Chinook - Still Hitting Back 3 (Merged)
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BOAC
If that barb was aimed at me then I suggest you read my post again; I did not say anything about taking "extra care". My point was that one should always refuse to give in to pressure from VIP Passengers which would involve "bending the rules" to achieve the task. Its always better to arrive a day late than not at all!!
If that barb was aimed at me then I suggest you read my post again; I did not say anything about taking "extra care". My point was that one should always refuse to give in to pressure from VIP Passengers which would involve "bending the rules" to achieve the task. Its always better to arrive a day late than not at all!!
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Cazatou
John Blakeley and Dalek have made most of the points that I would have retorted, but I'd like to pick on your assertion.....
.... I regret that your words are a nonsense. Forecast weather is exactly that and the actual weather may or may not bear any resemblance to it. I think it is relevant that Mr Holbrook could see as much as he describes from a few feet above the water and it is unlikely that the Chinook crew would have seen less than the yachtsman. It is ridiculous to state that "IFR flight would have been necessary" and even more ridiculous to reach the conclusion that the pilots were attempting to fly VFR in IMC - the logic fails! I do, however, find it amusing that you were.....
......yet quote several paragraph references to me, or are you attempting irony?
Rgds,
MB
John Blakeley and Dalek have made most of the points that I would have retorted, but I'd like to pick on your assertion.....
the forecast weather clearly showed that Flight in accordance with IFR would have been necessary in the vicinity of the Mull of Kintyre - the Pilots did not fly the aircraft in accordance with that requirement and crashed whilst attempting to fly VFR in IMC.
concientious enough not to bring a copy of the BOI to France with me when we moved here
Rgds,
MB
Flight in accordance with IFR would have been necessary in the vicinity of the Mull of Kintyre - the Pilots did not fly the aircraft in accordance with that requirement and crashed whilst attempting to fly VFR in IMC.
Incidentally, whilst flight under IFR is, of course, mandatory in IMC, flight under IFR may be flown in VMC. But flight under VFR must always be flown in VMC as appropriate to the category of airspace and the altitude and IAS of the aircraft.
tuc - brave to mention the B-word
. Large gin and tonic, thanks! As regards Glen Ogle, I don't think that the full facts will be made available for many a long day. Those who know, know why.......
"Stitch that......."
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Yes, Caz - it was 'aimed' at you because your post SHOULD have said
"the greatest attribute any Pilot .........can have is the ability to say NO."
I assume we come from different worlds.
Now - the 'B' word - moving on nicely!
"the greatest attribute any Pilot .........can have is the ability to say NO."
I assume we come from different worlds.
Now - the 'B' word - moving on nicely!
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Hahaha! Questions got a bit too tricky to answer, Cazatou? If you go now you leave several from within the last few posts unanswered and yourself looking, frankly, ridiculous! Come on now - face up to the debate you just mentioned. 
Avoid imitations
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Don't fret, I'm sure Cazatou will be back.
He sometimes leaves the debate for a while when awkward questions are asked of him. He then returns when sufficient time has elapsed for the question to disappear from the forefront.
For example, he has repeatedly refused to answer my question about the level of his personal SH experience (at least three or four times). He uses the same tactic.
He sometimes leaves the debate for a while when awkward questions are asked of him. He then returns when sufficient time has elapsed for the question to disappear from the forefront.
For example, he has repeatedly refused to answer my question about the level of his personal SH experience (at least three or four times). He uses the same tactic.
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John Blakeley
An excellent, informative, and timely post - at the very least, you have put to bed two important basic factors pertaining to this flight: the speed and the weather.
Firstly the speed: your quote supports Boeing's ("Analysis...", not simulation) such that it was appropriate for an HC2 cruising and not "hurried"/etc;
Secondly, the yachtsman's fuller account of the weather confirms what I have tried to describe as being typical in those conditions - specifically, in his description of how the lighthouse appeared, that the colour of the ground could be seen through the ground hugging mist that ran up the slopes beneath the base of the local orographic cloud.
It was not a case of their being lost in IMC but simply that range from the landmass would have been very difficult to estimate visually. The only way this could have affected their flight was if they had a reason to approach the Mull closely. Certainly, if they merely were passing by the Mull on their "ferry" flight, the position where they changed the waypoint was already too close in in those conditions given the (in)accuracy of the STANS unless they had some other reference.
Boeing's analysis made an important point regarding their altitude on the final leg (waypoint change to the crash site) and that was the higher value was consistent with their not having climbed at all until the last seconds; given that they had started to slow down and that their course (and actual track) of 035 was the ideal line to that LZ (I have described previously in detail), together with the other parameters I have previously mentioned pointing to a close approach or landing to that LZ, it seems reasonable to assume that they thought their actual track was taking them over that LZ. Had they been a little further out than they actually were, their speed would have been lower when they crossed the shoreline giving them more climbing ability if required - more crucially, had their track been over the LZ and they had been at the higher of the range of altitudes (as per Boeing'a analysis) their approach, even in those conditions, would have been safe as (if you study the topography along this track) they had a nice clear waveoff option just veering off to the left if they could not make out the LZ - this was not an option on their actual track.
I have made the point previously that the approach to the Mull was an excursion from a safe, preplanned route that they were intending to return to and this (with other suporting parameters) indicates a deliberate exercise - that they would attempt an approach to that LZ in those conditions without a local reference beggars belief - a local reference that should have been at the LZ but was 1/2 mile up the slope explains everything that is known about this flight.
At the very least, discounting consideration of any such local reference, if they had been deliberately approaching that LZ (for whatever reason), and it was known to the heirachy that this was their intention, then the crash could be seen as an error of judgement as opposed to gross negligence as this finding would have been based on false assumptions.
An excellent, informative, and timely post - at the very least, you have put to bed two important basic factors pertaining to this flight: the speed and the weather.
Firstly the speed: your quote supports Boeing's ("Analysis...", not simulation) such that it was appropriate for an HC2 cruising and not "hurried"/etc;
Secondly, the yachtsman's fuller account of the weather confirms what I have tried to describe as being typical in those conditions - specifically, in his description of how the lighthouse appeared, that the colour of the ground could be seen through the ground hugging mist that ran up the slopes beneath the base of the local orographic cloud.
It was not a case of their being lost in IMC but simply that range from the landmass would have been very difficult to estimate visually. The only way this could have affected their flight was if they had a reason to approach the Mull closely. Certainly, if they merely were passing by the Mull on their "ferry" flight, the position where they changed the waypoint was already too close in in those conditions given the (in)accuracy of the STANS unless they had some other reference.
Boeing's analysis made an important point regarding their altitude on the final leg (waypoint change to the crash site) and that was the higher value was consistent with their not having climbed at all until the last seconds; given that they had started to slow down and that their course (and actual track) of 035 was the ideal line to that LZ (I have described previously in detail), together with the other parameters I have previously mentioned pointing to a close approach or landing to that LZ, it seems reasonable to assume that they thought their actual track was taking them over that LZ. Had they been a little further out than they actually were, their speed would have been lower when they crossed the shoreline giving them more climbing ability if required - more crucially, had their track been over the LZ and they had been at the higher of the range of altitudes (as per Boeing'a analysis) their approach, even in those conditions, would have been safe as (if you study the topography along this track) they had a nice clear waveoff option just veering off to the left if they could not make out the LZ - this was not an option on their actual track.
I have made the point previously that the approach to the Mull was an excursion from a safe, preplanned route that they were intending to return to and this (with other suporting parameters) indicates a deliberate exercise - that they would attempt an approach to that LZ in those conditions without a local reference beggars belief - a local reference that should have been at the LZ but was 1/2 mile up the slope explains everything that is known about this flight.
At the very least, discounting consideration of any such local reference, if they had been deliberately approaching that LZ (for whatever reason), and it was known to the heirachy that this was their intention, then the crash could be seen as an error of judgement as opposed to gross negligence as this finding would have been based on false assumptions.
Last edited by walter kennedy; 16th Oct 2009 at 02:52. Reason: addition
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ShyTorque
Yes, I've noticed. Others have employed the same tactic too. Shame really, as Cazatou has made worthwhile contributions in the past and he was seemingly in the Flt Safety chain at the time. Shame he doesn't seem able to see the wood for the trees.
Roll on the next Government!
Yes, I've noticed. Others have employed the same tactic too. Shame really, as Cazatou has made worthwhile contributions in the past and he was seemingly in the Flt Safety chain at the time. Shame he doesn't seem able to see the wood for the trees.
Roll on the next Government!
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Caz, like all of us, has a right to his opinions but I would agree that he appears to be quite blinkered and flustered when John Blakeley and others make reasoned arguments to undermine the theories on which his opinion seems based. The same happens when others create enormous amounts of doubt which undermine the 'without any doubt whatsoever' basis of findings of the BoI vs QRs and AP3207.
But Caz is not alone in this; when faced with these obstacles, the higher levels of MoD, including the ROs, keep repeating the old mantra of 'too low, too fast, in IMC' - the same old tosh. Well, JB keeps dismantling that asertion - neither too low, too fast, nor IMC.....probably! And because of that last word, there exists doubt.
I would just like to add that the MoD, in 2004, accepted in writing, the fact that no-one knows to what extent the cloud projected out to sea, if at all.
are the exact words they used.
This is further backed up by the more thorough appreciation of Mr Holbrook's testimony taken at the FAI and the HoL - that he could make out the shape and position of the Mull by the fact that it (and another nearby island) had localised cloud hugging their contours and likewise, the crew of ZD576 - probably even more clearly.
This evidence has been rigorously scrutinised and has been taken as more reliable than Mr H's initial short statement used by the BoI.
The following pic has been used before to indicate the likely up-slope stratus.
If Mr H is correct in this, then the crew would almost certainly have known their position relative to the Mull. This is so very unlike the rather pitiful diagrams used by the Air Marshalls at the HoL. So, in one fell swoop, the arguments of the ROs (and Caz) are on far-from-solid ground.
In turn, this creates the question 'then why didn't turn away from the shrouded hills?'
Well, that question has many possible answers - all of which have been done to death on this forum, including Walt's off-beat idea of an LZ. However, even this is a possibility, however remote.
Also Caz, I accept that CFIT (and going IMC a second or two before the impact) is another such possible answer but we just don't know . And, If we don't know for sure (as in Glen Ogle (with a CVR/FDR) then, surely, doubt MUST exist and the ONLY possible conclusion is 'not positively determined', irrespective of the RO's, your or my opinions that are not based on the accepted facts.
respectfully,
flipster
But Caz is not alone in this; when faced with these obstacles, the higher levels of MoD, including the ROs, keep repeating the old mantra of 'too low, too fast, in IMC' - the same old tosh. Well, JB keeps dismantling that asertion - neither too low, too fast, nor IMC.....probably! And because of that last word, there exists doubt.
I would just like to add that the MoD, in 2004, accepted in writing, the fact that no-one knows to what extent the cloud projected out to sea, if at all.
Unfortunately, we are not able to say, even approximately, how far the cloud extended over the sea.
This is further backed up by the more thorough appreciation of Mr Holbrook's testimony taken at the FAI and the HoL - that he could make out the shape and position of the Mull by the fact that it (and another nearby island) had localised cloud hugging their contours and likewise, the crew of ZD576 - probably even more clearly.
This evidence has been rigorously scrutinised and has been taken as more reliable than Mr H's initial short statement used by the BoI.
The following pic has been used before to indicate the likely up-slope stratus.
If Mr H is correct in this, then the crew would almost certainly have known their position relative to the Mull. This is so very unlike the rather pitiful diagrams used by the Air Marshalls at the HoL. So, in one fell swoop, the arguments of the ROs (and Caz) are on far-from-solid ground.
In turn, this creates the question 'then why didn't turn away from the shrouded hills?'
Well, that question has many possible answers - all of which have been done to death on this forum, including Walt's off-beat idea of an LZ. However, even this is a possibility, however remote.
Also Caz, I accept that CFIT (and going IMC a second or two before the impact) is another such possible answer but we just don't know . And, If we don't know for sure (as in Glen Ogle (with a CVR/FDR) then, surely, doubt MUST exist and the ONLY possible conclusion is 'not positively determined', irrespective of the RO's, your or my opinions that are not based on the accepted facts.
respectfully,
flipster
From JB's excellent Post 5751, the Board stated in regard to ENG FAIL captions:
(my bold
If Walter's LZ was in regular use at that time, would it not have been considered for an emergency landing in the event of ENG FAIL captions?
If it was in regular use,
1. why did the BoI not refer to it? Does it mean that the LZ was not in use at that time?
2. would it explain why the heading bug was set to 035, i.e. straight towards it?
I know that military pilots are much more highly trained and practiced in dealing with emergencies than we PPLs but I am sure that, faced with the real possibility of a re-ocurrence of one of the frightening events which had already been experienced on the Mk2, we would share an overwhelming desire to be on the ground contemplating alternative ways of earning a living. Surely. they would have tried to get to the LZ, if it existed.
Had such an indication occurred it would have caused crew considerable concern particularly as they were over the water with no obvious area for an emergency landing.
If Walter's LZ was in regular use at that time, would it not have been considered for an emergency landing in the event of ENG FAIL captions?
If it was in regular use,
1. why did the BoI not refer to it? Does it mean that the LZ was not in use at that time?
2. would it explain why the heading bug was set to 035, i.e. straight towards it?
I know that military pilots are much more highly trained and practiced in dealing with emergencies than we PPLs but I am sure that, faced with the real possibility of a re-ocurrence of one of the frightening events which had already been experienced on the Mk2, we would share an overwhelming desire to be on the ground contemplating alternative ways of earning a living. Surely. they would have tried to get to the LZ, if it existed.
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Apparently, HQ 1 Gp kept a list of 'approved' LZs - I'm sure it would be mentioned - would anyone care to illuminate this? However, the speed of the ac at impact would preclude such an idea (too fast for approach/landing).... unless they had an engine problem. Of course, we don't know, either way.
BTW, Chinook experts tell me that the engine indications found by the AAIB only tell us that the engines had stopped and run down in the same way. In no way does this tell us what the engines were doing beforehand. Anyone who states that the engines were 'fully serviceable' is guessing.
BTW, Chinook experts tell me that the engine indications found by the AAIB only tell us that the engines had stopped and run down in the same way. In no way does this tell us what the engines were doing beforehand. Anyone who states that the engines were 'fully serviceable' is guessing.
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Flipster
<<The following pic has been used before to indicate the likely up-slope stratus. >>
While I applaud you making an effort to understand the weather I think I need to correct you here: the picture you posted was taken by me and I either posted it directly ontio the thread or (more likely) posted a link to it; it was NOT intended to illustrate up-slope stratus at all it was taken in conditions of high humidity and an on-shore wind but the wind was GENTLE and did not develop a faster, compressed layer following the ground this picture was of the local orographic cloud caused by a bulk of air being pushed up until it reached its dew point not dependent upon wind speed at all.
This is what would have been existent above about 800 ft at the time of the crash (from various accounts) and would have been the local cloud base on the Mull and extending out to sea as per the photo you posted.
I did post a link to a movie clip I took on another occasion when there was a stronger on-shore wind (but still less than that on the day of the crash) a movie better describes the nature of that thin, ground hugging mist that forms when the lower layer of air is compressed, speeds up, and thus reaches its dew point well before the bulk of the air mass and so starts well below the orographic cloud the movie best shows its intermittent (with varying turbulence over irregular slope) nature and you can see that it does follow the ground and is of limited thickness. I'll try and put a link here
[url="http://www.pprune.org/%5BURL=http://s229.photobucket.com/albums/ee134/grauniad/?action=view¤t=DSCF0414.flv%5D"]
This would have been what veiled the slopes below the solid orographic cloud that day but thicker (stronger wind and summer evening).
Here is a still shot from the north I took one evening that shows the up-slope mist in profile from a distance
http://i229.photobucket.com/albums/e...d/d00eae69.jpg
Really, these conditions are very common up there as I have said before, anyone interested in this case should spend a day or so up there in Summer.
<<The following pic has been used before to indicate the likely up-slope stratus. >>
While I applaud you making an effort to understand the weather I think I need to correct you here: the picture you posted was taken by me and I either posted it directly ontio the thread or (more likely) posted a link to it; it was NOT intended to illustrate up-slope stratus at all it was taken in conditions of high humidity and an on-shore wind but the wind was GENTLE and did not develop a faster, compressed layer following the ground this picture was of the local orographic cloud caused by a bulk of air being pushed up until it reached its dew point not dependent upon wind speed at all.
This is what would have been existent above about 800 ft at the time of the crash (from various accounts) and would have been the local cloud base on the Mull and extending out to sea as per the photo you posted.
I did post a link to a movie clip I took on another occasion when there was a stronger on-shore wind (but still less than that on the day of the crash) a movie better describes the nature of that thin, ground hugging mist that forms when the lower layer of air is compressed, speeds up, and thus reaches its dew point well before the bulk of the air mass and so starts well below the orographic cloud the movie best shows its intermittent (with varying turbulence over irregular slope) nature and you can see that it does follow the ground and is of limited thickness. I'll try and put a link here
[url="http://www.pprune.org/%5BURL=http://s229.photobucket.com/albums/ee134/grauniad/?action=view¤t=DSCF0414.flv%5D"]
This would have been what veiled the slopes below the solid orographic cloud that day but thicker (stronger wind and summer evening).
Here is a still shot from the north I took one evening that shows the up-slope mist in profile from a distance
http://i229.photobucket.com/albums/e...d/d00eae69.jpg
Really, these conditions are very common up there as I have said before, anyone interested in this case should spend a day or so up there in Summer.
Last edited by walter kennedy; 16th Oct 2009 at 23:06. Reason: correction
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flipster
<<Apparently, HQ 1 Gp kept a list of 'approved' LZs - I'm sure it would be mentioned ...>> Whether mentioned or not, several sources had it that Chinooks (let alone other mil helos) had landed there on previous occassions.
<<However, the speed of the ac at impact would preclude such an idea (too fast for approach/landing)....>> er, but they may have thought they were further away and may have intended just a low pass they had started to slow down (in terms of TAS from dist/time calcs by Boeing) and when they want to these beasts can slow down real quick (have you not seen their agility at airshows?) - that is to say, they don't need much room to slow down and, as I have pointed out, had their track been over the LZ they would have had a simple wave-off option.
<<BTW, Chinook experts tell me that the engine indications found by the AAIB only tell us that the engines had stopped and run down in the same way. In no way does this tell us what the engines were doing beforehand. Anyone who states that the engines were 'fully serviceable' is guessing.>> There is also the testimony of one of the lighthouse keepers which had it that the engines had not noticeably varied on their approach to the impact point (the human ear is very good at discerning changes in pitch etc). Just picking away, are you?
Still none of you will ask around about the system I have suggested nor have you attempted to address the possibility that they had been misled as to the position of a known LZ that they crashed so close to whilst apparently on the best line to it and with an appropriate QFE for approaching it and with a RADALT warning set appropriately for an imminent landing. Do you not have an obligation to those on board that day to at least consider such a scenario? - just in case?
<<Apparently, HQ 1 Gp kept a list of 'approved' LZs - I'm sure it would be mentioned ...>> Whether mentioned or not, several sources had it that Chinooks (let alone other mil helos) had landed there on previous occassions.
<<However, the speed of the ac at impact would preclude such an idea (too fast for approach/landing)....>> er, but they may have thought they were further away and may have intended just a low pass they had started to slow down (in terms of TAS from dist/time calcs by Boeing) and when they want to these beasts can slow down real quick (have you not seen their agility at airshows?) - that is to say, they don't need much room to slow down and, as I have pointed out, had their track been over the LZ they would have had a simple wave-off option.
<<BTW, Chinook experts tell me that the engine indications found by the AAIB only tell us that the engines had stopped and run down in the same way. In no way does this tell us what the engines were doing beforehand. Anyone who states that the engines were 'fully serviceable' is guessing.>> There is also the testimony of one of the lighthouse keepers which had it that the engines had not noticeably varied on their approach to the impact point (the human ear is very good at discerning changes in pitch etc). Just picking away, are you?
Still none of you will ask around about the system I have suggested nor have you attempted to address the possibility that they had been misled as to the position of a known LZ that they crashed so close to whilst apparently on the best line to it and with an appropriate QFE for approaching it and with a RADALT warning set appropriately for an imminent landing. Do you not have an obligation to those on board that day to at least consider such a scenario? - just in case?
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Walt,
I think your vid is good, except that on the day of the crash, the cloud base would have been low enough to almost engulf the whole lighthouse, in what is commonly known as "30 kt fog" and this cloud base was perfectly 'legal' for low-level in a helo. Whether the cloud was caused by a 5kt wind or a 30kt wind, it doesn't matter, it was still up-slope stratus that was caused by moist, saturated air being cooled by forced convection - so my basic met tells me.
Anyway, I think we are saying the same thing about the wx, as have many others; that it was not as bad as the Caz and the ROs say (and now confirmed by the MoD)!
To reaffirm; no-one knows whether the ac was IMC either 1-2 nm before the crash site (if so, then the ROs might have a point ) or a few tens of metres just before they hit the cliff. However, the picture painted in words by Mr H suggests it was nearer the latter. That being the case, the crew would have known how close they were to the Mull and very probably they knew what was coming next - but for some unknown reason, they didn't or couldn't take avoiding action.
The trouble is that we will never know the reason why ZD576 did not fly left away from the Mull; and that, to my mind, creates a large element doubt, especially after being allowed a closer inspection of the facts which was denied the original BoI.
Sorry, but I don't quite buy your SF LZ theory (too many SH people have said that it doesn't fit) but I freely admit is not impossible - especially if the ac had a problem and the crew had thought about the LZ for an emergency landing. Anyway, I don't believe that ZD576 had a CPLS-type receiver fitted!
But as I said, we are all guessing.....but also creating doubt. If its any consolation Walt, your LZ theory has more credence than the 'low rate of climb' suggestion that the BOI came up with - SH drivers seem united in their condemnation of that, especially after the first Boeing 'guessimation' was proved a load of codswallop.
flipster
I think your vid is good, except that on the day of the crash, the cloud base would have been low enough to almost engulf the whole lighthouse, in what is commonly known as "30 kt fog" and this cloud base was perfectly 'legal' for low-level in a helo. Whether the cloud was caused by a 5kt wind or a 30kt wind, it doesn't matter, it was still up-slope stratus that was caused by moist, saturated air being cooled by forced convection - so my basic met tells me.
Anyway, I think we are saying the same thing about the wx, as have many others; that it was not as bad as the Caz and the ROs say (and now confirmed by the MoD)!
To reaffirm; no-one knows whether the ac was IMC either 1-2 nm before the crash site (if so, then the ROs might have a point ) or a few tens of metres just before they hit the cliff. However, the picture painted in words by Mr H suggests it was nearer the latter. That being the case, the crew would have known how close they were to the Mull and very probably they knew what was coming next - but for some unknown reason, they didn't or couldn't take avoiding action.
The trouble is that we will never know the reason why ZD576 did not fly left away from the Mull; and that, to my mind, creates a large element doubt, especially after being allowed a closer inspection of the facts which was denied the original BoI.
Sorry, but I don't quite buy your SF LZ theory (too many SH people have said that it doesn't fit) but I freely admit is not impossible - especially if the ac had a problem and the crew had thought about the LZ for an emergency landing. Anyway, I don't believe that ZD576 had a CPLS-type receiver fitted!
But as I said, we are all guessing.....but also creating doubt. If its any consolation Walt, your LZ theory has more credence than the 'low rate of climb' suggestion that the BOI came up with - SH drivers seem united in their condemnation of that, especially after the first Boeing 'guessimation' was proved a load of codswallop.
flipster
flipster:
If facts were denied the original BoI they were denied those facts by themselves alone. No-one could have prevented them calling Sqn Ldr Burke, the Odiham TP, for a start. Of course that might have enraged others further up the CoC and have a detrimental effect on career patterns, but all such facts could have been exposed to them should they have so chosen. They did not chose to do so, the Accident Investigation was a farce and is an indictment of that BoI, the AOC, the AOC-in-C, and the RAF. That is why this thread just runs and runs and will continue to do so until the injustice done to the memory of two junior officers is reversed. The more important point is that while Military Air Accident Investigation is done by the operator we can have little or no confidence in it. It must be removed to an independent MAAIB, as must Military Airworthiness Regulation be removed from the MOD to an MAA.
Self Regulation does not work and in Aviation it Kills!
The trouble is that we will never know the reason why ZD576 did not fly left away from the Mull; and that, to my mind, creates a large element doubt, especially after being allowed a closer inspection of the facts which was denied the original BoI.
Self Regulation does not work and in Aviation it Kills!
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I am always amazed that BoIs before the Mull are generally accepted by the military fraternity. If the Mull BoI was flawed it must surely be as a result of the failure to seek information by the President. Perhaps he might be asked for his views again - MOD already have them I am certain.
Perhaps the AMs have a different view? Doubt it but why not ask them - MOD probably have already. But why not listen to the arguments for a change?
All this ranting and raving has got you all precisely nowhere in the last 15 years.
And if you think Cameron will help you really need to read the rider he put in his response. Politicians always use a get out clause.
Best regards
AC
Perhaps the AMs have a different view? Doubt it but why not ask them - MOD probably have already. But why not listen to the arguments for a change?
All this ranting and raving has got you all precisely nowhere in the last 15 years.
And if you think Cameron will help you really need to read the rider he put in his response. Politicians always use a get out clause.
Best regards
AC
Per Ardua ad Astraeus
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If the Mull BoI was flawed it must surely be as a result of the failure to seek information by the President
Join Date: Nov 2005
Location: Norfolk England
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Rants and Raves
AC,
Whilst I would agree with your last paragraph - do any of us trust any politician's promises these days, I am afraid that your other comments are way "off beam". The arguments, not "rants and raves" have been put forward at all levels and in the case of the Sherriff's FAI, the HCDC, an independent RAeS Pilot's Inquiry, the HofL etc MoD's response has either not been accepted by very emminent authorities or in some cases has not been provided. The latest "rejected" submission to MoD on behalf of the Mull Group was led by a very respected QC - hardly a "rant and rave"!
Having written an analysis of the Airworthiness and Engineering aspects of the BoI for the Tapper family some 6 years ago now, and which was a very long way from being a "rant and rave", I have offered to meet with the MoD to discuss the arguments, but their only response so far has been to say "there is no new evidence" - not true any more given the documentation etc that we now have from places like Boscombe Down which was not made available to the BoI - and even more importantly taking no account of the failure of the BoI to follow up the evidence it did have available - the original basis of my arguments. Following a personal approach from him which questioned my position I also wrote to the Senior Reviewing Officer with a proposal to have a meeting to discuss my report and my differing views - needless to say my "offer" has not been taken up.
At the end of the day, as most "non ranting and raving" contributors keep pointing out, this thread is not about the "impossible" task of finding the cause of the accident - it is about justice, and hence the injustice of a finding of "Gross Negligence" based on an indequate, and in my view illogical, BoI and, even worse, unsubstantiated speculation. If this was anything but a MoD BoI that the system originally never intended to have see "the light of day" the Courts would, I suggest, long ago have thrown out this finding. Indeed, given that one member of the HofL Select Committee was an Appeal Court judge, one could argue that they have. And then you have to wonder why MoD somehow sees itself as outside the process of ensuring that justice prevails - something which with some 31 years of RAF Service, I would have hoped might be at the very core of their ethos.
JB
Whilst I would agree with your last paragraph - do any of us trust any politician's promises these days, I am afraid that your other comments are way "off beam". The arguments, not "rants and raves" have been put forward at all levels and in the case of the Sherriff's FAI, the HCDC, an independent RAeS Pilot's Inquiry, the HofL etc MoD's response has either not been accepted by very emminent authorities or in some cases has not been provided. The latest "rejected" submission to MoD on behalf of the Mull Group was led by a very respected QC - hardly a "rant and rave"!
Having written an analysis of the Airworthiness and Engineering aspects of the BoI for the Tapper family some 6 years ago now, and which was a very long way from being a "rant and rave", I have offered to meet with the MoD to discuss the arguments, but their only response so far has been to say "there is no new evidence" - not true any more given the documentation etc that we now have from places like Boscombe Down which was not made available to the BoI - and even more importantly taking no account of the failure of the BoI to follow up the evidence it did have available - the original basis of my arguments. Following a personal approach from him which questioned my position I also wrote to the Senior Reviewing Officer with a proposal to have a meeting to discuss my report and my differing views - needless to say my "offer" has not been taken up.
At the end of the day, as most "non ranting and raving" contributors keep pointing out, this thread is not about the "impossible" task of finding the cause of the accident - it is about justice, and hence the injustice of a finding of "Gross Negligence" based on an indequate, and in my view illogical, BoI and, even worse, unsubstantiated speculation. If this was anything but a MoD BoI that the system originally never intended to have see "the light of day" the Courts would, I suggest, long ago have thrown out this finding. Indeed, given that one member of the HofL Select Committee was an Appeal Court judge, one could argue that they have. And then you have to wonder why MoD somehow sees itself as outside the process of ensuring that justice prevails - something which with some 31 years of RAF Service, I would have hoped might be at the very core of their ethos.
JB
Last edited by John Blakeley; 19th Oct 2009 at 13:35.