Chinook - Still Hitting Back 3 (Merged)
the attending helicopter that arrived less than an hour after the crash only gave the description of conditions on the high ground - pity he was not asked to say what the view was like from out to sea.
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Totally surprised on entering the mist.
Good post Walter.
What you describe is far more likely than a deliberate, controlled, headlong rush into IMC.
The crew flew much closer to the fogbank than they intended. That could be caused by TANS mishandling or malfunction followed by Visual Illusion.
And that Caz and JP is Aircrew Error, not Negligence.
I advance this theory as a possibility. Like everyone on this thread, I cannot possibly know what happened.
What you describe is far more likely than a deliberate, controlled, headlong rush into IMC.
The crew flew much closer to the fogbank than they intended. That could be caused by TANS mishandling or malfunction followed by Visual Illusion.
And that Caz and JP is Aircrew Error, not Negligence.
I advance this theory as a possibility. Like everyone on this thread, I cannot possibly know what happened.
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Re Weather
Perhaps instead you should consider the letter written to the Daily Telegraph by Sqn Ldr Donald Kinch, a very experienced Maritime Captain in Peace and War, who stated:-
" In light winds and high relative humidity, layers of fog and low cloud form adjacent to the Mull to obscure the high ground completely. There are occasions when a relatively calm sea and a grey sky of similar hue merge, so that in otherwise good visibility a pilot flying in accordance with Visual Flight Rules may be unaware that he is about to enter a fog/cloud bank."
In this case, however, the weather forecast had specifically warned that there was a 30 per cent chance that the weather in the vicinity of the Mull would be below VFR limits. The Pilots should, therefore, have been prepared for the poor weather and that they would have to climb to Safety Altitude and/or alter their routing to avoid the bad weather.
They adopted neither of those options but continued at high speed and low level in deteriorating weather conditions directly towards the high ground.
There is never any excuse for a negligent discharge of a weapon on a firing range because if the rules are obeyed it would not happen. The same principle applies in this tragic case.
Perhaps instead you should consider the letter written to the Daily Telegraph by Sqn Ldr Donald Kinch, a very experienced Maritime Captain in Peace and War, who stated:-
" In light winds and high relative humidity, layers of fog and low cloud form adjacent to the Mull to obscure the high ground completely. There are occasions when a relatively calm sea and a grey sky of similar hue merge, so that in otherwise good visibility a pilot flying in accordance with Visual Flight Rules may be unaware that he is about to enter a fog/cloud bank."
In this case, however, the weather forecast had specifically warned that there was a 30 per cent chance that the weather in the vicinity of the Mull would be below VFR limits. The Pilots should, therefore, have been prepared for the poor weather and that they would have to climb to Safety Altitude and/or alter their routing to avoid the bad weather.
They adopted neither of those options but continued at high speed and low level in deteriorating weather conditions directly towards the high ground.
There is never any excuse for a negligent discharge of a weapon on a firing range because if the rules are obeyed it would not happen. The same principle applies in this tragic case.
The Pilots should, therefore, have been prepared for the poor weather and that they would have to climb to Safety Altitude and/or alter their routing to avoid the bad weather.
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Caz,
The crew would certainly have formulated an escape plan for every part of the route. That plan would never have included a climb to SALT in the Mull area because that would clearly be illegal.
For the first leg to the Mull it would almost certainly be.
1. Slow down.
2. Stop.
3. Turn around.
Well at least that is what I, or I imagine, any other sane person would do in a helicopter.
The crew would certainly have formulated an escape plan for every part of the route. That plan would never have included a climb to SALT in the Mull area because that would clearly be illegal.
For the first leg to the Mull it would almost certainly be.
1. Slow down.
2. Stop.
3. Turn around.
Well at least that is what I, or I imagine, any other sane person would do in a helicopter.
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Just remember everybody, THE AIRCRAFT DID NOT HAVE A CLEARANCE TO CLIMB IN THE RELEASE TO SERVICE. IT WAS NOT A PLANNED OPTION.
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Dalek
Spot on.
You could add the old hover taxy to the beach if you were intent on finding the coast line to "coast crawl" until the weather improved.
I saw this quote on Rotorheads and though it perhaps relevant.
For the first leg to the Mull it would almost certainly be.
1. Slow down.
2. Stop.
3. Turn around.
1. Slow down.
2. Stop.
3. Turn around.
You could add the old hover taxy to the beach if you were intent on finding the coast line to "coast crawl" until the weather improved.
There are no new ways to crash a helicopter, we just keep repeating the same mistakes others have made before us.
Last edited by bast0n; 4th Dec 2010 at 12:03. Reason: Add quote
There are no new ways to crash a helicopter,
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Yeh, I thought this crash was a new way for a helicopter too ...
Caz,
with all due respect, had they run inadvertantly into IMC before they got to the Mull they would have had a chance to do something about it - prescribed actions which you and others are aware of and would surely realise that by the time these pilots had got to flying Chinooks in the RAF they could be relied upon to do the right thing.
We know that they were not in IMC at waypoint change (nearest ground only 600 metres-ish away) or they would not have dumped their local STANS waypoint.
I say that the weather of concern was right on the landmass - it was generated by it.
How do you judge your distance off a cloud/fog bank? - you could see the motley Mull alright, but it could have looked like a blimp made of DPM of unknown size in a whispy cloud.
If you inadvertantly ran into this localised IMC Wx, you'd be stuffed.
So why did they approach so close so fast? Perhaps something was telling them that they had further to go - Flt Lt Tapper would not have been trusting the STANS of the day to better than a mile after a sea crossing so dont worry about errors in the main nav system - try and think of what they could have been referring to, that they would trust because of its intrinsic reliability and which also could so easily be used to mislead them, accidentally or wilfully.
If you'll pardon me being a little didactic, perhaps I should spell it out
C P L S
Caz,
with all due respect, had they run inadvertantly into IMC before they got to the Mull they would have had a chance to do something about it - prescribed actions which you and others are aware of and would surely realise that by the time these pilots had got to flying Chinooks in the RAF they could be relied upon to do the right thing.
We know that they were not in IMC at waypoint change (nearest ground only 600 metres-ish away) or they would not have dumped their local STANS waypoint.
I say that the weather of concern was right on the landmass - it was generated by it.
How do you judge your distance off a cloud/fog bank? - you could see the motley Mull alright, but it could have looked like a blimp made of DPM of unknown size in a whispy cloud.
If you inadvertantly ran into this localised IMC Wx, you'd be stuffed.
So why did they approach so close so fast? Perhaps something was telling them that they had further to go - Flt Lt Tapper would not have been trusting the STANS of the day to better than a mile after a sea crossing so dont worry about errors in the main nav system - try and think of what they could have been referring to, that they would trust because of its intrinsic reliability and which also could so easily be used to mislead them, accidentally or wilfully.
If you'll pardon me being a little didactic, perhaps I should spell it out
C P L S
Last edited by walter kennedy; 4th Dec 2010 at 12:38. Reason: schpelling and addition
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Pulse
Sorry - I must have missed the bit where FADEC caused this one...............
Would I be right in thinking that, in 1994, there was a new way to crash a helicopter. Wasn't the Mk2 Chinook the first helicopter to have FADEC?
Bast0n
do read posts as written, not as you wish to reinforce your personal views.
The suggestion is that there is a new way to crash a helicopter, not necessarily that this was the actual cause of the accident under discussion - only that it adds one possibility. In the case of this type, one with known defects (although the behaviour was withheld from the aircrew operating the type).
do read posts as written, not as you wish to reinforce your personal views.
The suggestion is that there is a new way to crash a helicopter, not necessarily that this was the actual cause of the accident under discussion - only that it adds one possibility. In the case of this type, one with known defects (although the behaviour was withheld from the aircrew operating the type).
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Fitter
Thought that I had! If every bit of new kit fitted to aircraft gave rise to a new way to crash you have a point. I don't agree with that view.
My point with the quote was just to say that the operating of all these bits of kit that are introduced is always much the same, and whatever bit of kit you give someone the MoD/engineers/aircrew/et al will some how manage to cock it up at some time, somewhere.
I was not trying to
. If you gained that impression I must attend to my grammar, elucidation and so on to make my points clearer. Sorry.
do read posts as written
My point with the quote was just to say that the operating of all these bits of kit that are introduced is always much the same, and whatever bit of kit you give someone the MoD/engineers/aircrew/et al will some how manage to cock it up at some time, somewhere.
I was not trying to
reinforce your personal views
bast0n:
Well the MOD sure managed to cock this one up, no doubt about it. A Fully Autonomous Digital Engine Control (FADEC) means just that, not only the primary but the back up control as well was digital, and controlled by code that was bestrewn with errors. It had arbitrarily caused run-ups, rundowns and shutdowns totally uncommanded by pilots. The BoI could have "discovered" that if they had chosen to call the Odiham Test Pilot to give evidence. They did not. I cannot but wonder how your homespun philosophy would have dealt with that if it were fitted to your Wessex in Borneo bastOn. Even the stopwatch, charts and furled umbrella might not have prevailed I suspect. That is what pulse1 meant I think, and I have to concur.
Did the FADEC cause this accident? I don't know, though you and others seem to.
My point with the quote was just to say that the operating of all these bits of kit that are introduced is always much the same, and whatever bit of kit you give someone the MoD/engineers/aircrew/et al will some how manage to cock it up at some time, somewhere.
Did the FADEC cause this accident? I don't know, though you and others seem to.
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Chugaz
You have been looking in my logbook again!
Seriously though, you have a point. The Wx 5 was the first, (I think), with computer controlled engines with no manual backup. God knows if digital came into it but I suspect not! It gave untold problems to start with, especially when it was moved to the hot and humid. Runaway ups and downs, undemanded shut downs linked to the IGV actuators, inabiltity to re-start when hot, et all. Some people cocked it up but it was an amazingly forgiving aircaft having a surfeit of power when on single engine. Even so mis-handling of computer emergencies certainly caused one fatal crash to my knowledge, and there may have been more.
Yes FADEC may well have contributed to this one - mis-handled - uncontrollable - who knows, and I have never claimed to in spite of your assertion. Never mind - must go and re-fish oil my Wanchai burberry..........
I cannot but wonder how your homespun philosophy would have dealt with that if it were fitted to your Wessex in Borneo bastOn. Even the stopwatch, charts and furled umbrella might not have prevailed I suspect.
Seriously though, you have a point. The Wx 5 was the first, (I think), with computer controlled engines with no manual backup. God knows if digital came into it but I suspect not! It gave untold problems to start with, especially when it was moved to the hot and humid. Runaway ups and downs, undemanded shut downs linked to the IGV actuators, inabiltity to re-start when hot, et all. Some people cocked it up but it was an amazingly forgiving aircaft having a surfeit of power when on single engine. Even so mis-handling of computer emergencies certainly caused one fatal crash to my knowledge, and there may have been more.
Yes FADEC may well have contributed to this one - mis-handled - uncontrollable - who knows, and I have never claimed to in spite of your assertion. Never mind - must go and re-fish oil my Wanchai burberry..........
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Re your 7307
May I refer you to para 32c of the" BOI" which clearly states:-
"In the forecast conditions, the icing clearance would have allowed an IMC pull-up from low level to Safety Altitude over the Mull of Kintyre."
You will note that there are no caveats whatsoever to that statement.
Moreover, the Investigating BOI stated at para 54:-
If the crew did not have visual contact with the Mull, and had decided not to attempt a landfall in the vicinity of the lighthouse, they would, in the opinion of the Board, have been faced with 2 options: to turn away from land and attempt to route VFR towards Corran, parallel to their intended track but over the sea to the west of the Mull of Kintyre Peninsula, until clear of the poor weather; or to climb to a safe height and fly over the Mull of Kintyre on track, accepting a change of in-flight conditions if necessary.
I believe that the BOI, the Reviewing Officers and I are of one mind in respect of this scenario.
Re your 7307
May I refer you to para 32c of the" BOI" which clearly states:-
"In the forecast conditions, the icing clearance would have allowed an IMC pull-up from low level to Safety Altitude over the Mull of Kintyre."
You will note that there are no caveats whatsoever to that statement.
Moreover, the Investigating BOI stated at para 54:-
If the crew did not have visual contact with the Mull, and had decided not to attempt a landfall in the vicinity of the lighthouse, they would, in the opinion of the Board, have been faced with 2 options: to turn away from land and attempt to route VFR towards Corran, parallel to their intended track but over the sea to the west of the Mull of Kintyre Peninsula, until clear of the poor weather; or to climb to a safe height and fly over the Mull of Kintyre on track, accepting a change of in-flight conditions if necessary.
I believe that the BOI, the Reviewing Officers and I are of one mind in respect of this scenario.
Assuming, that is, that they had full control over their clearly non-airworthy aircraft....
And that is something neither cazatou, Air Chief Marshal (Retd) 'John Purdey', bast0n, Wratten, Day nor anyone else can be sure of 'with no doubt whatsoever'.
And that is something neither cazatou, Air Chief Marshal (Retd) 'John Purdey', bast0n, Wratten, Day nor anyone else can be sure of 'with no doubt whatsoever'.
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Baston:
By definition "computer controlled" is "digital"... Just for information. 
With regard to the FADEC. It has been stated that the code "cannot be audited". That's an utter joke... Actually, it's not because it is so bloody unfunny when the code controls critical systems. The code, like any other code, is auditable - someone has to load the code to the chips from somewhere so there is a "source". So there's another reason why it "can't be audited" and the only reason it can't be is because someone won't release the source code itself. (There has to be source code... Without source code no updates are possible and therefore no bug fixes are possible - even if the source code has "mysteriously" disappeared it is trivial to decompile compiled code if someone wanted to). Sensibly speaking, there is only one reason the authors won't release the source code - because they know it is faulty and they know that they will be liable for the errors and failure to properly test said code. How, you might ask, can they get away with that? Simple... They are being protected by someone with a lot of clout.
PS: I taught myself Assembly Language in 1982 and have worked professionally in the computer field at a high level for the last 20+ years...
Caz;
You really don't have any shame do you?
The Wx 5 was the first, (I think), with computer controlled engines with no manual backup. God knows if digital came into it but I suspect not!
With regard to the FADEC. It has been stated that the code "cannot be audited". That's an utter joke... Actually, it's not because it is so bloody unfunny when the code controls critical systems. The code, like any other code, is auditable - someone has to load the code to the chips from somewhere so there is a "source". So there's another reason why it "can't be audited" and the only reason it can't be is because someone won't release the source code itself. (There has to be source code... Without source code no updates are possible and therefore no bug fixes are possible - even if the source code has "mysteriously" disappeared it is trivial to decompile compiled code if someone wanted to). Sensibly speaking, there is only one reason the authors won't release the source code - because they know it is faulty and they know that they will be liable for the errors and failure to properly test said code. How, you might ask, can they get away with that? Simple... They are being protected by someone with a lot of clout.
PS: I taught myself Assembly Language in 1982 and have worked professionally in the computer field at a high level for the last 20+ years...
Caz;
You really don't have any shame do you?
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Beeegs
and vice versa for the rest of you!
Good night...................
Assuming, that is, that they had full control over their clearly non-airworthy aircraft....
And that is something neither cazatou, Air Chief Marshal (Retd) 'John Purdey', bast0n, Wratten, Day nor anyone else can be sure of 'with no doubt whatsoever'.
And that is something neither cazatou, Air Chief Marshal (Retd) 'John Purdey', bast0n, Wratten, Day nor anyone else can be sure of 'with no doubt whatsoever'.
Good night...................
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Good morning all...
caz said
here's one caveat for you dear caz:
The emergency safe alt and the leg safety alt (based on a 15nm or 25nm 'lozenge' around the leg to waypoint B - the one to which the nav kit was referenced) was, in fact, 6500ft or thereabouts. With a transition altitude of 5000 ft, a low RPS of about 1000mbs and a correct quadrantal, that gives the minimum safe flight level as FL70 - somewhat above the icing level, don't you think? That is the minimum FL I would have flown if I had aborted from LL and was IMC in that part of Scotland. However, it is patently obvious that this option was not available to ZD576 because of the icing restriction and why a 'cruise climb to 2500ft' was a ludicrous suggestion for the BoI to make.
caz said
"In the forecast conditions, the icing clearance would have allowed an IMC pull-up from low level to Safety Altitude over the Mull of Kintyre."
You will note that there are no caveats whatsoever to that statement.
You will note that there are no caveats whatsoever to that statement.
The emergency safe alt and the leg safety alt (based on a 15nm or 25nm 'lozenge' around the leg to waypoint B - the one to which the nav kit was referenced) was, in fact, 6500ft or thereabouts. With a transition altitude of 5000 ft, a low RPS of about 1000mbs and a correct quadrantal, that gives the minimum safe flight level as FL70 - somewhat above the icing level, don't you think? That is the minimum FL I would have flown if I had aborted from LL and was IMC in that part of Scotland. However, it is patently obvious that this option was not available to ZD576 because of the icing restriction and why a 'cruise climb to 2500ft' was a ludicrous suggestion for the BoI to make.