Haddon-Cave, Airworthiness, Sea King et al (merged)
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Originally Posted by Squidlord
A few people are being highly critical of the HC report. Yes, it does contain significant errors and it's a shame its scope is limited. But, imo and depending on MoD response, it could still be a force for significant improvement in safety. In that light, the criticisms are relatively minor, in my opinion.
the mightyimp
Well said. I think you are spot on. The point being that having staff with the required competencies is a fundamental requirement of JSP553.
Haddon-Cave's report is superb given the resistance he met from within MoD, but he missed a number of vital points including the fact that getting rid of these staff was a quite deliberate act. It commenced in about 1990 and peaked in 1996 when the then CDP (Walmsley) announced he didn't want or need engineers as engineering project managers. As airworthiness is primarily an engineering discipline..........
In omitting this fact (it wasn't that he didn't know), H-C baselined his report at 1998, implying there were no problems before that date. I have struggled to understand why and can only conclude there was a malignant MoD influence at hand to limit the damage. MoD did not want H-C looking into ACM Loader's second recommendation, that because the regulations apply to every aircraft then it is logical that other fleets have suffered. (A simple proven fact).
Crucially, and unforgivably, H-C omitted the written evidence that showed senior staffs in MoD(PE), AMSO, AML, DLO and DPA had, for nearly 20 years, received a series of formal warnings as to the inevitable outcome of their policies.
Nor did he mention the letter to Adam Ingram, Minister for the Armed Forces, written some months BEFORE XV230 crashed, which stated that the airworthiness regulations were not being implemented properly - PRECISELY the wording used by ACM Loader in the BoI report. THAT is scandalous, and the staffs who advised Ingram to say they were implemented properly 9 months AFTER the crash, should, quite simply, be sacked.
If the current MAA work is anything to go by it is just another audit process (and thus another 'hoop' - again the operative word) and IMHO does not have the staff with the required competencies to provide advice on best practice or, indeed, actually qualified auditors.
Haddon-Cave's report is superb given the resistance he met from within MoD, but he missed a number of vital points including the fact that getting rid of these staff was a quite deliberate act. It commenced in about 1990 and peaked in 1996 when the then CDP (Walmsley) announced he didn't want or need engineers as engineering project managers. As airworthiness is primarily an engineering discipline..........
In omitting this fact (it wasn't that he didn't know), H-C baselined his report at 1998, implying there were no problems before that date. I have struggled to understand why and can only conclude there was a malignant MoD influence at hand to limit the damage. MoD did not want H-C looking into ACM Loader's second recommendation, that because the regulations apply to every aircraft then it is logical that other fleets have suffered. (A simple proven fact).
Crucially, and unforgivably, H-C omitted the written evidence that showed senior staffs in MoD(PE), AMSO, AML, DLO and DPA had, for nearly 20 years, received a series of formal warnings as to the inevitable outcome of their policies.
Nor did he mention the letter to Adam Ingram, Minister for the Armed Forces, written some months BEFORE XV230 crashed, which stated that the airworthiness regulations were not being implemented properly - PRECISELY the wording used by ACM Loader in the BoI report. THAT is scandalous, and the staffs who advised Ingram to say they were implemented properly 9 months AFTER the crash, should, quite simply, be sacked.
Last edited by tucumseh; 5th Jul 2010 at 12:09.
In the MAA we have all that is wrong in 21st Century Britain. It cannot do its job because it is not competent enough to do so, but even if it could it can't because it is part of the MOD, the very organisation guilty of flouting its very own UK Military Airworthiness Regulations. It did so in the mistaken belief that such flouting would save money. It has not, it has cost money, lives and operational capability. The MOD needs protecting from itself by an independent professional regulator, indeed we all do. Time is of the essence for until that be done the then unforeseen consequences (one has to presume) of such Gross Negligence will continue in a plainly predictable fashion. That is more lives, money and operational capability lost unnecessarily.
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I have some difficulty with those who continuously repeat the popular mantra that "if it is part of the MoD it then it cannot take an independent view"...it is too much of a 21st Century get out phrase...there was time when proper airworthiness management was more than possible - with the right organisation, the right competencies and the right minded acceptance of such by those in authority - and the rules to ensure it was so. Having been part of such a system I can vouch that it can work. That said, as Tucumseh has regularly highlighted, the gradual erosion of the right organisation and competencies over more than 20 years has lead to present parlous situation. In part, IMO, this has been driven fundamentally by us continually trying to achieve world player status with the "best" technology ...and a joke of budget to underpin it (or not). The large erosions in competent personnel at every level, the blurring of responsibilities (particularly with the introduction of the IPT system amongst other issues), the ignorance of many about the issues and what drives them at AFB level (and at 1* level below) , the constant pressure to provide working operational capability - always in tension against proper airworthiness testing, analysis and deliverance - and the ripping apart of the independent organisations that used to deliver such so effectively and honestly ---- all have lead to this deplorable situation we now live in and with.
Couple that with the appalling decline in simple but essential qualities such as integrity and honesty...and loyalty by those in power down to those who are at risk...and we have a fatal combination which will need more than H-C to rescue us.
Cheers!!
Couple that with the appalling decline in simple but essential qualities such as integrity and honesty...and loyalty by those in power down to those who are at risk...and we have a fatal combination which will need more than H-C to rescue us.
Cheers!!
Tallsar:
"...there was time when proper airworthiness management was more than possible - with the right organisation, the right competencies and the right minded acceptance of such by those in authority - and the rules to ensure it was so. Having been part of such a system I can vouch that it can work."...
In 20:20 Hindsight - Ahh, them was the days!
Those standards are still achieveable - but alas, in this environment, not with the same old rules. It seems we have gone beyond trusting officers and gentlement to do their jobs - we must assure the tasks are now properly done by them - whether they like it or not!
Like Chug, I don't have a ha'porth of faith in the "old crowd", wearing their "new hats", doing anything other than what they did before (but with a new letterhead).
Rigga
"...there was time when proper airworthiness management was more than possible - with the right organisation, the right competencies and the right minded acceptance of such by those in authority - and the rules to ensure it was so. Having been part of such a system I can vouch that it can work."...
In 20:20 Hindsight - Ahh, them was the days!
Those standards are still achieveable - but alas, in this environment, not with the same old rules. It seems we have gone beyond trusting officers and gentlement to do their jobs - we must assure the tasks are now properly done by them - whether they like it or not!
Like Chug, I don't have a ha'porth of faith in the "old crowd", wearing their "new hats", doing anything other than what they did before (but with a new letterhead).
Rigga
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Tallsar has a point - independence of the MAA should be possible in its present position within the MoD. But its not!
I believe that the times have changed and that history has shown that many officers lack the moral fibre to fight for what is right. In the past, that sort of behaviour was encouraged by similarly-minded bosses. Unfortunately, those days are gone and all that appears to matter is office politics, budgets and promotion. The buck is passed......but sideways and not upwards.
As I have said elsewhere, perhaps all the recent loss of life on operations has bred more leaders ready to stand up and be counted on behalf of the troops? I sincerely hope so and that, one day, those people will be very senior; the wheel will have turned full circle. Only then will we have the personnel to effectively populate the MAA to give it proper independence but that could take a long, long time.
Therefore, it would be better if the MAA was made truly independent of the whole MoD and not just be 'independent of the front-line'. Far better for the MAA to be grouped together with the CAA (and the MAAIB with the AAIB). An option might be for the MAA to be staffed by current MoD personnel but who were 'seconded to' and working with the civil service, retired officers and experienced (and trained) engineers for the duration of their time with the MAA. Why would that be so difficult?
Sadly, however, I do not think that will happen, so until the MAA is innoculated with personnel with 'the right stuff', I suspect that the MAA will be anything but 'truly independent' and those within the MAA who do have sufficient moral courage will be in the minority. But if you are one of those people, don't give up hope and keep up the good fight. If you do have to make a stand, don't be afraid to do so - promotion ain't everything and you have to be able to look yourself in the eye in the bathroom mirror of a morning.
In the meantime, IPTs must not use the MAA as a 'buffer' and the MAA must be rigorous in forcing IPTs to comply with the regulations that make aircraft airworthy and fit for purpose. Otherwise the MAA is a white elephant and all that has happened is that the old DASC/DARS officers have changed offices and hats but without doing anything different.
Who watches the watchers???
I believe that the times have changed and that history has shown that many officers lack the moral fibre to fight for what is right. In the past, that sort of behaviour was encouraged by similarly-minded bosses. Unfortunately, those days are gone and all that appears to matter is office politics, budgets and promotion. The buck is passed......but sideways and not upwards.
As I have said elsewhere, perhaps all the recent loss of life on operations has bred more leaders ready to stand up and be counted on behalf of the troops? I sincerely hope so and that, one day, those people will be very senior; the wheel will have turned full circle. Only then will we have the personnel to effectively populate the MAA to give it proper independence but that could take a long, long time.
Therefore, it would be better if the MAA was made truly independent of the whole MoD and not just be 'independent of the front-line'. Far better for the MAA to be grouped together with the CAA (and the MAAIB with the AAIB). An option might be for the MAA to be staffed by current MoD personnel but who were 'seconded to' and working with the civil service, retired officers and experienced (and trained) engineers for the duration of their time with the MAA. Why would that be so difficult?
Sadly, however, I do not think that will happen, so until the MAA is innoculated with personnel with 'the right stuff', I suspect that the MAA will be anything but 'truly independent' and those within the MAA who do have sufficient moral courage will be in the minority. But if you are one of those people, don't give up hope and keep up the good fight. If you do have to make a stand, don't be afraid to do so - promotion ain't everything and you have to be able to look yourself in the eye in the bathroom mirror of a morning.
In the meantime, IPTs must not use the MAA as a 'buffer' and the MAA must be rigorous in forcing IPTs to comply with the regulations that make aircraft airworthy and fit for purpose. Otherwise the MAA is a white elephant and all that has happened is that the old DASC/DARS officers have changed offices and hats but without doing anything different.
Who watches the watchers???
Last edited by flipster; 6th Jul 2010 at 10:18.
Tallsar:
And having been part of a fleet of some 80+ aircraft that were simultaneously grounded around the world very soon after one of them crashed, I can vouch that "such a system" worked well... then! But that was a long long time ago when subordinate commanders commanded, ie demanded loyalty from their subordinates who got it in return. Those days are long past, and the present is ably portrayed above by flip. Airworthiness is vital in aviation. It's not just a wish list item but a must have, or people will needlessly die . The renegade Air Officers that suborned it showed just how vulnerable "such a system" is in the wrong hands. It would be unthinkable that the airlines be given control over Civil Airworthiness Regulatory Control. It should be equally unthinkable that any other operator be given similar control. At least 62 people have died in Military Airworthiness related accidents featured in this forum recently. The true overall total is bound to be magnitudes higher. That is an unacceptable cost and why, with respect, I have to disagree with flip when he says:
It has to happen. No matter how dedicated and professional its staff are they can be simply over-ruled and bypassed by the Higher Command and the MOD. It's happened before so it can happen again. So let us all now recite the mantra together after 3,...3!
Having been part of such a system I can vouch that it can work.
it would be better if the MAA was made truly independent of the whole MoD and not just be 'independent of the front-line'......Sadly, however, I do not think that will happen
Self Regulation never works and in Aviation it kills!
Well said Flip and Chug.
"Who watches the watchers??? "
As part of the H-C review and report - good 'ole H-C said that there would be a further review of the new MAA's progress in two years time - Due in November/December 2012 I believe.
I think he'll find a whole bunch of confused middle ranking personnel with no real idea of what is required, leading a lesser ranking group of personnel who are likely to know what they are supposed to be doing, but unable to do it due to a huge amount of MOD beaurocracy. Thus, following the Marham mantra..."Comfortable with Complication" ????
"Who watches the watchers??? "
As part of the H-C review and report - good 'ole H-C said that there would be a further review of the new MAA's progress in two years time - Due in November/December 2012 I believe.
I think he'll find a whole bunch of confused middle ranking personnel with no real idea of what is required, leading a lesser ranking group of personnel who are likely to know what they are supposed to be doing, but unable to do it due to a huge amount of MOD beaurocracy. Thus, following the Marham mantra..."Comfortable with Complication" ????
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Chug
While I do not think it will happen, it won't stop me pressing for it and I agree wholeheartedly that it should indeed happen. I was only trying to be realistic to help understand the perspective of those good guys and girls actually in the MAA.
One of the problems maybe that that there are not enough engineers that have the 'historical norms' of airworthiness experience or the training req'd to lead the MAA back to reality. They must also have the courage to fight off IPTs that try to use the MAA as a whipping boy for blame and excuses, as surely they will when the inevitable delays and budget over-runs occur.
There must be a percentage of engineers in the MAA asking themselves "what the f**k are people like tucumseh and safeware etc talking about - I've never been taught/learnt that?" When they check the regs, they find tuc et al are spot-on!
But we have to remember that it is not the fault of these good people in MAA - they have been put in this position by years of under-funding, bleeding of experience and incredibly poor leadership, so much so that there were people who, until recently (and maybe still), held airworthiness authority who would fit easily the descriptor of 'tumbleweed' (loss of awareness and position).
Furthermore, many of those who caused the demise of the pre-existing AW system (or who stood idly by while the system was dismantled) are still in post - at high-level or in a highly-paid consultative role - and it is they, not some 'low-level' Gp Capts or Wg Cdrs, who are the one who should be charged with negligence, dereliction of duty or even prosecuted by the Provost Marshal (or the Thames Valley Police)!
It is not until all the bad wood is gone will things really change.
While I do not think it will happen, it won't stop me pressing for it and I agree wholeheartedly that it should indeed happen. I was only trying to be realistic to help understand the perspective of those good guys and girls actually in the MAA.
One of the problems maybe that that there are not enough engineers that have the 'historical norms' of airworthiness experience or the training req'd to lead the MAA back to reality. They must also have the courage to fight off IPTs that try to use the MAA as a whipping boy for blame and excuses, as surely they will when the inevitable delays and budget over-runs occur.
There must be a percentage of engineers in the MAA asking themselves "what the f**k are people like tucumseh and safeware etc talking about - I've never been taught/learnt that?" When they check the regs, they find tuc et al are spot-on!
But we have to remember that it is not the fault of these good people in MAA - they have been put in this position by years of under-funding, bleeding of experience and incredibly poor leadership, so much so that there were people who, until recently (and maybe still), held airworthiness authority who would fit easily the descriptor of 'tumbleweed' (loss of awareness and position).
Furthermore, many of those who caused the demise of the pre-existing AW system (or who stood idly by while the system was dismantled) are still in post - at high-level or in a highly-paid consultative role - and it is they, not some 'low-level' Gp Capts or Wg Cdrs, who are the one who should be charged with negligence, dereliction of duty or even prosecuted by the Provost Marshal (or the Thames Valley Police)!
It is not until all the bad wood is gone will things really change.
flip, we are it seems in violent agreement with each other and in particular with your final paragraph. In which case might I propose that pursuing those very senior officers involved through the courts, civil or military as you suggest, is what is needed for the full extent of this scandal to be realised at large. Then perhaps it will be accepted that Military Aviation is as much in need of independent regulation as is Civil Aviation. It is not only the lives of members of the Armed Forces at stake here, important as they are, but those over whom they fly. I wouldn't be allowed to launch an unairworthy aircraft into the UK skies, so why should an Air Marshal?
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I have no difficulty with the clear authority of the CAA and its like (as well as the operators) to ensure the safety of pax and crew and those on the ground below them in civil aviation where there is a clear cut need to maximise safety and minimise risk. This is not so in military aviation - and we must not forget this. Wars are not won by staying safe at all times and minimising the risk at all times. Therefore, any MAA has to account for this as I'm sure you would agree. Its processes must ensure that military judgement and assessment of those risks are accounted for, in the right circumstances. Will a totally independent MAA enable this? Of course I am not suggesting that the MoD has carte blanche to ride roughshod on safety concerns at every opportunity and wave the "war" flag - an issue which perhaps has had to much leeway in recent times. In the understandable hiatus resulting from the recent Inquiries, it is all too easy to forget that constant attention to safety and airworthiness at the expense of operational and war winning capability is not always the best approach - ALARP must play its part as well as flight envelope management. To undertsand this better, we must also constantly recognise that airworthiness is not only a structural, maintainance and design issue, but also an operational spectrum issue - as I know many understand already. As some have already said, getting the modern generation to change their ways at any rank level after several decades of "other" thinking is important and vital work that need start now (if it already has not done!)
Cheers
Cheers
Tallsar:
What was the war winning capability of a constantly leaking fuel system running through bays containing an ignition source, or a tactical transport with no fuel tank protection, or a support helicopter with a FADEC arbitrarily causing power excursions from max to zero? The whole point of military Flight Safety used to be that of preserving Force levels and capability with which to go and win wars. Not sure what its point is these days, something to do with career development perhaps?
constant attention to safety and airworthiness at the expense of operational and war winning capability is not always the best approach
Tallsar
Your point is well made but what you are discussing is (a) airworthiness and (b) fitness for purpose. The latter is an operational term in this context. They are related, but not the same.
The regulations require MoD to first attain airworthiness. The Release to Service is the statement this has been achieved. Only then can they address FFP. Very often, attaining FFP involves a lot more than attaining or maintaining airworthiness. But over the years MoD has increasingly used the FFP concept to degrade safety to save money. That misses the point of FFP entirely.
The important point here is that MoD, when asked in a Coroner’s Court, could not explain who was responsible for FFP. It is a pity the Coroner did not pursue this and demand an answer.
Your point is well made but what you are discussing is (a) airworthiness and (b) fitness for purpose. The latter is an operational term in this context. They are related, but not the same.
The regulations require MoD to first attain airworthiness. The Release to Service is the statement this has been achieved. Only then can they address FFP. Very often, attaining FFP involves a lot more than attaining or maintaining airworthiness. But over the years MoD has increasingly used the FFP concept to degrade safety to save money. That misses the point of FFP entirely.
The important point here is that MoD, when asked in a Coroner’s Court, could not explain who was responsible for FFP. It is a pity the Coroner did not pursue this and demand an answer.
"The regulations require MoD to first attain airworthiness. The Release to Service is the statement this has been achieved. Only then can they address FFP. Very often, attaining FFP involves a lot more than attaining or maintaining airworthiness. But over the years MoD has increasingly used the FFP concept to degrade safety to save money. That misses the point of FFP entirely. "
Tuc, As you say - The RTS is the statement of the attainment of an Airworthiness Status.
From that RTS point onwards there is a need to maintain "Continued Airworthiness" which is not just 'airworthiness' but the full and proper enactment of ALL the processes required to maintain the designed purpose of the aircraft - and not just Fitness For Purpose
This means that even if the aircraft has a role change it should still meet (or exceed) its new designed purpose.
Tuc, As you say - The RTS is the statement of the attainment of an Airworthiness Status.
From that RTS point onwards there is a need to maintain "Continued Airworthiness" which is not just 'airworthiness' but the full and proper enactment of ALL the processes required to maintain the designed purpose of the aircraft - and not just Fitness For Purpose
This means that even if the aircraft has a role change it should still meet (or exceed) its new designed purpose.
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T.... couldn't agree more....FFP and its association and differentiation with airworthiness are so fuzzy in many people's mind. I raised the point as it appears that all too often this intimate relationship is ignored, blurred or as you say, FFP is used to overide the association. Some others have a tendency to focus too much on airworthiness at the expense of other matters needing consideration too to produce the optimum safe and effective "system"
You may laugh (in sadness), but some of it may have its roots in such stupid cultural nonsense associated with engineering trying to keep servicable ac in the hangar whilst aircrew want to get them out and get on with the job...seems silly ...but life can sometimes be as stupid as that - particualry if chips on shoulders are invovled.
I really do despair as I have watched the need for urgent capability generation overide best practice - the latter has often been scoffed at by some very senior people in the past (I point to 1982 as the watershed here). Often it was the very same individuals' inability to approve and provide airframe resources to ensure the correct processes were carried out as efficiently as possible in the first place. I recall only too well a meeting in MoD where a certain senior staff officer fought hard to minimise the time and hours available from only one airframe to be used for full RTS trials at Boscombe, based on ignorant prejudice of what was actually happening there, and no understandfing of the detailed engineering involved to permit the trials to happen at all. And more ....the 1971 Puma RTS recomendation that said the ac was unacceptable for service due to its poor engine/rotor governing design (The tp was awarded an AFC for the testing risks taken to prove it!).....and how many have died and been injured as a result of the MoD's decison to overide this and get the ac into service anyway. In these sort of things are rooted the very issues you (and others) have spoken so elequently on in this thread.
Cheers
You may laugh (in sadness), but some of it may have its roots in such stupid cultural nonsense associated with engineering trying to keep servicable ac in the hangar whilst aircrew want to get them out and get on with the job...seems silly ...but life can sometimes be as stupid as that - particualry if chips on shoulders are invovled.
I really do despair as I have watched the need for urgent capability generation overide best practice - the latter has often been scoffed at by some very senior people in the past (I point to 1982 as the watershed here). Often it was the very same individuals' inability to approve and provide airframe resources to ensure the correct processes were carried out as efficiently as possible in the first place. I recall only too well a meeting in MoD where a certain senior staff officer fought hard to minimise the time and hours available from only one airframe to be used for full RTS trials at Boscombe, based on ignorant prejudice of what was actually happening there, and no understandfing of the detailed engineering involved to permit the trials to happen at all. And more ....the 1971 Puma RTS recomendation that said the ac was unacceptable for service due to its poor engine/rotor governing design (The tp was awarded an AFC for the testing risks taken to prove it!).....and how many have died and been injured as a result of the MoD's decison to overide this and get the ac into service anyway. In these sort of things are rooted the very issues you (and others) have spoken so elequently on in this thread.
Cheers
Last edited by Tallsar; 8th Jul 2010 at 22:07.
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Hi Chug.. Do not misunderstand me....I have no truck with failure to sort the very issues you remind us of - the Puma engine governing issue has long been a hobby horse of mine. But my point stands - and every issue has its moment critique where action should have been taken. Airworthiness must always be paramount along with all the issues that attempt to ensure optimum safety and capability in a platform or operational system.
Similarly, all operational risks that are taken to pursue victory need to be fully understood by all those involved, and when at an extreme, provide enough leeway for dissent and volunteering. Most don't appreciate for example, that all RAF SAR winchmen are volunteers, however airworthy the platform and winch system and its associated kit. No, any operational risks taken should and must be confined to their specific context and then not run on (in ignorance or due to financial stringency) when the neccessity to take such risks is gone. Many of us have been part of an organisation that has avoided doing precisely that over the last 3 decades. How many of us for example have been part of debates about UOR mod continuance post their prime operational use, and then seen it take years for the proper integration of such mods to be funded, never mind properly engineered, and seen the airframes continue on in use during that period in some form or another. Indeed I would argue in some cases that a generation passes and the signifcance of the issue then fades as important, particualry if chance has not lead to any major problems. The situation has always been complex, and at the heart of it there was has needed some good and well educated and experienced staff and leaders prepared to act in the best interests of the very flight safety and airworthiness of which we speak. Quite clearly, not enough of it has been happening.
Similarly, all operational risks that are taken to pursue victory need to be fully understood by all those involved, and when at an extreme, provide enough leeway for dissent and volunteering. Most don't appreciate for example, that all RAF SAR winchmen are volunteers, however airworthy the platform and winch system and its associated kit. No, any operational risks taken should and must be confined to their specific context and then not run on (in ignorance or due to financial stringency) when the neccessity to take such risks is gone. Many of us have been part of an organisation that has avoided doing precisely that over the last 3 decades. How many of us for example have been part of debates about UOR mod continuance post their prime operational use, and then seen it take years for the proper integration of such mods to be funded, never mind properly engineered, and seen the airframes continue on in use during that period in some form or another. Indeed I would argue in some cases that a generation passes and the signifcance of the issue then fades as important, particualry if chance has not lead to any major problems. The situation has always been complex, and at the heart of it there was has needed some good and well educated and experienced staff and leaders prepared to act in the best interests of the very flight safety and airworthiness of which we speak. Quite clearly, not enough of it has been happening.
Last edited by Tallsar; 8th Jul 2010 at 22:04.
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Well said all.
For those who think that maintaining AW and FFP will inhibit our operational efficiency, I say this:
We have so few assets these days, that the loss of one ac (Herc, Nimrod or Sea King Mk7) due a lack of AW/FFP often represents a huge reduction of in-theatre capability - NOT ensuring our ac are safe and airworthy is doing the enemy's job for him.
However, as a former military, operational, in-theatre commander, I am very cognisant of the fact that sometimes, when lives on the ground are at risk, we need to say occasionally 'just go and do it'. However, this should be the exception and not the rule and those who do 'go sausage side with their fingers crossed' must do so armed with all the reasons why and all their ac's limitations known. Sadly, what has become the norm is that no-one knows that the ac have serious limitations and risks because no-one has done a rigorous threat assessment of them. Senior commanders who fail explain the whys and wherefores or accept the risks people take on their behalf are the lowest of the low.
ps Tallsar - When I last mentioned that the Puma engine/RPM droop probs could be construed as not meeting the Def Stans and so were unairworthy, I was shot down by Puma pilots who said they got taught how to prevent this. What they seemed to miss was the fact, rightly or wrongly, was that the MoD's risk mitigation was 'loads of trg and flying experience' that allowed pilots to be aware of the risks. Pilots don't get the hours and extensive trg these days (so I'm told) which thereby undermines the mitigations and so the AW of the Puma is in question (if it wasn't already).
F
For those who think that maintaining AW and FFP will inhibit our operational efficiency, I say this:
We have so few assets these days, that the loss of one ac (Herc, Nimrod or Sea King Mk7) due a lack of AW/FFP often represents a huge reduction of in-theatre capability - NOT ensuring our ac are safe and airworthy is doing the enemy's job for him.
However, as a former military, operational, in-theatre commander, I am very cognisant of the fact that sometimes, when lives on the ground are at risk, we need to say occasionally 'just go and do it'. However, this should be the exception and not the rule and those who do 'go sausage side with their fingers crossed' must do so armed with all the reasons why and all their ac's limitations known. Sadly, what has become the norm is that no-one knows that the ac have serious limitations and risks because no-one has done a rigorous threat assessment of them. Senior commanders who fail explain the whys and wherefores or accept the risks people take on their behalf are the lowest of the low.
ps Tallsar - When I last mentioned that the Puma engine/RPM droop probs could be construed as not meeting the Def Stans and so were unairworthy, I was shot down by Puma pilots who said they got taught how to prevent this. What they seemed to miss was the fact, rightly or wrongly, was that the MoD's risk mitigation was 'loads of trg and flying experience' that allowed pilots to be aware of the risks. Pilots don't get the hours and extensive trg these days (so I'm told) which thereby undermines the mitigations and so the AW of the Puma is in question (if it wasn't already).
F
Sorry Rigga, I missed your post.
Fully agree. What I have consistently said is that MoD do the "attaining airworthiness" reasonably well - but have largely ignored the "maintaining airworthiness". So important is it to understand the two they have different chapters in JSP553. When I say funding has been slashed over the years, it is primarily in the "maintaining" of airworthiness. But, as 80% of through life costs fall in this area, it is rather important.
To add to your second statement, there is a requirement to upissue the Safety Case at every such change in use or design, but this is almost totally ignored - for the same reasons, funding cuts. In the beginning, people complained, but in time this became the norm and most are no longer taught this basic discipline so don't know to ask the question.
I know what some will think- that sod Tuc bangs on about Chinook HC Mk2 and he's just said we attain airworthiness very well. But, the Mk2, like Nimrod MRA4, was in configuration control terms a simple modification to the Mk1. It is not a new aircraft in that sense, with a new Safety Case and RTS to be developed. It is a legacy aircraft with an extant Safety Case and RTS, which must be valid and verifiable at the Induction Build Standard. They form the contractual baseline. That is where MoD fell down on both programmes (and, conversely, why other similar programmes succeed effortlessly). And it is why Haddon-Cave was wrong to praise the Nimrod 2000/RMPA/MRA4 IPT leader, as a crucial part of his job was to be continually satisfied that the aircraft being inducted into his programme, the MR2, was airworthy. It wasn't, and one wonders what he said about this, or if he even knew. (His 2 Star did - he was happy for configuration control to be ignored).
From that RTS point onwards there is a need to maintain "Continued Airworthiness" which is not just 'airworthiness' but the full and proper enactment of ALL the processes required to maintain the designed purpose of the aircraft - and not just Fitness For Purpose
This means that even if the aircraft has a role change it should still meet (or exceed) its new designed purpose.
This means that even if the aircraft has a role change it should still meet (or exceed) its new designed purpose.
To add to your second statement, there is a requirement to upissue the Safety Case at every such change in use or design, but this is almost totally ignored - for the same reasons, funding cuts. In the beginning, people complained, but in time this became the norm and most are no longer taught this basic discipline so don't know to ask the question.
I know what some will think- that sod Tuc bangs on about Chinook HC Mk2 and he's just said we attain airworthiness very well. But, the Mk2, like Nimrod MRA4, was in configuration control terms a simple modification to the Mk1. It is not a new aircraft in that sense, with a new Safety Case and RTS to be developed. It is a legacy aircraft with an extant Safety Case and RTS, which must be valid and verifiable at the Induction Build Standard. They form the contractual baseline. That is where MoD fell down on both programmes (and, conversely, why other similar programmes succeed effortlessly). And it is why Haddon-Cave was wrong to praise the Nimrod 2000/RMPA/MRA4 IPT leader, as a crucial part of his job was to be continually satisfied that the aircraft being inducted into his programme, the MR2, was airworthy. It wasn't, and one wonders what he said about this, or if he even knew. (His 2 Star did - he was happy for configuration control to be ignored).