Chinook - Still Hitting Back 3 (Merged)
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Ploughing on - thumb in bum - in worsening weather/vis/snow/turbulence et all relying on the dodgy black boxes that the crew knew about does not seem to me to be a sensible course of action
Anybody interested in returning to what we can (or cannot) establish as matters of indisputable fact?
May I start the ball rolling? How about if we ALL agree that:
1) ZD576 spent much of it's transit of the Irish sea in VFR
2) Non of the handful of witnesses standing on the Mull of Kintyre describe the weather as anything other than thick (occasionally patchy?) fog. All were at altitudes some way above sea level.
3) AAIB could not positively determine the pre-impact serviceability of ZD576.
4) ZD576 impacted rising terrain at very (relatively) high speed.
5) A computer model suggests a possible manoeuvre in the 3 secs prior to impact which could explain the parameters exhibited by ZD576 at the moment of impact.
6) No voice or flight data records exist of actions or inactions in the cockpit of ZD576 at any time during the fatal flight, save the briefest of snippets from the navigation computer, which was never designed to provide historical data.
7) There were no survivors. Nor eyewitnesses, save a yachtsman, from the moment the aircraft coasted out from NI until some time after impact.
For our purposes I suggests we set to one side, the serious airworthiness issues.
Anyone care to disagree with any of these points? Or take them further? Or add other hard FACTS?
If anyone can marshal a set of facts which leads to a completely inevitable conclusion, with no possible alternatives, then we may be able to get somewhere???
Gentlemen (ladies?): Over to you.
Otherwise, tragically we may just have to accept, whilst we can have our own opinions, the available facts don't allow us to be certain.
Regards
Last edited by Tandemrotor; 2nd Dec 2010 at 21:27.
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Hey Ho Old Seldom!
No - but the out come of the flight suggests so. Pragmatism again.
No - but the out come of the flight suggests so. Pragmatism again.
Yes - does it appear to you that this is what they were displaying?
If so please elaborate.
Night night.
Have you a shred of evidence to suggest they were not using maps marked with distance and TTG to back up the 252 which was SOP during my time on SH
Can you confirm how you know this to be factually correct
It's not called being chicken it's called AIRMANSHIP.
If so please elaborate.
Night night.
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Whilst so called 'pragmatism' is absolutely understandable in forming an opinion, it is not a standard of proof recognised in any court of law!
When facts speak for themselves, pragmatism is utterly superfluous!
When facts speak for themselves, pragmatism is utterly superfluous!
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With regard to your theory I rest my case
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Seldom
Airmanship
Please answer - cheers.
Tandem
You are saying that I do not need to be pragmatic because the facts prove my opinion?
I don't think so old bean!
Airmanship
Yes - does it appear to you that this is what they were displaying?
If so please elaborate.
If so please elaborate.
Tandem
When facts speak for themselves, pragmatism is utterly superfluous!
I don't think so old bean!
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Tandem,
I am not a pilot, but know a bit about computer simulation, so suggest that this statement should be amended:
I suggest:
EG
I am not a pilot, but know a bit about computer simulation, so suggest that this statement should be amended:
5) A computer model suggests a possible manoeuvre in the 3 secs prior to impact which could explain the parameters exhibited by ZD576 at the moment of impact.
5) A computer model, programmed to assume a trimmed aircraft, had to suggest a possible manoeuvre in the 3 secs prior to impact to explain the inconsistencies between trimmed flight and the parameters exhibited by ZD576 at the moment of impact.
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I have absolutely no idea if they were displaying exemplary airmanship or were totally disregarding all safety factors.
But if we get right to the heart of it neither do you, the difference between to pair of us is I am open minded enough to grasp that.
But if we get right to the heart of it neither do you, the difference between to pair of us is I am open minded enough to grasp that.
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EG
Thanks, I will take that on board. Can you explain the significance of the changes you have made?
Also, are you familiar with flight simulations, and this one in particular?
Many thanks.
Thanks, I will take that on board. Can you explain the significance of the changes you have made?
Also, are you familiar with flight simulations, and this one in particular?
Many thanks.
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Seldom
That is fair comment. All I have said is that in view of the outcome of the flight it is fair to say that I veer to the view that mistakes were made. That's all.
But if we get right to the heart of it neither do you, the difference between to pair of us is I am open minded enough to grasp that.
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Baston,
I think a lot of us "vere to the view" that mistakes were made.
That is insufficient grounds for verdicts of Gross Negligence, Negiligence or Aircrew Error.
The incidents reported by Sqn Ldr Burke offer the possible cause as Technical Defect. The long odds of this happening at a critical stage of flight are lessened by Tucumseh's excellent research into the Airworthiness issues.
Still not a proven fact though.
What the majority of us are campaigning for is the only sensible verdict.
Cause Not Positively Determined
I think a lot of us "vere to the view" that mistakes were made.
That is insufficient grounds for verdicts of Gross Negligence, Negiligence or Aircrew Error.
The incidents reported by Sqn Ldr Burke offer the possible cause as Technical Defect. The long odds of this happening at a critical stage of flight are lessened by Tucumseh's excellent research into the Airworthiness issues.
Still not a proven fact though.
What the majority of us are campaigning for is the only sensible verdict.
Cause Not Positively Determined
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SFFP
Your 7279
You are absolutely correct that a forecast is a "Best Guess".
That "Best Guess" would have precluded flight in accordance with VFR in the vicinity of the Mull Of Kintyre; according to the Findings of the BOI. The Pilots should therefore have planned to transit the Mull at or above Safety Altitude and should only have descended to low level flight again once they were unequivocally certain that they could continue the flight under VFR conditions. This they did not do.
9 witnesses on the Mull gave evidence in respect of the actual weather at the time of the crash to the BOI. All of those witnesses heard or felt the crash -therefore their recollections are specifically linked to the time of the crash. Their evidence shows that the actual weather at the time of the crash was considerably worsethan the forecast weather and therefore precluded flight in accordance with VFR at that time.
These witnesses were some hundreds of feet above sea level and thus above the cloud base. The Yachtsman was, of course, at sea level some 2 NM from the Mull with a visibility of "1 NM limited by haze" and would thus have a different perspective from those in the immediate vicinity of the Mull. Moreover, he was not aware of the tragedy until some considerable time later. His recollections will not, therefore, necessarily be specifically linked to the crash; because he was unaware of such an occurrence until much later.
Failure to comply with the basic rules in respect of VFR flight at low level when faced with poor en route weather in the vicinity of high ground resulted in this tragedy.
Your 7279
You are absolutely correct that a forecast is a "Best Guess".
That "Best Guess" would have precluded flight in accordance with VFR in the vicinity of the Mull Of Kintyre; according to the Findings of the BOI. The Pilots should therefore have planned to transit the Mull at or above Safety Altitude and should only have descended to low level flight again once they were unequivocally certain that they could continue the flight under VFR conditions. This they did not do.
9 witnesses on the Mull gave evidence in respect of the actual weather at the time of the crash to the BOI. All of those witnesses heard or felt the crash -therefore their recollections are specifically linked to the time of the crash. Their evidence shows that the actual weather at the time of the crash was considerably worsethan the forecast weather and therefore precluded flight in accordance with VFR at that time.
These witnesses were some hundreds of feet above sea level and thus above the cloud base. The Yachtsman was, of course, at sea level some 2 NM from the Mull with a visibility of "1 NM limited by haze" and would thus have a different perspective from those in the immediate vicinity of the Mull. Moreover, he was not aware of the tragedy until some considerable time later. His recollections will not, therefore, necessarily be specifically linked to the crash; because he was unaware of such an occurrence until much later.
Failure to comply with the basic rules in respect of VFR flight at low level when faced with poor en route weather in the vicinity of high ground resulted in this tragedy.
Failure to comply with the basic rules in respect of VFR flight at low level when faced with poor en route weather in the vicinity of high ground resulted in this tragedy.
Lastly, define 'vicinity'.
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Caz,
Three very simple questions. I bet you don't answer.
1. If Holbrook was 2nms from the Mull and the Vis was limited all around to 1nm, how come he could see the lighthouse area on the Mull?
2. If the sortie was impossible to complete without IFR fliight at the Mull, (illegal due to icing limitations), how come the BOI and all the other bodies did not severely criticise the Planning and Flight Authorisation?
3. You are of course aware of Sqn Ldr Burke. How can you be certain that none of the FADEC / UFCM incidents happened on this flight?
Three very simple questions. I bet you don't answer.
1. If Holbrook was 2nms from the Mull and the Vis was limited all around to 1nm, how come he could see the lighthouse area on the Mull?
2. If the sortie was impossible to complete without IFR fliight at the Mull, (illegal due to icing limitations), how come the BOI and all the other bodies did not severely criticise the Planning and Flight Authorisation?
3. You are of course aware of Sqn Ldr Burke. How can you be certain that none of the FADEC / UFCM incidents happened on this flight?
Per Ardua ad Astraeus
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Beagle - 'vicinity' - I wouldn't bother to ask - not one of them has responded to several requests to do so (they don't know!), just as not one of them has been able to support their absolute certainty as to how the crew operated in the last few minutes.
- unbelievable crap. That ably demonstrates that some of our posters (Cazatou for sure) have NO (or have 'lost' ANY) IDEA of
a) The RTS of the a/c
b) What the MSA was
c) How such low-level ops are conducted
d) the fact that there was, as far as we know, NO PLAN to 'transit the Mull' in any case.
This thread is stuffed with low-level experts who boast they would:
abort if they saw a cloud on the coast
climb immediately to MSA if there was cloud forecast below MSA en-route
Heaven help us. Thankfully our low-level pilots operate normally. We are wasting our time engaging these folk in discussions. One has to hope that the mental processes were better when in any relevant post.
Originally Posted by Cazatou
That "Best Guess" would have precluded flight in accordance with VFR in the vicinity of the Mull Of Kintyre; according to the Findings of the BOI. The Pilots should therefore have planned to transit the Mull at or above Safety Altitude and should only have descended to low level flight again once they were unequivocally certain that they could continue the flight under VFR conditions. This they did not do.
a) The RTS of the a/c
b) What the MSA was
c) How such low-level ops are conducted
d) the fact that there was, as far as we know, NO PLAN to 'transit the Mull' in any case.
This thread is stuffed with low-level experts who boast they would:
abort if they saw a cloud on the coast
climb immediately to MSA if there was cloud forecast below MSA en-route
Heaven help us. Thankfully our low-level pilots operate normally. We are wasting our time engaging these folk in discussions. One has to hope that the mental processes were better when in any relevant post.
Dalek
Thank you kind sir but “research” is perhaps too strong a word.
The regulations required (at the time) Boscombe, Controller Aircraft and ACAS, in turn, to declare the aircraft airworthy and fit for safe flight.
Boscombe and CA did not. Based on the same evidence, ACAS did. It remains unclear what independent trials he paid for in the few days between CA’s advice and him issuing the RTS, but I’m hopeful Lord Philip will ask for this basic part of the audit trail.
MoD have happily provided this information to quite a few on pprune, including the Mull Group many years ago, long before I ever joined the forum. Internal and external reports and audits too numerous to mention have confirmed this since the late 80s; some specific to Chinook. I simply reiterate what is well known, irrefutable fact. That the regulations were systematically ignored. That Boscombe’s advice was withheld from Users. That the senior Test Pilot’s experiences with the aircraft were withheld/not investigated. That “Essential” modifications (in a safety sense) were not progressed, never mind embodied and trialled. That the RAF took no corrective action despite the evidence in the BoI, AAIB and FAI reports. So many facts when so many claim there are none. So many people with a vested interest in them not being aired. (And if you want names, they wrote to the press in January!).
Tucumseh's excellent research into the Airworthiness issues.
The regulations required (at the time) Boscombe, Controller Aircraft and ACAS, in turn, to declare the aircraft airworthy and fit for safe flight.
Boscombe and CA did not. Based on the same evidence, ACAS did. It remains unclear what independent trials he paid for in the few days between CA’s advice and him issuing the RTS, but I’m hopeful Lord Philip will ask for this basic part of the audit trail.
MoD have happily provided this information to quite a few on pprune, including the Mull Group many years ago, long before I ever joined the forum. Internal and external reports and audits too numerous to mention have confirmed this since the late 80s; some specific to Chinook. I simply reiterate what is well known, irrefutable fact. That the regulations were systematically ignored. That Boscombe’s advice was withheld from Users. That the senior Test Pilot’s experiences with the aircraft were withheld/not investigated. That “Essential” modifications (in a safety sense) were not progressed, never mind embodied and trialled. That the RAF took no corrective action despite the evidence in the BoI, AAIB and FAI reports. So many facts when so many claim there are none. So many people with a vested interest in them not being aired. (And if you want names, they wrote to the press in January!).
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BOAC
Hang on a minute old chap! Don't get over excited!
This was a perfectly straight forward low level passenger flight from a to b that ended up running into a hill. Very sad.
These flights are not the stuff of rocket science - simple to plan and simple to fly, and actually, usually great fun as well.
This one ended in tragedy and on the balance of probaility, for equally simple reasons.
No - no one can be 100% sure of anything in life before or after any event.
There I think you may be correct and I find both sides of this discussion fascinating both for the divergent views and the differing interpretations of events leading to the crash.
My view - I suspect you think - is simplistic. Your are right in that view, if you hold it, as I think this was a simple case of pilot error.
"Nibbled to death by ducks" used to be the saying of how all the parameters leading to an accident happened and eventually all the cogs lined up. The lining up of these cogs was usually an unfortunate combination of simple steps, any one of which had it been removed would have prevented tragedy.
I think that emotive statements such as "unbelievable crap" do little to further the arguement or your status within it.
unbelievable crap. That ably demonstrates that some of our posters (Cazatou for sure) have NO (or have 'lost' ANY) IDEA of
a) The RTS of the a/c
b) What the MSA was
c) How such low-level ops are conducted
d) the fact that there was, as far as we know, NO PLAN to 'transit the Mull' in any case.
a) The RTS of the a/c
b) What the MSA was
c) How such low-level ops are conducted
d) the fact that there was, as far as we know, NO PLAN to 'transit the Mull' in any case.
This was a perfectly straight forward low level passenger flight from a to b that ended up running into a hill. Very sad.
These flights are not the stuff of rocket science - simple to plan and simple to fly, and actually, usually great fun as well.
This one ended in tragedy and on the balance of probaility, for equally simple reasons.
No - no one can be 100% sure of anything in life before or after any event.
This thread is stuffed with low-level experts
My view - I suspect you think - is simplistic. Your are right in that view, if you hold it, as I think this was a simple case of pilot error.
"Nibbled to death by ducks" used to be the saying of how all the parameters leading to an accident happened and eventually all the cogs lined up. The lining up of these cogs was usually an unfortunate combination of simple steps, any one of which had it been removed would have prevented tragedy.
I think that emotive statements such as "unbelievable crap" do little to further the arguement or your status within it.
"Nibbled to death by ducks" used to be the saying of how all the parameters leading to an accident happened and eventually all the cogs lined up. The lining up of these cogs was usually an unfortunate combination of simple steps, any one of which had it been removed would have prevented tragedy.
Well said Baston. And I've mentioned one such step/cog/duck or even hole in a slice of cheese that led to them having to fly a Mk2 instead of a Mk1. There may indeed have been others, like a pilot error, but you are absolutely right to say all the cogs should be studied. That is why the regs required Organisational Fault, and other contributory factors, to be considered. One day, perhaps that particular regulation will be implemented properly.
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Tuc
What you have unearthed about design or functional safety and incompetent airworthiness process is hugely important because then legally (I believe) the responsibility is shared between the first actions of negligence and any subsequent actions by others (if proven).
I cannot believe that some people, while wishing to clear the names of the pilots, want to 'set aside' the argument about the patent lack of documented airworthiness. Such an argument seems the only thing that is factually provable and it cannot be denied - thanks to you. If people wish to spend their time going around and around the same old arguments (as seen on this forum) - ones that the MoD have consistently rebuffed and dodged - then I believe they are missing a big trick. Just the threat of dragging a few airships' names through the mud should be enough to bring the MoD to table.
Fortunatley, it is too late for that - as airworthiness (or lack of) is very much within the remit of the current Review and I trust Lord Philip and his team will do the honorable thing and put the matter to rest - once and for all; for the sake of so many.
What you have unearthed about design or functional safety and incompetent airworthiness process is hugely important because then legally (I believe) the responsibility is shared between the first actions of negligence and any subsequent actions by others (if proven).
I cannot believe that some people, while wishing to clear the names of the pilots, want to 'set aside' the argument about the patent lack of documented airworthiness. Such an argument seems the only thing that is factually provable and it cannot be denied - thanks to you. If people wish to spend their time going around and around the same old arguments (as seen on this forum) - ones that the MoD have consistently rebuffed and dodged - then I believe they are missing a big trick. Just the threat of dragging a few airships' names through the mud should be enough to bring the MoD to table.
Fortunatley, it is too late for that - as airworthiness (or lack of) is very much within the remit of the current Review and I trust Lord Philip and his team will do the honorable thing and put the matter to rest - once and for all; for the sake of so many.
Just the threat of dragging a few airships' names through the mud ....
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Airborne Aircrew
Your post #7274 was a refreshingly informative one.
Two good witnesses on the ground that evening descibed the layer of mist that you describe.
Met theory explains it.
It is there for all to see at the right time with a strong southerly blowing.
By all accounts the localised weather was as could be expected, a capping oro cloud (base that day about 800 ft), beneath this a thin layer running up the slope (as I have described previously).
Bad enough view ahead for a pilot to need to check his instruments just to avoid spatial disorientation, let alone get by visual illusion regarding range to go.
Just how certain do you (collectively speaking - pls don't pull me up on that one again!) need the weather to be? 99%? Unfortunately the attending helicopter that arrived less than an hour after the crash only gave the description of conditions on the high ground - pity he was not asked to say what the view was like from out to sea.
Being totally surprised upon entering the mist could explain the enigma of the intermediate power settings, NR 100.5%, yet fully pulled up thrust lever - it had been yanked up reflexively but there was wasn't even time for the rotors to start slowing down never mind engines increase power before impact (the 100.5 % figure came from a witness mark on an instrument as I believe).
Your post #7274 was a refreshingly informative one.
Two good witnesses on the ground that evening descibed the layer of mist that you describe.
Met theory explains it.
It is there for all to see at the right time with a strong southerly blowing.
By all accounts the localised weather was as could be expected, a capping oro cloud (base that day about 800 ft), beneath this a thin layer running up the slope (as I have described previously).
Bad enough view ahead for a pilot to need to check his instruments just to avoid spatial disorientation, let alone get by visual illusion regarding range to go.
Just how certain do you (collectively speaking - pls don't pull me up on that one again!) need the weather to be? 99%? Unfortunately the attending helicopter that arrived less than an hour after the crash only gave the description of conditions on the high ground - pity he was not asked to say what the view was like from out to sea.
Being totally surprised upon entering the mist could explain the enigma of the intermediate power settings, NR 100.5%, yet fully pulled up thrust lever - it had been yanked up reflexively but there was wasn't even time for the rotors to start slowing down never mind engines increase power before impact (the 100.5 % figure came from a witness mark on an instrument as I believe).