Chinook - Still Hitting Back 3 (Merged)
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One hopes, indeed, Flipster, as so often posted here, that this glaring error in that BoI statement (not noticed by WMD) is acknowledged in the enquiry by Lord Philip also. Had they said they could have climbed above the highest point of the Mull that would have been possible, but not something even our 'experts' would support in IMC, I fancy.
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Quite! The idea of a cruise climb to 2500ft is preposterous. In fact, does anyone know what were the Belfast and Portree RPS at the time. If either were 996 mbs or below, then that would put the MSFL to FL90!
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That aircraft could not pull up to Safety Altitude that day because of the lack of icing clearance, the captain said that he could not, to me and others present. You want that on oath?? I was out flying at the same time and a pull up into cloud was not an option for me either. The BOI said a lot of things that you keep quoting, what exactly did I do wrong with MY calculations that day, because Jon and the other members of my formation certainly agreed with me? A standard MK1 Chinook COULD have done it because they had a slightly better icing clearance. It was a long long time ago, but I can remember enough from the day about the weather. From the North West coast of NI, we could see Scotland, viz was good. Cloudbase was low, in limits, but low. It was bloody cold.......
Of interest, another board of enquiry that I was involved in directly, as an accused supervisor, stated that when the crew entered icing conditions, they should have CLIMBED as high as possible in IMC, because icing gets less as it gets colder. Never really got that one, they were in 8000' mountains in winter, but they were a BOI so they must have been right.............
Of interest, another board of enquiry that I was involved in directly, as an accused supervisor, stated that when the crew entered icing conditions, they should have CLIMBED as high as possible in IMC, because icing gets less as it gets colder. Never really got that one, they were in 8000' mountains in winter, but they were a BOI so they must have been right.............
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Cazatou,
You were once an Andover pilot. I know, I have flown with you.
If the only safe option was a climb to leg or route MSFL we could never have flown in Scotland, because most of the time we were unable to achieve those heights after an engine failure. We got round the problem by breaking up legs, working out safe escape headings at critical points on the route and using the bicycle chain method of working out revised (lower) SALT's.
On this particular flight the crew did not need to do this because they had the option of hover and turn round.
It is not essential to be able to achieve route MSFL as long as you have a viable safety plan.
Remember the Drift Down and Stabilisation Graphs in the ODM.
You were once an Andover pilot. I know, I have flown with you.
If the only safe option was a climb to leg or route MSFL we could never have flown in Scotland, because most of the time we were unable to achieve those heights after an engine failure. We got round the problem by breaking up legs, working out safe escape headings at critical points on the route and using the bicycle chain method of working out revised (lower) SALT's.
On this particular flight the crew did not need to do this because they had the option of hover and turn round.
It is not essential to be able to achieve route MSFL as long as you have a viable safety plan.
Remember the Drift Down and Stabilisation Graphs in the ODM.
bast0n:-
Thank you bast0n for seeing the point I was making and for revealing a not dissimilar situation with the Wessex 5 in your day. I had no idea that there had been previous non-manual back-up engine controllers prior to the HC2's. Interesting perhaps that they were manual in the interim. Not wishing to start a geek war, but I think AA is slightly in error to say that computer means necessarily digital, as both you and I come from a far off time when they were all analogue, including the Aer Lingus 1-11 sim ("St.Thetic", clever eh?) and the Dan-Air Comet sim. Notorious though they were for drifting off spec, they could always be tweaked back on again and didn't tend to go off on one as the rogue digital ones loaded with duff code per the Chinook Mk2 could.That was the point I was making and that you acknowledge. "Putting the airworthiness considerations aside", as some would have us do, is not an option I'm afraid. They existed, are pertinent, and must be fully reviewed IMHO. It is highly probable that they were a root cause of this tragedy.
BTW could we have a translation of your last sentence, or is it a naval ritual over which one might best politely draw a veil?
You have been looking in my logbook again!
Seriously though, you have a point. The Wx 5 was the first, (I think), with computer controlled engines with no manual backup. ........
Yes FADEC may well have contributed to this one - mis-handled - uncontrollable - who knows, and I have never claimed to in spite of your assertion. Never mind - must go and re-fish oil my Wanchai burberry..........
Seriously though, you have a point. The Wx 5 was the first, (I think), with computer controlled engines with no manual backup. ........
Yes FADEC may well have contributed to this one - mis-handled - uncontrollable - who knows, and I have never claimed to in spite of your assertion. Never mind - must go and re-fish oil my Wanchai burberry..........
BTW could we have a translation of your last sentence, or is it a naval ritual over which one might best politely draw a veil?
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Chugaz
You mentioned my furled umbrella in a previuos post! Well yes I did carry a brolly but it was the bamboo and paper variety known as the Wanchai Burberry - smelled awful - and its efficacy could be restored by wiping with oils various left over from.........................? Well thats another naval tail!
Never mind - must go and re-fish oil my Wanchai burberry..........
caz:
That just about sums up the BoI, The RO's, and yourself I'm afraid caz. The BoI did not do its job, which was to discover why this aircraft crashed, chiefly by not calling on those who might have helped them do just that. The RO's were not satisfied with them either and substituted their own bizarre finding for whatever reasons we can only guess. You have nailed your colours to their mast and seem determined to sink or swim with them. I should get hold of a Mae West if I were you, but your refusal to deviate at all from the brief is making your case ever less buoyant, I fear.
bast0n, so it was a naval ritual, I was right! I imagine one of the many pipes would have been; "All hands to oiling Wanchai Burberrys, I say again...". We crabs merely knew them by the far more plebeian title of Paper Umbrellas. One of our navs was never without them, carrying one at all times, with at least two others packed in reserve. The entire consignment was confiscated and destroyed by Australian Customs as "imported vegetable matter". He was never really the same again!
I believe that the BOI, the Reviewing Officers and I are of one mind in respect of this scenario.
bast0n, so it was a naval ritual, I was right! I imagine one of the many pipes would have been; "All hands to oiling Wanchai Burberrys, I say again...". We crabs merely knew them by the far more plebeian title of Paper Umbrellas. One of our navs was never without them, carrying one at all times, with at least two others packed in reserve. The entire consignment was confiscated and destroyed by Australian Customs as "imported vegetable matter". He was never really the same again!
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Walter and CPLS
For all the years I have been on this thread, I have watched many people (including myself at times) who have poured scorn on Walter and his CPLS theory.
It is now sixteen years since the crash and it turns out that Walter was right, at least in part. CPLS was indeed fitted to the aircraft.
If you persist for another sixteen years Walter, someone may come forward and admit to swiching on a CPLS transmitter on the Mull that day.
If that transmitter was faulty or switched on in the wrong place, it could explain why the crew got too close to the Fogbank.
Just a thought.
It is now sixteen years since the crash and it turns out that Walter was right, at least in part. CPLS was indeed fitted to the aircraft.
If you persist for another sixteen years Walter, someone may come forward and admit to swiching on a CPLS transmitter on the Mull that day.
If that transmitter was faulty or switched on in the wrong place, it could explain why the crew got too close to the Fogbank.
Just a thought.
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Dalek - I posted a long time ago my analysis of the 'probabilities' of 'getting away' with such an assassination attempt without it going 'pear-shaped', being discovered and the chances of success. It is worth sitting down and asking yourself if it would have been feasible, regardless of equipment which may or may not have been fitted/working/approved or a crew which may or may not have been tasked to test it. Ask yourself the odds that:
a crew would not sense something was wrong from visual cues, abort the mission and report back
the weather would provide EXACTLY the right orographic cloud at exactly the right time
the crew would have pressed on at cruise speed towards a 'murky Mull' relying solely on a reading fed into some black box by persons unknown.
Ask yourself also who tasked it? Who authorised it?
To me the whole question is of passing interest only for these reasons and should not detract from the gross injustice dealt to the deceased crew and families which is the thrust of this thread.
Perhaps we need to keep watching Wiki-leaks?? I guess in the world of bad and failed US plots against other countries, with the known sympathies for the IRA amongst our US 'friends' you just never know!
a crew would not sense something was wrong from visual cues, abort the mission and report back
the weather would provide EXACTLY the right orographic cloud at exactly the right time
the crew would have pressed on at cruise speed towards a 'murky Mull' relying solely on a reading fed into some black box by persons unknown.
Ask yourself also who tasked it? Who authorised it?
To me the whole question is of passing interest only for these reasons and should not detract from the gross injustice dealt to the deceased crew and families which is the thrust of this thread.
Perhaps we need to keep watching Wiki-leaks?? I guess in the world of bad and failed US plots against other countries, with the known sympathies for the IRA amongst our US 'friends' you just never know!
CPLS
I don’t agree with Walter’s theory of a conspiracy to bring down the aircraft.
But that CPLS seems to have been fitted raises a number of questions, among them;
Given the Service Deviation for CPLS wasn’t issued until the following year, how was it fitted to ZD576 and under what authority?
An STF requires a Trials Instruction or similar. If it exists, what does it say? Given the nature of the kit, one could not trial it properly without someone on ground at the other end (which is where I encroach on Walter’s theory but I don’t think that particular flight would be tasked with such a trial, but stranger things have happened. After all, ZD576 was flying that day without any legitimate clearance to do so).
Was this the classified kit mentioned by a BoI witness? Either way, why is its existence not mentioned in the RTS?
Were the crew aware of the EMC problems notified formally in the later SD? We know the US fitted the kit – did the UK simply read across not understanding the possible effect on UK differences, like FADEC?
Given the nature of the kit, did it have to be integrated in any way with existing aircraft kit (which, by definition, was not cleared for use anyway). As nothing else was cleared, it is highly unlikely Boscombe would have ignored that to jump forward to testing and trialling with CPLS fitted. These things are done in strict sequence and on 2/6/94 Boscombe had yet to commence Nav and Comms work in earnest on a Mk2.
And why did the BoI not ask these questions?
Summary – If CPLS caused a problem the likelihood is it was EMC related or connected to the physical installation. But that is just an opinion. It was up to the BoI to check and they failed.
But that CPLS seems to have been fitted raises a number of questions, among them;
Given the Service Deviation for CPLS wasn’t issued until the following year, how was it fitted to ZD576 and under what authority?
An STF requires a Trials Instruction or similar. If it exists, what does it say? Given the nature of the kit, one could not trial it properly without someone on ground at the other end (which is where I encroach on Walter’s theory but I don’t think that particular flight would be tasked with such a trial, but stranger things have happened. After all, ZD576 was flying that day without any legitimate clearance to do so).
Was this the classified kit mentioned by a BoI witness? Either way, why is its existence not mentioned in the RTS?
Were the crew aware of the EMC problems notified formally in the later SD? We know the US fitted the kit – did the UK simply read across not understanding the possible effect on UK differences, like FADEC?
Given the nature of the kit, did it have to be integrated in any way with existing aircraft kit (which, by definition, was not cleared for use anyway). As nothing else was cleared, it is highly unlikely Boscombe would have ignored that to jump forward to testing and trialling with CPLS fitted. These things are done in strict sequence and on 2/6/94 Boscombe had yet to commence Nav and Comms work in earnest on a Mk2.
And why did the BoI not ask these questions?
Summary – If CPLS caused a problem the likelihood is it was EMC related or connected to the physical installation. But that is just an opinion. It was up to the BoI to check and they failed.
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BOAC
I am very disappointed with you – especially given your pedigree – where have your balls gone?
Can you not resist the “group think” that has so constrained debate here?
Do not think emotionally like women – work through things rationally, like men used to do.
Let us go through your emotional responses – see the elephant in the room and deal with it:
<<...a crew would not sense something was wrong from visual cues, abort the mission and report back...>>
have I been somewhat too subtle about my descriptions of that localised weather, visual illusion, spatial orientation, my humble opinion after years of coastal navigation and being particularly familiar with the NW of Scotland from sea and air and hill top? - has something stopped you from calling my bluff when I suggested some years back that anyone interested in this case should go up there in the summer and, late in the afternoon to early evening, with a southerly blowing (most of the time, it's the prevailing wind there) you'd get the chance to witness those all so common conditions – if you cant afford a plane, just go out in a boat.
The lack of visual cues as they approached closely is the crux of the matter.
Those conditions that day would have been predictable with a forecast a few days ahead so much so that they could have been counted on – weeks ahead, they could have been expected, at that time of day, at that time of year.
<<the weather would provide EXACTLY the right orographic cloud at exactly the right time>>
The orographic cloud, so common there, did not have to be “exactly” right – it just had to obscure the higher topographical features – as it so often does – the subtlety is the ground hugging mist running up slopes that are devoid of recognisable features – with a strong wind, that develops hundreds of feet below the start of the oro cloud as I have described previously and have posted links to a video I took of its formation.
<<the crew would have pressed on at cruise speed towards a 'murky Mull' relying solely on a reading fed into some black box by persons unknown.>>
Chinooks can stop on a sixpence, so 150 kts should be viewed in context – but yes, one would have expected prudence without any local guidance – which is why I originally predicted some source of DME. The PRC112 is intrinsically reliable and very accurate, well used by that time by several countries. If you were flying VFR and something was giving you a measurement that you expected to be accurate, then you should have expected to stay out of contact with the mist – the American unit based at Macrihanish at the time would have been well versed in the use of the ground equipment and willing to help out their friends – a special relationship that needs lots of Preparation H.
<<Ask yourself also who tasked it? Who authorised it?>>
Well we would all like to know these things – have you (collectively speaking – want to pitch it right) accepted for 16 years the spin we have had that Flt Lt Tapper (by all accounts a conservative and responsible officer up until this point) pushed himself for this sortie, shortcutting authorisation, briefing, communication in general, and flouting common sense? – he simply had to have had support for this sortie from higher up that has thus far not been acknowledged by the RAF.
<<... the 'probabilities' of 'getting away' with such... >> it was a free shot with a better than 50% chance of success – doubtless there would have been a messier plan B.
<<... known sympathies for the IRA amongst our US 'friends'... .>> are you aware of how much the powers-that-be in London wanted to wash their hands of the NI problem? Even the PM and cabinet ministers publicly expressed the view that they wished NI would just go away – but this team on board that helicopter that day were not enthusiastic about the proposed peace process, did not think concessions to terrorists were necessary, and had they got to Ft George they would have set in motion their plans for a hard line, including mass round-ups – the bargaining position of the IRA would have been weakened but, more importantly for our internationalist political leaders, two of the last nationalist enclaves in Europe (Ulster and Ireland) would continue. So perhaps the scale of action and capability of potential perpetrators could be greater than the odd sympathiser.
<< … the gross injustice dealt to the deceased crew ... >> what superlative would you ascribe to the verdict if at the very least an exercise went wrong that had not even been disclosed and it was another party's fault? - further, what would be left in your vocabulary if the action had been wilful and organised?
Goes beyond words, doesn't it?
I am very disappointed with you – especially given your pedigree – where have your balls gone?
Can you not resist the “group think” that has so constrained debate here?
Do not think emotionally like women – work through things rationally, like men used to do.
Let us go through your emotional responses – see the elephant in the room and deal with it:
<<...a crew would not sense something was wrong from visual cues, abort the mission and report back...>>
have I been somewhat too subtle about my descriptions of that localised weather, visual illusion, spatial orientation, my humble opinion after years of coastal navigation and being particularly familiar with the NW of Scotland from sea and air and hill top? - has something stopped you from calling my bluff when I suggested some years back that anyone interested in this case should go up there in the summer and, late in the afternoon to early evening, with a southerly blowing (most of the time, it's the prevailing wind there) you'd get the chance to witness those all so common conditions – if you cant afford a plane, just go out in a boat.
The lack of visual cues as they approached closely is the crux of the matter.
Those conditions that day would have been predictable with a forecast a few days ahead so much so that they could have been counted on – weeks ahead, they could have been expected, at that time of day, at that time of year.
<<the weather would provide EXACTLY the right orographic cloud at exactly the right time>>
The orographic cloud, so common there, did not have to be “exactly” right – it just had to obscure the higher topographical features – as it so often does – the subtlety is the ground hugging mist running up slopes that are devoid of recognisable features – with a strong wind, that develops hundreds of feet below the start of the oro cloud as I have described previously and have posted links to a video I took of its formation.
<<the crew would have pressed on at cruise speed towards a 'murky Mull' relying solely on a reading fed into some black box by persons unknown.>>
Chinooks can stop on a sixpence, so 150 kts should be viewed in context – but yes, one would have expected prudence without any local guidance – which is why I originally predicted some source of DME. The PRC112 is intrinsically reliable and very accurate, well used by that time by several countries. If you were flying VFR and something was giving you a measurement that you expected to be accurate, then you should have expected to stay out of contact with the mist – the American unit based at Macrihanish at the time would have been well versed in the use of the ground equipment and willing to help out their friends – a special relationship that needs lots of Preparation H.
<<Ask yourself also who tasked it? Who authorised it?>>
Well we would all like to know these things – have you (collectively speaking – want to pitch it right) accepted for 16 years the spin we have had that Flt Lt Tapper (by all accounts a conservative and responsible officer up until this point) pushed himself for this sortie, shortcutting authorisation, briefing, communication in general, and flouting common sense? – he simply had to have had support for this sortie from higher up that has thus far not been acknowledged by the RAF.
<<... the 'probabilities' of 'getting away' with such... >> it was a free shot with a better than 50% chance of success – doubtless there would have been a messier plan B.
<<... known sympathies for the IRA amongst our US 'friends'... .>> are you aware of how much the powers-that-be in London wanted to wash their hands of the NI problem? Even the PM and cabinet ministers publicly expressed the view that they wished NI would just go away – but this team on board that helicopter that day were not enthusiastic about the proposed peace process, did not think concessions to terrorists were necessary, and had they got to Ft George they would have set in motion their plans for a hard line, including mass round-ups – the bargaining position of the IRA would have been weakened but, more importantly for our internationalist political leaders, two of the last nationalist enclaves in Europe (Ulster and Ireland) would continue. So perhaps the scale of action and capability of potential perpetrators could be greater than the odd sympathiser.
<< … the gross injustice dealt to the deceased crew ... >> what superlative would you ascribe to the verdict if at the very least an exercise went wrong that had not even been disclosed and it was another party's fault? - further, what would be left in your vocabulary if the action had been wilful and organised?
Goes beyond words, doesn't it?
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Walter,
Go back and read BOAC 4740.
If the plan is to kill everybody on board the aircraft it is a p**s poor plan.
The aircraft is approaching the coast with a visibility of one to two nms and the lighthouse area is clearly visible (Holbrook). I agree with you that the conditions are conducive to Visual Illusion, but people only succumb to illusion some of the time. Surely these master assassins, who have never come to light, could have devised a more foolproof plan.
Now, if you said that someone on the Mull, who was working with the aircraft, switched on the beacon in the wrong place and the subsequent Visual Illusion contributed to the accident. That I could believe.
But where is the evidence?
Go back and read BOAC 4740.
If the plan is to kill everybody on board the aircraft it is a p**s poor plan.
The aircraft is approaching the coast with a visibility of one to two nms and the lighthouse area is clearly visible (Holbrook). I agree with you that the conditions are conducive to Visual Illusion, but people only succumb to illusion some of the time. Surely these master assassins, who have never come to light, could have devised a more foolproof plan.
Now, if you said that someone on the Mull, who was working with the aircraft, switched on the beacon in the wrong place and the subsequent Visual Illusion contributed to the accident. That I could believe.
But where is the evidence?
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Walter - I'm sorry, but my balls are aching. Good luck with your endeavours and I hope the local police take note.
My conclusion of around an 8% chance of success remains, and my James Bond imagination will not stretch that far.
My conclusion of around an 8% chance of success remains, and my James Bond imagination will not stretch that far.
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As I've said several times before - you dont have to accept the whole "conspiracy" thing - but just in case it happened, it needed exploring fully, however unpallatable, because the implications are so serious. In doing so it emerges that there was a lot more that could have been established regarding the circumstances of this crash - analysis pointed to a deliberate close approach, etc leading to a conclusion that .... CPLS was used ... get the picture?
Sorry if my little wind-up caused offence - still hung over from that rather nice winter ale
Now why haven't you lot contributed positively to getting the basic intentions understood? - just sniping when anyone pushes an idea forward - shame.
Who exactly has been pushing this idea of saying nothing in the hope that their names will be cleared on the basis of there not being enough known to justify the verdict? I think they would have been cleared years ago if more had been exposed of what they were doing there.
You have to exercise freedom of speech otherwise it may wither away and not be there when you really need it.
Sorry if my little wind-up caused offence - still hung over from that rather nice winter ale
Now why haven't you lot contributed positively to getting the basic intentions understood? - just sniping when anyone pushes an idea forward - shame.
Who exactly has been pushing this idea of saying nothing in the hope that their names will be cleared on the basis of there not being enough known to justify the verdict? I think they would have been cleared years ago if more had been exposed of what they were doing there.
You have to exercise freedom of speech otherwise it may wither away and not be there when you really need it.
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Dalek
Evidence?
There were many parameters preserved which, combined with knowledge of local area and relating it to practical navigation, pointed to a deliberate approach (can't go through it all just now - makes for a 50 page report).
Use of a particular system was predicted as the only rational explanation and it was only subsequently that the fit of this kit was confirmed.
In science, the discovering of something that the theory predicted is termed QED -sort of proves the theory.
You see, there was just too much data to hide the truth - another reason why it was so important to put a lid on inquiry by blaming the pilots "beyond any doubt whatsoever".
Look back at the original story put out by the RAF - at the very least, analysis of the available data rubbishes that story. Does objective analysis constitute "evidence"? Perhaps not, but it should allow an inquiry to ask the right people the right questions.
Evidence?
There were many parameters preserved which, combined with knowledge of local area and relating it to practical navigation, pointed to a deliberate approach (can't go through it all just now - makes for a 50 page report).
Use of a particular system was predicted as the only rational explanation and it was only subsequently that the fit of this kit was confirmed.
In science, the discovering of something that the theory predicted is termed QED -sort of proves the theory.
You see, there was just too much data to hide the truth - another reason why it was so important to put a lid on inquiry by blaming the pilots "beyond any doubt whatsoever".
Look back at the original story put out by the RAF - at the very least, analysis of the available data rubbishes that story. Does objective analysis constitute "evidence"? Perhaps not, but it should allow an inquiry to ask the right people the right questions.
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but it should allow an inquiry to ask the right people the right questions
Have placed your 'evidence' before Lord Philip?
Whether you have been told you will be called?
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Walter,
I no longer knock your theory.
If CPLS was fitted it could be used to generate a range to the coastline.
An incorrect range generated by CPLS could be just a dangerous as one generated by TANS.
Have you submitted your 50 page analysis to Lord Phillips for him to have it examined by experts?
Do you accept that an equally valid reason that may have been used to place all of the blame on the Pilots was the RTS / Airworthiness disaster?
I no longer knock your theory.
If CPLS was fitted it could be used to generate a range to the coastline.
An incorrect range generated by CPLS could be just a dangerous as one generated by TANS.
Have you submitted your 50 page analysis to Lord Phillips for him to have it examined by experts?
Do you accept that an equally valid reason that may have been used to place all of the blame on the Pilots was the RTS / Airworthiness disaster?
Last edited by dalek; 7th Dec 2010 at 07:34.
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<<An incorrect range generated by CPLS could be just a dangerous as one generated by TANS.>>
Not really - Flt Lt Tapper was well aware of the potential inaccuracy of the STANS of the time - I have argued for a long time that they would not have relied upon it as close in as waypoint change.
The CPLS system interrogates a (back then) PRC112 which was effectively a portable DME - intrinsically reliable and the range very accurate (if you were getting a return and it was of the right order, you would expect it to be very accurate).
But it had to be where the pilot was expecting it to be - not 1/2 mile or more further up the hill.
It was more than just a range thing - don't forget you could home in on it (you got an approximate bearing) and with their oblique approach to the coast, this would have accounted for the track they took on that last leg.
Just for academic interest, has anyone here ever used the air version oif the Clansman (340) for VHF homing in a Mk1 Chinook? - How was it?
Not really - Flt Lt Tapper was well aware of the potential inaccuracy of the STANS of the time - I have argued for a long time that they would not have relied upon it as close in as waypoint change.
The CPLS system interrogates a (back then) PRC112 which was effectively a portable DME - intrinsically reliable and the range very accurate (if you were getting a return and it was of the right order, you would expect it to be very accurate).
But it had to be where the pilot was expecting it to be - not 1/2 mile or more further up the hill.
It was more than just a range thing - don't forget you could home in on it (you got an approximate bearing) and with their oblique approach to the coast, this would have accounted for the track they took on that last leg.
Just for academic interest, has anyone here ever used the air version oif the Clansman (340) for VHF homing in a Mk1 Chinook? - How was it?
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Fine, Walter, but
and
Have placed your 'evidence' before Lord Philip?
Have you submitted your 50 page analysis to Lord Phillips for him to have it examined by experts?
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WK....re the Clansman homing....used it several times on the Mk1....it was OK,but there was a major interference/feeback problem on the CCS system when it was in use, and if you didn't set all the other volume controls correctly. If I recall correctly, it didn't have a RtS as a result.