The lamentable lack of process in the release to service is a different campaign
I’m afraid I don’t see it that way. You only have to compare the names of those responsible for the premature release process with the RAF officers who have systematically lied and deceived for 15 years.
Far from being a separate issue, it is actually fundamental to understanding why the RAF/MoD has adopted this line.
These officers have been allowed to be judge and jury in their own case. But on every occasion an independent body has investigated, this judgement has been found wanting.
Notably, none of the four key players (DHP, DGA2, CA and ACAS) has ever been interviewed by these inquiries; despite the damning evidence of AD/HP1 (Capt Brougham) that they knew Boscombe had condemned the FADEC implementation as “positively dangerous”, updates were planned to safety critical software and that there were system integration problems.
The latter in part explains why the CAR and RTS provided so few clearances - the build standard of the aircraft was so immature Boscombe were simply unable to test it to the extent required by a Limitations based release process. That is, if kit isn’t integrated properly, how can you determine its installed performance and hence any limitations? You can’t, and that is why so little kit was cleared at any level.