Chinook - Still Hitting Back 3 (Merged)
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if the first 80 waypoints were already used it could be that they were all of the various HLS's within the province
After reading the report, I interpret it that, it shows the data recorded when power was lost was (GPS): 55 18.61N 05 47.80W Altitude 665ft +/-50ft. I just checked the map and at that point ground level is 623ft.
IOW when the power failed the aircraft was still airborne.
You may recall from reading the AAIB report that the first impact was between the cliff lip and the rear and lower fuselage and that 'many of the components of interest were found not to have received the deformation and/or gross shock loading at initial impact...'. That seems to create reasonable doubt that the power to the Supertans would fail on first impact.
And just as another wrinkle Mr Murchie reported the sound of the aircraft disappearing just before the impact.
More inconsistency with the 'official' version.
EG
Last edited by ExGrunt; 12th Feb 2010 at 08:06. Reason: Spelling
The lamentable lack of process in the release to service is a different campaign
Far from being a separate issue, it is actually fundamental to understanding why the RAF/MoD has adopted this line.
These officers have been allowed to be judge and jury in their own case. But on every occasion an independent body has investigated, this judgement has been found wanting.
Notably, none of the four key players (DHP, DGA2, CA and ACAS) has ever been interviewed by these inquiries; despite the damning evidence of AD/HP1 (Capt Brougham) that they knew Boscombe had condemned the FADEC implementation as “positively dangerous”, updates were planned to safety critical software and that there were system integration problems.
The latter in part explains why the CAR and RTS provided so few clearances - the build standard of the aircraft was so immature Boscombe were simply unable to test it to the extent required by a Limitations based release process. That is, if kit isn’t integrated properly, how can you determine its installed performance and hence any limitations? You can’t, and that is why so little kit was cleared at any level.
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vecvechookattack.
Good point. I asked earlier: IF they CFIT'd it, ARE they guilty of GN?
Never got an answer.
If not, then plainly there could be no question of making the GN thing stick.
(In my personal opinion, no more, that old "pilot error" phrase would be more appropriate.)
Good point. I asked earlier: IF they CFIT'd it, ARE they guilty of GN?
Never got an answer.
If not, then plainly there could be no question of making the GN thing stick.
(In my personal opinion, no more, that old "pilot error" phrase would be more appropriate.)
I don't agree that CFIT can be classed as GN
But (though not in this accident) intentional CFIT would be not merely Gross Negligence, it would be both suicide and, if there was more than one person in the aircraft, murder. Has it ever happened?
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BOAC
OOOH ERRR!
Seriously - I think that they made a major error, as I have stated before - GN - no - Pilot error............yes.
Not going to make a great deal of difference at the end of the day - the different opinions will always differ.
Soften the blow of the W&D verdict if you will - remove the GN - but then what?
It looks as though a serviceable aircraft hit the rocks.
Oh b***er - that circle again...................
'Baston Circle'
Seriously - I think that they made a major error, as I have stated before - GN - no - Pilot error............yes.
Not going to make a great deal of difference at the end of the day - the different opinions will always differ.
Soften the blow of the W&D verdict if you will - remove the GN - but then what?
It looks as though a serviceable aircraft hit the rocks.
Oh b***er - that circle again...................
Oh dear Baston - the circle continues.
What you 'think', or what it 'looks like' is utterly irrelevent.
What is known is that the aircraft (in the opinion of those tasked with the responsibility) should not have been in service.
What happened will never be known.
What you 'think', or what it 'looks like' is utterly irrelevent.
What is known is that the aircraft (in the opinion of those tasked with the responsibility) should not have been in service.
What happened will never be known.
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Fittter,
What matters is what actually happened.
You have to admit that the Chinook fleet has not exactly been overwhelmed with fatal accidents either before or since the Mull.
I think this whole 'get them off' thing (the GN thing that is) is rather ill-founded.
I'll grant you that it has taken on some momentum, though that does not make it correct.
Alright, they could have been faced with some unknown unknown, as Rumsfeld might have said, but let's face it, it's alot more likely they just made a cock of it.
And there but for the grace of God, go us all.
All this campaigning to 'right a wrong' sits poorly with the families of those whose lives were lost.
Nothing on pprune will change anything. Even overturning the GN thing changes nothing.
The dead sleep on.
What matters is what actually happened.
You have to admit that the Chinook fleet has not exactly been overwhelmed with fatal accidents either before or since the Mull.
I think this whole 'get them off' thing (the GN thing that is) is rather ill-founded.
I'll grant you that it has taken on some momentum, though that does not make it correct.
Alright, they could have been faced with some unknown unknown, as Rumsfeld might have said, but let's face it, it's alot more likely they just made a cock of it.
And there but for the grace of God, go us all.
All this campaigning to 'right a wrong' sits poorly with the families of those whose lives were lost.
Nothing on pprune will change anything. Even overturning the GN thing changes nothing.
The dead sleep on.
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Does anyone know what ACTUALLY happened and WHY it ACTUALLY happened 
That is what this is all about and for those that cannot see that maybe a step back to ponder would be in order
That is what this is all about and for those that cannot see that maybe a step back to ponder would be in order
Sorry SFP .. I disagree strongly .. 
No-one knows, and probably no-one will ever know .. exactly what happened ... everything .. be it formal or informal .. is some form of conjecture. Some from well known, and possibly proveable information, the rest from speculation.
The whole purpose and thrust of the thread and campaign is to remove the slur on the characters of the pilots....
The rules in play at the time .. and the rules of common decency .... do not allow speculation and conjecture to form proof of anything .. least of all "Gross Negligence"
No-one knows, and probably no-one will ever know .. exactly what happened ... everything .. be it formal or informal .. is some form of conjecture. Some from well known, and possibly proveable information, the rest from speculation.
The whole purpose and thrust of the thread and campaign is to remove the slur on the characters of the pilots....
The rules in play at the time .. and the rules of common decency .... do not allow speculation and conjecture to form proof of anything .. least of all "Gross Negligence"
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Guys, sorry to sound like a cracked record.
There are many very knowledgable folk on this forum. And this forum is called ' Chinook -still hitting back'
At what?
I repeat my earlier Q. If they CFIT'd it ARE they guilty of GN?
I know it's 'lawyerspeak'. but lets face it, that's all that this thread is about.
There are many very knowledgable folk on this forum. And this forum is called ' Chinook -still hitting back'
At what?
I repeat my earlier Q. If they CFIT'd it ARE they guilty of GN?
I know it's 'lawyerspeak'. but lets face it, that's all that this thread is about.
It looks as though a serviceable aircraft
Nor can MoD say what corrective action was taken. In fact, the question put them in such a blind panic that they lied (in a Ministerial brief), implying all avionic contractors had moved into Swanton Morley along with their engineers, integration/reference/sample rigs. Nonsense of course, but that is what Ingram signed.
If, as I stated above, a raft of systems had no clearance whatsoever in the Chinook HC Mk2, and many that were "cleared" carried limitations so vague as to make any aircrew nervous, pray tell what installed performance baseline one would use to determine serviceability?
Given the statement in the RTS that aircrew should now ignore the SuperTANS "Error" code as meaningless, could it be that MoD's idea of serviceability was "Ignore all warnings, if it takes off it's ok". Facetious perhaps, but the fact remains they released the aircraft before determining what the "Error" code actually meant. Perhaps this is why Flt Lt Tapper felt compelled to visit Racal, to do Boeing and DHP's job for them? (Assuming Boeing were contracted to deliver a functionally safe aircraft, which actually seems doubtful).
Just one example of why the Mk2 was so immature Boscombe stated it should not be released.
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Barbie,
Beagle has succinctly answered your question! But I will add to it because it is a very grey area - even AP3207 at the time was not totally clear.
If they intentionally flew into the hill or cloud (knowing that particular bit was culmulo-granite) - the cause group would have been Human Factors (Aircrew) (Gross Negligence) - recklessness, disobedience or effectively suicide and/or murder. Unlikely, but we can't prove it.
If they unintentionally flew into the hill/culmulo-granite then it would have been either HF(A) (Negligence) or (Error of Judgement). Which one would depend on how the BoI and ROs assessed any of the mitigating circumstances. As we know, the latter were rather less charitable than the former. The latter decided to ignore the fact the crew could not climb to above the appropriate Safety Alt (approx 6500ft) because of the icing limit, instead insisting that the ac could climb to about 2500ft to miss the Mull - absolute poppycock - that would put the ac 'IMC below SAlt' - such a suggestion would be incredibly poor airmanship! The former elected to discount the parts of the AAIB report that indicated various control problems and distractions 'could not be positively discounted' and then forgot that 'no evidence of failure does not mean there was evidence of no failure'!
Also, both parties used flawed simulations and incomplete assessments of equipment as ADR-type 'evidence' to come up with a postulation that all Chinook pilots to whom I have talked describe as rediculous (ie the 'inappropriate ROC' over the Mull). The mitigating evidence that the aircraft had no navigational clearances of any worth at all was not discovered bythe BoI, nor did the BoI discover that the higher authorities (ACAS and Controller Aircraft) had by-passed the process of airworthiness and had ignored expert pleadings that the aircraft was 'positively dangerous'. Day and Wratten would have been accutely aware of the problems as they were understandably very keen to get the HC2 up and running. But by written definition of the regulations, the aircraft was too 'immature' for release and not fit for the purpose of a pax transit sortie. Even if no technical fault occurred that afternoon, this in itself, adds up to a considerable measure of mitigation and the cause group drops to HF(A) (Error of Judgement) at the very least but because the AAIB report mentions the lack of evidence on the ground and because there was only one eye-witness to the in-flight weather, I believe that 'Not Positively Determined' (NPD) would be appropriate .
The lack of a CVR/ADR and having no true assessment of the in-flight weather conditions limits the amount of factual evidence, thereby creating a modicum of doubt in anyone with an open mind. Therefore, the ROs ignored the regulation that dead crews cannot be accused of negligence, unless there is absolutely no doubt whatsoever. Some people believe that it would be impossible to ever overcome this 'obstacle' in allocating blame. When I asked the Air Officer who added this rule in the 1980s, he said that this was the intention - as the dead cannot speak for themselves and have no right of redress! The ROs may have truly believed their assessment but they cannot prove it - and certainly with absolutely no doubt whatsoever!
Therefore, a reassessment of the evidence can only point to a cause of either 'Not Positively Determined' (NPD) or 'HF(A) (Error of Judgement)' - neither of which allocates blame as negligence would.
Importantly, however, one would also have to include 'Organisational Fault' (O) and 'Unsatisfactory Equipment' (UE). Although not part of the BoI, it is also possible that ACAS and Controller Aircraft and their staffs would have been subsequently Court Martialled for negligence in their duties - sadly unlikely!
If, however, the aircraft had had a FADEC fault leading to temporary/intermittent Run-Away Up/Down or spurious engine failure or a control restriction or AFCS fault, then this would not have been in 'Controlled Flight' and so the cause group would have been Technical Fault (TF). In this case, it would also have been O and UE with the ensuing Courts Martial. Because of the paucity of evidence this cannot not be proven but neither can it be discounted.
In sum, the lack of a CVR/ADR and the overall paucity of factual evidence must create an element of doubt - as evidenced by the numerous opinions on this thread. Unfortunately, an opinion does not amount to the evidence to decide with 'absolutely no doubt whatsoever'. This scarcity of factual evidence would indicate that perhaps the most appropriate cause group is NPD.
So, to answer your question Barbie, the cause group is somewhere on the scale from O & UE, through HF(A) (Error of Judgement) to NPD or even a combination of all 3 but not, I believe, negligence. Take your pick.
Ultimately, I think O & UE is definitely a major contributory factor. It also puts the Air Staffs' inactions in the category of negligence and on a date before the the accident . In doing so, this creates definite mitigating circumstance for the crew. Unfortunately, we will never, ever know what actually happened the day of the accident, so NPD gets my nod for the final cause group.
Hope that helps
flipster
Beagle has succinctly answered your question! But I will add to it because it is a very grey area - even AP3207 at the time was not totally clear.
If they intentionally flew into the hill or cloud (knowing that particular bit was culmulo-granite) - the cause group would have been Human Factors (Aircrew) (Gross Negligence) - recklessness, disobedience or effectively suicide and/or murder. Unlikely, but we can't prove it.
If they unintentionally flew into the hill/culmulo-granite then it would have been either HF(A) (Negligence) or (Error of Judgement). Which one would depend on how the BoI and ROs assessed any of the mitigating circumstances. As we know, the latter were rather less charitable than the former. The latter decided to ignore the fact the crew could not climb to above the appropriate Safety Alt (approx 6500ft) because of the icing limit, instead insisting that the ac could climb to about 2500ft to miss the Mull - absolute poppycock - that would put the ac 'IMC below SAlt' - such a suggestion would be incredibly poor airmanship! The former elected to discount the parts of the AAIB report that indicated various control problems and distractions 'could not be positively discounted' and then forgot that 'no evidence of failure does not mean there was evidence of no failure'!
Also, both parties used flawed simulations and incomplete assessments of equipment as ADR-type 'evidence' to come up with a postulation that all Chinook pilots to whom I have talked describe as rediculous (ie the 'inappropriate ROC' over the Mull). The mitigating evidence that the aircraft had no navigational clearances of any worth at all was not discovered bythe BoI, nor did the BoI discover that the higher authorities (ACAS and Controller Aircraft) had by-passed the process of airworthiness and had ignored expert pleadings that the aircraft was 'positively dangerous'. Day and Wratten would have been accutely aware of the problems as they were understandably very keen to get the HC2 up and running. But by written definition of the regulations, the aircraft was too 'immature' for release and not fit for the purpose of a pax transit sortie. Even if no technical fault occurred that afternoon, this in itself, adds up to a considerable measure of mitigation and the cause group drops to HF(A) (Error of Judgement) at the very least but because the AAIB report mentions the lack of evidence on the ground and because there was only one eye-witness to the in-flight weather, I believe that 'Not Positively Determined' (NPD) would be appropriate .
The lack of a CVR/ADR and having no true assessment of the in-flight weather conditions limits the amount of factual evidence, thereby creating a modicum of doubt in anyone with an open mind. Therefore, the ROs ignored the regulation that dead crews cannot be accused of negligence, unless there is absolutely no doubt whatsoever. Some people believe that it would be impossible to ever overcome this 'obstacle' in allocating blame. When I asked the Air Officer who added this rule in the 1980s, he said that this was the intention - as the dead cannot speak for themselves and have no right of redress! The ROs may have truly believed their assessment but they cannot prove it - and certainly with absolutely no doubt whatsoever!
Therefore, a reassessment of the evidence can only point to a cause of either 'Not Positively Determined' (NPD) or 'HF(A) (Error of Judgement)' - neither of which allocates blame as negligence would.
Importantly, however, one would also have to include 'Organisational Fault' (O) and 'Unsatisfactory Equipment' (UE). Although not part of the BoI, it is also possible that ACAS and Controller Aircraft and their staffs would have been subsequently Court Martialled for negligence in their duties - sadly unlikely!
If, however, the aircraft had had a FADEC fault leading to temporary/intermittent Run-Away Up/Down or spurious engine failure or a control restriction or AFCS fault, then this would not have been in 'Controlled Flight' and so the cause group would have been Technical Fault (TF). In this case, it would also have been O and UE with the ensuing Courts Martial. Because of the paucity of evidence this cannot not be proven but neither can it be discounted.
In sum, the lack of a CVR/ADR and the overall paucity of factual evidence must create an element of doubt - as evidenced by the numerous opinions on this thread. Unfortunately, an opinion does not amount to the evidence to decide with 'absolutely no doubt whatsoever'. This scarcity of factual evidence would indicate that perhaps the most appropriate cause group is NPD.
So, to answer your question Barbie, the cause group is somewhere on the scale from O & UE, through HF(A) (Error of Judgement) to NPD or even a combination of all 3 but not, I believe, negligence. Take your pick.
Ultimately, I think O & UE is definitely a major contributory factor. It also puts the Air Staffs' inactions in the category of negligence and on a date before the the accident . In doing so, this creates definite mitigating circumstance for the crew. Unfortunately, we will never, ever know what actually happened the day of the accident, so NPD gets my nod for the final cause group.
Hope that helps
flipster
Last edited by flipster; 13th Feb 2010 at 08:58.
flipster:
At last we get to the logical point of this thread. It is alleged that senior Air Officers conspired to suborn the UK Military Airworthiness Regulations, no doubt to deal with ongoing budgetary cuts. It is further alleged that as a result the Chinook HC2 was released into RAF service in a Grossly Unairworthy condition. The allegations then continue that, following the tragic Mull accident when 29 people were killed, a cover up ensued entailing a BoI that disgracefully ignored the technical shortcomings of the aircraft. The cover up is alleged to then extend to the RO's who threw out the BoI finding as inadequate for their purposes and replaced it with their own idiosyncratic finding; that the two pilots' Gross Negligence was the sole cause of the accident. Again the allegations continue, that the RAF High Command thereafter stood firm in blocking any move to reopen this scandal simply because that indeed is what it is. The culmination of that was the letter signed by 5 Air Marshals. Now that is a lot of allegations and "allegeds". It would seem to me that those in the RAF High Command have a self interest in lancing this boil now, rather than for the whole farago to come out elsewhere (Coroner's Court, FAI, HoL, HoC, where next?) and condemn them all for failing in their duty to safeguard the good name and reputation of the Royal Air Force. The RAF Provost Marshal has already been charged with investigating matters arising from the Nimrod Report. Those matters are of course intimately related to these, for the reasons that tucumseh has reminded us. Let us trust that the Provost Branch are invested with the zeal that all good coppers should have, to follow the evidence no matter where it leads!
Importantly, however, one would also have to include 'Organisational Fault' (O) and 'Unsatisfactory Equipment' (UE). Although not part of the BoI, it is also possible that ACAS and Controller Aircraft and their staffs would have been subsequently Court Martialled for negligence in their duties - sadly unlikely!
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Flipster
Thanks for the effort you put into that post.
Shame it's not a simple 'yes or no' answer but then, nothing about this case is straightforward is it?
If they went into the cloud covering the Mull on purpose, are they then guilty of the GN charge as you outline in your first para.?
I don't think anyone has ever suggested that they intentionally caused the accident.
Thanks for the effort you put into that post.
Shame it's not a simple 'yes or no' answer but then, nothing about this case is straightforward is it?
If they went into the cloud covering the Mull on purpose, are they then guilty of the GN charge as you outline in your first para.?
I don't think anyone has ever suggested that they intentionally caused the accident.
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BBF - did you note
? It makes your question totally hypothetical and of little relevance, I'm afraid.
The answer to your question is yes, of course, but you would need a CVR saying "hey, let's fly on into this cloud here".
Same question to you as to vecve - what 'verdict' do you come to on the Tornado crash? CVR and FDR available in this one. Again, flipster's 'rule' over-rides - there could not be absolutely no doubt whatsoever.
Originally Posted by flipster
Therefore, the ROs ignored the regulation that dead crews cannot be accused of negligence, unless there is absolutely no doubt whatsoever.
The answer to your question is yes, of course, but you would need a CVR saying "hey, let's fly on into this cloud here".
Same question to you as to vecve - what 'verdict' do you come to on the Tornado crash? CVR and FDR available in this one. Again, flipster's 'rule' over-rides - there could not be absolutely no doubt whatsoever.
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A question from an outsider whose only Chinook experience was slinging things underneath them.
As a result of this incident, was any action taken to the other Chinooks of the same mark/standard, or have they continued flying as was?
As a result of this incident, was any action taken to the other Chinooks of the same mark/standard, or have they continued flying as was?
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flipster
Your 6248
The +4 degree C isotherm in the area of the Mull that evening was at 3500 ft - Minimum Safe Altitude was at 2400 ft. The aircraft could therefore, without any doubt whatsoever, have transited over the Mull at or above MSA.
That finding was included by the Investigating Board in its Report to the AOC.
The Air Staff at HQ 1 Gp, HQSTC and at MOD concurred with that finding - as did AOC 1 Gp, AOCinC STC and CAS.
The Investigating Board also stated unequivocally in their report that "the forecast weather was suitable for the flight but would have required flight in accordance with IFR in the vicinity of the Mull of Kintyre".
Your 6248
The +4 degree C isotherm in the area of the Mull that evening was at 3500 ft - Minimum Safe Altitude was at 2400 ft. The aircraft could therefore, without any doubt whatsoever, have transited over the Mull at or above MSA.
That finding was included by the Investigating Board in its Report to the AOC.
The Air Staff at HQ 1 Gp, HQSTC and at MOD concurred with that finding - as did AOC 1 Gp, AOCinC STC and CAS.
The Investigating Board also stated unequivocally in their report that "the forecast weather was suitable for the flight but would have required flight in accordance with IFR in the vicinity of the Mull of Kintyre".