It is fact that:
1. The Chinook struck the ground around 800ft, at speed, in cloud, well to the right of the Lighthouse, the planned Waypoint.
2. Some 20 seconds before impact it was around 400ft and under the control of the two pilots as they changed Waypoint.
Emerging from these facts, it is also irrefutable that:
Some 20 seconds before impact they were either IMC or VMC.
If IMC they should have been at calculated safety altitude which, for that sector, was within the limit of their icing clearance.
By definition, if VMC they had the visibility to see, well before the time they chose to change Waypoint, that they were to the right of track and therefore heading towards the highest point of the Mull. They would also have seen before WP change that the Mull was in cloud above 300ft.
If VMC and aware of their track error, they nonetheless chose to continue to fly directly towards the cloud covered Mull until changing WP, by which time they were a mere 5 seconds from landfall, making no effort to turn left as soon as they realised their off-track situation.
In either set of circumstances, IMC or VMC, there is absolutely no doubt whatsoever that they followed a course of action a reasonable man would not have taken. This is the definition of negligence in the context of military aircraft accidents.
If they could not see they were off track well before WP change, then they did not even have the minimum visibility required for VMC at speeds below 140kts, visibility being defined as the distance from which an object (in this case, the coastline) can be seen and recognised for what it is. In other words, if they could not see where they were well before WP change, they were IMC.
In weather conditions the pilots had been warned to expect, if they had climbed to calculated safety altitude in good time in IMC, or turned back or turned away from the Mull also in good time in VMC, they would not have crashed.
These are the essentials of this accident. This is what those in Whitehall responsible for briefing Ministers summarise. If they are to brief differently, then they must be persuaded:
How, if IMC, the pilots could possibly have been justified in remaining below safety altitude before WP change.
How, if VMC, the pilots could possibly have been justified in remaining off planned track, heading directly for the highest part of the Mull, able to see it was covered in cloud above 300ft, until they were only some 5 seconds from landfall, without making any effort to guarantee safety by immediately turning left as soon as they were aware of their predicament, and thereby placing the Lighthouse on their right.
How the pilots could possibly have had the safety of their passengers and crew uppermost in their minds whilst proceeding as they did, in either IMC or VMC.
Whitehall staffs have no interest in the juvenile squabbling that often characterises this site. They have no interest in insults. In particular, anyone who proffers absurdities or inaccuracies is immediately condemned. Here are just two examples:
Some claim the pilots’ speed at WP change could have been in the order of 80kts. If they were that slow, and ignoring what they would then have had to achieve to accelerate to their impact speed, at 20 seconds from impact they would already have been over the land and, at 400ft, in cloud.
In his report commissioned by Mr Tapper, Air Cdre (retd) Blakeley claims the senior of the two reviewing officers (ACM Wratten) prefaced his BoI comments with the words: ‘in the absence of an ADR no-one can ever be sure of the causes of this accident’. In fact, ACM Wratten wrote nothing of the sort. So as far as Ministerial briefers are concerned Mr Blakeley immediately loses all credibility.
Does this give opponents of negligence a flavour of the challenge? In short, if the facts with which I open this piece can be refuted, let us please see the logic. Do note, however, that we want to see facts only. And you will need also to explain why your analysis of whatever facts you identify carries more weight than the analysis of the air staffs of the MOD and HQSTC, the reviewing officers and three successive CASs. For if there is nothing compelling and therefore convincing to place before Ministers to refute negligence, plus ça change. Also please note that when it comes to aircraft accident analysis, there is not a whole lot of credibility that can be claimed by such bodies as the PAC, the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland, a petition with umpteen hundred signatories, etc, etc.
We even know about ‘handrailing’, so no need to explain that either.
Please remember that we have not only read everything ever written on this accident, we have actually studied it all.