Haddon-Cave, Airworthiness, Sea King et al (merged)
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SK2 had no NVG fit.
The limited capability is not the fit, which is perfectly adequate, but the training and currency, and is solely due to operating in Afghanistan.
By limited, I mean that they are not going be pretending to be junglies.
They have neither the crew complement or the amount of training/workup required (though yes there are a few ex junglies amongst them)
It is not fitting out the aircraft which takes the time, effort and money.
The training and continuation cost has been huge to get them to where they are now, and is only justified by their current job.
The limited capability is not the fit, which is perfectly adequate, but the training and currency, and is solely due to operating in Afghanistan.
By limited, I mean that they are not going be pretending to be junglies.
They have neither the crew complement or the amount of training/workup required (though yes there are a few ex junglies amongst them)
It is not fitting out the aircraft which takes the time, effort and money.
The training and continuation cost has been huge to get them to where they are now, and is only justified by their current job.
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The most crass thing imaginable would be to spend all that treasure to end up with a military which looks pretty in peactime, has very few accidental deaths because we go nowhere near the ragged edge where accidents and excellence happen, but then loses when we actually are called upon to fight.
With the caveat that, when the possibility of a deadly systemic issue raises it's head we don't put good men and women into a possibly flawed airframe until everything has been done to rectify or mitigate the problem rather than turn away looking nervously at the ground whilst whistling tunelessly as has happened too often in the last 30 years...
Tourist:
"I do not know the details of the Nimrod disaster"
Seriously.
You REALLY need to read the H-C Nimrod Review - even though it is readily discredited on here. It will open your eyes to what you are missing - and the whole point of this thread.
I can send it to you if you wish.
"I do not know the details of the Nimrod disaster"
Seriously.
You REALLY need to read the H-C Nimrod Review - even though it is readily discredited on here. It will open your eyes to what you are missing - and the whole point of this thread.
I can send it to you if you wish.
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Rigga
What I do know from personal experience is the resulting disaster sweeping across British military aviation in the wake of that report.
Whatever the true causes of that accident, if the recommendations of the report cause our current situation, then either the recommendations or the whole report are deeply and catastrophically flawed.
Actual safety is being compromised in the interests of percieved safety.
That is the legacy of Haddon Cave.
Arse covering is the future.
When a wrong decision sends you to jail, risk aversion is the only sensible option.
What I do know from personal experience is the resulting disaster sweeping across British military aviation in the wake of that report.
Whatever the true causes of that accident, if the recommendations of the report cause our current situation, then either the recommendations or the whole report are deeply and catastrophically flawed.
Actual safety is being compromised in the interests of percieved safety.
That is the legacy of Haddon Cave.
Arse covering is the future.
When a wrong decision sends you to jail, risk aversion is the only sensible option.
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You REALLY need to read the H-C Nimrod Review - even though it is readily discredited on here. It will open your eyes to what you are missing - and the whole point of this thread.
If you think the Haddon Cave report is a revealing insight it is you that is suffering from a naive outlook.
There is very little "educational" value in the HC report. Just a great deal of self justifying horse manure.
Did HC "discover" the cause of the accident...nope it agreed with BOI.
Did HC attribute blame...not really, it pointed a few fingers, probably at the wrong people.
Did HC stick to it's remit..nope it waffled on about all manner of crap (Challenger et al)
Given that it wandered off down any old alleyway, did it therefore have the cojones to lift the stone and open the can of worms that it could have visa vi the Chinook accident etc etc? Dear me no...that would have caused way too much trouble.
Haddon Cave was, like just about every other public enquiry, a glorious waste of taxpayer's money. An exercise in public placification.
The changes to the airworthiness regime were well advance before Haddon Cave was even conceived.
In fairness, HC might have contributed to the downfall of the our maritime capability. But we would need to another public enquiry to verify that.
So I'll agree (again) with Tourist. Keep up the good work...soon enough we will have f*** a** with which to fight/defend with against any **** who fancies a go.
TOFO,
While you and others here may have an opinion on the value of H-C; Tuorist admits he has no idea what went on. So we should show him the ways in which he is being deceived - even if they meander down alleys. His ignorance is my target, not his personal knowledge of the workings of MOD.
It's the airworthiness principles being deliberately missed that Tourist needs to see.
While you and others here may have an opinion on the value of H-C; Tuorist admits he has no idea what went on. So we should show him the ways in which he is being deceived - even if they meander down alleys. His ignorance is my target, not his personal knowledge of the workings of MOD.
It's the airworthiness principles being deliberately missed that Tourist needs to see.
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It's the airworthiness principles being deliberately missed that Tourist needs to see.
He's not arguing airworthiness... He's arguing safety and it's potential detrimental effect on operational effectiveness. Safety has very little to do with airworthiness once one is in combat. As long as the airframe we send our men and women up in the air is airworthy then what they do with it is their job. You seem to think that unless they are invincible the aircraft is un-airworthy. If that's the case you are wrong.
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The Old Fat One:
What changes are you referring to and why do you say this? (I think it's wrong but I'm interested to understand your rationale.)
The changes to the airworthiness regime were well advance before Haddon Cave was even conceived.
Tourist
Despite our differences in opinion, I'd just like to say I received a very polite PM from Tourist explaining his views on Sea King. So, credit where it is due.
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Re the SeaKing accident. I haven't re-read the BOI recently so I apologise if I get something a little wrong. However, I think the following is roughly right.
Both crews were aware of the general limitations of their aircraft. i.e.
They did not have NVG (thus it is irrelevant to the likely cause).
There was a perception that the HISLs were a problem and the Sqn had an SOP to switch them off at low level (whatever the conditions). (There was a problem with HISLs but the aircrew were aware of it and thus could mitigate the issue)
Other Sqns did not have such an SOP.
The crew thus knew their look out had to be much better.
The aircraft being "not radar equipped" was a legal issue of definition of the term.
The outbound aircraft had a radar problem which meant it was turned off.
Both aircraft called "visual" within 45 secs of the collision.
There appeared to be no procedural attempt in either aircraft to take steps to avoid each other (ie no radio chat).
There was no evidence to suggest either aircraft was concerned about the position of the other.
There appeared to be nothing wrong with either aircraft.
But....all were killed and thus without all the facts the BOI could not form a final opinion of cause.
You can use hindsight to go on about NVG and HISLs (and all sorts of other things) but at the end of the day the crew knew the limitations of their aircraft on that day and the conditions in which they were operating. It is how we fly every day and how we go to war.
Both crews were aware of the general limitations of their aircraft. i.e.
They did not have NVG (thus it is irrelevant to the likely cause).
There was a perception that the HISLs were a problem and the Sqn had an SOP to switch them off at low level (whatever the conditions). (There was a problem with HISLs but the aircrew were aware of it and thus could mitigate the issue)
Other Sqns did not have such an SOP.
The crew thus knew their look out had to be much better.
The aircraft being "not radar equipped" was a legal issue of definition of the term.
The outbound aircraft had a radar problem which meant it was turned off.
Both aircraft called "visual" within 45 secs of the collision.
There appeared to be no procedural attempt in either aircraft to take steps to avoid each other (ie no radio chat).
There was no evidence to suggest either aircraft was concerned about the position of the other.
There appeared to be nothing wrong with either aircraft.
But....all were killed and thus without all the facts the BOI could not form a final opinion of cause.
You can use hindsight to go on about NVG and HISLs (and all sorts of other things) but at the end of the day the crew knew the limitations of their aircraft on that day and the conditions in which they were operating. It is how we fly every day and how we go to war.
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Re Tourist
Glad to hear it. I can agree with some of his points (and that of TOFO etc) - i.e. mil flying is a risky business and most ops are close to the fuzzy margin between excellence and f~ck-up. Been there and done that!
BUT that is not the issue many of us have with the 'A word' process.
What really cheeses me off is having to go to funerals or to write notes of condolence about people who have been killed by our own side's incompetence and inability to see that the risks we are asking our crews to take could be easily and cheaply (in some cases) mitigated - giving us some sort of edge and improved safety margins. To continue the tennis analogy - no self-respecting pro would continue to use heavy, small, wooden rackets when he could get light, carbon-fibre rackets with over-size heads and enlarged 'sweet-spots'.
Sadly however, our own ac are doing the enemy's job for him FFS! On occasion, the crews were even unaware of those added risks - which is a failure of leadership and communication - but that's another story. Chinook, Nimrod, Sea Kings(2) and Patriot/Tornado (to mention but a few) have all been tragedies of our own making, away from the front-line and not losses in actual combat - ALQ hardly have an Integrated Air Defence System. What is worse, is that these loses were mostly predictable, predicted and preventable. If the mil system can't sort that out, then it needs changing IMHO.
AA you said
I couldn't agree more (airworthiness v fitness for purpose - is a grey area) but the big problem is that over 60 lives have been lost TOTALLY UNNECESSARILY because the extant regulations to ensure that the airframe IS airworthy have been systemically ignored for 30 odd years on the grounds of cost (and senior officers careers). All those lives wasted - lives which we can ill-afford - militarily and economically, let alone emotionally and morally.
I know that sometimes you have to go to war with what you have got and when the kit is not fit for purpose (also been there, so please don't lecture). Incidentally, this should not still be happening 10 years after we went into AFG/IRQ! But the trouble is that the underlying airframes have not been kept definitively as safe & airworthy as possible because of massive funding cuts since the 1980s - that is what we are paying for now and is what H-C was all about.
Yes, H-C missed a lot and got a lot wrong (including the 'guilty ones') but in creating the MAA/MAAIB he took a step in the right direction and they need our support. However, 2 things still worry me:
MAA is still too close to higher MoD.
The lack of cash and experience to make MAA work.
If the defence vote continues to dry up then TOFO's prediction of
will be true, God forbid. Perhaps we are perilously close to that situation already. If that's the case, then we need our air assets to be a close to 'indestructible' as possible - we will not be able to take many operational risks or suffer any combat losses before our op output is terminally compromised - with or without the bravado and aggressive attacking ethos of the likes of Tourist - which I greatly admire BTW.
As aircrew, I always believed my ac was airworthy yet I knew it was often far from fit-for-purpose - but I never wanted to be 'cotton-woolled' (though a cloaking device and deflector shields would have been welcome UORs!). What is scary is that I was very wrong in my beliefs and the ac could have easily done to me what Terry Taliban and Alan Queda had been trying to do for a number of years. This is what needs correcting and the only way to achieve that is to implement the extant airworthiness regulations so that we don't kill our own - neither in peace nor in war. If one can't see the logic in that, then I fear for our sanity and future.
Bismark,
To are right to a degree but you fall into the trap of concentrating on the final unsafe acts rather than the environment and organisational shortcomings that caused the acts become fatal. The crews did what they did because it must have seemed right to them at the time - no-one intentionally kills themselves like that. So what can we learn to prevent recurrence? What opportunities were there to break the links in the chain? There are many - an extra pairs of eyes, better communications, NVGs, better ship's radar, improved transit deconfliction procedures, TCAS or more appropriate anti-coll lighting etc I am not saying they would all have prevented the loss but they all need to be considered in depth and corrected/implemented wherever possible.
Don't forget this accident robbed the RN of 2/3s of its in-theatre AEW assets - seriously compromising the grey-funnel op output. Thank the Lord, the IRQ naval threat was minimal or we may have had another Atlantic Conveyor-type loss.
Glad to hear it. I can agree with some of his points (and that of TOFO etc) - i.e. mil flying is a risky business and most ops are close to the fuzzy margin between excellence and f~ck-up. Been there and done that!
BUT that is not the issue many of us have with the 'A word' process.
What really cheeses me off is having to go to funerals or to write notes of condolence about people who have been killed by our own side's incompetence and inability to see that the risks we are asking our crews to take could be easily and cheaply (in some cases) mitigated - giving us some sort of edge and improved safety margins. To continue the tennis analogy - no self-respecting pro would continue to use heavy, small, wooden rackets when he could get light, carbon-fibre rackets with over-size heads and enlarged 'sweet-spots'.
Sadly however, our own ac are doing the enemy's job for him FFS! On occasion, the crews were even unaware of those added risks - which is a failure of leadership and communication - but that's another story. Chinook, Nimrod, Sea Kings(2) and Patriot/Tornado (to mention but a few) have all been tragedies of our own making, away from the front-line and not losses in actual combat - ALQ hardly have an Integrated Air Defence System. What is worse, is that these loses were mostly predictable, predicted and preventable. If the mil system can't sort that out, then it needs changing IMHO.
AA you said
As long as the airframe we send our men and women up in the air is airworthy then what they do with it is their job
I know that sometimes you have to go to war with what you have got and when the kit is not fit for purpose (also been there, so please don't lecture). Incidentally, this should not still be happening 10 years after we went into AFG/IRQ! But the trouble is that the underlying airframes have not been kept definitively as safe & airworthy as possible because of massive funding cuts since the 1980s - that is what we are paying for now and is what H-C was all about.
Yes, H-C missed a lot and got a lot wrong (including the 'guilty ones') but in creating the MAA/MAAIB he took a step in the right direction and they need our support. However, 2 things still worry me:
MAA is still too close to higher MoD.
The lack of cash and experience to make MAA work.
If the defence vote continues to dry up then TOFO's prediction of
...soon enough we will have f*** a** with which to fight/defend with against any **** who fancies a go
As aircrew, I always believed my ac was airworthy yet I knew it was often far from fit-for-purpose - but I never wanted to be 'cotton-woolled' (though a cloaking device and deflector shields would have been welcome UORs!). What is scary is that I was very wrong in my beliefs and the ac could have easily done to me what Terry Taliban and Alan Queda had been trying to do for a number of years. This is what needs correcting and the only way to achieve that is to implement the extant airworthiness regulations so that we don't kill our own - neither in peace nor in war. If one can't see the logic in that, then I fear for our sanity and future.
Bismark,
To are right to a degree but you fall into the trap of concentrating on the final unsafe acts rather than the environment and organisational shortcomings that caused the acts become fatal. The crews did what they did because it must have seemed right to them at the time - no-one intentionally kills themselves like that. So what can we learn to prevent recurrence? What opportunities were there to break the links in the chain? There are many - an extra pairs of eyes, better communications, NVGs, better ship's radar, improved transit deconfliction procedures, TCAS or more appropriate anti-coll lighting etc I am not saying they would all have prevented the loss but they all need to be considered in depth and corrected/implemented wherever possible.
Don't forget this accident robbed the RN of 2/3s of its in-theatre AEW assets - seriously compromising the grey-funnel op output. Thank the Lord, the IRQ naval threat was minimal or we may have had another Atlantic Conveyor-type loss.
AA:
Well we are, or at least should be, as that is the point of this thread. If he wants to pursue a different agenda, it should be in a different thread. I have no issue with attacking H-C or Lord P. They are both exercises in whitewash. Hence their "baby", the MAA, is doomed in its mission to return airworthiness to military aviation as presently constituted, and if in trying to do so they are disrupting operational effectiveness then Tourist et al have my sympathy. You make the point that to be operationally effective, UK Military Aviation has first to be Airworthy. I couldn't agree more! That has to be done outside of the MOD or it will never happen. How it be done and by whom I leave to others better informed than I, but done it must be or we simply wait for the next Airworthiness Related Fatal Military Air Accident OP in this Forum. I don't see how that helps Tourist, Operational Effectiveness, or anyone.
dervish:
Well that's good to know, but it might help this thread if we all get to hear why he thinks these two aircraft collided instead of simply attacking other (including the BoI's) ideas.
He's not arguing airworthiness... He's arguing safety and it's potential detrimental effect on operational effectiveness.
dervish:
I received a very polite PM from Tourist explaining his views on Sea King
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Bismark
Mostly correct.
However.
In my experience, all Seakings used to turn off the HISLs when they became an irritant.
Moreover, We all used to do that with the previous flashing light which was replaced by the HISL, which is why it is such a red herring.
You may be amazed to find out that it is even now SOP in just about every fleet I can think of to turn off strobes of all sorts under certain circumstances such as formation flying.
Does this mean that they are unfit for purpose across all fleets?
Of course not.
Flipster.
Trying to rope the Seakings into a general attack on airworthiness is why I got involved in this thread again.
The Seaking was and is totaly airworthy in my opinion.
Would I rather fly a Seahawk variant again rather than a seaking ?
Yes, of course, it is superior in most ways including safety, but you have to cut your cloth in the best way to win a war, not just to stop accidents.
The mention of radar/TCAS/Strobes/IFF etc misses the point. We are all trained and practised quiet departures from ships for obvious reasons, and in any normal war with a realistic anti ship threat this would be normal, so fitting a peacetime only kit would be stupid.
If the ship was not being slack, it was reasonable to expect no radar, no lights, no radio calls, no IFF(maybe), so it is all total bollocks.
Mostly correct.
However.
In my experience, all Seakings used to turn off the HISLs when they became an irritant.
Moreover, We all used to do that with the previous flashing light which was replaced by the HISL, which is why it is such a red herring.
You may be amazed to find out that it is even now SOP in just about every fleet I can think of to turn off strobes of all sorts under certain circumstances such as formation flying.
Does this mean that they are unfit for purpose across all fleets?
Of course not.
Flipster.
Trying to rope the Seakings into a general attack on airworthiness is why I got involved in this thread again.
The Seaking was and is totaly airworthy in my opinion.
Would I rather fly a Seahawk variant again rather than a seaking ?
Yes, of course, it is superior in most ways including safety, but you have to cut your cloth in the best way to win a war, not just to stop accidents.
The mention of radar/TCAS/Strobes/IFF etc misses the point. We are all trained and practised quiet departures from ships for obvious reasons, and in any normal war with a realistic anti ship threat this would be normal, so fitting a peacetime only kit would be stupid.
If the ship was not being slack, it was reasonable to expect no radar, no lights, no radio calls, no IFF(maybe), so it is all total bollocks.
While I agree with all of TOFO’s criticism of Haddon-Cave, I disagree with this;
In the late 90s, in fact from 1988 to 2009, this is demonstrably wrong, although I of course accept that many people were notifying systemic failings. For example, the various Airworthiness Review Teams (ARTs) under Director Flight Safety and the formal rulings of very senior staffs that the regulations can be ignored to save money. By no stretch of the imagination does that characterise a Department addressing systemic failings.
It is a simple fact that, at the end of the day, H-C merely collated known facts that had been reported many times, by numerous individuals and officials bodies, over a 20+ year period. What is different is that he was listened to, whereas those in MoD who pointed out the failings to the likes of DGAS2, CDP, DGSM and others were completely ignored. In that sense he served his purpose.
While I agree H-C has resulted in major problems in MoD, these are of MoD’s own making. When recommending various actions, H-C was perfectly entitled to assume MoD had the experience, competence, corporate knowledge and will to do so – because he was merely reiterating mandated policy. (His entire report can be summarised thus – “Implement your existing regulations”). But MoD had none of these attributes. H-C didn’t cause the problems. It was MoD’s 20+ year refusal to meet their legal obligations.
As a result of H-C, the MAA was created. Actually, a host of existing posts rebrigaded under a new title. But they have been struck by inertia (which is what I think Tourist means). They are re-inventing something that, in due course, they may decide to call a wheel. At the moment, their early prototype is hexagonal and they’dve given themselves a bumpy ride.
What is the root cause? The various ART reports from the 1990s spell it out. The reports are too consistent, over too long a period, to be wrong. They can be mapped directly to innumerable BoI reports.
Always follow the deceit, half truths and lies. That is where you find the real answers. Follow every strand on Nimrod and Chinook and you always get back to the same individuals, all protected by MoD, H-C, LP and Ministers. And list 99% of the detailed systemic failings and you always get back to one key process – the Build Standard was not maintained. There is a total lack of understanding of how this fundamental process is carried out. Until they sort that foundation out, airworthiness will always sit rocking on sand. Sitting above all this, we need leadership. Not sycophancy.
As Airborne Aircrew said;
As Flip says, that is the Airworthiness Vs Fit for Purpose issue. To make a Fitness for Purpose judgement, one must first be confident the aircraft is airworthy. One follows the other. An aircraft cannot be declared FFP without first being airworthy. If it is not airworthy, then the FFP judgement (what tourist discusses) is based on a flawed premise. More often than not, you get away with it. But too many have not. They were avoidable accidents and the lessons were not learned. That is why MoD will not comment on whether or not the recommendations of the CHART and NART reports were implemented. They were not.
The changes to the airworthiness regime were well advance before Haddon Cave was even conceived.
It is a simple fact that, at the end of the day, H-C merely collated known facts that had been reported many times, by numerous individuals and officials bodies, over a 20+ year period. What is different is that he was listened to, whereas those in MoD who pointed out the failings to the likes of DGAS2, CDP, DGSM and others were completely ignored. In that sense he served his purpose.
While I agree H-C has resulted in major problems in MoD, these are of MoD’s own making. When recommending various actions, H-C was perfectly entitled to assume MoD had the experience, competence, corporate knowledge and will to do so – because he was merely reiterating mandated policy. (His entire report can be summarised thus – “Implement your existing regulations”). But MoD had none of these attributes. H-C didn’t cause the problems. It was MoD’s 20+ year refusal to meet their legal obligations.
As a result of H-C, the MAA was created. Actually, a host of existing posts rebrigaded under a new title. But they have been struck by inertia (which is what I think Tourist means). They are re-inventing something that, in due course, they may decide to call a wheel. At the moment, their early prototype is hexagonal and they’dve given themselves a bumpy ride.
What is the root cause? The various ART reports from the 1990s spell it out. The reports are too consistent, over too long a period, to be wrong. They can be mapped directly to innumerable BoI reports.
Always follow the deceit, half truths and lies. That is where you find the real answers. Follow every strand on Nimrod and Chinook and you always get back to the same individuals, all protected by MoD, H-C, LP and Ministers. And list 99% of the detailed systemic failings and you always get back to one key process – the Build Standard was not maintained. There is a total lack of understanding of how this fundamental process is carried out. Until they sort that foundation out, airworthiness will always sit rocking on sand. Sitting above all this, we need leadership. Not sycophancy.
As Airborne Aircrew said;
As long as the airframe we send our men and women up in the air is airworthy then what they do with it is their job.
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" To make a Fitness for Purpose judgement, one must first be confident the aircraft is airworthy"
The problem with all this become obvious when you consider things like the AAR Hercules/Seaking Mk2/Dambusters Lancaster/ etc
These aircraft were needed, wildly successful and blatantly would never pass the airworthiness process in the timeframes required or indeed ever.
Somebody bravely took a gamble with other peoples lives that they would get away with it.
That is what he was paid to do.
It is the military, and sometimes the correct thing to do gets good guys killed.
Under todays "Duty Holder" cr@p, somebody will go to jail.
I have a very simple question for you.
Do you honestly believe that we should never build a short notice back of a fag packet aircraft?
Because that is what the airworthiness regime you crave will ensure.
Nowadays, the military is going outside the military system into the civilian system to build soime of it's aircraft because of the vastly less stringent airworthiness requirments, and then dragging them across onto the military register.
That is insane!!!!
If a civvy certified engineer can fit a wescam to a helicopter in about a week and a quick sketch on a fag packet then why can we not?!?!?
The problem with all this become obvious when you consider things like the AAR Hercules/Seaking Mk2/Dambusters Lancaster/ etc
These aircraft were needed, wildly successful and blatantly would never pass the airworthiness process in the timeframes required or indeed ever.
Somebody bravely took a gamble with other peoples lives that they would get away with it.
That is what he was paid to do.
It is the military, and sometimes the correct thing to do gets good guys killed.
Under todays "Duty Holder" cr@p, somebody will go to jail.
I have a very simple question for you.
Do you honestly believe that we should never build a short notice back of a fag packet aircraft?
Because that is what the airworthiness regime you crave will ensure.
Nowadays, the military is going outside the military system into the civilian system to build soime of it's aircraft because of the vastly less stringent airworthiness requirments, and then dragging them across onto the military register.
That is insane!!!!
If a civvy certified engineer can fit a wescam to a helicopter in about a week and a quick sketch on a fag packet then why can we not?!?!?
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Tourist, I can put a date on when I had the same attitude as you.
http://www.pprune.org/military-aircr...-choice-4.html
Posts # 77 & 79
July 2003
'...the Belgians got shot at so the Greeks stopped flying...'
At the time, I was highly motivated, convinced that we had a job to do & proud of my contribution. Sharing a shabby hotel in Karachi with our ISAF partners Greece, Portugal & Belgium. Having deployed, the Greek, Portuguese & Belgian aircrew were not allowed into theatre by their governments due to the danger, and spent their days sitting by the pool, counting their extra $50/day UN pay. We were doing all the dangerous stuff, and we treated them with scorn.
I was arrogant & ignorant.
http://www.pprune.org/military-aircr...-choice-4.html
Posts # 77 & 79
July 2003
'...the Belgians got shot at so the Greeks stopped flying...'
At the time, I was highly motivated, convinced that we had a job to do & proud of my contribution. Sharing a shabby hotel in Karachi with our ISAF partners Greece, Portugal & Belgium. Having deployed, the Greek, Portuguese & Belgian aircrew were not allowed into theatre by their governments due to the danger, and spent their days sitting by the pool, counting their extra $50/day UN pay. We were doing all the dangerous stuff, and we treated them with scorn.
I was arrogant & ignorant.
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Everybody in this life makes mistakes.
In very few professions does a mistake often mean somebody's death.
Pretty much Doctors, military and emergency services perhaps.
Surgeons kill people all the time. I am not talking about bad ones, I am talking about good ones. Every now and then they accidentally cut the wrong bit and a patient dies. It's part of the job.
The medical world totaly recognises this, and because of this they have very large insurance policies, but they are only in trouble if they are found to be negligent, not just human.
Military personnel have to be able to make a judgement call and be wrong without being in trouble.
By this I mean they have to be able to make a decision that gets people killed without them being in trouble if the mistake was honestly made.
Let me be clear about this.
Think of the greatest military leader in History, be it Napoleon, Churchill or whoever.
Every so often they will have made a judgement call that got 10,000 of their troops killed pointlessly.
Were they bad at their job?
No, they were about as good as it gets.
If you investigated every army officer in WW1/2 who made a judgement call that got his men killed we would have no officers left and would still be working our way through the inquiries today!
The only people who will progress under the system we are endlessly gravitating towards is the person who says no to everything, because everybody who has the balls to take a chance will be court martialed or in Jail.
I am not surprised that those involved in the Nimrod debacle are squirming to avoid the witch hunt, so would I!
I do not believe anybody involved deliberately did anything wrong. I have no doubt whatsoever that many made judgement calls that the risk was worth it, as many soldiers have made judgement calls throughout history.
The simple fact is that one in a hundred/thousand/million chances happen every now and then and make the judgement call look bad, but it doesnt mean that the decision was bad.
All aviation works on an allowable risk, even civil aviation.
Lets say that an Airbus A380 with 500pob suffers a triple engine failure over the Pacific and it splashes in with loss of all lives.
Airbus has worked out that it is a one in a million chance, ie legal.
If a one in a million chance happens in the first twenty flights, that is terrible luck, but it does not change the fact that it was a reasonable risk to take.
The world has forgotten that not everything has somebody to blame, sometimes sh1t happens.
In very few professions does a mistake often mean somebody's death.
Pretty much Doctors, military and emergency services perhaps.
Surgeons kill people all the time. I am not talking about bad ones, I am talking about good ones. Every now and then they accidentally cut the wrong bit and a patient dies. It's part of the job.
The medical world totaly recognises this, and because of this they have very large insurance policies, but they are only in trouble if they are found to be negligent, not just human.
Military personnel have to be able to make a judgement call and be wrong without being in trouble.
By this I mean they have to be able to make a decision that gets people killed without them being in trouble if the mistake was honestly made.
Let me be clear about this.
Think of the greatest military leader in History, be it Napoleon, Churchill or whoever.
Every so often they will have made a judgement call that got 10,000 of their troops killed pointlessly.
Were they bad at their job?
No, they were about as good as it gets.
If you investigated every army officer in WW1/2 who made a judgement call that got his men killed we would have no officers left and would still be working our way through the inquiries today!
The only people who will progress under the system we are endlessly gravitating towards is the person who says no to everything, because everybody who has the balls to take a chance will be court martialed or in Jail.
I am not surprised that those involved in the Nimrod debacle are squirming to avoid the witch hunt, so would I!
I do not believe anybody involved deliberately did anything wrong. I have no doubt whatsoever that many made judgement calls that the risk was worth it, as many soldiers have made judgement calls throughout history.
The simple fact is that one in a hundred/thousand/million chances happen every now and then and make the judgement call look bad, but it doesnt mean that the decision was bad.
All aviation works on an allowable risk, even civil aviation.
Lets say that an Airbus A380 with 500pob suffers a triple engine failure over the Pacific and it splashes in with loss of all lives.
Airbus has worked out that it is a one in a million chance, ie legal.
If a one in a million chance happens in the first twenty flights, that is terrible luck, but it does not change the fact that it was a reasonable risk to take.
The world has forgotten that not everything has somebody to blame, sometimes sh1t happens.
Cunning Artificer
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If a civvy certified engineer can fit a wescam to a helicopter in about a week and a quick sketch on a fag packet then why can we not?!?!?
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SPHLC
And that is why the first thing that happens in every serious war in history is that the average age of senior officers halves overnight.
Once people lose their arrogance and ignorance, they become incapable of making the decisions required to win a war.
I honestly believe, and history generally supports me, that great leaders need to be young and arrogant.
Nelson, captain of a warship at 21 I believe?
I find it horrifying that as a serving serviceman you seem almost proud to have lost your drive for excellence.
You should treat those who have no wish to do their job with scorn, and to ally yourself with those from countries which we all know won't be winning any wars any day soon is worrying.
And that is why the first thing that happens in every serious war in history is that the average age of senior officers halves overnight.
Once people lose their arrogance and ignorance, they become incapable of making the decisions required to win a war.
I honestly believe, and history generally supports me, that great leaders need to be young and arrogant.
Nelson, captain of a warship at 21 I believe?
I find it horrifying that as a serving serviceman you seem almost proud to have lost your drive for excellence.
You should treat those who have no wish to do their job with scorn, and to ally yourself with those from countries which we all know won't be winning any wars any day soon is worrying.
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Tourist:
So, after the Falklands Chinook affair, when we were told not to discuss the cause with the bereaved "lest it embarrass Boeing" that was a "slip of the tongue"?
A known, deadly, issue was being brushed under a rug, deliberately. They'll argue that they had mitigated the issue by issuing a policy that restricted the aircraft from flying at high speed below 300'. This, obviously, falls right into your argument that safety issues are increasing operational risk because we both know that a Chinook at 300' or at 50kts is a much easier target than one at 120kts and less than 50 feet.
I'm afraid there is a huge difference between Churchill or Napoleon sending men to die in battle and some "airships" gambling with other people's lives to avoid cost or embarrassment to some corporate entity.
I do not believe anybody involved deliberately did anything wrong. I have no doubt whatsoever that many made judgement calls that the risk was worth it, as many soldiers have made judgement calls throughout history.
A known, deadly, issue was being brushed under a rug, deliberately. They'll argue that they had mitigated the issue by issuing a policy that restricted the aircraft from flying at high speed below 300'. This, obviously, falls right into your argument that safety issues are increasing operational risk because we both know that a Chinook at 300' or at 50kts is a much easier target than one at 120kts and less than 50 feet.
I'm afraid there is a huge difference between Churchill or Napoleon sending men to die in battle and some "airships" gambling with other people's lives to avoid cost or embarrassment to some corporate entity.