Chinook - Still Hitting Back 3 (Merged)
I think that we are now getting to the nub of this debate and where it should go next. I have called for the BoI to be reopened because it would be an RAF inquiry, not an MOD one. It would be a one shot opportunity for the RAF to regain the moral ground that it has lost in this disgraceful affair and for ALL the known evidence to be presented. That in turn would mean that its finding could not possibly be the same as W&D's, thus the reputations of the pilots would be restored. Also it would mean that evidence revealed could be pursued both within and without the RAF. In comparison, a hearing by the "Minister" of both pro's and con's would simply mean more of the same farrago as has added to this scandal over the decades. Ask the Mull group about the "Minister". I think they would see him, as I do, not as a solution but as part of the problem. Of course the RAF may be seen in the same way, I admit, but for those that love it and care for its reputation surely it should be given one last chance to redeem itself?
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This is not a job for an RAF BoI.
Far better that the full facts are presented before a number of high court judges.
It may then be that the air marshalls and their unseen advisors come under much closer scrutiny. I wonder where then will rest the finger of blame?
Far better that the full facts are presented before a number of high court judges.
It may then be that the air marshalls and their unseen advisors come under much closer scrutiny. I wonder where then will rest the finger of blame?
Well, it all rather depends on what "job" we are talking about, Flip. The only job that a BoI has is to determine is, if possible, the likely cause of an accident with the prime intention being to avoid possible recurrences. If, like me, they happened to believe that the grossly unairworthy state of the aircraft was a major contributing factor if not the primary cause of this accident, then the complete cycle of cause and effect will have been demonstrated. Scene: AM's office in Main Building, with entire IPT and him filling it. Script: "Ignore the Airworthiness Regulations, we can't afford the time and money that observance of them will cost, but sign them off as complied with anyway". Closing Scene: Wreckage scattered hillside where 29 people have lost their lives unnecessarily. I don't see a judge or a jury being able to demonstrate cause and effect as authoritatively as a professionally run accident investigation would. Of course they would then be involved in the subsequent legal cases and the BoI evidence and witnesses would no doubt be called upon as well. In other words a question of carts and horses?
There is probably no more hard evidence that the airworthiness state of the HC2 was directly responsible for this accident than there is that it was caused by pilot negligence.
It seems to me what should be important is that those responsible for the gross negligent verdict were also responsible in part for an unairworthy aircraft being used for this task. This same argument applies to those airships who have recently supported this verdict in the press.
When Jeremy Paxman suggested something like this to Wratten in the infamous Newsnight interview many years ago, Wratten appeared to be shocked and offended that anyone should suggest that an officer of the Royal Air Force would stoop to allowing self interest to interfere with his duty. He left Paxman lost for words but I am sure that, with access to the information we have today, it would have been a more fruitful interview.
Now some of the facts are public knowledge and now Haddon Cave has made this stance of Wratten's sound so phony, I would like to see the interview repeated but replacing Paxman with a good barrister or Judge.
It seems to me what should be important is that those responsible for the gross negligent verdict were also responsible in part for an unairworthy aircraft being used for this task. This same argument applies to those airships who have recently supported this verdict in the press.
When Jeremy Paxman suggested something like this to Wratten in the infamous Newsnight interview many years ago, Wratten appeared to be shocked and offended that anyone should suggest that an officer of the Royal Air Force would stoop to allowing self interest to interfere with his duty. He left Paxman lost for words but I am sure that, with access to the information we have today, it would have been a more fruitful interview.
Now some of the facts are public knowledge and now Haddon Cave has made this stance of Wratten's sound so phony, I would like to see the interview repeated but replacing Paxman with a good barrister or Judge.
Couldn't agree more with your sentiments pulse, particularly your last wish. I also agree that:
Although who knows what may be discovered if someone is actually looking for a change? But this is where the BoI has a role to play. Very often an Air Accident Inquiry is starved of "hard evidence", but the essence of its task is to nonetheless determine the most likely cause or causes. I would hope that is exactly what a reopened BoI would endeavour to do. As I have said it is my belief that the Gross Unairworthiness (which can now be shown) of the aircraft had a major role in its demise, and that would be reflected in the finding of the BoI. A judge armed with such a finding would have rather more ammunition in his locker than that found from "public knowledge" and the RAF would be seen to have been not merely a passive bystander in the process.
There is probably no more hard evidence that the airworthiness state of the HC2 was directly responsible for this accident than there is that it was caused by pilot negligence.
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One wonders how many hearings before judges it'll take for the MoD to right this wrong. After all, of the HoL Committee only Lord Hooson wasn't a lawyer and of the other 4, as far as I can see, Lord Bowness was the only one not to have served as a judge. Add Sir Stephen Young of the FAI and that's 4 judges to nil who have heard the case have decided against the opinions of Day and Wratten.
Really the MoD alone now stands by its Gross Negligence opinion (finding has been shown by subsequent enquiries to be far too strong a word to apply in this case). Nationally and internationally, the MoD is looking at best rather silly and at worst like a Kafkaesque bureaucracy trying (and failing) to cover its own six. Had they relented after the HoL Enquiry, that would have been an end to the matter. I suspect their prolonged pig-headedness will result in enquiries reaching the parts the MoD would would rather had not been reached.
Really the MoD alone now stands by its Gross Negligence opinion (finding has been shown by subsequent enquiries to be far too strong a word to apply in this case). Nationally and internationally, the MoD is looking at best rather silly and at worst like a Kafkaesque bureaucracy trying (and failing) to cover its own six. Had they relented after the HoL Enquiry, that would have been an end to the matter. I suspect their prolonged pig-headedness will result in enquiries reaching the parts the MoD would would rather had not been reached.
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That is precisely why we should keep well clear of anything to do with an investigation run by MoD - serving or mandarin. If you want to know how good these people are at twisting and turning and generally being 'obfuscators par-excellence', have a read of 'Lying in State' by Tim Slessor - not just the Chinook bit but all the other examples he uses. Truly scary!
This one will keep on running.
This one will keep on running.
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New Look at the evidence....
Further thoughts...........
My understanding of Doppler radar navigation is that it has to be initialized in the same manner as INS ie. told the local time and location in latitude and longitude , and it tracks the motion of the A/C from that point .......in the case of the SuperTANS without the built in 6 channel GPS receiver ..
( a later model than that installed in ZD576 ) this would mean manually entering the position unless there is another external source , which in this case there was .... the Trimble GPS receiver ............
So the starting location would be derived from the GPS source and any comparison early in the flight would show the two sources ....GPS and Doppler , to be in close agreement......................................but we know from the data later recovered from the SuperTANS that the two sources were NOT in agreement just before the crash.....
The Doppler source info. can be expected to drift as discussed previously by many contributors , due to poor returns from a flat water surface and/or wave and tide motion......
The GPS source accuracy can vary wildly depending on the motion of the satellites , the application of the encrypted algorithm to remove the deliberate corruption of the signal ( selective availability ) for military use , but mostly from the accuracy of the frequency standard inside the SuperTANS ......
Any drift on the internal clock would have a dramatic and unpredictable effect on the position error and extremes of temperature is one factor to effect the drift . Normally on powerup there will be a period when the equipment is slowly reaching a working temperature inside .......
If we assume that the GPS error changed in a linear fashion during this short flight , unlikely in practice but as an example..............
and the crew had the opportunity to compare the Doppler and GPS sources halfway across the sea , they would still have seen little difference between the two sources , ie. crosschecking would have still shown agreement........
...but if the GPS error apparent at the crash site , were present when they were two miles from the Mull , a crosscheck would have
shown a 2 or 3 degree difference , and a crosscheck at the position where the waypoints were changed would display a 10 degree difference................
Tragically , if they were navigating purely from the Doppler source it would have led them to a waypoint 'A' which was on the shoreline.....
just a little south of the light house.......they would have safely overflown this part of the coast and not come close to any high ground till a little further north.............giving them much longer to assess the flying conditions along the edge of the localized cloud formation.......
and quite possibly continuing the journey without incidence ............
From what I have read , the crew would have had low confidence in the SuperTANS and may have decided to check the accuracy whenever possible .
One easy way to do this during pre-flight would be to pretend they wished to fly to waypoint 'H'........which was programmed into the SuperTANS.......
......using a location a few miles away from Aldergrove and at roughly right angles to their intended departure would give them a good
reference to a known location whilst they were stationary.... .
From the centre of Aldergrove airfield this SHOULD be a course of 331 degrees true and distance of 9.8nm .......................... but the
starting location which appears to have been recorded in the SuperTANS would have given them a course of 320 degrees true and
a distance of 8.7 nm ......( in my entry #6155 I pointed out the starting Lat.and Long. were halfway to the town of Antrim)
....thus it would have been possible to determine that in that present condition the SuperTANS would guide them to a waypoint 'A'
which was some distance offshore of the lighthouse ..................
I do NOT find it at all strange that there was information stored inside the SuperTANS................ as with a large number of devices there would be a second power source or internal batteries to save any important information in the event of a power interuption ......
.......the name for this varies with manufacturers but Non-Volatile-Storage , or NVS is a common term..............in this way the
equipment can continue to function after power is restored ..........
I entirely agree about the references to an immature a/c by other contibutors , in fact you could almost claim it was an experimental a/c.!.
....I found one document which says that the first 20 Chinooks converted by Boeing were all delivered with different faults present........ .........varying from loose nuts and bolts to old wiring partly disconnected but left in situ...... ...........?????????...
My understanding of Doppler radar navigation is that it has to be initialized in the same manner as INS ie. told the local time and location in latitude and longitude , and it tracks the motion of the A/C from that point .......in the case of the SuperTANS without the built in 6 channel GPS receiver ..
( a later model than that installed in ZD576 ) this would mean manually entering the position unless there is another external source , which in this case there was .... the Trimble GPS receiver ............
So the starting location would be derived from the GPS source and any comparison early in the flight would show the two sources ....GPS and Doppler , to be in close agreement......................................but we know from the data later recovered from the SuperTANS that the two sources were NOT in agreement just before the crash.....
The Doppler source info. can be expected to drift as discussed previously by many contributors , due to poor returns from a flat water surface and/or wave and tide motion......
The GPS source accuracy can vary wildly depending on the motion of the satellites , the application of the encrypted algorithm to remove the deliberate corruption of the signal ( selective availability ) for military use , but mostly from the accuracy of the frequency standard inside the SuperTANS ......
Any drift on the internal clock would have a dramatic and unpredictable effect on the position error and extremes of temperature is one factor to effect the drift . Normally on powerup there will be a period when the equipment is slowly reaching a working temperature inside .......
If we assume that the GPS error changed in a linear fashion during this short flight , unlikely in practice but as an example..............
and the crew had the opportunity to compare the Doppler and GPS sources halfway across the sea , they would still have seen little difference between the two sources , ie. crosschecking would have still shown agreement........
...but if the GPS error apparent at the crash site , were present when they were two miles from the Mull , a crosscheck would have
shown a 2 or 3 degree difference , and a crosscheck at the position where the waypoints were changed would display a 10 degree difference................
Tragically , if they were navigating purely from the Doppler source it would have led them to a waypoint 'A' which was on the shoreline.....
just a little south of the light house.......they would have safely overflown this part of the coast and not come close to any high ground till a little further north.............giving them much longer to assess the flying conditions along the edge of the localized cloud formation.......
and quite possibly continuing the journey without incidence ............
From what I have read , the crew would have had low confidence in the SuperTANS and may have decided to check the accuracy whenever possible .
One easy way to do this during pre-flight would be to pretend they wished to fly to waypoint 'H'........which was programmed into the SuperTANS.......
......using a location a few miles away from Aldergrove and at roughly right angles to their intended departure would give them a good
reference to a known location whilst they were stationary.... .
From the centre of Aldergrove airfield this SHOULD be a course of 331 degrees true and distance of 9.8nm .......................... but the
starting location which appears to have been recorded in the SuperTANS would have given them a course of 320 degrees true and
a distance of 8.7 nm ......( in my entry #6155 I pointed out the starting Lat.and Long. were halfway to the town of Antrim)
....thus it would have been possible to determine that in that present condition the SuperTANS would guide them to a waypoint 'A'
which was some distance offshore of the lighthouse ..................
I do NOT find it at all strange that there was information stored inside the SuperTANS................ as with a large number of devices there would be a second power source or internal batteries to save any important information in the event of a power interuption ......
.......the name for this varies with manufacturers but Non-Volatile-Storage , or NVS is a common term..............in this way the
equipment can continue to function after power is restored ..........
I entirely agree about the references to an immature a/c by other contibutors , in fact you could almost claim it was an experimental a/c.!.
....I found one document which says that the first 20 Chinooks converted by Boeing were all delivered with different faults present........ .........varying from loose nuts and bolts to old wiring partly disconnected but left in situ...... ...........?????????...
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Robin,
you raise an interesting point, which has nagged me for some time. RACAL did produce a report on the SUPERTANS fitted to ZD576, but I have never seen it and as far as I am aware it is not in the public domain.
You may recall that the AAIB found that the there was a pre-existing fault on the doppler antenna.
My poor understanding of the system is that it 'blended' the information from the doppler and the GPS to arrive at the position of the aircraft.
It is yet another loose thread.
EG
you raise an interesting point, which has nagged me for some time. RACAL did produce a report on the SUPERTANS fitted to ZD576, but I have never seen it and as far as I am aware it is not in the public domain.
You may recall that the AAIB found that the there was a pre-existing fault on the doppler antenna.
My poor understanding of the system is that it 'blended' the information from the doppler and the GPS to arrive at the position of the aircraft.
It is yet another loose thread.
EG
Map Datums
Out of interest, can anyone state 'with no doubt whatsoever' that all Lat/Long navigation systems, plus the charts being used, were all using the same mapping datum (presumably WGS 84).
During GW1, it was discovered that some of the 1/2 mill maps had incorrect postions for things like aerodromes. I seem to recall that KKIA was nowhere near where the chart said it was, for example. Those few people who had access to GPS (usually hand-held) often found quite a difference between the chart L/L and the GPS L/L.
GPS was relatively immature at the time of the Chinook crash; even when the first few VC10s were fitted with GPS/LINS, we occasionally obtained larger than expected position errors - and found that some of the GPS hadn't been delivered set to WGS 84....
I don't want to embark on another 'little green men with wacky wirelesses' wild-goose chase, but it could just be another reason for the crew to think that they were somewhere else than their actual location - especially if the GPS was confusing the STANS with mis-matching grid origins and positional information?
Perhaps someone who has done the 'hard sums' course could offer an opinion?
During GW1, it was discovered that some of the 1/2 mill maps had incorrect postions for things like aerodromes. I seem to recall that KKIA was nowhere near where the chart said it was, for example. Those few people who had access to GPS (usually hand-held) often found quite a difference between the chart L/L and the GPS L/L.
GPS was relatively immature at the time of the Chinook crash; even when the first few VC10s were fitted with GPS/LINS, we occasionally obtained larger than expected position errors - and found that some of the GPS hadn't been delivered set to WGS 84....
I don't want to embark on another 'little green men with wacky wirelesses' wild-goose chase, but it could just be another reason for the crew to think that they were somewhere else than their actual location - especially if the GPS was confusing the STANS with mis-matching grid origins and positional information?
Perhaps someone who has done the 'hard sums' course could offer an opinion?
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Can't comment on that specific example but do recollect having a significant error between chart and GPS (a matter of kms) due to an overlay error. I think the problem was because we were not using WGS84 charts; it was one of the early PfP exercises where we obtained the charts from our host nation.
GPS was relatively immature at the time of the Chinook crash
Subsequently, in 1995, there was found to be a howler of a mistake in one of the GPS specs manufacturers worked to. Bottom line was equipment using Time of Day for sync'ing would find it losing sync very quickly.
Grunt
The report is widely available. Give me time and I'll PM a link. However, Commercial-in-Confidence parts are not available.
The main issue here is that Racal "tested" the remnants of the RNS252 and said "It worked". Then MoD took the extraordinary leap of faith by claiming this meant the entire Nav System was both serviceable and accurate (despite, as above, most of it having no clearance as installed performance had not been established - which means you have no baseline against which to measure ZD576's performance).
They also conveniently forget that while a "black box" may be serviceable, that in no way means the indication to the pilot is correct; and, more often than not, that indicator is not part of that installation. For example, the Radar Altimeter (which in ZD576 carried both defects and faults, making a mockery of MoD's claim the Nav System was fully serviceable). .
In short, the aircraft was immature, at best still in its training and development stage, and operating against a wholly fabricated RTS.
RACAL did produce a report on the SUPERTANS fitted to ZD576, but I have never seen it and as far as I am aware it is not in the public domain.
The report is widely available. Give me time and I'll PM a link. However, Commercial-in-Confidence parts are not available.
The main issue here is that Racal "tested" the remnants of the RNS252 and said "It worked". Then MoD took the extraordinary leap of faith by claiming this meant the entire Nav System was both serviceable and accurate (despite, as above, most of it having no clearance as installed performance had not been established - which means you have no baseline against which to measure ZD576's performance).
They also conveniently forget that while a "black box" may be serviceable, that in no way means the indication to the pilot is correct; and, more often than not, that indicator is not part of that installation. For example, the Radar Altimeter (which in ZD576 carried both defects and faults, making a mockery of MoD's claim the Nav System was fully serviceable). .
In short, the aircraft was immature, at best still in its training and development stage, and operating against a wholly fabricated RTS.
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Gents.
This thread has always been contraversial and opinionated.
On the one hand are the posters who say that the a/c was plainly CFIT'd.
On the other hand are the guys who say 'who knows?' and that therefore the GN charge is unwarranted.
I think both are correct. It just depends on your start position.
I'll expand.
From a legal point of view; A lawyers', if you will, then plainly all eventualites can NOT be ruled out. Therefore the Gross negligence charge is plainly unsustainable.
FADEC trouble, Nav troubles, Aurora wake turbulence issues, you pick 'em!
I tend to agree with the guys who say "dismiss the GN charge" any one of the above could have happened- or something else.
On the other hand, from a 'pilotty' point of view, and let's face it chaps, it's highly likely that they did what many a pilot has done before and will do again.
I don't cast any scorn on these guys whatsoever. After all they are stone dead. Along with their pax. Whatever the 'real' price is for GN, they've paid it. Guilty or not.
I wish you luck in overturning the GN charge but it will make no difference to the cold hard facts on the ground.
In fact, what difference will it make at all?
(And let's face it. If they did CFIT the a/c (which we'll never know), then they WERE guilty of GN and overturning the GN verdict would ACTUALLY represent a true miscarriage of justice).
This thread has always been contraversial and opinionated.
On the one hand are the posters who say that the a/c was plainly CFIT'd.
On the other hand are the guys who say 'who knows?' and that therefore the GN charge is unwarranted.
I think both are correct. It just depends on your start position.
I'll expand.
From a legal point of view; A lawyers', if you will, then plainly all eventualites can NOT be ruled out. Therefore the Gross negligence charge is plainly unsustainable.
FADEC trouble, Nav troubles, Aurora wake turbulence issues, you pick 'em!
I tend to agree with the guys who say "dismiss the GN charge" any one of the above could have happened- or something else.
On the other hand, from a 'pilotty' point of view, and let's face it chaps, it's highly likely that they did what many a pilot has done before and will do again.
I don't cast any scorn on these guys whatsoever. After all they are stone dead. Along with their pax. Whatever the 'real' price is for GN, they've paid it. Guilty or not.
I wish you luck in overturning the GN charge but it will make no difference to the cold hard facts on the ground.
In fact, what difference will it make at all?
(And let's face it. If they did CFIT the a/c (which we'll never know), then they WERE guilty of GN and overturning the GN verdict would ACTUALLY represent a true miscarriage of justice).
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BBF
"(And let's face it. If they did CFIT the a/c (which we'll never know), then they WERE guilty of GN and overturning the GN verdict would ACTUALLY represent a true miscarriage of justice)."
could just as easily read
"(And let's face it. If they did not CFIT the a/c (which we'll never know), then they WERE NOT guilty of GN and overturning the GN verdict would ACTUALLY represent a true carriage of justice)."
Whilst it's very easy to re spin things the only certainty in your post is "(which we'll never know)" and that means the GN verdict cannot apply.
"(And let's face it. If they did CFIT the a/c (which we'll never know), then they WERE guilty of GN and overturning the GN verdict would ACTUALLY represent a true miscarriage of justice)."
could just as easily read
"(And let's face it. If they did not CFIT the a/c (which we'll never know), then they WERE NOT guilty of GN and overturning the GN verdict would ACTUALLY represent a true carriage of justice)."
Whilst it's very easy to re spin things the only certainty in your post is "(which we'll never know)" and that means the GN verdict cannot apply.
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Barbie, you are correct. The whole point must be that a burden of proof must have been satisfied. Most SH guys I have spoken with agree that the chaps may well have screwed-up. However, the rules at the time were quite clear and it remains quite clear that the burden of proof requirement was not satisfied. This case should be no different to judicial processes such as those that overturned the Birmingham Seven judgement or those where First WW deserters have subsequently been pardoned. What is done is done, but there is still a need for the system to demonstrate that it acts in a fair, reasonable and objective manner; that is democracy.
Of course, the nature of the Mull crash also (re?)opened the Pandora's Box regarding airworthiness. Airworthiness is, in many respects, a separate issue that must be pursued for the greater good, but in this specific case is a plausible explanation to demonstrate that doubt must exist.
Perversely, I still work with people who had close friends/colleagues on the Chinook and many of them still have a notable degree of anger aimed at the RAF, notably the crew. I find it difficult to explain how their anger may be slightly maligned.
Of course, the nature of the Mull crash also (re?)opened the Pandora's Box regarding airworthiness. Airworthiness is, in many respects, a separate issue that must be pursued for the greater good, but in this specific case is a plausible explanation to demonstrate that doubt must exist.
Perversely, I still work with people who had close friends/colleagues on the Chinook and many of them still have a notable degree of anger aimed at the RAF, notably the crew. I find it difficult to explain how their anger may be slightly maligned.
CGB, I would suggest that they direct their quite justifiable anger not at the RAF but at its Higher Command. I believe that five of them wrote letters recently to the National Press suggesting that the finding by the Air Marshals W & D into this accident was perfectly justifiable and that they all stood by it. Whatever one's own personal take on this accident the one thing that seems to unite those who have posted here is that the finding was totally unjustified. Why part of the RAF High Command should choose to unite behind such an untenable position says a lot about themselves and of their military abilities. That is their business, it is the business of the Royal Air Force and especially its Senior Commanders to disassociate itself completely from such a shameful position. The RAF Provost Marshal's investigation into individuals named in the Nimrod Review should follow the evidence no matter how high up the food chain that it leads. To not do so will taint the Service forever with this scandal. Then and only then would those you speak of be justified in directing their righteous anger against the Royal Air Force as a whole.