.
Still, Ageing aircraft are at 15 years plus - so they qualify anyway for typical old aeroplane faults and issues.
Still, Ageing aircraft are at 15 years plus - so they qualify anyway for typical old aeroplane faults and issues.
Still, Ageing aircraft are at 15 years plus - so they qualify anyway for typical old aeroplane faults and issues.
I agree. But I know a great many who don’t, the immortal statement being “This is old equipment and reliability improves with age, so we’re not approving funding to investigate (safety related) faults”. Made by RAF at Harrogate in 1992 (part of AMSO, who controlled funding to maintain airworthiness). Subject – C130 equipment exhibiting cracks propagating at an alarming rate. Believe me, you keep those letters when its your signature on the PE(CA) 6/7 or DDP.
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http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/new...cle6960975.ece
'Don’t blame us for Nimrod crash, says general '
No Comment!
'Don’t blame us for Nimrod crash, says general '
No Comment!
Perhaps those, including the General, mentioned by Mr Haddon-Cave QC in his Nimrod Report do have a grievance, TD. That grievance being that no mention was made in the Report of other very senior officers who are conspicuous by their absence. Perhaps the General and the Air Chief Marshal might feel so aggrieved as to mention those names to Investigating Officers already detailed to interview two comparatively junior Royal Air Force officers. Their inquiry needs to range far wider than that. The newly announced MAA cannot begin to put right the mischief that has been done to UK Military Airworthiness if the depth and extent of that mischief is not discovered. That knowledge lies with many more senior officers than have so far been identified.
Air Chief Marshal Pledger said the cuts had nothing to do with the failure to spot the design flaw in the Nimrod which was a matter for a different organisation, not defence logistics.
But if the above quote attributed to ACM Pledger is accurate (and I concede it is entirely possible it is not, given the source) then this is precisely the simplistic attitude that has led to this and other accidents. In fact, it betrays a complete ignorance of the very basics of Safety Management. It smacks of “It was deemed safe, so we don’t have to ensure it remains safe”. This leads to the erosion of functional safety and, to varying degrees, was blamed in Hercules, Sea King, Tornado and others.
To quote the Secretary of State’s Policy on Safety….
“…in the acquisition of materiel and equipment of all kinds, safety and environmental management begins at the requirement definition stage and is carried forward through service to disposal. This includes all aspects of maintenance and operation”.
Who would be a SofS when his “junior” staffs so openly disagree with him? But when the SofS compounds the issue by disagreeing with himself……….
Also, please note the structure of MoD at the time. The above are 3 Stars. There was still a 4 Star above them to whom they reported, even though he was in charge of the “other” organisation. Ain’t it funny how he’s never mentioned, yet is on record as agreeing that functional safety is unnecessary? This is getting interesting!
Finally, do these statements mean that these two officers are not being investigated? (See Nimrod thread).
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Whoever is being investigated, might it not pay their defence counsel to be aware of the above 'machinations'???
While 'the brown stuff' flows downhill, responsibility goes the other way!
While 'the brown stuff' flows downhill, responsibility goes the other way!
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The Secretary of State for Defence statement was an abbreviated response dealing with only a couple of the key recommendations. The full response to the H-C report was to be placed in the "Library of the House of Commons"...does anyone know how to get hold of that as it does not seem to be online or if it is I can't find it.....
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00-56
BGG
Its a bit snooty of you - I guess you are well qualified in these matters. Even so - your quaint use of the old ad-hominem line doesn't wash. Please explain what is drivel and why?
Incidentally, I am quite well acquainted with all 4 issues of Defence Standard 00-56 and the various related standards that have been withdrawn - even though it is a while since I needed to review them. The Standard at Issue 4 needs a rewrite because it does not fully reflect HSE guidance. Let me explain: young Ainsworth has stated publicly that the MOD meets HSE guidance - so you might expect Defence Standard 00-56 to use exactly the same terms as used by the HSE.
Perhaps you ought to read more widely on the subject of risk management and safety management. You might then appreciate that the brief comments posted here are addressing complex issues. One of the points to note is that the QC has reinforced the introduction of a blame culture into military aviation safety. What is interesting is that there are many people more to blame than the poor scapegoats he picked on. Tucumseh has shown that there is plenty of mud to sling. And it won't be sling at at dead men.
Ciao.
Its a bit snooty of you - I guess you are well qualified in these matters. Even so - your quaint use of the old ad-hominem line doesn't wash. Please explain what is drivel and why?
Incidentally, I am quite well acquainted with all 4 issues of Defence Standard 00-56 and the various related standards that have been withdrawn - even though it is a while since I needed to review them. The Standard at Issue 4 needs a rewrite because it does not fully reflect HSE guidance. Let me explain: young Ainsworth has stated publicly that the MOD meets HSE guidance - so you might expect Defence Standard 00-56 to use exactly the same terms as used by the HSE.
Perhaps you ought to read more widely on the subject of risk management and safety management. You might then appreciate that the brief comments posted here are addressing complex issues. One of the points to note is that the QC has reinforced the introduction of a blame culture into military aviation safety. What is interesting is that there are many people more to blame than the poor scapegoats he picked on. Tucumseh has shown that there is plenty of mud to sling. And it won't be sling at at dead men.
Ciao.
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Don't blame us for the Nimrod crash
DV
BGG
Spot on. And within those teams you’ll hear an ethos “Maintaining safety is a waste of money”.
That doesn’t necessarily mean those in the team actually ignore safety, but it makes it difficult for those who recognise the implications, as straight away they are fighting against the “system”.
Haddon-Cave made many recommendations and comments on this general subject, but didn't go into the detail of how this situation came about. The reason, to me, is very clear.
Coroner Walker opined that the Nimrod had not been airworthy since 1969. To what degree this was accurate was the only real debate, given the clear evidence presented to H-C that it was true for a large part of that period.
However, H-C launched into an astonishing attack on Mr Walker (as noted by DV). In isolation one could almost ignore this, as the bottom line was criticism of MoD far greater than Mr Walker’s. When reading it, I thought the two must have had a private spat in the past. Whatever, it was unprofessional and uncalled for.
But, it served a purpose because, as noted many times on the Nimrod thread, the clear agenda was for MoD to take a hit on airworthiness, but compartmentalise the damage. H-C baselined his report at 1999 and concentrated on the Nimrod Safety Case, completely ignoring an obligation to assess the wider impact of the systemic failure to apply airworthiness regulations – notably ignoring ACM Sir Clive Loader’s 2nd recommendation in the Nimrod BoI.
Why baseline at 1999, not 1969? That is the key question. In part, the answer can be seen in Ainsworth’s immediate statement that no other aircraft were affected. That illustrates the compartmentalisation policy. He didn’t want to spend money on 30 years regression work, across all fleets.
Yet, a few weeks later and very clearly the higher level committees in MoD have reported back to Ainsworth that yes, indeed, they and their predecessors had taken their eye off the ball for a long period. The result? A Military Airworthiness Authority. Note – not a Nimrod Airworthiness Authority, but pan-MoD. At least THEY have been honest and recognised the truth (or read pprune!) – that MoD simply no longer has the “training, experience, knowledge and ability” to perform their most basic task – exercise their Duty of Care over staff.
So, where are we now? We have (effectively) an admission from Ainsworth that he was wrong to claim the problems were confined to Nimrod (although I doubt if he realises or remotely understands what he’s said). By definition, the H-C report is seen to be at best incomplete, as it does not address the years to 1999. Yet, it is so damning and demonstrably accurate about 1999-onwards I’d say he was honest in his approach. But, crucially, I sincerely believe there was influence brought to bear to draw a line at 1999. H-C could be seen to meet his very restrictive terms of reference and still accede to MoD’s wishes. A compromise from his viewpoint, if you like. He can be proud that he made 80+ recommendations (many of which have been made before anyway) and MoD have accepted all but a few.
And there’s the rub – they have been made before and the same people who have most to lose by looking pre-1999 rejected them, time and again.
Who has most to gain or lose from not going back beyond 1999?
I’ve mentioned General Cowan. He would have been “in the clear” if the huge cuts of 87-93 had been considered, or even the 5% per annum from about 96-99. His 20% over 4 or 5 years would have been seen for what it was – quite insignificant and the continuation of long standing policy directives, from both main parties. Who was responsible for the really damaging, long term cuts that targeted airworthiness? Not Cowan.
Gp Capt (as was) Baber. His, and therefore his staffs’ task, was made very difficult by the prevailing management / leadership practices and policies of the preceding 10 or so years. What was his task? In a nutshell, to provide a Nimrod capable of meeting the Operational Capability required of it, safely. What resources did he need? Back to “training, experience, knowledge and ability”. Plus funding. Whose policies denied him (and most IPTLs) all of that? Not Baber’s. He was denied the “training, experience, knowledge and ability” (and funding), which of course has not been MoD policy to provide since 1996 when CDP decided all he needed was administrators. Crucially, this was against a background of 10 years or more deliberate neglect of airworthiness.
Now that Ainsworth has been forced to backtrack and accept that the failures are pan-MoD, it is surely incumbent upon MoD to now fill in the gaps in the H-C report. It doesn’t require much work, as all the evidence was presented to him. Then we can truly see how many past cases this applies to, including the big one, Mull of Kintyre.
THAT is where MoD didn’t want this to go. Throughout the H-C report, you so often come to the end of a sentence and think “Go on, the next logical link brings you to Mull”. But he stops (or MoD stopped him). I think he’s been very clever (notwithstanding the spat with Walker). His recommendations have left MoD with nowhere to go. Who among us truly though they would accept 80 of them? But I think the classic passage is his swipe at submariners being in charge of aircraft. Which gets us back to those who denuded MoD of “training, experience, knowledge and ability” and ruled that ignoring functional safety was acceptable………. Yes, in that one sentence he demonstrated he had indeed read the evidence submitted, and I think it may have been a subliminal nod in the right direction, from behind the barrier erected by MoD.
Of course the problem comes when you have an organisation (the MoD) with such an obvious lack of training, knowledge, experience and ability in this area. Go to any Project Team and look.
That doesn’t necessarily mean those in the team actually ignore safety, but it makes it difficult for those who recognise the implications, as straight away they are fighting against the “system”.
Haddon-Cave made many recommendations and comments on this general subject, but didn't go into the detail of how this situation came about. The reason, to me, is very clear.
Coroner Walker opined that the Nimrod had not been airworthy since 1969. To what degree this was accurate was the only real debate, given the clear evidence presented to H-C that it was true for a large part of that period.
However, H-C launched into an astonishing attack on Mr Walker (as noted by DV). In isolation one could almost ignore this, as the bottom line was criticism of MoD far greater than Mr Walker’s. When reading it, I thought the two must have had a private spat in the past. Whatever, it was unprofessional and uncalled for.
But, it served a purpose because, as noted many times on the Nimrod thread, the clear agenda was for MoD to take a hit on airworthiness, but compartmentalise the damage. H-C baselined his report at 1999 and concentrated on the Nimrod Safety Case, completely ignoring an obligation to assess the wider impact of the systemic failure to apply airworthiness regulations – notably ignoring ACM Sir Clive Loader’s 2nd recommendation in the Nimrod BoI.
Why baseline at 1999, not 1969? That is the key question. In part, the answer can be seen in Ainsworth’s immediate statement that no other aircraft were affected. That illustrates the compartmentalisation policy. He didn’t want to spend money on 30 years regression work, across all fleets.
Yet, a few weeks later and very clearly the higher level committees in MoD have reported back to Ainsworth that yes, indeed, they and their predecessors had taken their eye off the ball for a long period. The result? A Military Airworthiness Authority. Note – not a Nimrod Airworthiness Authority, but pan-MoD. At least THEY have been honest and recognised the truth (or read pprune!) – that MoD simply no longer has the “training, experience, knowledge and ability” to perform their most basic task – exercise their Duty of Care over staff.
So, where are we now? We have (effectively) an admission from Ainsworth that he was wrong to claim the problems were confined to Nimrod (although I doubt if he realises or remotely understands what he’s said). By definition, the H-C report is seen to be at best incomplete, as it does not address the years to 1999. Yet, it is so damning and demonstrably accurate about 1999-onwards I’d say he was honest in his approach. But, crucially, I sincerely believe there was influence brought to bear to draw a line at 1999. H-C could be seen to meet his very restrictive terms of reference and still accede to MoD’s wishes. A compromise from his viewpoint, if you like. He can be proud that he made 80+ recommendations (many of which have been made before anyway) and MoD have accepted all but a few.
And there’s the rub – they have been made before and the same people who have most to lose by looking pre-1999 rejected them, time and again.
Who has most to gain or lose from not going back beyond 1999?
I’ve mentioned General Cowan. He would have been “in the clear” if the huge cuts of 87-93 had been considered, or even the 5% per annum from about 96-99. His 20% over 4 or 5 years would have been seen for what it was – quite insignificant and the continuation of long standing policy directives, from both main parties. Who was responsible for the really damaging, long term cuts that targeted airworthiness? Not Cowan.
Gp Capt (as was) Baber. His, and therefore his staffs’ task, was made very difficult by the prevailing management / leadership practices and policies of the preceding 10 or so years. What was his task? In a nutshell, to provide a Nimrod capable of meeting the Operational Capability required of it, safely. What resources did he need? Back to “training, experience, knowledge and ability”. Plus funding. Whose policies denied him (and most IPTLs) all of that? Not Baber’s. He was denied the “training, experience, knowledge and ability” (and funding), which of course has not been MoD policy to provide since 1996 when CDP decided all he needed was administrators. Crucially, this was against a background of 10 years or more deliberate neglect of airworthiness.
Now that Ainsworth has been forced to backtrack and accept that the failures are pan-MoD, it is surely incumbent upon MoD to now fill in the gaps in the H-C report. It doesn’t require much work, as all the evidence was presented to him. Then we can truly see how many past cases this applies to, including the big one, Mull of Kintyre.
THAT is where MoD didn’t want this to go. Throughout the H-C report, you so often come to the end of a sentence and think “Go on, the next logical link brings you to Mull”. But he stops (or MoD stopped him). I think he’s been very clever (notwithstanding the spat with Walker). His recommendations have left MoD with nowhere to go. Who among us truly though they would accept 80 of them? But I think the classic passage is his swipe at submariners being in charge of aircraft. Which gets us back to those who denuded MoD of “training, experience, knowledge and ability” and ruled that ignoring functional safety was acceptable………. Yes, in that one sentence he demonstrated he had indeed read the evidence submitted, and I think it may have been a subliminal nod in the right direction, from behind the barrier erected by MoD.
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Who carried out the release to service trials for the Mk2 in 1982 (?); was it A&AEE Boscombe Down? And who issued the RTS document; was the Controller of Aircraft?
Does anyone know?
DV
Does anyone know?
DV
Bravo, tuc! You describe this malevolent countdown to doom with persuasive and authoratative skill. We can now see more clearly the significance of the successive cutbacks that you enumerate in post #155:
Not so much Salami slices as brutal butchery of a magnificent but doomed beast. As you say Mull is the key, and Mull is where the MOD just will not go, not for the Next of Kin, not for the Fatal Accident Inquiry, not for the House of Lords, not for the House of Commons, not for the Mull Campaign, and not for Mr Haddon-Cave QC. 29 deaths still not properly accounted for. 2 deceased junior officers reputations destroyed. A Board of Inquiry that was a disgrace. The honour of the Royal Air Force sullied. For what? Or rather for whom?
(e.g. 33%, 28%, 28%, 28%; the last 3 specifically targeting airworthiness).