It looks as though a serviceable aircraft
It goes without saying that this statement is both claimed and contradicted by MoD, who freely acknowledge faults and defects were not recorded in the aircraft documentation (and so no judgment as to "acceptability" was made).
Nor can MoD say what corrective action was taken. In fact, the question put them in such a blind panic that they lied (in a Ministerial brief), implying all avionic contractors had moved into Swanton Morley along with their engineers, integration/reference/sample rigs. Nonsense of course, but that is what Ingram signed.
If, as I stated above, a raft of systems had no clearance whatsoever in the Chinook HC Mk2, and many that were "cleared" carried limitations so vague as to make any aircrew nervous, pray tell what installed performance baseline one would use to determine serviceability?
Given the statement in the RTS that aircrew should now ignore the SuperTANS "Error" code as meaningless, could it be that MoD's idea of serviceability was "Ignore all warnings, if it takes off it's ok". Facetious perhaps, but the fact remains they released the aircraft before determining what the "Error" code actually meant. Perhaps this is why Flt Lt Tapper felt compelled to visit Racal, to do Boeing and DHP's job for them? (Assuming Boeing were contracted to deliver a functionally safe aircraft, which actually seems doubtful).
Just one example of why the Mk2 was so immature Boscombe stated it should not be released.