Chinook - Still Hitting Back 3 (Merged)
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Walter,
This
A radio call had been transmitted and not acknowledged earlier in the flight. All you can say accurately is that no distress call was received, not that one was not transmitted (unless, of course, you know what was going on in the cockpit). The aircraft suffered multiple impacts with the ground, thereby making it impossible to say what position the passengers and crewmen were in. There was substantial damage to the aircraft and not all of it was recovered for examination. Therefore the correct statement would be no evidence was found ....in the recovered parts of the wreckage.
Ask the MoD - they know with absolutely no doubt whatsoever.
Tired old mantra that it can't be proved Walter. Proved, not known. Keep up!
Who says they didn't. The map the crew was using was never recovered.
Because that was where the waypoint was, I suspect.
So where are they then?
Perhaps they planned to turn to the selected waypoint (but, of course, I'm guessing).
You tell me... I have heard that there wasn't anything fitted (but of course if it was, I doubt I would be told).
Yep, me. You know I have asked and you know the replies I was given.
Now instead of insulting people because they are not listening to you, perhaps you would like to contact the MoD yourself and ask as many questions as you want.
Directorate of Air Staff
Ministry of Defence Head Office
Level 5, Zone H
Whitehall
London SW1A 2HB
I wish you luck.
Brian
"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook
Regarding Cazatou's post #5236, just what parts of it do you regard as “Opinion and speculation “?
There was no distress call, emergency squawk or SARBE activation prior to the crash which occurred whilst the Handling Pilot was engaged in attempting an emergency escape manouvre. There was no evidence that the Passengers and Rear Crew had adopted crash positions or were even aware of any form of emergency, let alone the impending crash. No evidence was found of any technical malfunction that could have caused the aircraft to crash.
Do you not think it is about time that we started to ask why they flew as they did?
as opposed to challenging anything and everything with that tired old mantra that nothing can be known?
Why did they not use the prepared, safe flight plan
why did they go anywhere near the Mull?
There has to have been a reason and someone must know of it.
Why, when so close to a hazard, did they render ineffective in their immediate circumstance their nav computer by putting in a distant waypoint unless they had something else to go on?
What was that (then) classified equipment that was fitted?
any hope of the Mull group having the balls to ask ??!!
Now instead of insulting people because they are not listening to you, perhaps you would like to contact the MoD yourself and ask as many questions as you want.
Directorate of Air Staff
Ministry of Defence Head Office
Level 5, Zone H
Whitehall
London SW1A 2HB
I wish you luck.
Brian
"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook
WK,
I think that someone with some experience flying Chinooks will have to comment on your post but I do find your:
to be not a very impressive argument against the testimony of a highly experienced Chinook test pilot which, it seems to me, should have been highly relevant to the BoI. At least his testimony could have been formally and publicly assessed.
I have been trying to find the reference but I seem to remember reading that S/L Burke was ordered to discontinue investigative work which he believed might explain the accident, and not to communicate with anyone his findings. If that is true, it is an indication that the BoI was never intended to find the truth.
I think that someone with some experience flying Chinooks will have to comment on your post but I do find your:
I find the above difficult to reconcile with characteristics of tandemrotor a/c that I have read about and with what I have seen in videos of Chinooks at airshows.
I have been trying to find the reference but I seem to remember reading that S/L Burke was ordered to discontinue investigative work which he believed might explain the accident, and not to communicate with anyone his findings. If that is true, it is an indication that the BoI was never intended to find the truth.
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Pulse,
Sqn Ldr Burke did, indeed state that at the HoL Select Committee.
House of Lords - Chinook ZD 576 - Minutes of Evidence (755 onwards).
It was refuted by the MoD in a subsequent written submission.
House of Lords - Chinook ZD 576 - Written Evidence (Question 659)
Hope this helps.
Regards,
Brian
"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook
Sqn Ldr Burke did, indeed state that at the HoL Select Committee.
House of Lords - Chinook ZD 576 - Minutes of Evidence (755 onwards).
It was refuted by the MoD in a subsequent written submission.
House of Lords - Chinook ZD 576 - Written Evidence (Question 659)
Hope this helps.
Regards,
Brian
"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook
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Brian
A Distress Call on frequencies 121.5 or 243.0 or a SARBE being activated would have been picked up by SARSAT. An emergency squawk may not have been received by a ground radar station but could have been received by AWACS. No such frequency or squawk had been selected nor had any SARBE's been activated.
A Distress Call on frequencies 121.5 or 243.0 or a SARBE being activated would have been picked up by SARSAT. An emergency squawk may not have been received by a ground radar station but could have been received by AWACS. No such frequency or squawk had been selected nor had any SARBE's been activated.
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WK
Thanks for your reply.
Yes, I have studied the Boeing analysis in detail and have commented on it in previous posts.
The problem with it is that many parts of the analysis are speculation and all too often in this thread it is quoted as fact.
Remember, the position of the ATC "fix" is not known (it was based on a radio call, not a radar position).
The time and position waypoint change was initiated is not known.
The heading and track at this point is not known.
The airspeed and groundspeed at this point, or indeed any point up to impact, is not known.
Hence my questions to Caz.
Thanks for your reply.
Yes, I have studied the Boeing analysis in detail and have commented on it in previous posts.
The problem with it is that many parts of the analysis are speculation and all too often in this thread it is quoted as fact.
Remember, the position of the ATC "fix" is not known (it was based on a radio call, not a radar position).
The time and position waypoint change was initiated is not known.
The heading and track at this point is not known.
The airspeed and groundspeed at this point, or indeed any point up to impact, is not known.
Hence my questions to Caz.
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Brian
A Distress Call on frequencies 121.5 or 243.0 or a SARBE being activated would have been picked up by SARSAT. An emergency squawk may not have been received by a ground radar station but could have been received by AWACS. No such frequency or squawk had been selected nor had any SARBE's been activated.
A Distress Call on frequencies 121.5 or 243.0 or a SARBE being activated would have been picked up by SARSAT. An emergency squawk may not have been received by a ground radar station but could have been received by AWACS. No such frequency or squawk had been selected nor had any SARBE's been activated.
I cannot recall for sure but I don't remember in my Puma days flying round with either emergency freq preset and selected instantly ready for transmit. On Albert we do sometimes fly with the emergency freq being monitored but it is not selected and ready for instant transmission and on neither aircraft do we fly with the transponder sqwaking emergency.
Those things would need to be set and unless Caz is now accusing the crew of some sort of premeditation here there would have been no time for this to be done.
As regards Sarbe's and brace position again there would have been no time for anyone to do anything
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Chugalug2
<<Why route A,B instead of H,B as planned? … To alter and shorten NI overflight (security?)>>
Check out this 1:250,000 chart on which I have marked the two routes:
">
Aldergrove to Carnlough (the route that they took) is not significantly shorter than waypoint H (Curran) to the coast – and it crosses the metropolis of Antrim and the hazard of the Antrim hills whereas the latter is over low population areas and is flatter country. Further, Aldergrove to H is mainly across Lough Neagh and low pop rural. Overall, Ald to H to B seems an obvious route for LL – and of course, there would have been no need to go right to H, the corner could be cut.
<<...to fly by the Mull for some unknown reason (pax interest?)>> Well it would hardly have been for the scenery as, with the southerly wind, the clag would have covered most of the Mull. I have suggested before that at least some of the passengers would have been interested in the HC2's ability to get into a spot in adverse weather if a demonstration of such was the case – the advantage that the HC2 had over the HC1 Chin was that the on board equipment for the CPLS gave bearing as well as range to the ground kit – so if you had an operator in a known position with a PRC112, you had an all weather approach capability – very handy if you needed an extraction in a hurry and the conditions were bad.
<<an unbelievably botched attempt to overfly the Mull having encountered IMC? >> I've covered this before, recently – the planning for the flight gave rise to the conclusion by the pilots involved that only LL VFR was possible due to fuel and lack of alternates – if they had gone up into IMC, their whole plan and schedule would have been blown, not to mention the icing issue. So why would they risk blowing their VIP ferry flight by going anywhere near the Mull without good reason?
<<None of those, or no doubt half a dozen other reasons, would have any significance to my conviction that this was an "eruption" of an Airworthiness condition, other than the location of its occurrence.>> Yup, hell of a coincidence, a control jam just there and clearing itself in the last seconds – and requiring that they had gotten so close for it to be critical without any sane reason for them going so close – and a control jam that, in a very unstable twin rotor, kept the a/c wings level and following for about a mile the track that the HP seemed to be interested in judging by his HoSI, without plumetting or zooming – were not the other occurences of jams that are known about such that the a/c behaved erratically (a barrel role in one case)? Even if HC2 Chinooks had been dropping out of the sky on a regular basis due to control jams, the odds of it occurring at this point in this way are just too great to be worthy of consideration.
<<Was the accident caused by such an "eruption", by an abortive attempt to land at the Mull LZ whether being misdirected or no, or an unbelievably botched attempt to overfly the Mull having encountered IMC? You will realise I am sure that the last two scenarios would both involve pilot error, perhaps negligent, perhaps Grossly Negligent. >> Not so in the case of an approach to an LZ as part of a planned exercise if “misdirected” - that LZ, as I have tried to explain earlier, is a bit of a “perch” - although roomy, its threshold is a 300 ft precipice and so a slow hovering approach would be a nightmare with the wind, etc, - a smooth fast approach with a neat flare into the ground effect would be the preferred way (like plonking onto a helideck in blustery conditions) – but an overshoot would be dodgy, too fast and, well, we know what can happen – so accurate closing range is critical and this would have been appreciated before any such exercise and the responsibility for the risks would have to have been shared with those approving it – so it could hardly be the fault of the pilots if they were getting erroneous readings and perhaps even misleading encouragement (on the UHF guard frequency that the HP had selected on his intercom) by some rrrsole who was expected to have been on the LZ but actually was ˝ mile or so up the hill.
<<Your belief (as I understand it) is that it was to cover up a covert operation that went wrong, or even a planned murder that went right! >> Not exactly, I believe, from analysis of the available data, that there was a planned demonstration/ trial/ exercise of the HC2's capabilities involving a fast approach in marginal weather to a known LZ on the Mull (much used up until that time) which was an ideal location for demonstrating such approaches as the weather was predictable and localised on the Mull;
The crew would have had to be relying upon a special procedure in the vicinity of the Mull to have attempted that approach in those conditions and that procedure would have had to have involved a third party and equipment on the ground;
The evidence is that they were misled as to their range and bearing to that LZ such that it appeared that they were being guided to a point just over ˝ a mile further up the slope;
Whatever this procedure and equipment, there was the possibility that an operator on the ground had got it wrong, for example, by being out of position;
I believe that the RAF/MOD may believe that this was just human error but it would have been an embarrassment if it emerged that any such risky exercise had been sanctioned with the security team on board – and so leapt at the chance to get out of it smelling of roses by blaming the pilots.
Beyond this I am only speculating:
I think that the idea of blaming the pilots came from the politicians who feared public unrest if there had been any chance of sabotage and so the pilots had to be blamed so confidently that there was no doubt whatsoever that it was a simple case of pilot error – hence gross negligence – the verdict implies to legal minds (ie most politicians) “no doubt whatsoever”. Of course it is not justified – but you will not clear their names arguing on legal technicalities until the political need to hold them to blame eases (don't hold your breath).
Problem is, this has blocked further investigation – if the very existence of any such exercise was covered up, then it is is nigh on impossible to investigate whether there was any wilful intent on the part of the operator(s) on the ground.
I am suggesting that, because the security team on board were opposed to the conditions of the peace process that had been secretly and illegally negotiated by MI6 (not 5) it is possible that they were seen as an obstacle to that process and so it is possible that the suggestion for this exercise originated within the intelligence community – they would have been able to facilitate the cooperation of the American unit based at Mac at the time who had the equipment and training for working with SF helos – further, the operator on the ground was instructed to be out of position. The implications, if this is the case, are so serious for the country that the barrier of the cover up of an exercise must be removed – by being open about any such exercise, it can then be established who put it together and who was responsible on the ground at the Mull.
I have suggested a candidate equipment that could have been trialled/demonstrated that day which, had it been used, would explain all that is known from the available data had it been ˝ mile or so up the hill instead of at the LZ.
<<The only answer for both of us surely is to press for a new Accident Investigation>> But no kind of new investigation can start without some credible person having the courage to come forward with a piece of inside information – if ever a whistle blower was needed ,,,. was the equipment on board, was the approach to the LZ planned, who knew of what, ???
<<Why route A,B instead of H,B as planned? … To alter and shorten NI overflight (security?)>>
Check out this 1:250,000 chart on which I have marked the two routes:
">Aldergrove to Carnlough (the route that they took) is not significantly shorter than waypoint H (Curran) to the coast – and it crosses the metropolis of Antrim and the hazard of the Antrim hills whereas the latter is over low population areas and is flatter country. Further, Aldergrove to H is mainly across Lough Neagh and low pop rural. Overall, Ald to H to B seems an obvious route for LL – and of course, there would have been no need to go right to H, the corner could be cut.
<<...to fly by the Mull for some unknown reason (pax interest?)>> Well it would hardly have been for the scenery as, with the southerly wind, the clag would have covered most of the Mull. I have suggested before that at least some of the passengers would have been interested in the HC2's ability to get into a spot in adverse weather if a demonstration of such was the case – the advantage that the HC2 had over the HC1 Chin was that the on board equipment for the CPLS gave bearing as well as range to the ground kit – so if you had an operator in a known position with a PRC112, you had an all weather approach capability – very handy if you needed an extraction in a hurry and the conditions were bad.
<<an unbelievably botched attempt to overfly the Mull having encountered IMC? >> I've covered this before, recently – the planning for the flight gave rise to the conclusion by the pilots involved that only LL VFR was possible due to fuel and lack of alternates – if they had gone up into IMC, their whole plan and schedule would have been blown, not to mention the icing issue. So why would they risk blowing their VIP ferry flight by going anywhere near the Mull without good reason?
<<None of those, or no doubt half a dozen other reasons, would have any significance to my conviction that this was an "eruption" of an Airworthiness condition, other than the location of its occurrence.>> Yup, hell of a coincidence, a control jam just there and clearing itself in the last seconds – and requiring that they had gotten so close for it to be critical without any sane reason for them going so close – and a control jam that, in a very unstable twin rotor, kept the a/c wings level and following for about a mile the track that the HP seemed to be interested in judging by his HoSI, without plumetting or zooming – were not the other occurences of jams that are known about such that the a/c behaved erratically (a barrel role in one case)? Even if HC2 Chinooks had been dropping out of the sky on a regular basis due to control jams, the odds of it occurring at this point in this way are just too great to be worthy of consideration.
<<Was the accident caused by such an "eruption", by an abortive attempt to land at the Mull LZ whether being misdirected or no, or an unbelievably botched attempt to overfly the Mull having encountered IMC? You will realise I am sure that the last two scenarios would both involve pilot error, perhaps negligent, perhaps Grossly Negligent. >> Not so in the case of an approach to an LZ as part of a planned exercise if “misdirected” - that LZ, as I have tried to explain earlier, is a bit of a “perch” - although roomy, its threshold is a 300 ft precipice and so a slow hovering approach would be a nightmare with the wind, etc, - a smooth fast approach with a neat flare into the ground effect would be the preferred way (like plonking onto a helideck in blustery conditions) – but an overshoot would be dodgy, too fast and, well, we know what can happen – so accurate closing range is critical and this would have been appreciated before any such exercise and the responsibility for the risks would have to have been shared with those approving it – so it could hardly be the fault of the pilots if they were getting erroneous readings and perhaps even misleading encouragement (on the UHF guard frequency that the HP had selected on his intercom) by some rrrsole who was expected to have been on the LZ but actually was ˝ mile or so up the hill.
<<Your belief (as I understand it) is that it was to cover up a covert operation that went wrong, or even a planned murder that went right! >> Not exactly, I believe, from analysis of the available data, that there was a planned demonstration/ trial/ exercise of the HC2's capabilities involving a fast approach in marginal weather to a known LZ on the Mull (much used up until that time) which was an ideal location for demonstrating such approaches as the weather was predictable and localised on the Mull;
The crew would have had to be relying upon a special procedure in the vicinity of the Mull to have attempted that approach in those conditions and that procedure would have had to have involved a third party and equipment on the ground;
The evidence is that they were misled as to their range and bearing to that LZ such that it appeared that they were being guided to a point just over ˝ a mile further up the slope;
Whatever this procedure and equipment, there was the possibility that an operator on the ground had got it wrong, for example, by being out of position;
I believe that the RAF/MOD may believe that this was just human error but it would have been an embarrassment if it emerged that any such risky exercise had been sanctioned with the security team on board – and so leapt at the chance to get out of it smelling of roses by blaming the pilots.
Beyond this I am only speculating:
I think that the idea of blaming the pilots came from the politicians who feared public unrest if there had been any chance of sabotage and so the pilots had to be blamed so confidently that there was no doubt whatsoever that it was a simple case of pilot error – hence gross negligence – the verdict implies to legal minds (ie most politicians) “no doubt whatsoever”. Of course it is not justified – but you will not clear their names arguing on legal technicalities until the political need to hold them to blame eases (don't hold your breath).
Problem is, this has blocked further investigation – if the very existence of any such exercise was covered up, then it is is nigh on impossible to investigate whether there was any wilful intent on the part of the operator(s) on the ground.
I am suggesting that, because the security team on board were opposed to the conditions of the peace process that had been secretly and illegally negotiated by MI6 (not 5) it is possible that they were seen as an obstacle to that process and so it is possible that the suggestion for this exercise originated within the intelligence community – they would have been able to facilitate the cooperation of the American unit based at Mac at the time who had the equipment and training for working with SF helos – further, the operator on the ground was instructed to be out of position. The implications, if this is the case, are so serious for the country that the barrier of the cover up of an exercise must be removed – by being open about any such exercise, it can then be established who put it together and who was responsible on the ground at the Mull.
I have suggested a candidate equipment that could have been trialled/demonstrated that day which, had it been used, would explain all that is known from the available data had it been ˝ mile or so up the hill instead of at the LZ.
<<The only answer for both of us surely is to press for a new Accident Investigation>> But no kind of new investigation can start without some credible person having the courage to come forward with a piece of inside information – if ever a whistle blower was needed ,,,. was the equipment on board, was the approach to the LZ planned, who knew of what, ???
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<<I think that someone with some experience flying Chinooks will have to comment on your post>>
I really hope they do.
I don't know why they didn't pick up on S/L Burke's comments themselves ages ago - if you know any Chinook pilots, please, please prod them into giving you their opinion and do let us all know.
I am confident about that post of mine.
<<I think that someone with some experience flying Chinooks will have to comment on your post>>
I really hope they do.
I don't know why they didn't pick up on S/L Burke's comments themselves ages ago - if you know any Chinook pilots, please, please prod them into giving you their opinion and do let us all know.
I am confident about that post of mine.
Walter, I must admit that you have a prima facie case pointing to a possible attempt at an Approach and Landing at the Mull LZ. That is you have an explanation for instrument settings, tracks on maps, TPs etc. You even have a method of doing that in IMC, ie with the "wacky" radios (sorry not trying to be flippant but I'm not qualified enough to use the correct descriptions). But that is the point. You are asking us to believe that this crew was authorised to do an IFR letdown in IMC at high speed into an LZ with very high terrain all around, and with pax on board, and the nation's most VIP (security wise) pax at that? I must admit that a CoC that is reckless enough to push a grossly unairworthy aircraft into service might just be reckless enough to pull this flanker along with it, but it borders on the incredible. And when I say IFR letdown I don't refer to a published procedure with a fixed, calibrated and licenced installation, but some bloke wandering around the Mull slopes, with a backpack, not at the LZ because he himself is a little uncertain of his position due to fog? It might look kosher on paper, but just think about it. These guys might have been SF, but they weren't kamikazes, Walter. One look at the conditions and its left hand down a bit for point B and call the ALM up to tell the pax that the LZ demo is scrubbed due wx. You say an investigation into your theory needs witnesses and evidence not yet produced. Well so does mine, Walter. The difference is both in my case are available, have appeared before the FAI and the HoL and could be produced at a proper RAF BoI or AAIB Accident Investigation. Like I say Walter your ideas are persuasive and have merit but at the end of the day they are little more than a conspiracy theory which is hardly surprising given the cover up perpetrated here by the MOD and RAF!
Last edited by Chugalug2; 10th Jul 2009 at 00:39.
WK,
We do have on record the testimony of Witness A, a very experienced SH Chinook pilot:
Other than that, all I can say is that, when you are given information that doesn't fit your theories, e.g. by jayteeto and tandemrotor, you tend to ignore it.
In the light of Witness A's further testimony, it is a pity that more crews from that period can't enlighten us about this and some of the airworthiness issues.
We do have on record the testimony of Witness A, a very experienced SH Chinook pilot:
807. What do you deduce, if anything, from the position in which the aircraft was flying with the left rudder 77 per cent after the accident?
A. Again that is a highly anomalous position for the rudder pedals to be, the yaw pedals to be in. There is absolutely no reason for applying that amount of yaw pedal during forward flight and the the only reason I can think of for aplying that much yaw pedal would be if the aircraft was becoming extremely difficult to control. The other theory I have to say put forward by the Board of Inquiry is that the displacement of the yaw pedals was caused by the force of the impact itself which was predominantly on the starboard side of the cockpit causing the right pedal to the forced back and the left pedal to be forced forward, so I do not think that can be ignored either.
A. Again that is a highly anomalous position for the rudder pedals to be, the yaw pedals to be in. There is absolutely no reason for applying that amount of yaw pedal during forward flight and the the only reason I can think of for aplying that much yaw pedal would be if the aircraft was becoming extremely difficult to control. The other theory I have to say put forward by the Board of Inquiry is that the displacement of the yaw pedals was caused by the force of the impact itself which was predominantly on the starboard side of the cockpit causing the right pedal to the forced back and the left pedal to be forced forward, so I do not think that can be ignored either.
In the light of Witness A's further testimony, it is a pity that more crews from that period can't enlighten us about this and some of the airworthiness issues.
852. You heard the question that was put to Squadron Leader Morgan by me. I repeated to him the one question that was put to him by the Board, "what unforeseen malfunctions have occurred on the Chinook Mark II since its introduction?" He listed a number of things in his answer, which were not, at least on the record, pursued. Just so that we understand the flavour of it, how much were these matters the subject of discussion at the time amongst helicopter pilots, these various problems that were apparently manifesting themselves and the problems at Boscombe Down?
A. They occupied our minds to a great degree, my Lord, crew room talk was of little else at the time. The crews felt extremely uneasy about the way the aircraft had been introduced into service. This perception was reinforced by the lack of information contained in the aircrew manual, the poor state of repair of the flight reference cards and such like as well.
853. You say crew rooms were full of that talk. You cannot know for sure but is it likely that senior officers were unaware of that?
A. I can only speak for the officers at station level because I had no exposure to the command chain above that, and certainly all of the hierarchy of RAF Odiham were acutely aware of the feeling at shop floor level.
A. They occupied our minds to a great degree, my Lord, crew room talk was of little else at the time. The crews felt extremely uneasy about the way the aircraft had been introduced into service. This perception was reinforced by the lack of information contained in the aircrew manual, the poor state of repair of the flight reference cards and such like as well.
853. You say crew rooms were full of that talk. You cannot know for sure but is it likely that senior officers were unaware of that?
A. I can only speak for the officers at station level because I had no exposure to the command chain above that, and certainly all of the hierarchy of RAF Odiham were acutely aware of the feeling at shop floor level.
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Devils Alternative and Voodoo Statistics
On 10 Sep 1979 I was in my Canberra TT18 on final approach to R/W 09 at Gibraltar with my regular pilot JM. The weather was CAVOK, but the surface wind was 180/15 (ish).
At around 350ft, 135kts, gear and flap down JM called "Engine Flameout, Starboard Engine......."
Freeze the clock for explanation:
A Canberra TT18 is a heavy aircraft with lots of drag.
R/W 09 at Gib is 5940 ft long, it has sea left, right, undershoot and overshoot.
It requires a curved approach with line up at around 100ft.
All Canberra assymetric approaches are taught "hot, straight and clean"
W/V !80/15 produces moderate to severe turbulence and is right on legal limits.
There are two flying orders to consider:
1. Once gear and flap is selected no assymetric overshoots must be attempted.
2. An assymetric approach must never be attempted on a runway of less than 7500ft.
R/w 09 in those conditions, was the nightmare assymetric landing scenario.
Unfreeze:
"........decision, Overshoot."
+ 0.1 sec. Wings level, flap up, gear up, keep the nose down, ball in the middle, gentle application of power.
+ 5 secs. Speed 150kts, safety speed, level at 100ft 45 degress off heading and entering Spanish airspace, power 95%.
+15 secs. 180 kts, 500 ft, full power. Well inside Spain, commence gentle climbing starboard turn.
My sole contribution at this stage had been:
" Mayday, Mayday, Mayday. Engine failure. Wait Out"
+ 2 mins. "2000ft, speed 220kts heading 180. Drill complete. Mayday downgrade to PAN.
We discussed the rights and wrongs of the "decision" over our third pint in the El Minzah hotel, Tangier, some hours later.
The following day a technical examination found the problem. Two small locking pins, holding in position one of the four Starter Cartridge Exhaust Manifolds had not been fitted. This allowed it to move in the airflow. At rest it always took up the correct position. When it went from aerofoil to flat plate, it stalled the airflow into intake.
New pins located and fitted. Problem solved.
Two days later we found ourselves sitting in front of the Sqn Execs.
The Sqn QFI had come to the decision, from the comfort of his desk, that overshoot was definitely the "Wrong Option"
The Sqn Cdr realised that we were faced with two equally bad options.
We brought the aircraft back, so the decision was good.
The incident was classified as "Servicing Error".
But what if we had "Crashed and Burned", and taken out a Spanish school to boot.
There would have been a record of my Mayday call, there would have been witnesses to the "attempted" overshoot, There had clearly been the breach of a flying order. The missing locking pins would be put down to crash damage. This was a clear case of "Gross Negligence."
That was until, of course, the explanation "why" was given by the surviving crew.
There were 1400 Canberra's and B-57,s built.
They flew an average of 3200hrs each. Around 4.5 million flying hours.
There are no other records of a similar servicing error.
The error was traced back to the last "major" some 140 hours before. For less than 4 minutes of that time was the aircraft in a similar, or worse configuration.
So Caz, using your reasoning the odds of this incident happening are:
140 x60 divide 4 x 4.5 million.
Even so the "absolutely" , in 3207 was put in to protect even the likes of us.
By his support for the Mull Group, Aire Cdre Hine certainly intended it to clear JT and RC.
What they did not have, unlike myself and JM, was the abilty to defend their actions.
At around 350ft, 135kts, gear and flap down JM called "Engine Flameout, Starboard Engine......."
Freeze the clock for explanation:
A Canberra TT18 is a heavy aircraft with lots of drag.
R/W 09 at Gib is 5940 ft long, it has sea left, right, undershoot and overshoot.
It requires a curved approach with line up at around 100ft.
All Canberra assymetric approaches are taught "hot, straight and clean"
W/V !80/15 produces moderate to severe turbulence and is right on legal limits.
There are two flying orders to consider:
1. Once gear and flap is selected no assymetric overshoots must be attempted.
2. An assymetric approach must never be attempted on a runway of less than 7500ft.
R/w 09 in those conditions, was the nightmare assymetric landing scenario.
Unfreeze:
"........decision, Overshoot."
+ 0.1 sec. Wings level, flap up, gear up, keep the nose down, ball in the middle, gentle application of power.
+ 5 secs. Speed 150kts, safety speed, level at 100ft 45 degress off heading and entering Spanish airspace, power 95%.
+15 secs. 180 kts, 500 ft, full power. Well inside Spain, commence gentle climbing starboard turn.
My sole contribution at this stage had been:
" Mayday, Mayday, Mayday. Engine failure. Wait Out"
+ 2 mins. "2000ft, speed 220kts heading 180. Drill complete. Mayday downgrade to PAN.
We discussed the rights and wrongs of the "decision" over our third pint in the El Minzah hotel, Tangier, some hours later.
The following day a technical examination found the problem. Two small locking pins, holding in position one of the four Starter Cartridge Exhaust Manifolds had not been fitted. This allowed it to move in the airflow. At rest it always took up the correct position. When it went from aerofoil to flat plate, it stalled the airflow into intake.
New pins located and fitted. Problem solved.
Two days later we found ourselves sitting in front of the Sqn Execs.
The Sqn QFI had come to the decision, from the comfort of his desk, that overshoot was definitely the "Wrong Option"
The Sqn Cdr realised that we were faced with two equally bad options.
We brought the aircraft back, so the decision was good.
The incident was classified as "Servicing Error".
But what if we had "Crashed and Burned", and taken out a Spanish school to boot.
There would have been a record of my Mayday call, there would have been witnesses to the "attempted" overshoot, There had clearly been the breach of a flying order. The missing locking pins would be put down to crash damage. This was a clear case of "Gross Negligence."
That was until, of course, the explanation "why" was given by the surviving crew.
There were 1400 Canberra's and B-57,s built.
They flew an average of 3200hrs each. Around 4.5 million flying hours.
There are no other records of a similar servicing error.
The error was traced back to the last "major" some 140 hours before. For less than 4 minutes of that time was the aircraft in a similar, or worse configuration.
So Caz, using your reasoning the odds of this incident happening are:
140 x60 divide 4 x 4.5 million.
Even so the "absolutely" , in 3207 was put in to protect even the likes of us.
By his support for the Mull Group, Aire Cdre Hine certainly intended it to clear JT and RC.
What they did not have, unlike myself and JM, was the abilty to defend their actions.
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Chinook
Dalek. Your post above: "And John Purdy, each of these incidents was "new evidence""
Well, it's no use telling me! A succession of SofSs have clearly said that given new evidence they would re-open the Inquiry. So please take your new evidence to the present incumbent, and do not forget to let us know how you get on.
Regards as always JP
Well, it's no use telling me! A succession of SofSs have clearly said that given new evidence they would re-open the Inquiry. So please take your new evidence to the present incumbent, and do not forget to let us know how you get on.
Regards as always JP
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TheAerosCo
If the departing fix was based on a radio call not radar then can you explain how the Aldergrove Controller managed to give them their position as 027 degrees at 7 NM from the Aldergrove beacon? They were, after all, just leaving the CTZ which prompted the call. Are you stating that Aldergrove radar was unservicable at the time?
If the departing fix was based on a radio call not radar then can you explain how the Aldergrove Controller managed to give them their position as 027 degrees at 7 NM from the Aldergrove beacon? They were, after all, just leaving the CTZ which prompted the call. Are you stating that Aldergrove radar was unservicable at the time?
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Caz
Thanks for your reply and, no, I'm not suggesting the radar was u/s at the time.
I am interested that your understanding is that the controller passed them their position. Are the R/T transcripts and radar recordings available to verify the position fix (perhaps in the full BOI report to which I do not have access)?
Up to now, from my reading of the available sources and from direct correspondence with the MOD on this matter (although I can see their reply might have been misleading!) I have not been convinced that the time and position of the fix is as clearcut as it might first appear.
I am, however, more than willing to modify my views if you can show me (or point me to) the detailed evidence which supports the accuracy of the fix.
Thanks for your reply and, no, I'm not suggesting the radar was u/s at the time.
I am interested that your understanding is that the controller passed them their position. Are the R/T transcripts and radar recordings available to verify the position fix (perhaps in the full BOI report to which I do not have access)?
Up to now, from my reading of the available sources and from direct correspondence with the MOD on this matter (although I can see their reply might have been misleading!) I have not been convinced that the time and position of the fix is as clearcut as it might first appear.
I am, however, more than willing to modify my views if you can show me (or point me to) the detailed evidence which supports the accuracy of the fix.
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Brian
Sorry to be late in replying - been grandchildren sitting!
Yep - it is a phrase that has no practical meaning whatsoever. I think I have said this before. Nothing in life is in "absolutely no doubt whatsoever" so to all intents and purposes it is meaningless. No descisions, judgements, convictions, progress in medicine etc etc would ever be made if that was the absolute. That is why I believe in the "balance of probability". That is how juries have to make judgements and so do, I believe, the rest of us.
Not perfect - but the best we will achieve.
Best wishes, David.
Sorry to be late in replying - been grandchildren sitting!
may I ask what your interpretation of the phrase "absolutely no doubt whasoever" is?
Not perfect - but the best we will achieve.
Best wishes, David.
bastOn,
One wonders if you have ever knowingly been the victim of a poorly made judgement in any of the fields you mention.
It is interesting that, as I understand it, the requirements for certainty are different in different circumstances. For example, for judgements made by jury, the requirement in a criminal case is "beyond all reasonable doubt". That required in a civil case is "on balance of probability".
I cannot speak for medical judgements but, as a scientist, I have spent my life making judgements and these are almost always based on risk assessment i.e. how much does it cost to reduce the risk against the cost of getting it wrong. In medicine, where the risk can be life threatening, the cost can be very high so the judgements tend to be made by an independent regulating authority e.g. NICE.
However, where a judgement is made against someone who is not in a position to defend themselves, natural justice demands the highest possible standard of certainty. When the judging authority is not independent this must be even more so. When, as we seem to have in this case, the judging authority has a vested interest in the outcome, the standard should be "absolutely no doubt whatsoever".
If it is necessary for some reason to determine whether deceased pilots were guilty of gross negligence (i.e. manslaughter), the judging authority should have been totally independent. Hang on, we did have that. One was called a FAI and the other, a HoL Inquiry.
One wonders if you have ever knowingly been the victim of a poorly made judgement in any of the fields you mention.
It is interesting that, as I understand it, the requirements for certainty are different in different circumstances. For example, for judgements made by jury, the requirement in a criminal case is "beyond all reasonable doubt". That required in a civil case is "on balance of probability".
I cannot speak for medical judgements but, as a scientist, I have spent my life making judgements and these are almost always based on risk assessment i.e. how much does it cost to reduce the risk against the cost of getting it wrong. In medicine, where the risk can be life threatening, the cost can be very high so the judgements tend to be made by an independent regulating authority e.g. NICE.
However, where a judgement is made against someone who is not in a position to defend themselves, natural justice demands the highest possible standard of certainty. When the judging authority is not independent this must be even more so. When, as we seem to have in this case, the judging authority has a vested interest in the outcome, the standard should be "absolutely no doubt whatsoever".
If it is necessary for some reason to determine whether deceased pilots were guilty of gross negligence (i.e. manslaughter), the judging authority should have been totally independent. Hang on, we did have that. One was called a FAI and the other, a HoL Inquiry.
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TheAerosCo
I do not have a copy of the full BOI, I seem to have forgotten to pack it when we moved to France. I do, however, have a copy of the MOD response to the HOL report where it states in Section 1 para 8 :-
"At 1646 a positive fix for the aircraft at 027 degrees magnetic and 7 nautical miles from the Aldergrove radio beacon was obtained following an exchange between the crew and Air Traffic Control." The crew had been asked to report leaving the Control Zone and my recollection is that ATC confirmed that they had so done with a bearing and distance from the Aldergrove beacon.
If that does not satisfy you perhaps should ask Brian Dixon who has access to all the documentation.
I do not have a copy of the full BOI, I seem to have forgotten to pack it when we moved to France. I do, however, have a copy of the MOD response to the HOL report where it states in Section 1 para 8 :-
"At 1646 a positive fix for the aircraft at 027 degrees magnetic and 7 nautical miles from the Aldergrove radio beacon was obtained following an exchange between the crew and Air Traffic Control." The crew had been asked to report leaving the Control Zone and my recollection is that ATC confirmed that they had so done with a bearing and distance from the Aldergrove beacon.
If that does not satisfy you perhaps should ask Brian Dixon who has access to all the documentation.
bast0n:
I daresay you do, bast0n. Others may even subscribe to the "March the guilty men in, Flight Sergeant" method, but Messrs W&D were constrained by the Royal Air Force Regulation at the time and decided to ignore it, or indeed were ignorant of it, which as any LAC will remind you is no excuse! Not only bent on covering up the culpability of the CoC in foisting a known unairworthy aircraft type into service, the RAF then stitches up two JO's to cover their tracks with fabricated "modelling" of non-evidence. All in all they don't even meet your woeful standard as above bast0n! The BoI was a farce, the finding of the RO's a disgrace and a dishonour to the RAF.This accident has yet to be properly investigated. What is the "balance of probability" that the RAF will ever do so, would you say?
That is why I believe in the "balance of probability".
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Chinook
Chugalug.
..... " Not only bent on covering up the culpability of the CoC in foisting a known unairworthy aircraft type into service, the RAF then stitches up two JO's to cover their tracks with fabricated "modelling" of non-evidence."
So it was a conspiracy. Why do you not go public? I'm sure that many 'major' newspapers would be only too pleased to get their hands on a scandal of that scale; failing that, then 'Private Eye 'would probably do so. Ofcourse, you would have to give your real name, and to be sure of your facts. [.
..... " Not only bent on covering up the culpability of the CoC in foisting a known unairworthy aircraft type into service, the RAF then stitches up two JO's to cover their tracks with fabricated "modelling" of non-evidence."
So it was a conspiracy. Why do you not go public? I'm sure that many 'major' newspapers would be only too pleased to get their hands on a scandal of that scale; failing that, then 'Private Eye 'would probably do so. Ofcourse, you would have to give your real name, and to be sure of your facts. [.