Chinook - Still Hitting Back 3 (Merged)
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New Look....
..interesting that you should mention Mt.Erebus , at least I guess that is what the book is about ......
I feel strongly that ZD576 had some navigation error and have been examining possibilities...
Mt. Erebus for those unaware.......the location of which in Antarctica was
wrongly logged in all the database's at the time , first time a flight went that way in IMC , hit the mountain....
Has anyone on here seen the copy of the planning document for the Chinook flight.???? I was wondering how specific it was about the route for one thing.....????...
I feel strongly that ZD576 had some navigation error and have been examining possibilities...
Mt. Erebus for those unaware.......the location of which in Antarctica was
wrongly logged in all the database's at the time , first time a flight went that way in IMC , hit the mountain....
Has anyone on here seen the copy of the planning document for the Chinook flight.???? I was wondering how specific it was about the route for one thing.....????...
twinboom:
Can't respond as either a mover or shaker, twinboom, so apologies for doing so in place of those who are. What I am struck with is how easily I can identify with AVM Garwood's call, for it was the philosophy of Flight Safety in the 60's and 70's when I served. The point was simply to avoid avoidable accidents thus preserving the force, both people and kit, for going to war with. I am intrigued though as to who "Just Culture" will apply to. Will it merely be a case of:
or will those who flagrantly disregarded the UK Military Airworthiness Regulations and hence caused so many accidents and so much loss of life also come under its protective wing? In short is JC to be the "get out of jail" (or stay out) clause that so many of his predecessors are so desperately searching for now? If those who are guilty of presiding over this scandal get off scot-free then the scandal remains forever over the good name of the Royal Air Force and implies that nothing really has changed at all.
Are you movers and shakers as struck as I am by the contrast between the MoD's ostrich-like intransigence in this case and the RAF's current Chief of Staff (Operations), AVM Garwood's clarion call in his forward to on-line Air Clues 2.0 (q.v.)
" JC is about treating those involved in incidents and accidents in a transparently fair and consistent manner, whilst ensuring that all factors which lead to an incident, be they individual or organizational, are recognised and taken into account" (my italics).
" JC is about treating those involved in incidents and accidents in a transparently fair and consistent manner, whilst ensuring that all factors which lead to an incident, be they individual or organizational, are recognised and taken into account" (my italics).
treating those involved in incidents and accidents in a transparently fair and consistent manner, whilst ensuring that all the factors which lead to an incident, be they individual or organisational, are recognised
and taken into account.
and taken into account.
Just Culture
The AVM merely quotes long standing MoD literature on the subject, which was also pointed out to Haddon-Cave. Another example of his recommendations actually being a simple call for MoD to practice what their regulations mandate.
The trouble, as always, is that there were clear Organisational failures, but because they were at 2 Star and above, the individuals were protected. H-C shamefully named a Gp Capt and Wg Cdr, when all the evidence presented to him pointed to a civilian 2 Star, an AVM 2 Star and a former Admiral, later civilian 4 Star. This evidence was irrefutable as all were kind enough to confirm, in writing, that airworthiness / safety / fitness for purpose could be ignored.
This isn't thread creep. Same people on both Nimrod and Chinook (and C130, Tornado etc). Nimrod, C130 and others were inevitable because organisational failures exposed on Chinook (and admitted in 1999 by the above 4 Star) were not challenged.
The trouble, as always, is that there were clear Organisational failures, but because they were at 2 Star and above, the individuals were protected. H-C shamefully named a Gp Capt and Wg Cdr, when all the evidence presented to him pointed to a civilian 2 Star, an AVM 2 Star and a former Admiral, later civilian 4 Star. This evidence was irrefutable as all were kind enough to confirm, in writing, that airworthiness / safety / fitness for purpose could be ignored.
This isn't thread creep. Same people on both Nimrod and Chinook (and C130, Tornado etc). Nimrod, C130 and others were inevitable because organisational failures exposed on Chinook (and admitted in 1999 by the above 4 Star) were not challenged.
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Chinook
Tucumseh. Your statement "The trouble, as always, is that there were clear Organisational failures, but because they were at 2 Star and above, the individuals were protected" will puzzle many folk here. Just how and why does rank above 2-star confer immunity? Regards JP
JP
Put another way, I shall gladly withdraw when Controller Aircraft (3 Star), DGA2 (2 Star) and ACAS (3 Star) are called to give evidence as to why they participated in the fabrication of aircraft release documents, including the Master Airworthiness Reference. Fabrication, as in misrepresentation of the known facts, primarily that Boscombe considered a key part of the Mk2 modification "positively dangerous", but withheld this from users.
Always good to know you are still watching and to learn what interests you. I imagine the same makes the MoD nervous.
Put another way, I shall gladly withdraw when Controller Aircraft (3 Star), DGA2 (2 Star) and ACAS (3 Star) are called to give evidence as to why they participated in the fabrication of aircraft release documents, including the Master Airworthiness Reference. Fabrication, as in misrepresentation of the known facts, primarily that Boscombe considered a key part of the Mk2 modification "positively dangerous", but withheld this from users.
Always good to know you are still watching and to learn what interests you. I imagine the same makes the MoD nervous.
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Have I missed something
, and the H-C inquiry managed to get a damn good look at more evidence!
JP
^^
Indeed, but it is a far more interesting question why H-C (not the MoD) chose to name those two when their "offence" paled into insignificance beside that "committed" by their predecessors.
Worth noting that this "offence" was to implement a 20% savings in support costs, spread over 4 years (within a support structure that had bloated out of all proportion following the creation of AMSO/AML/DLO and any pain was spread across all 3 Services). Why did H-C not reveal far more damning evidence that, from 1991-94, around 28% had been cut EACH YEAR, from the budget whose sole purpose was to maintain airworthiness? A budget that serviced a legal requirement which was not volume related. That is, unlike most of the General's 20% cut, it could not be justified by the argument that numbers/fleets were reducing. THAT fact was far more pertinent to his brief. And it is that volume related issue which is at the heart of many of our airworthiness problems, because so few understand it.
He won't answer the question (a common trait it seems) but it conveniently allowed his report to omit a period crucial to the introduction of Chinook HC Mk2; which of course relied heavily on the airworthiness of the Mk1 being maintained in the preceding years, and a stable and maintained build standard being presented for trials and conversion. (Precisely the same situation on the Nimrod MR2 > MRA4 programme, which has been the cause of so many delays). As I have said before, its not as if this was news to H-C, as the Chief of Defence Procurement (4 Star) admitted these crucial failings on Chinook to the PAC in 1999; which he could hardly deny as the Chinook Project Director had voiced the same concerns at the time the Releases were being fabricated.
^^
Indeed, but it is a far more interesting question why H-C (not the MoD) chose to name those two when their "offence" paled into insignificance beside that "committed" by their predecessors.
Worth noting that this "offence" was to implement a 20% savings in support costs, spread over 4 years (within a support structure that had bloated out of all proportion following the creation of AMSO/AML/DLO and any pain was spread across all 3 Services). Why did H-C not reveal far more damning evidence that, from 1991-94, around 28% had been cut EACH YEAR, from the budget whose sole purpose was to maintain airworthiness? A budget that serviced a legal requirement which was not volume related. That is, unlike most of the General's 20% cut, it could not be justified by the argument that numbers/fleets were reducing. THAT fact was far more pertinent to his brief. And it is that volume related issue which is at the heart of many of our airworthiness problems, because so few understand it.
He won't answer the question (a common trait it seems) but it conveniently allowed his report to omit a period crucial to the introduction of Chinook HC Mk2; which of course relied heavily on the airworthiness of the Mk1 being maintained in the preceding years, and a stable and maintained build standard being presented for trials and conversion. (Precisely the same situation on the Nimrod MR2 > MRA4 programme, which has been the cause of so many delays). As I have said before, its not as if this was news to H-C, as the Chief of Defence Procurement (4 Star) admitted these crucial failings on Chinook to the PAC in 1999; which he could hardly deny as the Chinook Project Director had voiced the same concerns at the time the Releases were being fabricated.
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Chinook
Tucumseh. As you say, all this has no direct bearing on the Chinook crash, which is the subject of this thread. Meanwhile, it is quite clear from your many postings on the subject that you are a knowledgable expert on air worthiness matters, so did you give evidence to the H-C inquiry? Regards. Jp
JP
1. I did not say the policy to cut funding designed to maintain airworthiness had no bearing on the crash. Quite the contrary, it clearly did, because the aircraft was manifestly not airworthy or Fit for Purpose - and I have cited CDP's key evidence and that of the Project Director in support of that conclusion. The difference between the two is that the latter clearly wanted the aircraft to be airworthy, whereas the former ruled consistently that airworthiness, in particular functional safety, could be ignored (which didn't actually make matters worse over the situation that prevailed in 1992/3/4!).
2. Yes.
Thank you for your kind words, but I am no expert. I just remember what I have been taught (by real experts) and choose to implement the regulations. There are many more in MoD who know much more than I, but unfortunately some choose to follow orders instead.
1. I did not say the policy to cut funding designed to maintain airworthiness had no bearing on the crash. Quite the contrary, it clearly did, because the aircraft was manifestly not airworthy or Fit for Purpose - and I have cited CDP's key evidence and that of the Project Director in support of that conclusion. The difference between the two is that the latter clearly wanted the aircraft to be airworthy, whereas the former ruled consistently that airworthiness, in particular functional safety, could be ignored (which didn't actually make matters worse over the situation that prevailed in 1992/3/4!).
2. Yes.
Thank you for your kind words, but I am no expert. I just remember what I have been taught (by real experts) and choose to implement the regulations. There are many more in MoD who know much more than I, but unfortunately some choose to follow orders instead.
tuc:
JP:
That is exactly what he is saying! The aircraft was grossly unairworthy when it crashed thanks to the cuts and consequent actions described by tucumseh.
Why did H-C not reveal far more damning evidence that, from 1991-94, around 28% had been cut EACH YEAR, from the budget whose sole purpose was to maintain airworthiness? A budget that serviced a legal requirement which was not volume related. That is, unlike most of the General's 20% cut, it could not be justified by the argument that numbers/fleets were reducing. THAT fact was far more pertinent to his brief. And it is that volume related issue which is at the heart of many of our airworthiness problems, because so few understand it.
He won't answer the question (a common trait it seems) but it conveniently allowed his report to omit a period crucial to the introduction of Chinook HC Mk2; which of course relied heavily on the airworthiness of the Mk1 being maintained in the preceding years, and a stable and maintained build standard being presented for trials and conversion.
He won't answer the question (a common trait it seems) but it conveniently allowed his report to omit a period crucial to the introduction of Chinook HC Mk2; which of course relied heavily on the airworthiness of the Mk1 being maintained in the preceding years, and a stable and maintained build standard being presented for trials and conversion.
Tucumseh. As you say, all this has no direct bearing on the Chinook crash, which is the subject of this thread.
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Originally Posted by John Purdey
Seldom. I asked Tuc a straightforward question, and he has given a very straightforward reply. Not clear why you seem to have a problem with that, but never mind. JP
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That is exactly what he is saying! The aircraft was grossly unairworthy when it crashed thanks to the cuts and consequent actions described by tucumseh.
Pillorying their Lordships over airworthiness is another matter altogether,
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Originally Posted by bast0n
I quite thought that most sensible people here think that they may have flown it into a cliff - Which would suggest possible "Pilot error".
Pillorying their Lordships over airworthiness is another matter altogether,
Pillorying their Lordships over airworthiness is another matter altogether,
Apologies but I do think it reads more accurately like that
Just a numbered other
David
We sensible people agree that it flew into a cliff, but are open minded enough to understand that we have no evidence to find that Pilot Error, Negligence, or whatever else you might want to call it, was the reason 'beyond any doubt whatsoever'.
We sensible people agree that it flew into a cliff, but are open minded enough to understand that we have no evidence to find that Pilot Error, Negligence, or whatever else you might want to call it, was the reason 'beyond any doubt whatsoever'.
ArkRoyal & SFFP miss the point.
In Baston's self opinion he and Cazatou are sensible, the rest of the world doesn't understand that 2 Stars and above are incapable of making an error (or deliberately obscuring their own failings).
In Baston's self opinion he and Cazatou are sensible, the rest of the world doesn't understand that 2 Stars and above are incapable of making an error (or deliberately obscuring their own failings).
Pillorying their Lordships over airworthiness is another matter altogether
1. Airworthiness is not "another matter". It is fundamental. It is what won the day (rather easily) on both C130 and Nimrod. The difference here is that MoD have admitted the failures already on Chinook, but have not yet been challenged on the subject in a court. They denied them on C130 and Nimrod, until such a challenge was made (even then, notoriously, claiming airworthiness regulations were of no consequence).
2. Not quite sure who "Their Lordships" are, but it would indeed be unfair to point a finger at anyone if they had nothing to do with (a) ignoring Boscombe and fabricating the CA Release (b) the mandated two-way correspondence between CA and ACAS prior to CAR being signed and (c) signing the Release to Service knowing of Boscombe's concerns. To this end, we still await the evidence of Spiers, Norriss and Bagnall. (That Wratten and Day knew of the concerns is already known but, to be fair, neither was in post throughout the above process. In this context they are largely irrelevant anyway).
