Chinook - Still Hitting Back 3 (Merged)
Join Date: Feb 2007
Location: Oxon
Age: 66
Posts: 1,942
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
SFFP
Mr Murchie, lighthouse keeper:" I would estimate the visibility at this stage to be 15 to 20 metres at most."
Mr Lamont, lighthouse keeper: "the visibility as I drove over the hill from Campbeltown was down to 10 metres or less.
Mr Brocher: " The weather was really bad at this time, there was a lot of mist and fog, visibility was only about 10 or 15 ft .... I could not see it (the Chinook) for the mist and fog.
There are several others
Mr Murchie, lighthouse keeper:" I would estimate the visibility at this stage to be 15 to 20 metres at most."
Mr Lamont, lighthouse keeper: "the visibility as I drove over the hill from Campbeltown was down to 10 metres or less.
Mr Brocher: " The weather was really bad at this time, there was a lot of mist and fog, visibility was only about 10 or 15 ft .... I could not see it (the Chinook) for the mist and fog.
There are several others
Dead easy question for you Sir,
Can anyone of those witness's tell you, me or anyone else what the actual visibility was 25 meters away from where they were stood at the time of the crash
Join Date: May 2008
Location: Somerset
Age: 81
Posts: 635
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Vertico
Well they wouldn't be here now if they were.......................
How close do they have to be to satisfy you?
But none of the witnesses you list was actually at the crash site.
How close do they have to be to satisfy you?
Join Date: Feb 2007
Location: Oxon
Age: 66
Posts: 1,942
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Join Date: May 2008
Location: Somerset
Age: 81
Posts: 635
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Seldom
They would need to pretty sharpish on their toes if they were to be that close......................
15 to 20 metres at most
10 metres or less.
visibility was only about 10 or 15 ft
Join Date: Feb 2007
Location: Oxon
Age: 66
Posts: 1,942
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Join Date: May 2008
Location: Somerset
Age: 81
Posts: 635
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Seldom
I think we would have more casualities - but enough of this I think.
Shame they were not as, I am sure you would agree we would then have the conclusive evidence we currently lack.
Per Ardua ad Astraeus
Join Date: Mar 2000
Location: UK
Posts: 18,579
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
but enough of this I think.
Who keeps waking this lot up?Seems to be a complete lack of 'no doubt what-so-evers' around, don't you think chaps?
Join Date: Feb 2007
Location: Oxon
Age: 66
Posts: 1,942
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Join Date: Sep 2005
Location: preston
Age: 76
Posts: 376
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Dear Old Baston,
I too have read all those hundreds of posts on supposed failures in Airmanship. Unlike you I have also understood them.
Let us look at them one at a time:
1. The crew failed to take adequate breakfast. Wrong
2. The crew planned to exceed crew duty. Speculative and irrelevant. They hadn't
3. The crew did not complete all of the planning themselves. True, but the person who assisted was a Navigator qualified for the task. Common practice.
4. The planning was flawed. Really? Why did the BOI, Reviewing Officers and other investigations not crtiticise both Planning and Authorisation.
5. No irregularities reported by ATC or anyone else on departure.
6. Departure radio call made on time.
7. Lastly, and most importantly, the aircraft was reported in VMC at safe height and speed at the very point (According to Wratten) the negligence was being committed.
I may have missed some points so please enlighten as us to where you see the the poor Airmanship or flaws in planning
John Purdey,
As Vertico so rightly pointed out, if the aircraft experienced the type of problems envisaged by Sqn Ldr Burke, the crew may well have been passengers at the scene of the accident.
I have also mentioned many times, the possibility of Visual Illusion and Distraction. Both fairly common incidents. This would make this accident Aircrew Error.
Is that really too difficult to hoist on board.
Regards
I too have read all those hundreds of posts on supposed failures in Airmanship. Unlike you I have also understood them.
Let us look at them one at a time:
1. The crew failed to take adequate breakfast. Wrong
2. The crew planned to exceed crew duty. Speculative and irrelevant. They hadn't
3. The crew did not complete all of the planning themselves. True, but the person who assisted was a Navigator qualified for the task. Common practice.
4. The planning was flawed. Really? Why did the BOI, Reviewing Officers and other investigations not crtiticise both Planning and Authorisation.
5. No irregularities reported by ATC or anyone else on departure.
6. Departure radio call made on time.
7. Lastly, and most importantly, the aircraft was reported in VMC at safe height and speed at the very point (According to Wratten) the negligence was being committed.
I may have missed some points so please enlighten as us to where you see the the poor Airmanship or flaws in planning
John Purdey,
As Vertico so rightly pointed out, if the aircraft experienced the type of problems envisaged by Sqn Ldr Burke, the crew may well have been passengers at the scene of the accident.
I have also mentioned many times, the possibility of Visual Illusion and Distraction. Both fairly common incidents. This would make this accident Aircrew Error.
Is that really too difficult to hoist on board.
Regards
Join Date: Jun 2007
Location: Detroit MI
Age: 66
Posts: 1,460
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
I'm unsure why everyone keeps pointing to the three witnesses on the ground who state the vis was only a matter of feet. I can't begin to count the number of times I have hiked in vis measured in metres horizontally yet I can clearly see the sun or the times I have flown over 20-30' layers of fog. Those people on the ground are relevant only as far as the height AGL that the fog/cloud reached. Above that the Chinook could have been in clear air... Sort of like the Yachtsman described... Thus precluding the requirement for IFR and a climb to SA and taking many of the airmanship arguments out of the mix too.
But we'll never know how relevant they are, will we?
But we'll never know how relevant they are, will we?
CGB, I was an FSO at 1Gp,when ,W and D were there; The GFSO was from a land S of the Equator,and had been on the Bucc. fleet. I think the Victor at Hamilton may have been a G-N verdict,but can`t be sure,and the GFSO decided that maybe we should look at previous BoIs that had similar verdicts,but the crew were killed.I think we found there was a Jaguar accident that may have been `shaky`in it`s verdict in the light of other later accidents.As this was `cold-case` stuff,it was not priority,and there was too much other stuff to look at. Ibelieve Caz. was there later,perhaps he may know more..
Join Date: May 2008
Location: Somerset
Age: 81
Posts: 635
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Dear old Dalek!!
I like this chumley address!
The airmanship that I refer to is not breakfast/crew duty time/planning/radio calls and so on,and other irrelevant,to me, data.
What I stated many moons ago was what happened once they were airborne.
Simple things like starting a stopwatch on the dashboard as a "run in to coast warning" as a backup to the starwars nav system that I understand they were not too happy with. Gosh if I mention DR backup I will bring lots of modern aviators down on my back again, but I flew the Seaking 4 with Tans and always had a backup running in my mind and on my knee pad. Is that so wrong? It certainly stopped me running into the Caradon Hill mast.
Ploughing on - thumb in bum - in worsening weather/vis/snow/turbulence et all relying on the dodgy black boxes that the crew knew about does not seem to me to be a sensible course of action.
Approaching the coast, as I have stated before, is a high risk business if the weather is starting to turn against you, and that moment when it is turning to rat**** is so very difficult to judge.
I am sorry to admit that I always chickened out early, slowed down, descended, hover taxied et all until I could clearly see the beach/cliff/ship/what have you.
I am still here. Not because I am clever, but like all sensible aviators I am nervous.........................
PS why can we not have a spill and grimmer checker on this sight?
I like this chumley address!
The airmanship that I refer to is not breakfast/crew duty time/planning/radio calls and so on,and other irrelevant,to me, data.
What I stated many moons ago was what happened once they were airborne.
Simple things like starting a stopwatch on the dashboard as a "run in to coast warning" as a backup to the starwars nav system that I understand they were not too happy with. Gosh if I mention DR backup I will bring lots of modern aviators down on my back again, but I flew the Seaking 4 with Tans and always had a backup running in my mind and on my knee pad. Is that so wrong? It certainly stopped me running into the Caradon Hill mast.
Ploughing on - thumb in bum - in worsening weather/vis/snow/turbulence et all relying on the dodgy black boxes that the crew knew about does not seem to me to be a sensible course of action.
Approaching the coast, as I have stated before, is a high risk business if the weather is starting to turn against you, and that moment when it is turning to rat**** is so very difficult to judge.
I am sorry to admit that I always chickened out early, slowed down, descended, hover taxied et all until I could clearly see the beach/cliff/ship/what have you.
I am still here. Not because I am clever, but like all sensible aviators I am nervous.........................
PS why can we not have a spill and grimmer checker on this sight?
Last edited by bast0n; 2nd Dec 2010 at 19:17. Reason: Grimmer
Join Date: Apr 2005
Location: France 46
Age: 77
Posts: 1,743
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
SFFP
You have neglected one important finding of the AAIB - which was that the Chinook impacted at a speed of approx 150 kts. That equates to slightly greater than 253 ft/sec or approximately 80 metres/sec. The highest estimate of the visibility by those in the vicinity was by Mr Murchie (a Qualified Met Observer) whose estimate was "15 to 20 metres at most". That speed therefore gave them just one quarter of a second to acquire, recognise and attempt to avoid danger.
I must point out, however, that the assessed speed at impact was whilst attempting an apparent escape manoeuvre ; the speed prior to that attempt would of course have been greater.
Whilst it is apparent that a belated escape manoeuvre was attempted, that attempt was to late to prevent impact with the ground.
The Forecast weather for the Mull would have precluded flight in accordance with VFR. The actual weather at the Mull as assessed by 2 qualified Met Observers was distinctly worse than the Forecast. That assessment was reinforced by the evidence of 7 other eye witnesses.
You have neglected one important finding of the AAIB - which was that the Chinook impacted at a speed of approx 150 kts. That equates to slightly greater than 253 ft/sec or approximately 80 metres/sec. The highest estimate of the visibility by those in the vicinity was by Mr Murchie (a Qualified Met Observer) whose estimate was "15 to 20 metres at most". That speed therefore gave them just one quarter of a second to acquire, recognise and attempt to avoid danger.
I must point out, however, that the assessed speed at impact was whilst attempting an apparent escape manoeuvre ; the speed prior to that attempt would of course have been greater.
Whilst it is apparent that a belated escape manoeuvre was attempted, that attempt was to late to prevent impact with the ground.
The Forecast weather for the Mull would have precluded flight in accordance with VFR. The actual weather at the Mull as assessed by 2 qualified Met Observers was distinctly worse than the Forecast. That assessment was reinforced by the evidence of 7 other eye witnesses.
Join Date: Feb 2007
Location: Oxon
Age: 66
Posts: 1,942
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Dear old Dalek!!
I like this chumley address!
The airmanship that I refer to is not breakfast/crew duty time/planning/radio calls and so on,and other irrelevant,to me, data.
What I stated many moons ago was what happened once they were airborne.
Simple things like starting a stopwatch on the dashboard as a "run in to coast warning" as a backup to the starwars nav system that I understand they were not too happy with.
Have you a shred of evidence to suggest they were not using maps marked with distance and TTG to back up the 252 which was SOP during my time on SH
Gosh if I mention DR backup I will bring lots of modern aviators down on my back again, but I flew the Seaking 4 with Tans and always had a backup running in my mind and on my knee pad. Is that so wrong? It certainly stopped me running into the Caradon Hill mast.
Also SOP along with a Decca map during my early single pilot Puma days
Ploughing on - thumb in bum - in worsening weather/vis/snow/turbulence et all relying on the dodgy black boxes that the crew knew about does not seem to me to be a sensible course of action.
Can you confirm how you know this to be factually correct
Approaching the coast, as I have stated before, is a high risk business if the weather is starting to turn against you, and that moment when it is turning to rat**** is so very difficult to judge.
I am sorry to admit that I always chickened out early, slowed down, descended, hover taxied et all until I could clearly see the beach/cliff/ship/what have you.
It's not called being chicken it's called AIRMANSHIP.
I am still here. Not because I am clever, but like all sensible aviators I am nervous.........................
PS why can we not have a spill and grimmer checker on this sight?
I like this chumley address!
The airmanship that I refer to is not breakfast/crew duty time/planning/radio calls and so on,and other irrelevant,to me, data.
What I stated many moons ago was what happened once they were airborne.
Simple things like starting a stopwatch on the dashboard as a "run in to coast warning" as a backup to the starwars nav system that I understand they were not too happy with.
Have you a shred of evidence to suggest they were not using maps marked with distance and TTG to back up the 252 which was SOP during my time on SH
Gosh if I mention DR backup I will bring lots of modern aviators down on my back again, but I flew the Seaking 4 with Tans and always had a backup running in my mind and on my knee pad. Is that so wrong? It certainly stopped me running into the Caradon Hill mast.
Also SOP along with a Decca map during my early single pilot Puma days
Ploughing on - thumb in bum - in worsening weather/vis/snow/turbulence et all relying on the dodgy black boxes that the crew knew about does not seem to me to be a sensible course of action.
Can you confirm how you know this to be factually correct
Approaching the coast, as I have stated before, is a high risk business if the weather is starting to turn against you, and that moment when it is turning to rat**** is so very difficult to judge.
I am sorry to admit that I always chickened out early, slowed down, descended, hover taxied et all until I could clearly see the beach/cliff/ship/what have you.
It's not called being chicken it's called AIRMANSHIP.
I am still here. Not because I am clever, but like all sensible aviators I am nervous.........................
PS why can we not have a spill and grimmer checker on this sight?
Join Date: Feb 2007
Location: Oxon
Age: 66
Posts: 1,942
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
SFFP
You have neglected one important finding of the AAIB - which was that the Chinook impacted at a speed of approx 150 kts. That equates to slightly greater than 253 ft/sec or approximately 80 metres/sec. The highest estimate of the visibility by those in the vicinity was by Mr Murchie (a Qualified Met Observer) whose estimate was "15 to 20 metres at most".
If I was a barrister in a court of law and was to ask Mr Murchie to tell me on oath what the actually visibility was 30 meters away from where he stood what do you reckon his answer would be
That speed therefore gave them just one quarter of a second to acquire, recognise and attempt to avoid danger.
1/4 of a second to spot and react
I must point out, however, that the assessed speed at impact was whilst attempting an apparent escape manoeuvre ; the speed prior to that attempt would of course have been greater.
Whilst it is apparent that a belated escape manoeuvre was attempted, that attempt was to late to prevent impact with the ground.
Where did they find the time to spot and react to the upcoming disaster if the vis was only 20 to 30 meters
The Forecast weather for the Mull would have precluded flight in accordance with VFR. The actual weather at the Mull as assessed by 2 qualified Met Observers was distinctly worse than the Forecast. That assessment was reinforced by the evidence of 7 other eye witnesses.
You have neglected one important finding of the AAIB - which was that the Chinook impacted at a speed of approx 150 kts. That equates to slightly greater than 253 ft/sec or approximately 80 metres/sec. The highest estimate of the visibility by those in the vicinity was by Mr Murchie (a Qualified Met Observer) whose estimate was "15 to 20 metres at most".
If I was a barrister in a court of law and was to ask Mr Murchie to tell me on oath what the actually visibility was 30 meters away from where he stood what do you reckon his answer would be
That speed therefore gave them just one quarter of a second to acquire, recognise and attempt to avoid danger.
1/4 of a second to spot and react
I must point out, however, that the assessed speed at impact was whilst attempting an apparent escape manoeuvre ; the speed prior to that attempt would of course have been greater.
Whilst it is apparent that a belated escape manoeuvre was attempted, that attempt was to late to prevent impact with the ground.
Where did they find the time to spot and react to the upcoming disaster if the vis was only 20 to 30 meters
The Forecast weather for the Mull would have precluded flight in accordance with VFR. The actual weather at the Mull as assessed by 2 qualified Met Observers was distinctly worse than the Forecast. That assessment was reinforced by the evidence of 7 other eye witnesses.
If you were really a pilot in the RAF you would know for sure that a forecast is precisely that, it's a best guess as to what may happen weather wise in the coming hours.
In my 20 odd years of flying the amount of forecasts that eventually mirror actuals is absolutely nowhere near 100%
This really is not rocket science, I make tea and coffee for a living and even I get it.
bast0n:
.
Well of course you are quite right, indeed you are so right as to be more than quite right but utterly and totally right! Congratulations for encapsulating the very essence of good airmanship so succinctly. Is the above quote by chance one of the "Rules of Airmanship" quoted by JP, or merely stating the blindingly obvious?
What on earth has it to do with the price of fish? The implication is that the pilots did the very thing that you feel not to be sensible, which of course would be an act of Gross Negligence and agrees entirely with the RO's finding. If that is indeed what you are saying, I find your oft repeated assurance that the pilots were not negligent but were in error as to be somewhat disingenuous. They may well have been in error, I think that is a possibility that all acknowledge. They may just as equally have acted in a completely exemplary fashion to the very end but were helpless in avoiding the accident that both would know confronted them. We just don't know. Well most of us just don't know. Some of course know that they would never have found themselves in that latter situation, thanks to their superior knowledge, experience and proficiency. Others merely think, "There but for the Grace of God...".
Ploughing on - thumb in bum - in worsening weather/vis/snow/turbulence et all relying on the dodgy black boxes that the crew knew about does not seem to me to be a sensible course of action
Well of course you are quite right, indeed you are so right as to be more than quite right but utterly and totally right! Congratulations for encapsulating the very essence of good airmanship so succinctly. Is the above quote by chance one of the "Rules of Airmanship" quoted by JP, or merely stating the blindingly obvious?
What on earth has it to do with the price of fish? The implication is that the pilots did the very thing that you feel not to be sensible, which of course would be an act of Gross Negligence and agrees entirely with the RO's finding. If that is indeed what you are saying, I find your oft repeated assurance that the pilots were not negligent but were in error as to be somewhat disingenuous. They may well have been in error, I think that is a possibility that all acknowledge. They may just as equally have acted in a completely exemplary fashion to the very end but were helpless in avoiding the accident that both would know confronted them. We just don't know. Well most of us just don't know. Some of course know that they would never have found themselves in that latter situation, thanks to their superior knowledge, experience and proficiency. Others merely think, "There but for the Grace of God...".
Join Date: May 2002
Location: On the keyboard
Posts: 73
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Recent posters remind me of two aphorisms attributed to the great economist, John Maynard Keynes.
1. There are only two kinds of economic forecasters: those who don't know what will happen and those who don't know that they don't know what will happen.
Similar attitudes, with the timescale reversed, are all too common on this thread. Nobody, but NOBODY, will ever know precisely how and why the Chinook flew into cumulo-granite. End of story.
2. When accused of having changed his mind, Keynes replied "When the facts change, I change my opinions. What do you do, Sir?"
In this case, it is now abundantly clear that the "facts", as presented to the BoI, have changed radically. Why, then, have W & D not changed their opinions?
Roll on Lord Philip's report!
1. There are only two kinds of economic forecasters: those who don't know what will happen and those who don't know that they don't know what will happen.
Similar attitudes, with the timescale reversed, are all too common on this thread. Nobody, but NOBODY, will ever know precisely how and why the Chinook flew into cumulo-granite. End of story.
2. When accused of having changed his mind, Keynes replied "When the facts change, I change my opinions. What do you do, Sir?"
In this case, it is now abundantly clear that the "facts", as presented to the BoI, have changed radically. Why, then, have W & D not changed their opinions?
Roll on Lord Philip's report!
