Chinook - Still Hitting Back 3 (Merged)
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CHINOOK
Uncle Peter, I entirely agree that we shall never know WHY they did not turm away, but the fact is that THEY DID NOT DO SO. I have offered my opinion, and I will not bore you with it here yet again, because it really does not matter WHY they pressed on, the fact is that they DID SO. Please forgive the capital letters; I wish only to emphasise the points that so many folk seem to misunderstand.
The most likely, and indeed the only plausible, explanation for the crew's pressing on towards that high ground is that they thought they would clear it with a cruise climb. Indeed the verdict of the original BofI was, I understand, that the crew ' selected an inappropriate rate of climb' over the high ground.
We shall never know what went on in the cockpit, and it does not matter; but we do know that the crew were at the controls as the aircraft headed towards the hills, when by all the rules they should not have done so. They should have turned away. Would you not have done so?
It really does not matter, in the slightest, WHY they decided to press on, but the fact is that they did so.
Sad but true, Regards John Purdey.
The most likely, and indeed the only plausible, explanation for the crew's pressing on towards that high ground is that they thought they would clear it with a cruise climb. Indeed the verdict of the original BofI was, I understand, that the crew ' selected an inappropriate rate of climb' over the high ground.
We shall never know what went on in the cockpit, and it does not matter; but we do know that the crew were at the controls as the aircraft headed towards the hills, when by all the rules they should not have done so. They should have turned away. Would you not have done so?
It really does not matter, in the slightest, WHY they decided to press on, but the fact is that they did so.
Sad but true, Regards John Purdey.
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Mr Purdey, the original verdict of the Board if Inquiry was:
In deciding which one of these three was the most probable cause, the Board could not avoid a degree of speculation. However, after careful consideration, the Board concluded that the most probable cause of the accident was that the crew selected an inappropriate ROC to safely overfly the Mull.
Whilst the Board's findings may, indeed, be accurate the fact that there is a degree of speculation, and this was one of three possible options considered, negates the absolutely no doubt whatsoever requirement.
Perhaps the crew were pressing on (your words) because there was a problem which required them to land immediately. As you are no doubt aware, helicopters require only their size in area to land, whereas a fixed wing aircraft needs a somewhat longer stretch of straight tarmac.
I know we've had many a discussion before, but I just feel that there are far too many unanswered questions and unknown variables for the verdict to be considered safe.
My best, as always.
Brian
"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook
In deciding which one of these three was the most probable cause, the Board could not avoid a degree of speculation. However, after careful consideration, the Board concluded that the most probable cause of the accident was that the crew selected an inappropriate ROC to safely overfly the Mull.
Whilst the Board's findings may, indeed, be accurate the fact that there is a degree of speculation, and this was one of three possible options considered, negates the absolutely no doubt whatsoever requirement.
Perhaps the crew were pressing on (your words) because there was a problem which required them to land immediately. As you are no doubt aware, helicopters require only their size in area to land, whereas a fixed wing aircraft needs a somewhat longer stretch of straight tarmac.
I know we've had many a discussion before, but I just feel that there are far too many unanswered questions and unknown variables for the verdict to be considered safe.
My best, as always.
Brian
"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook
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I will post another reply when I have a little more time. Particularly in response to K52's assertion that numerous rules had been broken at the time of the accident, and this alone constituted negligence!
K52, you know as well as all of us, that NO SUCH rules had been broken, and your tacky attempts to besmirch the crew's reputation, say more about the weakness of your case than any lack of professionalism on the part of the crew!
Don't make the mistake of so many others, who extend half truths, and snippets of information to build a 'FACTUAL' case! Leave that to the two discredited Air Marshalls!
Anybody interested in this case (on both sides of the argument) should read the book "LYING IN STATE" written by Tim Slessor, published by Aurum Press 2004.
In it, you will find, in my humble opinion, a quite superbly researched dissection of the Chinook 'affair.' I challenge ANYONE to find fault with it.
Including the details of the new simulation from Boeing (This time modelled on the CORRECT aircraft!!) which calls into question the entire notion that the crew had adopted a 'cruise climb!'
This simulation of course being the MAJOR basis for the entire hypothesis of CFIT
So much for SIMULATIONS!
Wonder if they've got it right this time?
K52
I see there is no requirement to respond ONCE AGAIN to your tacky and irrelevant assertions, first made on a previous thread of a similar name on 9 Feb 2002, and subsequently repeated on p47 of this thread on 19 Jun 2003.
Since I gave you a full reply on the same page the following day! Perhaps you should refresh your memory.
You failed to justify your allegations then, and I trust we can expect the same response this time!
Talk about covering old ground!
Brian, I really think there should be something on the campaign website about this book by Tim Slessor. It is very persuasive stuff!
cheers.
K52, you know as well as all of us, that NO SUCH rules had been broken, and your tacky attempts to besmirch the crew's reputation, say more about the weakness of your case than any lack of professionalism on the part of the crew!
Don't make the mistake of so many others, who extend half truths, and snippets of information to build a 'FACTUAL' case! Leave that to the two discredited Air Marshalls!
Anybody interested in this case (on both sides of the argument) should read the book "LYING IN STATE" written by Tim Slessor, published by Aurum Press 2004.
In it, you will find, in my humble opinion, a quite superbly researched dissection of the Chinook 'affair.' I challenge ANYONE to find fault with it.
Including the details of the new simulation from Boeing (This time modelled on the CORRECT aircraft!!) which calls into question the entire notion that the crew had adopted a 'cruise climb!'
This simulation of course being the MAJOR basis for the entire hypothesis of CFIT
So much for SIMULATIONS!
Wonder if they've got it right this time?
K52
I see there is no requirement to respond ONCE AGAIN to your tacky and irrelevant assertions, first made on a previous thread of a similar name on 9 Feb 2002, and subsequently repeated on p47 of this thread on 19 Jun 2003.
Since I gave you a full reply on the same page the following day! Perhaps you should refresh your memory.
You failed to justify your allegations then, and I trust we can expect the same response this time!
Talk about covering old ground!
Brian, I really think there should be something on the campaign website about this book by Tim Slessor. It is very persuasive stuff!
cheers.
Last edited by Tandemrotor; 2nd Aug 2004 at 14:30.
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CHINOOK
Brian Dixon. I appreciate your courteous response, but please say what uncertainties exist about the fact that this aircraft continued towards the hills when the rules of airmanship said that the crew should not do so. This fact was the negligence, nothing to do with why they did so.
And, to pre-empt another intervention from Ark Royal, if he will forgive me, I know those sinister slopes as well as most of us do. The mere thought of approaching them without being absolutely certain without any doubt whatsoever of one's exact postion gives me the heebie-jeebies.
This whole story now has more more smoke about it than Krackatoa, and more red herrings than a Soviet fishing fleet. But facts are facts.
Regards to all contributers. John Purdey.
And, to pre-empt another intervention from Ark Royal, if he will forgive me, I know those sinister slopes as well as most of us do. The mere thought of approaching them without being absolutely certain without any doubt whatsoever of one's exact postion gives me the heebie-jeebies.
This whole story now has more more smoke about it than Krackatoa, and more red herrings than a Soviet fishing fleet. But facts are facts.
Regards to all contributers. John Purdey.
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CHINOOK
Ark Royal.
Fact: the aircraft continued towards the cloud/mist/fog covered hills with this crew at the controls.
Fact: the rules said that the crew should have turned away.
Opinion: the aircraft was 500 yds plus to the right of the intended track, and thus was facing hills about 500 ft higher than expected.
What else is there to say?
Regards. John Purdey
Fact: the aircraft continued towards the cloud/mist/fog covered hills with this crew at the controls.
Fact: the rules said that the crew should have turned away.
Opinion: the aircraft was 500 yds plus to the right of the intended track, and thus was facing hills about 500 ft higher than expected.
What else is there to say?
Regards. John Purdey
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John Purdey
I hope you will take this response as courteous.
You talk of your hypothesis, as giving you the "heebie-jeebies"
Many of us on this thread (and in the world of SH, and SF ops) agree entirely with you! Our experience, and knowledge of helicopter operations, give us a different perspective to yourself, but essentially, we agree!
It is unthinkable!
Which is precisely why, knowing (and having flown with) the individuals involved we HAVE to consider ALL other options.
NO CREW would have relied so much on any navigation equipment, to have allowed a 500m error, to have meant the difference between life and death!!
The visual picture MUST have played a HUGE and CONVINCING part in the equation for any entry into IMC to have been volountary.
Of course, it may not have been volountary at all!
This is where the airworthiness of that particular aircraft, at THAT particular time can quite reasonably be brought into question! Circumstantial evidence (at least!) tells us CLEARLY that the Mk2 in general, and ZD576 specifically! was a heap of sh:t AT THAT TIME!!!
There is NO record of survivors, eye witnesses, recording equipment, radar traces, radio calls, NOTHING!
Just a smouldering heap of wreckage, and a dodgy MANUFACTURER'S simulation!!
WHY WEREN'T THESE PILOTS GIVEN THE BENEFIT OF THE DOUBT?
IT STINKS!
John, I will meet with you anywhere to talk. We do need to convince people like yourself. Tell me where it can happen, perhaps Brian may come too?
Take care, and thank you.
posted 29th July 2003 01:49
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k52
and had you been more familiar with this case, you would have been more accurate with your assertions!
From where were you quoting the assessment of their abilities?
Or did you just make it up?
.....Well K52, we are STILL waiting!
Sorry to raise this guys, but why do K52, and John Purdey, always seem to crop up together?
I hope you will take this response as courteous.
You talk of your hypothesis, as giving you the "heebie-jeebies"
Many of us on this thread (and in the world of SH, and SF ops) agree entirely with you! Our experience, and knowledge of helicopter operations, give us a different perspective to yourself, but essentially, we agree!
It is unthinkable!
Which is precisely why, knowing (and having flown with) the individuals involved we HAVE to consider ALL other options.
NO CREW would have relied so much on any navigation equipment, to have allowed a 500m error, to have meant the difference between life and death!!
The visual picture MUST have played a HUGE and CONVINCING part in the equation for any entry into IMC to have been volountary.
Of course, it may not have been volountary at all!
This is where the airworthiness of that particular aircraft, at THAT particular time can quite reasonably be brought into question! Circumstantial evidence (at least!) tells us CLEARLY that the Mk2 in general, and ZD576 specifically! was a heap of sh:t AT THAT TIME!!!
There is NO record of survivors, eye witnesses, recording equipment, radar traces, radio calls, NOTHING!
Just a smouldering heap of wreckage, and a dodgy MANUFACTURER'S simulation!!
WHY WEREN'T THESE PILOTS GIVEN THE BENEFIT OF THE DOUBT?
IT STINKS!
John, I will meet with you anywhere to talk. We do need to convince people like yourself. Tell me where it can happen, perhaps Brian may come too?
Take care, and thank you.
posted 29th July 2003 01:49
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
k52
and had you been more familiar with this case, you would have been more accurate with your assertions!
From where were you quoting the assessment of their abilities?
Or did you just make it up?
.....Well K52, we are STILL waiting!
Sorry to raise this guys, but why do K52, and John Purdey, always seem to crop up together?
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CHINOOK
Tandemrotor. Thanks for the courteous post. First, I promise you i have not the slightest idea who K52 might be; it seems to be just that both of us see it as a straightforward case of crew error.
I take your point about the importance of visual keys as one approaches those hills, but are you suggesting that misreading the terrain caused the crew to press on and that this is what led to the accident? If so, then it was still crew error.
I am not convinced by the suggestion that technical fault caused the crash, even if, as you say, this aircraft was a heap of s***. In that case, why did the crew accept it? (We have been round this particular bouy too many times before, but none of the the nine or so possible technical malfunctions that have been suggested along the way could possibly have caused the crew to press on towards those hills. If you believe that one of them could have done so, then please suggest how).
Thanks for the invitation to meet, but I cannot see what good would come of it (and by the way, my anonimity does not mean that I am Wratten, Day or MOD!! Regards John.
I take your point about the importance of visual keys as one approaches those hills, but are you suggesting that misreading the terrain caused the crew to press on and that this is what led to the accident? If so, then it was still crew error.
I am not convinced by the suggestion that technical fault caused the crash, even if, as you say, this aircraft was a heap of s***. In that case, why did the crew accept it? (We have been round this particular bouy too many times before, but none of the the nine or so possible technical malfunctions that have been suggested along the way could possibly have caused the crew to press on towards those hills. If you believe that one of them could have done so, then please suggest how).
Thanks for the invitation to meet, but I cannot see what good would come of it (and by the way, my anonimity does not mean that I am Wratten, Day or MOD!! Regards John.
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JP, Thank you for the information on your flying experience. Although I am an experienced aviator, I am not a helicopter expert. Your backgroung suggests you are not either. During my service career I have spent over six years as Station and unit FSO looking after a variety of aircraft, and sifting through countless incident and accident reports. It was never possible to be expert on all aspects of safety. I relied in most part on the advice of flying and technical experts. Now, go to p69 of this thread, open www.chinook-justice.org and read the report of JB consultancy, (Air Cdre Blakely) and see what he says about the technical investigation of the Board. If you are still in any doubt, look up the evidence given by Sqn Ldr Burke to the HOL committee. Are you so sure of yourself that you are prepared to disregard these two witnesses?
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Hi Mr Purdey,
May I start by saying that I don't believe that there are any uncertainties about the fact that the aircraft continued towards the hills when the rules of airmanship said that the crew should not do so. Aircraft should not hit the ground - I agree.
What my whole argument is about is that there may be mitigating circumstances why the accident occurred. There may have been an actual mechanical failure or control jam or there may have been an assumed emergency. It is because of these elements of doubt that the burden of proof for absolutely no doubt whatsoever is undermined. I hope the following information explains this particular paragraph.
Picking up on Tandemrotor's accurate description of ZD576, I invite you to look at the service history from the point of return to the UK after Mid-Life Update:
8 Apr 94 - Returned from Boeing. Experiences a FADEC problem.
21 Apr 94 - During a transition to hover the helicopter has a torque mismatch of 40%. No engine warning lights illuminate. Number one engine is replaced. (Cause was a faulty torquementer).
26 Apr 94 - Has a problem with engine control levers at the flight idle position. There was no torque indication to either engine and the number one engine ran high. Whole engine replaced again.
3 May 94 - GPS failed to operate.
5 May 94 - GPS failed to operate.
9 May 94 - No GPS feed to RNS252.
10 May 94 - A large spring detached from the collective lever. It was found that the bonding had failed to keep the spring in place. The engineering note stated that there was cause for concern with regards loose atricles within the flying control closet.
17 May 94 - Engine power warning light illuminates three times. Engine temperature also goes beyond its normal level. As a result, part of the FADEC system is returned to the USA for investigation. The engine is stripped and rebuilt.
18 May 94 - Number one ECU PTIT rises (undemanded) to transient 950 degrees C for about 1 second before returning to normal temperature. The ECU is changed.
20 May 94 - During control checks, an unusual vibration was felt when raising the collective. Loose washers and securing nut were found on the CPT assembly. No locking wire was found.
26 May 94- During flight, numerous warning lights illuminate, including the master warning light and a number two engine failure notification. The helicopter makes an emergency diversion to a civilian airport.
31 May 94 - ZD576 delivered to RAF Aldergrove. The IR jammer has a fault. It is replaced.
1 Jun 94 - During flight, there is a problem with the PTIT guage. It is replaced upon landing.
2 Jun 94 - The PTIT guage plays up again and later in the the task it is noticed that there are problems with the RNS 252. However, on return to Aldergrove the faults could not be replicated.
The crash occurs later that day during the second sortie.
As you can see, not an inspirational aircraft.
The Board's comments with regards to the Chinook HC2 in RAF Service concluded, "Nevertheless, an unforseen technical malfunction of the type being experienced on the Chinook HC2, which would not necessarily have left any physical evidence, remained a possibility, and could not be discounted ".
The Board go on to say "In considering the available technical information the Board concluded that technical failure was unlikely to have been the direct cause of the accident. However, given the large number of unexplained technical occurrences on the Chinook HC2 since its introduction, the Board considered it possible that a technical malfunction or indication could have proved a distraction to the crew ".
Taking into account the impeccable history of ZD576, could you say with absolute certainty, that nothing occurred to distract/prevent the crew from making the turn after they deliberately changed the waypoint reference? I, and many others - including the Board of Inquiry, don't feel able to.
My apologies for such a long reply, but I hope it explaines my viewpoint sufficiently.
Finally, to follow on from Tandemrotor's post again, I'm happy to meet anyone to bore them to death on this subject - travelling distance considering! (Oh, if only Messrs Hoon & Blair would be willing!)
My best, as always.
Brian
"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook
May I start by saying that I don't believe that there are any uncertainties about the fact that the aircraft continued towards the hills when the rules of airmanship said that the crew should not do so. Aircraft should not hit the ground - I agree.
What my whole argument is about is that there may be mitigating circumstances why the accident occurred. There may have been an actual mechanical failure or control jam or there may have been an assumed emergency. It is because of these elements of doubt that the burden of proof for absolutely no doubt whatsoever is undermined. I hope the following information explains this particular paragraph.
Picking up on Tandemrotor's accurate description of ZD576, I invite you to look at the service history from the point of return to the UK after Mid-Life Update:
8 Apr 94 - Returned from Boeing. Experiences a FADEC problem.
21 Apr 94 - During a transition to hover the helicopter has a torque mismatch of 40%. No engine warning lights illuminate. Number one engine is replaced. (Cause was a faulty torquementer).
26 Apr 94 - Has a problem with engine control levers at the flight idle position. There was no torque indication to either engine and the number one engine ran high. Whole engine replaced again.
3 May 94 - GPS failed to operate.
5 May 94 - GPS failed to operate.
9 May 94 - No GPS feed to RNS252.
10 May 94 - A large spring detached from the collective lever. It was found that the bonding had failed to keep the spring in place. The engineering note stated that there was cause for concern with regards loose atricles within the flying control closet.
17 May 94 - Engine power warning light illuminates three times. Engine temperature also goes beyond its normal level. As a result, part of the FADEC system is returned to the USA for investigation. The engine is stripped and rebuilt.
18 May 94 - Number one ECU PTIT rises (undemanded) to transient 950 degrees C for about 1 second before returning to normal temperature. The ECU is changed.
20 May 94 - During control checks, an unusual vibration was felt when raising the collective. Loose washers and securing nut were found on the CPT assembly. No locking wire was found.
26 May 94- During flight, numerous warning lights illuminate, including the master warning light and a number two engine failure notification. The helicopter makes an emergency diversion to a civilian airport.
31 May 94 - ZD576 delivered to RAF Aldergrove. The IR jammer has a fault. It is replaced.
1 Jun 94 - During flight, there is a problem with the PTIT guage. It is replaced upon landing.
2 Jun 94 - The PTIT guage plays up again and later in the the task it is noticed that there are problems with the RNS 252. However, on return to Aldergrove the faults could not be replicated.
The crash occurs later that day during the second sortie.
As you can see, not an inspirational aircraft.
The Board's comments with regards to the Chinook HC2 in RAF Service concluded, "Nevertheless, an unforseen technical malfunction of the type being experienced on the Chinook HC2, which would not necessarily have left any physical evidence, remained a possibility, and could not be discounted ".
The Board go on to say "In considering the available technical information the Board concluded that technical failure was unlikely to have been the direct cause of the accident. However, given the large number of unexplained technical occurrences on the Chinook HC2 since its introduction, the Board considered it possible that a technical malfunction or indication could have proved a distraction to the crew ".
Taking into account the impeccable history of ZD576, could you say with absolute certainty, that nothing occurred to distract/prevent the crew from making the turn after they deliberately changed the waypoint reference? I, and many others - including the Board of Inquiry, don't feel able to.
My apologies for such a long reply, but I hope it explaines my viewpoint sufficiently.
Finally, to follow on from Tandemrotor's post again, I'm happy to meet anyone to bore them to death on this subject - travelling distance considering! (Oh, if only Messrs Hoon & Blair would be willing!)
My best, as always.
Brian
"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook
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Jobs for the boys
Dear Astazou and SLJ
Same story in today's Private Eye, under the caption "Biggles Fills His Pockets" about Sir John Day, BAE Systems, and the PM. I'll track down a copy of the Committee's report to find out when the intervention took place.
No news yet about the meeting between Blair, James Arbuthnot MP, and other MPs who would like to see this case put right, but the fight goes on...
Same story in today's Private Eye, under the caption "Biggles Fills His Pockets" about Sir John Day, BAE Systems, and the PM. I'll track down a copy of the Committee's report to find out when the intervention took place.
No news yet about the meeting between Blair, James Arbuthnot MP, and other MPs who would like to see this case put right, but the fight goes on...
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CHINOOK
Brian Dixon.
Many thanks for the very interesting technical details of this aircraft's history, which are indeed sobering. And of course I have seen Blakely's report. How come, then, that this aircraft was allowed to continue operating? In my experience as the CO of several squadrons (though not helos) it would have been absolutely and utterly inconceivable for me to have allowed such a state of affairs to continue, except perhaps under the most urgent operational conditions which, as I understand matters, did not apply in this case. Is, then, the Sqn Cdr culpable? What does he have to say about it all?
I greatly admire your loyalty to your former colleagues, and I also admire your tenacity in arguing the case for them; but like very many others to whom I have spoken, I cannot avoid the obvious conclusion, which is that the crew sadly made a very serious misjudgement
I think the reason why so few experienced military aviators like myself have been reluctant to put their heads above the parapet in this case, is that they did not wish to be seen to be heaping further ashes upon the heads of the sadly deceased crew. Do you understand that?
Please see para 1 of my post on 18 July.
With all good wishes, John Purdey.
Many thanks for the very interesting technical details of this aircraft's history, which are indeed sobering. And of course I have seen Blakely's report. How come, then, that this aircraft was allowed to continue operating? In my experience as the CO of several squadrons (though not helos) it would have been absolutely and utterly inconceivable for me to have allowed such a state of affairs to continue, except perhaps under the most urgent operational conditions which, as I understand matters, did not apply in this case. Is, then, the Sqn Cdr culpable? What does he have to say about it all?
I greatly admire your loyalty to your former colleagues, and I also admire your tenacity in arguing the case for them; but like very many others to whom I have spoken, I cannot avoid the obvious conclusion, which is that the crew sadly made a very serious misjudgement
I think the reason why so few experienced military aviators like myself have been reluctant to put their heads above the parapet in this case, is that they did not wish to be seen to be heaping further ashes upon the heads of the sadly deceased crew. Do you understand that?
Please see para 1 of my post on 18 July.
With all good wishes, John Purdey.
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It is fact that:
1. The Chinook struck the ground around 800ft, at speed, in cloud, well to the right of the Lighthouse, the planned Waypoint.
2. Some 20 seconds before impact it was around 400ft and under the control of the two pilots as they changed Waypoint.
Emerging from these facts, it is also irrefutable that:
Some 20 seconds before impact they were either IMC or VMC.
If IMC they should have been at calculated safety altitude which, for that sector, was within the limit of their icing clearance.
By definition, if VMC they had the visibility to see, well before the time they chose to change Waypoint, that they were to the right of track and therefore heading towards the highest point of the Mull. They would also have seen before WP change that the Mull was in cloud above 300ft.
If VMC and aware of their track error, they nonetheless chose to continue to fly directly towards the cloud covered Mull until changing WP, by which time they were a mere 5 seconds from landfall, making no effort to turn left as soon as they realised their off-track situation.
In either set of circumstances, IMC or VMC, there is absolutely no doubt whatsoever that they followed a course of action a reasonable man would not have taken. This is the definition of negligence in the context of military aircraft accidents.
If they could not see they were off track well before WP change, then they did not even have the minimum visibility required for VMC at speeds below 140kts, visibility being defined as the distance from which an object (in this case, the coastline) can be seen and recognised for what it is. In other words, if they could not see where they were well before WP change, they were IMC.
In weather conditions the pilots had been warned to expect, if they had climbed to calculated safety altitude in good time in IMC, or turned back or turned away from the Mull also in good time in VMC, they would not have crashed.
These are the essentials of this accident. This is what those in Whitehall responsible for briefing Ministers summarise. If they are to brief differently, then they must be persuaded:
How, if IMC, the pilots could possibly have been justified in remaining below safety altitude before WP change.
How, if VMC, the pilots could possibly have been justified in remaining off planned track, heading directly for the highest part of the Mull, able to see it was covered in cloud above 300ft, until they were only some 5 seconds from landfall, without making any effort to guarantee safety by immediately turning left as soon as they were aware of their predicament, and thereby placing the Lighthouse on their right.
How the pilots could possibly have had the safety of their passengers and crew uppermost in their minds whilst proceeding as they did, in either IMC or VMC.
Whitehall staffs have no interest in the juvenile squabbling that often characterises this site. They have no interest in insults. In particular, anyone who proffers absurdities or inaccuracies is immediately condemned. Here are just two examples:
Some claim the pilots’ speed at WP change could have been in the order of 80kts. If they were that slow, and ignoring what they would then have had to achieve to accelerate to their impact speed, at 20 seconds from impact they would already have been over the land and, at 400ft, in cloud.
In his report commissioned by Mr Tapper, Air Cdre (retd) Blakeley claims the senior of the two reviewing officers (ACM Wratten) prefaced his BoI comments with the words: ‘in the absence of an ADR no-one can ever be sure of the causes of this accident’. In fact, ACM Wratten wrote nothing of the sort. So as far as Ministerial briefers are concerned Mr Blakeley immediately loses all credibility.
Does this give opponents of negligence a flavour of the challenge? In short, if the facts with which I open this piece can be refuted, let us please see the logic. Do note, however, that we want to see facts only. And you will need also to explain why your analysis of whatever facts you identify carries more weight than the analysis of the air staffs of the MOD and HQSTC, the reviewing officers and three successive CASs. For if there is nothing compelling and therefore convincing to place before Ministers to refute negligence, plus ça change. Also please note that when it comes to aircraft accident analysis, there is not a whole lot of credibility that can be claimed by such bodies as the PAC, the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland, a petition with umpteen hundred signatories, etc, etc.
We even know about ‘handrailing’, so no need to explain that either.
Please remember that we have not only read everything ever written on this accident, we have actually studied it all.
1. The Chinook struck the ground around 800ft, at speed, in cloud, well to the right of the Lighthouse, the planned Waypoint.
2. Some 20 seconds before impact it was around 400ft and under the control of the two pilots as they changed Waypoint.
Emerging from these facts, it is also irrefutable that:
Some 20 seconds before impact they were either IMC or VMC.
If IMC they should have been at calculated safety altitude which, for that sector, was within the limit of their icing clearance.
By definition, if VMC they had the visibility to see, well before the time they chose to change Waypoint, that they were to the right of track and therefore heading towards the highest point of the Mull. They would also have seen before WP change that the Mull was in cloud above 300ft.
If VMC and aware of their track error, they nonetheless chose to continue to fly directly towards the cloud covered Mull until changing WP, by which time they were a mere 5 seconds from landfall, making no effort to turn left as soon as they realised their off-track situation.
In either set of circumstances, IMC or VMC, there is absolutely no doubt whatsoever that they followed a course of action a reasonable man would not have taken. This is the definition of negligence in the context of military aircraft accidents.
If they could not see they were off track well before WP change, then they did not even have the minimum visibility required for VMC at speeds below 140kts, visibility being defined as the distance from which an object (in this case, the coastline) can be seen and recognised for what it is. In other words, if they could not see where they were well before WP change, they were IMC.
In weather conditions the pilots had been warned to expect, if they had climbed to calculated safety altitude in good time in IMC, or turned back or turned away from the Mull also in good time in VMC, they would not have crashed.
These are the essentials of this accident. This is what those in Whitehall responsible for briefing Ministers summarise. If they are to brief differently, then they must be persuaded:
How, if IMC, the pilots could possibly have been justified in remaining below safety altitude before WP change.
How, if VMC, the pilots could possibly have been justified in remaining off planned track, heading directly for the highest part of the Mull, able to see it was covered in cloud above 300ft, until they were only some 5 seconds from landfall, without making any effort to guarantee safety by immediately turning left as soon as they were aware of their predicament, and thereby placing the Lighthouse on their right.
How the pilots could possibly have had the safety of their passengers and crew uppermost in their minds whilst proceeding as they did, in either IMC or VMC.
Whitehall staffs have no interest in the juvenile squabbling that often characterises this site. They have no interest in insults. In particular, anyone who proffers absurdities or inaccuracies is immediately condemned. Here are just two examples:
Some claim the pilots’ speed at WP change could have been in the order of 80kts. If they were that slow, and ignoring what they would then have had to achieve to accelerate to their impact speed, at 20 seconds from impact they would already have been over the land and, at 400ft, in cloud.
In his report commissioned by Mr Tapper, Air Cdre (retd) Blakeley claims the senior of the two reviewing officers (ACM Wratten) prefaced his BoI comments with the words: ‘in the absence of an ADR no-one can ever be sure of the causes of this accident’. In fact, ACM Wratten wrote nothing of the sort. So as far as Ministerial briefers are concerned Mr Blakeley immediately loses all credibility.
Does this give opponents of negligence a flavour of the challenge? In short, if the facts with which I open this piece can be refuted, let us please see the logic. Do note, however, that we want to see facts only. And you will need also to explain why your analysis of whatever facts you identify carries more weight than the analysis of the air staffs of the MOD and HQSTC, the reviewing officers and three successive CASs. For if there is nothing compelling and therefore convincing to place before Ministers to refute negligence, plus ça change. Also please note that when it comes to aircraft accident analysis, there is not a whole lot of credibility that can be claimed by such bodies as the PAC, the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland, a petition with umpteen hundred signatories, etc, etc.
We even know about ‘handrailing’, so no need to explain that either.
Please remember that we have not only read everything ever written on this accident, we have actually studied it all.
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Interesting to see that after an absence from these pages of over a year the argument is still going round in circles.
As Uncle Peter sates Messrs Wratten and Day had to satisfy the requirement of "to determine that the crew were negligent.
The only ones who know exactly what happened that tragic night are sadly dead and no amount of specualtion is going to provide an answer to satisfy the requirement of absolutely no doubt whatsoever as to the cause of the accident.
As Uncle Peter sates Messrs Wratten and Day had to satisfy the requirement of "to determine that the crew were negligent.
The only ones who know exactly what happened that tragic night are sadly dead and no amount of specualtion is going to provide an answer to satisfy the requirement of absolutely no doubt whatsoever as to the cause of the accident.
Worker,
A very good analysis but, just for the record, what the AOCinC actually said was:
"Without the irrefutable evidence which is provided by an ADR and CVR there is inevitably a degree of speculation as to the precise detail of the sequence of events in the minutes and seconds immediately prior to impact."
Not vastly different from your Blakely quote in my view and can hardly be described as "nothing of the sort".
This makes you guilty of the charge you lay against Blakely i.e. you lose all credibility.
"Degree of speculation" means that there must be some doubt about any concusion drawn.
A very good analysis but, just for the record, what the AOCinC actually said was:
"Without the irrefutable evidence which is provided by an ADR and CVR there is inevitably a degree of speculation as to the precise detail of the sequence of events in the minutes and seconds immediately prior to impact."
Not vastly different from your Blakely quote in my view and can hardly be described as "nothing of the sort".
This makes you guilty of the charge you lay against Blakely i.e. you lose all credibility.
"Degree of speculation" means that there must be some doubt about any concusion drawn.
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It is disappointing but not surprising that the very first reaction to my initial missive is one of cynicism.
pulse 1 accurately quotes the AOCinC's opening words, but in stopping where he does, pulse 1 conveys an ambiguous message, just as Blakely did, and what the AOCinC wrote was not ambiguous.
The AOCinC went on to conclude: ‘that the operating pilots could and would have avoided this accident had they followed a different course of action from the one they chose to pursue.’ He went on to write: ‘why they therefore elected to ignore the safe options open to them and pursue the one imposing the ultimate danger, we shall never know.’
This is precisely the analysis which I expand in my earlier piece.
So, pulse 1, why not answer the three exam questions?
pulse 1 accurately quotes the AOCinC's opening words, but in stopping where he does, pulse 1 conveys an ambiguous message, just as Blakely did, and what the AOCinC wrote was not ambiguous.
The AOCinC went on to conclude: ‘that the operating pilots could and would have avoided this accident had they followed a different course of action from the one they chose to pursue.’ He went on to write: ‘why they therefore elected to ignore the safe options open to them and pursue the one imposing the ultimate danger, we shall never know.’
This is precisely the analysis which I expand in my earlier piece.
So, pulse 1, why not answer the three exam questions?
Worker,
I am sorry that my frustration allowed my choice of words to come across as cynicism. I still think that your attempt to discredit the whole Blakeley report on this basis is highly questionable. You actually said that the AOCinC said “nothing of the sort” when he clearly did say it.
Although it maybe that Blakeley took this out of context, this debate is full of this, it does surely not change the facts he quotes, especially that the BoI did not review the previous aircraft reliability issues. Either they did or they didn’t. I do not see it in the report.
Certainly one of the problems was still potentially there. Having been involved in managing the design and marketing of electronic equipment for the last eighteen years, I am completely astounded that anyone thought it was acceptable to carry passengers in an aircraft in which the DECU plug had to be checked every 15 minutes to ensure connection. My experience tells me that this will usually only work as a temporary measure and will eventually fail to work as intermittent contacts tend to degrade quite rapidly when not designed for it. I understand that failure of this item would, at least, cause a major distraction. Perhaps I should add that I have some experience of the lack of understanding within the MoD of the performance of electrical contacts.
My limited relevant flying experience as a PPL does not allow me to make many valued judgements about the various theories expounded in this case and to attempt to answer your “exam” questions. However, my forty years experience being trained and working as a scientist does help me to evaluate the responses to the facts and opinions which have been expressed by many in this long and sad affair.
Working as a scientist in industry I have sometimes published reports or technical papers which have drawn conclusions. For these, the standard of certainty required is “absolutely no doubt whatsoever” as judged by one’s impartial peers before publication. In this type of work there is no room for speculation. (dic. theorising, guessing, engaging in risky commercial transactions).
Sometimes scientists are pressurised to make or support decisions for which there is insufficient factual data to make these decisions with this high degree of certainty. In the real world these decisions have to be made and, although I hate doing it, I recognise that there are often compelling commercial reasons for this kind of speculation. In this respect I am regularly involved in many discussions/arguments about the right decision and these often depend on the ambitions of the various parties involved. In the Chinook case I cannot see any compelling reason for making the decision to condemn the pilots based on speculation except as an attempt to hide the manifest incompetence which led to an unsafe aircraft being used for a passenger flight. Perhaps this is naive of me.
As you say, this case has been reviewed by professional airmen, politicians, lawyers and even Churchmen. Maybe it is time that it was reviewed by scientists who are best able to distinguish between fact and speculation. In my view, the degree of scientific proof required, best described in the words of the RAF regulation as “absolutely no doubt whatsoever”, would leave the questions unanswered and the charge of gross negligence removed.
I personally have little idea whether they were negligent or not but it makes me frustrated when I see those who cannot defend themselves being systematically condemned on the basis of speculation, no matter how well informed it is.
p1
I am sorry that my frustration allowed my choice of words to come across as cynicism. I still think that your attempt to discredit the whole Blakeley report on this basis is highly questionable. You actually said that the AOCinC said “nothing of the sort” when he clearly did say it.
Although it maybe that Blakeley took this out of context, this debate is full of this, it does surely not change the facts he quotes, especially that the BoI did not review the previous aircraft reliability issues. Either they did or they didn’t. I do not see it in the report.
Certainly one of the problems was still potentially there. Having been involved in managing the design and marketing of electronic equipment for the last eighteen years, I am completely astounded that anyone thought it was acceptable to carry passengers in an aircraft in which the DECU plug had to be checked every 15 minutes to ensure connection. My experience tells me that this will usually only work as a temporary measure and will eventually fail to work as intermittent contacts tend to degrade quite rapidly when not designed for it. I understand that failure of this item would, at least, cause a major distraction. Perhaps I should add that I have some experience of the lack of understanding within the MoD of the performance of electrical contacts.
My limited relevant flying experience as a PPL does not allow me to make many valued judgements about the various theories expounded in this case and to attempt to answer your “exam” questions. However, my forty years experience being trained and working as a scientist does help me to evaluate the responses to the facts and opinions which have been expressed by many in this long and sad affair.
Working as a scientist in industry I have sometimes published reports or technical papers which have drawn conclusions. For these, the standard of certainty required is “absolutely no doubt whatsoever” as judged by one’s impartial peers before publication. In this type of work there is no room for speculation. (dic. theorising, guessing, engaging in risky commercial transactions).
Sometimes scientists are pressurised to make or support decisions for which there is insufficient factual data to make these decisions with this high degree of certainty. In the real world these decisions have to be made and, although I hate doing it, I recognise that there are often compelling commercial reasons for this kind of speculation. In this respect I am regularly involved in many discussions/arguments about the right decision and these often depend on the ambitions of the various parties involved. In the Chinook case I cannot see any compelling reason for making the decision to condemn the pilots based on speculation except as an attempt to hide the manifest incompetence which led to an unsafe aircraft being used for a passenger flight. Perhaps this is naive of me.
As you say, this case has been reviewed by professional airmen, politicians, lawyers and even Churchmen. Maybe it is time that it was reviewed by scientists who are best able to distinguish between fact and speculation. In my view, the degree of scientific proof required, best described in the words of the RAF regulation as “absolutely no doubt whatsoever”, would leave the questions unanswered and the charge of gross negligence removed.
I personally have little idea whether they were negligent or not but it makes me frustrated when I see those who cannot defend themselves being systematically condemned on the basis of speculation, no matter how well informed it is.
p1
A really irritating PPRuNer
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WOrkER,
welcome to the debate.
In additioon to the opening sentence, surely the last four words of the Air Marshal's conclusion negates the requirement of absolutely no doubt whatsoever.
".... we shall never know".
One would expect that with a burden of proof of absolutely no doubt whatsoever, you really should know!
My best.
Brian
"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook
welcome to the debate.
In additioon to the opening sentence, surely the last four words of the Air Marshal's conclusion negates the requirement of absolutely no doubt whatsoever.
".... we shall never know".
One would expect that with a burden of proof of absolutely no doubt whatsoever, you really should know!
My best.
Brian
"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook
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DID A PIG FLY BY?
I have long found it strange that lawyers, churchmen and politicians believe they have an unerring understanding of military flying procedures and ethos when they can't agree on much within their own specialisations. And now we are being asked to believe that scientists, who can' t get their act together on BSE, CJD, MMR, how to deal with global warming etc, 'can differentiate between fact and speculation'.