Haddon-Cave, Airworthiness, Sea King et al (merged)
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"There are different perceptions of 'heroes'. I believe that the guys that are willing to make a stand for what is right are fairly brave, and they are posting on this thread."
It is not the intentions of people that I question.
It is their actual effect on the ability of this country to effectively wage war.
It is not the intentions of people that I question.
It is their actual effect on the ability of this country to effectively wage war.
Tourist,
I would say that this country lost "the ability to effectively wage war" quite some time ago.....
We can however, turn up to help participate in the occasional armed conflict!
I would say that this country lost "the ability to effectively wage war" quite some time ago.....
We can however, turn up to help participate in the occasional armed conflict!
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To Sir Peters Love Child,
You gave one example of the ladder. Is that the system failure or a failure of that individual? A poorly qualified individual with too much authority?
If he knowingly introduced a piece of equipment that was not compliant and you know that he knows then what have you done about it?
Fed up of hearing people complain and not doing anything about - if you are not happy then make a stand.
You gave one example of the ladder. Is that the system failure or a failure of that individual? A poorly qualified individual with too much authority?
If he knowingly introduced a piece of equipment that was not compliant and you know that he knows then what have you done about it?
Fed up of hearing people complain and not doing anything about - if you are not happy then make a stand.
Tourist:
Then that is another point where you and I differ. This thread is about Airworthiness, indeed about the provision of Airworthiness, or rather the lack of it, in UK Military Aviation over recent decades. That lack derived from the deliberate policy of subverting and suborning the Regulations at the very highest levels. I do question the intentions, the malevolence, and the moral cowardice, of those VSO's that perpetrated it and inflicted it on our Armed Forces, blaming instead JO's for Gross Negligence in subsequent Airworthiness Related Fatal Accidents.
If only your bit of Goebbelsesque fantasy were the truth! I was a product of the Flight Safety system borne on the back of the appalling list of accidents that you posted. We were always told that it was the Meteor accident rate that was the catalyst of reform, and it is indeed well in the lead, but the others too give much food for thought. To suggest that things have simply gone on getting better and better year on year since, when many avoidable fatal accidents have been featured in this forum and far more haven't, is perverse in my opinion. UK Military Aviation is now at a numerical low to compete with the inter-war years, and each loss thus accounts for a very significant loss rate.
You speak of the differences between military and civil aviation, and they are in truth significant, but they both share an unforgiving response to self delusion. One of us, you or I, is so deluded. If it be me then worry not, for I no longer fly and you are triumphant in your brilliant surmising of the situation. If it be you then I worry, for you, for your fellow aviators, for your loved ones, and for those who depend on your prowess being available when this country needs it. Help those who help you to be around then..... please!
It is not the intentions of people that I question.
If only your bit of Goebbelsesque fantasy were the truth! I was a product of the Flight Safety system borne on the back of the appalling list of accidents that you posted. We were always told that it was the Meteor accident rate that was the catalyst of reform, and it is indeed well in the lead, but the others too give much food for thought. To suggest that things have simply gone on getting better and better year on year since, when many avoidable fatal accidents have been featured in this forum and far more haven't, is perverse in my opinion. UK Military Aviation is now at a numerical low to compete with the inter-war years, and each loss thus accounts for a very significant loss rate.
You speak of the differences between military and civil aviation, and they are in truth significant, but they both share an unforgiving response to self delusion. One of us, you or I, is so deluded. If it be me then worry not, for I no longer fly and you are triumphant in your brilliant surmising of the situation. If it be you then I worry, for you, for your fellow aviators, for your loved ones, and for those who depend on your prowess being available when this country needs it. Help those who help you to be around then..... please!
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Chug
"That lack derived from the deliberate policy of subverting and suborning the Regulations at the very highest levels. I do question the intentions, the malevolence, and the moral cowardice, of those VSO's that perpetrated it and inflicted it on our Armed Forces, blaming instead JO's for Gross Negligence in subsequent Airworthiness Related Fatal Accidents."
I think you need to go put on your tinfoil helmet.
There are a huge range of senior officers of all colours of uniform that I consider stupid, dangerous and incompetent, but I strongly doubt any of them are doing things deliberately to harm their service.
Do you honestly believe that people have been subverting regulations with the intention of doing harm?
Seriously?
I am not saying that they have not in some instances dishonourably tried to slope the blame onto others after it has all gone wrong, but to suggest that the initial actions were malevolent rather than an attempt to get around overly restrictive regulation and enhance their bang per buck is just National Enquirer territory.
"To suggest that things have simply gone on getting better and better year on year since, when many avoidable fatal accidents have been featured in this forum and far more haven't, is perverse in my opinion."
How do you want to judge the statistics?
I think the fairest way is to do it per flying hour, don't you?
As I said, none of the "improvements" in regulations have done anything measurable for decades except intefere with getting the job done and increasing the cost of aviation to unsupportable levels.
Incidentally, comparing me to Goebbels is personally insulting, suggests that I have an ulterior purpose and is the sort of the thing Mods are supposed to stamp on, you c##t.
"That lack derived from the deliberate policy of subverting and suborning the Regulations at the very highest levels. I do question the intentions, the malevolence, and the moral cowardice, of those VSO's that perpetrated it and inflicted it on our Armed Forces, blaming instead JO's for Gross Negligence in subsequent Airworthiness Related Fatal Accidents."
I think you need to go put on your tinfoil helmet.
There are a huge range of senior officers of all colours of uniform that I consider stupid, dangerous and incompetent, but I strongly doubt any of them are doing things deliberately to harm their service.
Do you honestly believe that people have been subverting regulations with the intention of doing harm?
Seriously?
I am not saying that they have not in some instances dishonourably tried to slope the blame onto others after it has all gone wrong, but to suggest that the initial actions were malevolent rather than an attempt to get around overly restrictive regulation and enhance their bang per buck is just National Enquirer territory.
"To suggest that things have simply gone on getting better and better year on year since, when many avoidable fatal accidents have been featured in this forum and far more haven't, is perverse in my opinion."
How do you want to judge the statistics?
I think the fairest way is to do it per flying hour, don't you?
As I said, none of the "improvements" in regulations have done anything measurable for decades except intefere with getting the job done and increasing the cost of aviation to unsupportable levels.
Incidentally, comparing me to Goebbels is personally insulting, suggests that I have an ulterior purpose and is the sort of the thing Mods are supposed to stamp on, you c##t.
I'm certainly not comparing you to Goebbels, I am comparing your way of changing the argument to suit your agenda to his habit of doing the same thing (hence the "..esque"). This thread is about Military Airworthiness and Airworthiness Related Accidents. The reason that Mr Haddon-Cave called for the establishment of an MAA was because of clear evidence that Military Airworthiness Provision has been subverted in recent decades. The problem is that the MAA can similarly be subverted while it remains within the MOD. You seem to want to move the argument to Flight Safety in general, all military air accidents in general, and the alleged operational deficiencies inherent in pursuing Flight Safety via the MAA. Like others here here I find that incomprehensible, but that is not the issue here.
The point at issue is airworthiness provision, and your question goes to the very nub of it:
To which of course the answer is no, I do not think that their intention was harm, their intention was expediency. I am not going to rerun all that emerged on the Mull thread over several years, suffice it to say that though locked (after the Wratten and Day finding was set aside) it can still be read. The effect though was the same, subordinates were ordered to disregard the regulations but sign them off as complied with. The result was a Grossly Unairworthy Aircraft (prone to UFCM's, jammed Flight Controls, and a FADEC that could cause uncommanded power ups/ downs/ shutdowns) received Controller Aircraft Release and a Release to Service into the RAF. That it had switch on clearance only, so that Comms and Nav-Aids could not be used was never made known to aircrew, because of course it would make the aircraft unusable! The malevolence of which I speak is manifest in the persecution of the few who were prepared to resist such illegal orders. To date the Provost Marshal has shown no interest though in investigating them. My motivation is to simply ensure that the regulations are protected from being further suborned. As the MAA is now responsible for their enforcement then simple logic requires that the MAA must be outside the MOD to ensure this.
The point at issue is airworthiness provision, and your question goes to the very nub of it:
Do you honestly believe that people have been subverting regulations with the intention of doing harm?
Tourist,
You may think that you have the final choice to judge if you want to fly an aircrft or not - Are you sure?
If your not told whether your aircraft is unsafe - how do you still have that choice?
An independant view on the state of your steed is what is needed. It's not even about what the bloke behind the 700 says.
Get real, stop dreaming and wake up!
You may think that you have the final choice to judge if you want to fly an aircrft or not - Are you sure?
If your not told whether your aircraft is unsafe - how do you still have that choice?
An independant view on the state of your steed is what is needed. It's not even about what the bloke behind the 700 says.
Get real, stop dreaming and wake up!
Methinks Mr Tourists last word says more about him and his opinions than anything else he has said.
Whereas I started off thinking he was just a misguided soul I now think he is simply a troll looking to see his own words in print.
Not worth even considering his views any more.
Whereas I started off thinking he was just a misguided soul I now think he is simply a troll looking to see his own words in print.
Not worth even considering his views any more.
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Yes, because that is how the world works Omega.
Dropping a "C" bomb invalidates all arguments.
This forum is supposed to be like a crewroom, and let me tell you that anybody who compares a gentleman of my religion to a Nazi in my crewroom is lucky to only get called that, and weasel words about how I was not being compared don't wash. He could have gone for any number of other spin doctors to make his dubious point, but no he goes nuclear. Incidentally, it is generally considered worldwide that the first person to compare to a nazi in a forum discussion has lost the argument.
It is particulary ironic that I get accused of shifting the argument shortly after I show a graph conclusively proving chugs argument about crash rates to be false.
Rigga
It is always my choice, I'll-informed or not.
Dropping a "C" bomb invalidates all arguments.
This forum is supposed to be like a crewroom, and let me tell you that anybody who compares a gentleman of my religion to a Nazi in my crewroom is lucky to only get called that, and weasel words about how I was not being compared don't wash. He could have gone for any number of other spin doctors to make his dubious point, but no he goes nuclear. Incidentally, it is generally considered worldwide that the first person to compare to a nazi in a forum discussion has lost the argument.
It is particulary ironic that I get accused of shifting the argument shortly after I show a graph conclusively proving chugs argument about crash rates to be false.
Rigga
It is always my choice, I'll-informed or not.
The phrase that you took offence to was:
where Goebbelsesque is an adjective describing the noun "fantasy", You could indeed have taken well deserved offence if it had been "Goebbelsesque Tourist" but it wasn't, was it? Methinks you doth protest too much, though I for one am dropping out of this exchange right now, before I get my collar felt for thread drift at least. So just have a last word and then let it go, for God's sake.
Goebbelsesque fantasy
...Except that graph only shows the gradient for military aircraft from 1946 and we are generally talking about from the 1990s to present - quite a lot of difference.
You may need to know some international aviation design and management history to decode the changes shown in that graph - especially what happened in 1947, 1970 and again in 2003 - but you're too intelligent to want to know - aren't you?
And the percentages of total aircraft to incidents/accidents is quite hugely different now too. Perhaps you could stumble on one that shows how wild your theories are?
While your digging - try "researching" how safe aircraft are today - and then try to find why?
Finally, I'd like to see your equation/definition about the risks in flying what you think is an unsafe aircraft (try to include probability and severity) and its relationship to impaired judgement.
You may need to know some international aviation design and management history to decode the changes shown in that graph - especially what happened in 1947, 1970 and again in 2003 - but you're too intelligent to want to know - aren't you?
And the percentages of total aircraft to incidents/accidents is quite hugely different now too. Perhaps you could stumble on one that shows how wild your theories are?
While your digging - try "researching" how safe aircraft are today - and then try to find why?
Finally, I'd like to see your equation/definition about the risks in flying what you think is an unsafe aircraft (try to include probability and severity) and its relationship to impaired judgement.
Tourist
If a person is told their actions will cause harm, they ignore that advice and harm is caused, that is not necessarily malevolent.
But if their actions result in harm and they continue with those actions, then there is certainly a degree of intent.
Even if the original reason for ignoring advice was to get more “bang per buck” (or, more likely, to enhance one’s chances of advancement and /or save money at the expense of safety), the knowledge that the action causes harm must become a conscious factor in the later decision making.
That may be acceptable in the operational theatre (fitness for purpose as opposed to airworthiness) but it is not acceptable when attaining and maintaining airworthiness. (Which is why everyone must understand the difference). The act is particularly malevolent if one knowingly makes a false statement (that regulations have been implemented correctly or an aircraft is safe, when neither is the case) or, even worse, brings malignant influence to bear by instructing a subordinate to make a false statement.
If your premise forms any conscious part of your personal risk assessment, my advice is to think again. How many times have you stood toe to toe with a 2 Star and told him “Your decision will kill aircrew”, only to be ridiculed – and later proven right at a Board of Inquiry? Or, while aircrew were in sickbay, sought funding to make an aircraft safe and been told “I don’t care, the RN can ground their fleet”. Or been formally disciplined for complaining that fraud has been committed through a contract being signed and paid off and the aircraft declared safe in the full knowledge it was not? (9 dead and 6 injured in just those 3 examples).
Malevolence or incompetence? It is the deliberate nature of the act which points toward the former. But the ones I feel the most contempt for are those who adopted this ethos as the easy way to advancement. They have been taught properly yet made a conscious decision to forsake their training and ignore the safety of aircrew for their own ends. That is truly malevolent. As one once said to me “Let it go, the aircrew can fight their own battles”. Not if they’re fighting the controls while heading for the ****** ground, mate.
Do you honestly believe that people have been subverting regulations with the intention of doing harm?
I am not saying that they have not in some instances dishonourably tried to slope the blame onto others after it has all gone wrong, but to suggest that the initial actions were malevolent rather than an attempt to get around overly restrictive regulation and enhance their bang per buck is just National Enquirer territory.
I am not saying that they have not in some instances dishonourably tried to slope the blame onto others after it has all gone wrong, but to suggest that the initial actions were malevolent rather than an attempt to get around overly restrictive regulation and enhance their bang per buck is just National Enquirer territory.
But if their actions result in harm and they continue with those actions, then there is certainly a degree of intent.
Even if the original reason for ignoring advice was to get more “bang per buck” (or, more likely, to enhance one’s chances of advancement and /or save money at the expense of safety), the knowledge that the action causes harm must become a conscious factor in the later decision making.
That may be acceptable in the operational theatre (fitness for purpose as opposed to airworthiness) but it is not acceptable when attaining and maintaining airworthiness. (Which is why everyone must understand the difference). The act is particularly malevolent if one knowingly makes a false statement (that regulations have been implemented correctly or an aircraft is safe, when neither is the case) or, even worse, brings malignant influence to bear by instructing a subordinate to make a false statement.
If your premise forms any conscious part of your personal risk assessment, my advice is to think again. How many times have you stood toe to toe with a 2 Star and told him “Your decision will kill aircrew”, only to be ridiculed – and later proven right at a Board of Inquiry? Or, while aircrew were in sickbay, sought funding to make an aircraft safe and been told “I don’t care, the RN can ground their fleet”. Or been formally disciplined for complaining that fraud has been committed through a contract being signed and paid off and the aircraft declared safe in the full knowledge it was not? (9 dead and 6 injured in just those 3 examples).
Malevolence or incompetence? It is the deliberate nature of the act which points toward the former. But the ones I feel the most contempt for are those who adopted this ethos as the easy way to advancement. They have been taught properly yet made a conscious decision to forsake their training and ignore the safety of aircrew for their own ends. That is truly malevolent. As one once said to me “Let it go, the aircrew can fight their own battles”. Not if they’re fighting the controls while heading for the ****** ground, mate.
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I don't want my ladder gymnastics to hijack this thread, but it is a good example on a smaller scale
exairman
Bit of a random inject, that's not Terry, is it?
Everything necessary has now been done, nothing like death or injury to get people to concentrate on doing what they're paid for.
MoD admitted 100% liability immediately so there is no need (for me) to blame individuals. Although there is the IPT, as always, looking a little negligent. It surprises me that a medium level CS signs off stuff when there are several highly paid uniforms that should be carrying the can.
Another uniform that would have been subpoena'd (sp?) was the Sqn Ldr who closed down the Role Equipment Bay at Lyneham, sending all the Riggers back to Main Sqn shiftwork in an efficiency saving. It was at this point that the oversight took place.
Looking back at my post on the 19th Aug, I don't want to give the impression that my warmongering wasn't the most exciting time of my life, making lifelong friends.
My spirit was broken in gradual stages (leading me to a solicitor), the most hilarious one was that when I was well enough to drive myself to innumerable x-rays, scans & reviews at hospital, I put enough claims in to get biffed for an external JPA audit. Claims that had already gone through at Stn level and long been paid. It turns out I was claiming 1 mile too many each way to hospital and they recovered 63p x 9 claims. (after threats of course) I did ask for all my original paperwork to be returned so that I could check again, just for a larf.
SPHLC
exairman
To Sir Peters Love Child,
You gave one example of the ladder. Is that the system failure or a failure of that individual? A poorly qualified individual with too much authority?
If he knowingly introduced a piece of equipment that was not compliant and you know that he knows then what have you done about it?
Fed up of hearing people complain and not doing anything about - if you are not happy then make a stand.
You gave one example of the ladder. Is that the system failure or a failure of that individual? A poorly qualified individual with too much authority?
If he knowingly introduced a piece of equipment that was not compliant and you know that he knows then what have you done about it?
Fed up of hearing people complain and not doing anything about - if you are not happy then make a stand.
Everything necessary has now been done, nothing like death or injury to get people to concentrate on doing what they're paid for.
MoD admitted 100% liability immediately so there is no need (for me) to blame individuals. Although there is the IPT, as always, looking a little negligent. It surprises me that a medium level CS signs off stuff when there are several highly paid uniforms that should be carrying the can.
Another uniform that would have been subpoena'd (sp?) was the Sqn Ldr who closed down the Role Equipment Bay at Lyneham, sending all the Riggers back to Main Sqn shiftwork in an efficiency saving. It was at this point that the oversight took place.
Looking back at my post on the 19th Aug, I don't want to give the impression that my warmongering wasn't the most exciting time of my life, making lifelong friends.
My spirit was broken in gradual stages (leading me to a solicitor), the most hilarious one was that when I was well enough to drive myself to innumerable x-rays, scans & reviews at hospital, I put enough claims in to get biffed for an external JPA audit. Claims that had already gone through at Stn level and long been paid. It turns out I was claiming 1 mile too many each way to hospital and they recovered 63p x 9 claims. (after threats of course) I did ask for all my original paperwork to be returned so that I could check again, just for a larf.
SPHLC
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CHART, NART and H-C
At long last, something about the contents of NART
http://politics.caledonianmercury.com/2011/08/30/nimrod-safety-problems-revealed-in-reluctantly-released-mod-report/
DV
http://politics.caledonianmercury.com/2011/08/30/nimrod-safety-problems-revealed-in-reluctantly-released-mod-report/
DV
Well done DV. Excellent.
NART dwells heavily on (lack of) structural integrity. It is interesting to consider the oversight system (as of mid-90s).
1. Fixed Wing Structural Integrity Working Parties, chaired by the Aircraft Project Director (in this case, Director/Maritime). Their reports went to.....
2. Fixed Wing Structural Integrity Working Group, chaired by DPTCAn. Reported to Defence Airworthiness Group on health of entire FW fleet.
D/Maritime's boss (2 Star) sat on the DAG. I can tell you what his attitude to structural integrity was at the time of NART. Ignore it. Not interested. No matter where you look on this entire subject, that postholder features heavily. The article mentions his RAF/AML counterparts.
Question - Were the NART conclusions (1998) advised to the above groups in the preceding years, and if so what action did they take? Anyone reading NART in 1998 would reach only one conclusion - cancel RMPA. Swiftly followed by a review of MR2 clearances.
But periodic/infrequent reports such as NART, CHART, HEART, TART, WART etc should not come as a surprise. The ART report should be a reassurance to the brass that Continual Assessment is working properly, not a detailed investigation in its own right.
The concept of Continual Assessment (of Safety) is mandated. But, as a matter of policy, not implemented. That basic conflict between two policies is at the root of many accidents. Every single person who has tried to resolve it, since created by AMSO in June 1987, has failed and been castigated for trying.
To slightly digress, the Public Accounts Committee called Chinook Mk3 the "gold standard cock up", blaming lack of management oversight. (One assumes MRA4 has now overtaken Mk3?). Who, supposedly, provided that oversight? Despite the PAC saying they'd didn't know (or MoD wouldn't tell them) the answer is, the same post. Where does it say this? In the mandated Management Plan for any MoD project. No Plan, no approval. Air systems, and especially airworthiness, is a small world in MoD. The same names crop up all the time. It only needs one fool.
NART dwells heavily on (lack of) structural integrity. It is interesting to consider the oversight system (as of mid-90s).
1. Fixed Wing Structural Integrity Working Parties, chaired by the Aircraft Project Director (in this case, Director/Maritime). Their reports went to.....
2. Fixed Wing Structural Integrity Working Group, chaired by DPTCAn. Reported to Defence Airworthiness Group on health of entire FW fleet.
D/Maritime's boss (2 Star) sat on the DAG. I can tell you what his attitude to structural integrity was at the time of NART. Ignore it. Not interested. No matter where you look on this entire subject, that postholder features heavily. The article mentions his RAF/AML counterparts.
Question - Were the NART conclusions (1998) advised to the above groups in the preceding years, and if so what action did they take? Anyone reading NART in 1998 would reach only one conclusion - cancel RMPA. Swiftly followed by a review of MR2 clearances.
But periodic/infrequent reports such as NART, CHART, HEART, TART, WART etc should not come as a surprise. The ART report should be a reassurance to the brass that Continual Assessment is working properly, not a detailed investigation in its own right.
The concept of Continual Assessment (of Safety) is mandated. But, as a matter of policy, not implemented. That basic conflict between two policies is at the root of many accidents. Every single person who has tried to resolve it, since created by AMSO in June 1987, has failed and been castigated for trying.
To slightly digress, the Public Accounts Committee called Chinook Mk3 the "gold standard cock up", blaming lack of management oversight. (One assumes MRA4 has now overtaken Mk3?). Who, supposedly, provided that oversight? Despite the PAC saying they'd didn't know (or MoD wouldn't tell them) the answer is, the same post. Where does it say this? In the mandated Management Plan for any MoD project. No Plan, no approval. Air systems, and especially airworthiness, is a small world in MoD. The same names crop up all the time. It only needs one fool.
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1998 Nimrod Airworthiness Review Team Report
Haddon Cave on the 1998 NART:-
13.4
These concerns and warnings in the NART report were dismissed at the time as ‘uninformed, crew-room level, emotive comment lacking substantive evidence and focus’.
They should not have been dismissed so easily in 1998.
13.6
The Nimrod fleet of aircraft was going to require more (not less) care, resources and vigilance and a strengthening (not weakening) of the airworthiness regime and culture if these ‘legacy’ aircraft were going to continue to operate safely until their extended Out-of-Service date.
13.7
And according to Jimmy Jones in this new article:-
In total, the NART report lists some 120 airworthiness recommendations, of which 47 were regarded as “Airworthiness Concerns” and 11 as “Airworthiness Hazards”
Having read H-C's 585 page report, and seen how thorough it was, I am astounded that he didn't pick up on Jimmy Jones' information above.
Are Haddon-Cave's Terms of Reference in the public domain? Or was it just '...conduct a Review into the wider issues surrounding the loss of Nimrod XV230 in Afghanistan on 2 September 2006.'
Did he make his own decision to plot the start of the rot at the SDR 98?
I fear that he just read the Executive Summary of the NART (from which he quotes) and makes the mistake that he accuses so many other of !
This is getting interesting...
13.4
These concerns and warnings in the NART report were dismissed at the time as ‘uninformed, crew-room level, emotive comment lacking substantive evidence and focus’.
They should not have been dismissed so easily in 1998.
They proved to be very prescient. (It should be noted that many of the same concerns were echoed to me by rank-and-file during my visits to RAF Kinloss ten years later in 2008.)
13.5
In my view, the NART concerns and warnings were not sufficiently heeded in the following years leading up to the XV230 accident, 1998 to 2006
13.5
In my view, the NART concerns and warnings were not sufficiently heeded in the following years leading up to the XV230 accident, 1998 to 2006
13.6
The Nimrod fleet of aircraft was going to require more (not less) care, resources and vigilance and a strengthening (not weakening) of the airworthiness regime and culture if these ‘legacy’ aircraft were going to continue to operate safely until their extended Out-of-Service date.
13.7
Unfortunately, this proved not to be the case because of the ‘cuts, change, dilution and distraction’ that took place in the MOD between 1998 and 2006.
And according to Jimmy Jones in this new article:-
In total, the NART report lists some 120 airworthiness recommendations, of which 47 were regarded as “Airworthiness Concerns” and 11 as “Airworthiness Hazards”
Having read H-C's 585 page report, and seen how thorough it was, I am astounded that he didn't pick up on Jimmy Jones' information above.
Are Haddon-Cave's Terms of Reference in the public domain? Or was it just '...conduct a Review into the wider issues surrounding the loss of Nimrod XV230 in Afghanistan on 2 September 2006.'
Did he make his own decision to plot the start of the rot at the SDR 98?
I fear that he just read the Executive Summary of the NART (from which he quotes) and makes the mistake that he accuses so many other of !
This is getting interesting...
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Sir Peter,
You are correct, it is clear that H-C only read the Exec Summary.
Also, I have now realised that Darren Beck (MoD), Secretary to the Nimrod Review was a Nimrod Commercial Officer in D/Maritime in around 1990/91? (I'm 99% sure it is the same guy). As such, he was fully aware the PDS contracts necessary to maintain Safety Cases were not in place and funding had been cut. I'm pretty sure H-C didn't know he had one of the best witnesses sitting beside him! If Beck had told him this detail, it made the 1998 baseline doubly ridiculous. Conversely, Beck would know the 98 baseline was wrong. So, perhaps, H-C was steered away from events pre-1998.
DV
You are correct, it is clear that H-C only read the Exec Summary.
Also, I have now realised that Darren Beck (MoD), Secretary to the Nimrod Review was a Nimrod Commercial Officer in D/Maritime in around 1990/91? (I'm 99% sure it is the same guy). As such, he was fully aware the PDS contracts necessary to maintain Safety Cases were not in place and funding had been cut. I'm pretty sure H-C didn't know he had one of the best witnesses sitting beside him! If Beck had told him this detail, it made the 1998 baseline doubly ridiculous. Conversely, Beck would know the 98 baseline was wrong. So, perhaps, H-C was steered away from events pre-1998.
DV
DV:
The "steering" of which you speak is what has bedevilled UK Military Airworthiness enforcement for some 3 decades, and why it must be removed entirely from the clutches of the MOD, ASAP. This is not just about reports that a QC can't be bothered to read, this is about lives. 62 of them have been lost in airworthiness related fatal accidents featured in this forum alone. The real death toll is probably far higher. Two reviews, a clutch of "ARTs", BoIs, FAIs, Commons and Lords Committees, all have failed to point a finger at the glaring systemic failures in UK Military Airworthiness Provision. Are we forever destined to accept this self regulating scandal killing more and more in avoidable fatal accidents, or is someone, somewhere, at last going to say, "Enough is enough, we now have to stop this"?
The "steering" of which you speak is what has bedevilled UK Military Airworthiness enforcement for some 3 decades, and why it must be removed entirely from the clutches of the MOD, ASAP. This is not just about reports that a QC can't be bothered to read, this is about lives. 62 of them have been lost in airworthiness related fatal accidents featured in this forum alone. The real death toll is probably far higher. Two reviews, a clutch of "ARTs", BoIs, FAIs, Commons and Lords Committees, all have failed to point a finger at the glaring systemic failures in UK Military Airworthiness Provision. Are we forever destined to accept this self regulating scandal killing more and more in avoidable fatal accidents, or is someone, somewhere, at last going to say, "Enough is enough, we now have to stop this"?
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Chug; Who, with clout, will take the airworthiness case forward, and challenge the findings of H-C?
(a) The media has lost interest. We may have new information, but Nimrod and Chinook are old stories.
(b) Most people do not understand the difference between serviceability and airworthiness.
(c) MP's are not interested as it has little or no benefit to their constituents
(d) Pledger and Cowan appear to have given up the fight, having been worn down by MoD
(e) H-C was paid £3.5 million for his report and received a Knighthood (I believe). Who in MoD is going to admit that his report was seriously flawed?
DV
Could be wrong about the KNighthood, however,
"The Queen has been pleased to approve the appointment of Charles Anthony Haddon-Cave, Esq., Q.C., to be a Justice of the High Court with effect from the end of October 2011 on the retirement of Mr. Justice David Steel."
(a) The media has lost interest. We may have new information, but Nimrod and Chinook are old stories.
(b) Most people do not understand the difference between serviceability and airworthiness.
(c) MP's are not interested as it has little or no benefit to their constituents
(d) Pledger and Cowan appear to have given up the fight, having been worn down by MoD
(e) H-C was paid £3.5 million for his report and received a Knighthood (I believe). Who in MoD is going to admit that his report was seriously flawed?
DV
Could be wrong about the KNighthood, however,
"The Queen has been pleased to approve the appointment of Charles Anthony Haddon-Cave, Esq., Q.C., to be a Justice of the High Court with effect from the end of October 2011 on the retirement of Mr. Justice David Steel."
Last edited by Distant Voice; 2nd Sep 2011 at 09:26.