Chinook - Still Hitting Back 3 (Merged)
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Brian << What about the possibility that there was an emergency of some sort, after the waypoint had been selected, and the aircraft had to turn right to head towards land, in order to land (slowing down in the process). Would that not offer an alternative reason for the suggested course of action?>>
It is difficult for me to go through the analysis each time in detail and so, when I reply briefly, please consider going back to the posts where I put in annotated maps and read the explanations.
If you guys got around a (large) table and did the chart work with my notes and the Boeing analysis as guides you would perhaps see just how much points to an intended approach to that landing area.
The course selector setting in particular would have an obvious connotation to any pilot – again very briefly, the handling pilot’s course selector up until the position of waypoint change, after 40 miles of hills in bad weather (Antrim) and sea crossing with the land ahead fuzzy with local cloud and mist, should reasonably be expected to have been on 027 as that position lay right on the 027 (mag) radial from Aldergrove, as did waypoint A which was directly ahead until that point. Boeing’s analysis (which you can easily replicate yourselves) discounts there being time for any deviation from that track on that long leg.
The nature of the knob which is turned to change the course selected on the HSI is such that a large change from 027 to 035 by impact seems unlikely and that the a/c held that track (035 mag) from waypoint change to the area of impact implies that this was not just a coincidental setting – that is to say, the handling pilot must have deliberately set that course and it would be an unlikely thing to be doing in an emergency (setting an aid that keeps you nicely on track).
The other implication of setting the course on an HSI is that there is no point unless the HSI has a navaid to work off: there was no known fixed navaid on that bearing (eg VOR or TACAN); another thing that could have given meaningful input to the HSI CDI could have been a waypoint in the SuperTANS but there was no stored waypoint between ‘A’ and Corran – this leaves the only obvious possibility being range and bearing data from an ARS6 working off a PRC112 that was on the ground in that direction; had there been such an arrangement, then had the PRC112 been on the LZ described previously, for which waypoint A was an obvious inner marker, then there would have been no change of course at the position of waypoint change – the a/c would have continued straight and the pilots would have known their proximity to it; had said PRC 112 been ½ mile or so further up the hill than the LZ, then all that is known about this crash is explained.
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ShyTorque
<< Walter, perhaps you should ask the question why engine DECUs were, at that time, being swapped over from left to right to see if the reported faults transferred from one engine to the other.>>
What does this have to do with my pointing out to Cazatou that disturbing the connections of the equipment he referred to should not be undertaken lightly?
.
<< If the crew were trying to land shortly after landfall, for whatever reason there is no way on this earth that they would have flown at at such a high speed, even in perfect weather conditions.>>
According to Boeing’s analysis, they had started to slow down (air speed had reduced significantly) and I would suggest that, as the engines powers were found to be matched, that the crew had left the power setting steady for a while showing an intent to continue slowing down; the Boeing analysis suggested that the slowing down in airspeed terms was masked by an increase in wind speed as the landmass was approached and crossed, such that the ground speed remained high.
I suggest that their problem was judgment of range to go, that something misled them, something that they would have trusted – had they had another ½ mile or so to go over the sea, before the wind sped up, they may well have got their speed down to a sensible figure and that they would have initiated a final aggressive speed reduction using increased power or whatever the practice would be for a landing or close pass and wave off.
.
<< Again, it really is time you began your own separate thread on your theories. Posting here does nothing one way or other for or against the campaign.>>
Some, at least, of the points I have raised over many posts I humbly suggest are relevant for any and all who would like to get as far as possible to the full truth as to what happened. There seems to be hostility to any suggestion that there has been a cover up of an undisclosed activity, something that I understand, as I have said in a recent post. What I cannot understand is the hostility towards clarification of such factors as weather, track, etc whilst endless debate is indulged in that is based on misconceptions of such factors. I have said it many times that you do not have to accept the whole “conspiracy” theory to advance understanding as far as is possible with the available data – but many of the points I have raised simply have arisen from my starting point that there was a possible motive for people with the means to arrange a convenient accident and in the circumstances of this crash it seems that an obvious way was to deceive them in some way as to their range to go to the landmass – one of the few systems that a helo pilot would trust in those conditions would have been DME of some sort, being intrinsically accurate and reliable – and that is the function of PRC112s that is used so much in support helo tasks.
If you can prove that they had an additional task on the Mull that has been so far undisclosed then not only do you get their names cleared but also there is a chance that whoever stuffed it up (whether by error or willful action) gets held responsible – real justice.
It is difficult for me to go through the analysis each time in detail and so, when I reply briefly, please consider going back to the posts where I put in annotated maps and read the explanations.
If you guys got around a (large) table and did the chart work with my notes and the Boeing analysis as guides you would perhaps see just how much points to an intended approach to that landing area.
The course selector setting in particular would have an obvious connotation to any pilot – again very briefly, the handling pilot’s course selector up until the position of waypoint change, after 40 miles of hills in bad weather (Antrim) and sea crossing with the land ahead fuzzy with local cloud and mist, should reasonably be expected to have been on 027 as that position lay right on the 027 (mag) radial from Aldergrove, as did waypoint A which was directly ahead until that point. Boeing’s analysis (which you can easily replicate yourselves) discounts there being time for any deviation from that track on that long leg.
The nature of the knob which is turned to change the course selected on the HSI is such that a large change from 027 to 035 by impact seems unlikely and that the a/c held that track (035 mag) from waypoint change to the area of impact implies that this was not just a coincidental setting – that is to say, the handling pilot must have deliberately set that course and it would be an unlikely thing to be doing in an emergency (setting an aid that keeps you nicely on track).
The other implication of setting the course on an HSI is that there is no point unless the HSI has a navaid to work off: there was no known fixed navaid on that bearing (eg VOR or TACAN); another thing that could have given meaningful input to the HSI CDI could have been a waypoint in the SuperTANS but there was no stored waypoint between ‘A’ and Corran – this leaves the only obvious possibility being range and bearing data from an ARS6 working off a PRC112 that was on the ground in that direction; had there been such an arrangement, then had the PRC112 been on the LZ described previously, for which waypoint A was an obvious inner marker, then there would have been no change of course at the position of waypoint change – the a/c would have continued straight and the pilots would have known their proximity to it; had said PRC 112 been ½ mile or so further up the hill than the LZ, then all that is known about this crash is explained.
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ShyTorque
<< Walter, perhaps you should ask the question why engine DECUs were, at that time, being swapped over from left to right to see if the reported faults transferred from one engine to the other.>>
What does this have to do with my pointing out to Cazatou that disturbing the connections of the equipment he referred to should not be undertaken lightly?
.
<< If the crew were trying to land shortly after landfall, for whatever reason there is no way on this earth that they would have flown at at such a high speed, even in perfect weather conditions.>>
According to Boeing’s analysis, they had started to slow down (air speed had reduced significantly) and I would suggest that, as the engines powers were found to be matched, that the crew had left the power setting steady for a while showing an intent to continue slowing down; the Boeing analysis suggested that the slowing down in airspeed terms was masked by an increase in wind speed as the landmass was approached and crossed, such that the ground speed remained high.
I suggest that their problem was judgment of range to go, that something misled them, something that they would have trusted – had they had another ½ mile or so to go over the sea, before the wind sped up, they may well have got their speed down to a sensible figure and that they would have initiated a final aggressive speed reduction using increased power or whatever the practice would be for a landing or close pass and wave off.
.
<< Again, it really is time you began your own separate thread on your theories. Posting here does nothing one way or other for or against the campaign.>>
Some, at least, of the points I have raised over many posts I humbly suggest are relevant for any and all who would like to get as far as possible to the full truth as to what happened. There seems to be hostility to any suggestion that there has been a cover up of an undisclosed activity, something that I understand, as I have said in a recent post. What I cannot understand is the hostility towards clarification of such factors as weather, track, etc whilst endless debate is indulged in that is based on misconceptions of such factors. I have said it many times that you do not have to accept the whole “conspiracy” theory to advance understanding as far as is possible with the available data – but many of the points I have raised simply have arisen from my starting point that there was a possible motive for people with the means to arrange a convenient accident and in the circumstances of this crash it seems that an obvious way was to deceive them in some way as to their range to go to the landmass – one of the few systems that a helo pilot would trust in those conditions would have been DME of some sort, being intrinsically accurate and reliable – and that is the function of PRC112s that is used so much in support helo tasks.
If you can prove that they had an additional task on the Mull that has been so far undisclosed then not only do you get their names cleared but also there is a chance that whoever stuffed it up (whether by error or willful action) gets held responsible – real justice.
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Amazing, all these esoteric points about satelite tracking etc and the issue is to be judged by an MP who has never been near a helicopter or involved in any aspect of military aviation.
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and the issue is to be judged by an MP who has never been near a helicopter or involved in any aspect of military aviation
A really irritating PPRuNer
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Quote:
and the issue is to be judged by an MP who has never been near a helicopter or involved in any aspect of military aviation
Who, in turn, is advised by those who have never seen/heard/felt a shot fired in anger, made a Command decision where lives were at risk, or successfully survived the cut and thrust of life outside the sheltered workshop of the Civil Service.
and the issue is to be judged by an MP who has never been near a helicopter or involved in any aspect of military aviation
Who, in turn, is advised by those who have never seen/heard/felt a shot fired in anger, made a Command decision where lives were at risk, or successfully survived the cut and thrust of life outside the sheltered workshop of the Civil Service.
Regards,
Brian
"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook
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Courtney,
Everyday in the British legal system, judges make binding decisions on matters medical, technical, environmental etc etc as well as legal. They are trained to do so. They do this with the benefit of expert technical advisors. Try watching John Deed on TV.
Have you done any research on Des Browne? Unlike David Cameron, who has never done a real job in his life, Des Browne practiced as a solicitor from 1976 to 1993 and a barrister from 1993 until joining the commons in 1997.
He is very well quallified to sift through the evidence given to him and is capable of sorting the wheat from the chaff. He also has access to all the experts, of both MOD, and the Campaign, should he require clarification.
Do I trust him? I have two reservations.
1. He is a politician and his lips move.
2. I have a sneaking suspicion that this all comes down to money. If the two pilots are not responsible for the accident then someone further up the MOD foodchain is.
Multi million pound compensation chain agaist a cash strapped government
Everyday in the British legal system, judges make binding decisions on matters medical, technical, environmental etc etc as well as legal. They are trained to do so. They do this with the benefit of expert technical advisors. Try watching John Deed on TV.
Have you done any research on Des Browne? Unlike David Cameron, who has never done a real job in his life, Des Browne practiced as a solicitor from 1976 to 1993 and a barrister from 1993 until joining the commons in 1997.
He is very well quallified to sift through the evidence given to him and is capable of sorting the wheat from the chaff. He also has access to all the experts, of both MOD, and the Campaign, should he require clarification.
Do I trust him? I have two reservations.
1. He is a politician and his lips move.
2. I have a sneaking suspicion that this all comes down to money. If the two pilots are not responsible for the accident then someone further up the MOD foodchain is.
Multi million pound compensation chain agaist a cash strapped government
Avoid imitations
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Dalek, your second point is probably close to the truth. The other similar point is a loss of credibility in the RAF management system, regarding the bungled, premature introduction of this aircraft into service.
There are a number of similarities between this and the problems caused by the premature introduction of the Lockheed Lightning into service before it was ready, some decades before, in the USA. A similar outcome resulted.
Walter, I was perhaps in error to expect you to understand anything outside of your theory. However, to explain: you seemed incredulous that avionics boxes were being re-racked in an attempt to clear malfunctions. This was reportedly also being done with DECUs at the time, before the accident, in attempts to clear what were possibly software issues. It is now well documented that MOD were suing Boeing over engine software issues, but at the time did not acknowledge this downwards to the RAF engineers responsible for fixing the aircraft.
There are a number of similarities between this and the problems caused by the premature introduction of the Lockheed Lightning into service before it was ready, some decades before, in the USA. A similar outcome resulted.
Walter, I was perhaps in error to expect you to understand anything outside of your theory. However, to explain: you seemed incredulous that avionics boxes were being re-racked in an attempt to clear malfunctions. This was reportedly also being done with DECUs at the time, before the accident, in attempts to clear what were possibly software issues. It is now well documented that MOD were suing Boeing over engine software issues, but at the time did not acknowledge this downwards to the RAF engineers responsible for fixing the aircraft.
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Shytorque,
I spent the first 14 years of my RAF life as an Avionics Technician and can confirm what you say with regards to re racking of boxes is true. It was common practice to re rack or swap boxes as part of the fault analysis and even today on the "electric" aircraft I fly on I still see the GE's doing it.
I have told WK this and given him plenty of other pertinent information with regards to how work is carried out on aircraft on numerous occasions but like every other person who has offered him advice he chooses to ignore me.
I spent the first 14 years of my RAF life as an Avionics Technician and can confirm what you say with regards to re racking of boxes is true. It was common practice to re rack or swap boxes as part of the fault analysis and even today on the "electric" aircraft I fly on I still see the GE's doing it.
I have told WK this and given him plenty of other pertinent information with regards to how work is carried out on aircraft on numerous occasions but like every other person who has offered him advice he chooses to ignore me.
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Courtney's post is quite right - how can any legal mind without some knowledge of aviation and supporting technology ever see through the misrepresentation, deception, spin, omissions, and b*llsh*t that has pervaded this case.
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SFFP
You seem the ideal volunteer to give us all a summary of how range and bearing data are passed from an ARS6 to the HSI in an HC2 Chinook as was the case in several after ZD576.
Internal to the a/c stuff like this would not be a big secret would it? - I mean, the overall system was common in other NATO countries back in 94.
It would surely be of great academic interest to all.
May even be one reason to dump waypoint A if routed through the CDU - hypothetically if equip fitted of course.
.
As a general point to all in the Mull group - don't think there is any good from allowing this incident to slip away uninvestigated even when the plots' names are cleared - the bombing may have stopped but in all other respects the outcome of the peace process is lousy.
Those who enthusiastically block full investigation of what was going on possibly in the belief that they are acting for the greater good of the country are not appreciating just how bad it is to abandon a large section of the British people whose sovereign control of their own community was undermined by the effective end to the anti-terrorism effort that this crash brought. The implications of any possible foul play by the intelligence lot in this incident are just too dire to let them get away with it, if this was the case - we just have to explore such possibilities thoroughly, especially when it is so obvious that there was a cover up to some degree regarding the conditions and activity near the Mull.
.
SFFP
You seem the ideal volunteer to give us all a summary of how range and bearing data are passed from an ARS6 to the HSI in an HC2 Chinook as was the case in several after ZD576.
Internal to the a/c stuff like this would not be a big secret would it? - I mean, the overall system was common in other NATO countries back in 94.
It would surely be of great academic interest to all.
May even be one reason to dump waypoint A if routed through the CDU - hypothetically if equip fitted of course.
.
As a general point to all in the Mull group - don't think there is any good from allowing this incident to slip away uninvestigated even when the plots' names are cleared - the bombing may have stopped but in all other respects the outcome of the peace process is lousy.
Those who enthusiastically block full investigation of what was going on possibly in the belief that they are acting for the greater good of the country are not appreciating just how bad it is to abandon a large section of the British people whose sovereign control of their own community was undermined by the effective end to the anti-terrorism effort that this crash brought. The implications of any possible foul play by the intelligence lot in this incident are just too dire to let them get away with it, if this was the case - we just have to explore such possibilities thoroughly, especially when it is so obvious that there was a cover up to some degree regarding the conditions and activity near the Mull.
Last edited by walter kennedy; 11th May 2008 at 14:36. Reason: grammar
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Walter
If you are correct about the "Intelligence Lot" then how come you are still able to post your denunciations of their "misdeeds"?
Surely you would have met with an unfortunate "accident" by now?
If you are correct about the "Intelligence Lot" then how come you are still able to post your denunciations of their "misdeeds"?
Surely you would have met with an unfortunate "accident" by now?
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WK,
Because I was never a Chinook avionics tech I cannot answer your question however Master of None in posts #3313 and #3326 DID answer your question and qualified his answer with "As someone who has operated and instructed on the RAF Chinook HC2" but you chose to ignore him as is your want.
Why you continue to ask questions then ignore the answers given, even when they come from such experts in their field is beyond me
Because I was never a Chinook avionics tech I cannot answer your question however Master of None in posts #3313 and #3326 DID answer your question and qualified his answer with "As someone who has operated and instructed on the RAF Chinook HC2" but you chose to ignore him as is your want.
Why you continue to ask questions then ignore the answers given, even when they come from such experts in their field is beyond me
Walter, you say
Forgive me if I've missed any previous mention of this line of thought in your multifarious and voluminous posts - if so, I've clearly not studied them with the intensity they obviously deserve.
But, if you haven't mentioned this before, could it possibly be that you are now offering us a peek into the real reasons behind your one-person crusade?
I think we should be told.
airsound
the bombing may have stopped but in all other respects the outcome of the peace process is lousy.
Those who enthusiastically block full investigation of what was going on possibly in the belief that they are acting for the greater good of the country are not appreciating just how bad it is to abandon a large section of the British people whose sovereign control of their own community was undermined by the effective end to the anti-terrorism effort that this crash brought.
Those who enthusiastically block full investigation of what was going on possibly in the belief that they are acting for the greater good of the country are not appreciating just how bad it is to abandon a large section of the British people whose sovereign control of their own community was undermined by the effective end to the anti-terrorism effort that this crash brought.
But, if you haven't mentioned this before, could it possibly be that you are now offering us a peek into the real reasons behind your one-person crusade?
I think we should be told.
airsound
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It's Not What This is About!
There are still too many people posting speculations and their own "reasons" for this accident - this is not what this is about - there is only one reason for this thread and the submission to MOD and that is to clear the pilots' names of an unjustified and possibly illegal charge of gross negligence - ie manslaughter! You do not have to be a helicopter pilot or expert to make that judgement because none of these people, whatever their rank and experience, know what happened - an admission from the senior reviewing officer who then, in what I see as an error of judgement himself, based his findings on hypothesis and speculation - not on facts - the "facts" were not and are not available. Many people have studied this accident most carefully, and were well qualified to do so, and none could agree the BoI findings. But perhaps the most qualified investigation, combining legal, engineering and aviation expertise, the HoL Select Committee, after an exhaustive investigation which covered even more ground than the BoI, said "we will never know" - that alone is a good enough reason, or even fact, why whatever mistakes the pilots may or may not have made, whether the aircraft had a major technical defect or not, whether it was "airworthy" enough ever to have been used for this flight and whatever our personal opinions may be as to what happened the pilots should not have been accused of gross negligence - it is as simple as that.
JB
JB
the pilots should not have been accused of gross negligence - it is as simple as that.
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It's exactly what this is about.
Let's not forget what PPrune is about...
Clearly, the facts, or lack of them, surrouding this incident are one of the reasons we are where we are 13+ years later. As frustrating as it can be to see a point raised go around in ever decreasing circles, it is wrong to imply that all points/issues have been exhausted. There are still, for some, a lot of unanswered questions, and this forum has, over the years, served to allow some individuals to persue lines of inquiry that may not have been started but for PPrune.
AA
The Professional Pilots Rumour Network (PPRuNe) is a community of professional pilots and people who work in aviation, both experienced and inexperienced. Your behaviour here, and ours, can be summed up in four words: “Mi casa, su casa” (my house is your house).
The PPRuNe Forums are a place where it's okay to be yourself as long as you always act with respect for your fellow members as well as PPRuNe staff. Our goal will be to treat our members as we would wish to be treated. In return, we ask that you act here as you would if you were face to face with the other members. You are not expected to leave your personality at the door. There are going to be topics and discussions that will have heated debates. Please think before you post and re-read what you type before you post it. Keep your comments limited to the debate at hand and do not make this a personal issue between you and another member.
There is tremendous diversity in age, race, gender, language, location (worldwide). There will be a lot of varying opinions on different subjects. We're all human beings and we're all drawn to this site because we have a common bond as pilots, cabin crew, air traffic controllers, engineers, technicians or just interested parties.
The PPRuNe Forums are a place where it's okay to be yourself as long as you always act with respect for your fellow members as well as PPRuNe staff. Our goal will be to treat our members as we would wish to be treated. In return, we ask that you act here as you would if you were face to face with the other members. You are not expected to leave your personality at the door. There are going to be topics and discussions that will have heated debates. Please think before you post and re-read what you type before you post it. Keep your comments limited to the debate at hand and do not make this a personal issue between you and another member.
There is tremendous diversity in age, race, gender, language, location (worldwide). There will be a lot of varying opinions on different subjects. We're all human beings and we're all drawn to this site because we have a common bond as pilots, cabin crew, air traffic controllers, engineers, technicians or just interested parties.
Clearly, the facts, or lack of them, surrouding this incident are one of the reasons we are where we are 13+ years later. As frustrating as it can be to see a point raised go around in ever decreasing circles, it is wrong to imply that all points/issues have been exhausted. There are still, for some, a lot of unanswered questions, and this forum has, over the years, served to allow some individuals to persue lines of inquiry that may not have been started but for PPrune.
AA
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Ancient Aviator,
For once we are in total agreement.
To quote the saying attributed to Francois Marie Arouet Voltaire:
" I disapprove of what you say, but I will defend to the death your right to say it".
For once we are in total agreement.
To quote the saying attributed to Francois Marie Arouet Voltaire:
" I disapprove of what you say, but I will defend to the death your right to say it".
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AA,
See the first post on this thread from February 2002 - it was started to fight the injustice of the verdict, not just to come up with ever wilder speculation for the cause of the accident, an accident which we will never know the reason for until time travel is invented! You and anyone else are of course entitled to have your own opinions as to what may have caused the accident but they will only be that - opinions. There are though two basic facts, ZD 576 crashed, and as any possible cause is based on an element of speculation (ie the questions cannot be answered with facts) we will never know why with the certainty needed for a verdict of gross negligence. Obviously you may consider the verdict was correct based on your opinion, and again we are all entitled to express our views for or against - I was expressing mine and I stand by them - using my own name!
JB
See the first post on this thread from February 2002 - it was started to fight the injustice of the verdict, not just to come up with ever wilder speculation for the cause of the accident, an accident which we will never know the reason for until time travel is invented! You and anyone else are of course entitled to have your own opinions as to what may have caused the accident but they will only be that - opinions. There are though two basic facts, ZD 576 crashed, and as any possible cause is based on an element of speculation (ie the questions cannot be answered with facts) we will never know why with the certainty needed for a verdict of gross negligence. Obviously you may consider the verdict was correct based on your opinion, and again we are all entitled to express our views for or against - I was expressing mine and I stand by them - using my own name!
JB
AA
PPRuNe is merely a reflection of us all, good bad and indifferent. At its best though it shines. Invariably that coincides with when it is fighting a good fight, be it on behalf of SSAFFA, Gurkhas, AT fleet protection, etc. The subject of this thread is such a good fight, not an invitation to second guess what may or may not have happened to result in a terrible accident, but to right a wrong, an injustice done to two of its kind by their own service. JB sums it up more succinctly than I, so I will merely add:
Let Right Be Done!
PPRuNe is merely a reflection of us all, good bad and indifferent. At its best though it shines. Invariably that coincides with when it is fighting a good fight, be it on behalf of SSAFFA, Gurkhas, AT fleet protection, etc. The subject of this thread is such a good fight, not an invitation to second guess what may or may not have happened to result in a terrible accident, but to right a wrong, an injustice done to two of its kind by their own service. JB sums it up more succinctly than I, so I will merely add:
Let Right Be Done!
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There were other casualties on board other than the RAF aircrew the relatives, friends and colleagues of whom would surely like to know the full story.
The loss of those personnel on board also had a great impact on a large section of the British people who would surely be interested in the full story.
However, that the crash happened in an RAF a/c and any hope of understanding anything much about the crash depends upon debate amongst those with knowledge and experience of the a/c, operations, avionics, etc those with an interest would naturally be drawn to a forum such as this.
I don't know of any better forum and so believe that not only should some inquiry beyond just the legal details of clearing their names be tolerated but also supported constructively.
We don't want debate to be gagged as so many inquiries are by sticking rigidly to a narrow scope (eg Hutton).
Yes we would all like to see the pilots' names cleared - the campaign's main thrust is quite right, that there was never evidence to justify that verdict - but there are indeed so many unanswered questions that still can be answered.
I personally believe that the harsh verdict was politically motivated to discourage speculation in the first place ("Look folks, it was just a case of pilot error beyond any doubt whatsover - look at the verdict!") and I do not believe that anything that could be uncovered would be prejudicial to overturning that unjust verdict - you all should have that confidence if you have faith in the pilots' abilities.
The loss of those personnel on board also had a great impact on a large section of the British people who would surely be interested in the full story.
However, that the crash happened in an RAF a/c and any hope of understanding anything much about the crash depends upon debate amongst those with knowledge and experience of the a/c, operations, avionics, etc those with an interest would naturally be drawn to a forum such as this.
I don't know of any better forum and so believe that not only should some inquiry beyond just the legal details of clearing their names be tolerated but also supported constructively.
We don't want debate to be gagged as so many inquiries are by sticking rigidly to a narrow scope (eg Hutton).
Yes we would all like to see the pilots' names cleared - the campaign's main thrust is quite right, that there was never evidence to justify that verdict - but there are indeed so many unanswered questions that still can be answered.
I personally believe that the harsh verdict was politically motivated to discourage speculation in the first place ("Look folks, it was just a case of pilot error beyond any doubt whatsover - look at the verdict!") and I do not believe that anything that could be uncovered would be prejudicial to overturning that unjust verdict - you all should have that confidence if you have faith in the pilots' abilities.
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Walter,
We have met and spoken on several times, and I have listened with interest and politely to your theory - but on every occasion I have told you that in the absence of the ability for anyone to know what happened the Mull Group's strategy has been to work on the legal challenge and in areas where facts are available that show there could be a different explanation to that of pilot error associated with gross negligence, and hence generate the "doubt" that would make it even more impossible for the RAF to sustain a verdict based on speculation as they have done up to now. That as far as I can see has always been the purpose of this thread. Of course the relatives and many others would like to know what happened, but they, and we, never will, and there is nothing we can do about that.
Your ideas may or may not hold water - I am not a RW pilot but I have seen others who are rebut many of your theories. Where I might agree with you is that there could have been other factors influencing the verdict, and indeed as I have shown you there is very clear evidence that not all extant and highly relevant "facts" were made available to the BOI - these do not tell us the cause of the accident as you and everyone else would like, but they do give the basis for doubt and the legal challenge. Like everyone else you are entitled to your views, but, for example, I suggest that you could start a new thread which would allow you and others to expound your theories without detracting from the purpose of this thread which I believe still has one simple factual based objective - to clear the pilots of the unjust and unjustified charge of gross negligence. Your ideas, in the absence of proof, do not help this objective in any way.
Clearly we wait for SofS's response, which is now getting later and later than "promised". But, for example, if the MOD were to take the decision to re-open the Inquiry I assume that if you have complete confidence that you can prove your point then you would step forward to give such evidence.
JB
We have met and spoken on several times, and I have listened with interest and politely to your theory - but on every occasion I have told you that in the absence of the ability for anyone to know what happened the Mull Group's strategy has been to work on the legal challenge and in areas where facts are available that show there could be a different explanation to that of pilot error associated with gross negligence, and hence generate the "doubt" that would make it even more impossible for the RAF to sustain a verdict based on speculation as they have done up to now. That as far as I can see has always been the purpose of this thread. Of course the relatives and many others would like to know what happened, but they, and we, never will, and there is nothing we can do about that.
Your ideas may or may not hold water - I am not a RW pilot but I have seen others who are rebut many of your theories. Where I might agree with you is that there could have been other factors influencing the verdict, and indeed as I have shown you there is very clear evidence that not all extant and highly relevant "facts" were made available to the BOI - these do not tell us the cause of the accident as you and everyone else would like, but they do give the basis for doubt and the legal challenge. Like everyone else you are entitled to your views, but, for example, I suggest that you could start a new thread which would allow you and others to expound your theories without detracting from the purpose of this thread which I believe still has one simple factual based objective - to clear the pilots of the unjust and unjustified charge of gross negligence. Your ideas, in the absence of proof, do not help this objective in any way.
Clearly we wait for SofS's response, which is now getting later and later than "promised". But, for example, if the MOD were to take the decision to re-open the Inquiry I assume that if you have complete confidence that you can prove your point then you would step forward to give such evidence.
JB
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Master of None
SFFP dobbed you in as the expert in this area when he wrote:
<<Because I was never a Chinook avionics tech I cannot answer your question however Master of None in posts #3313 and #3326 DID answer your question and qualified his answer with "As someone who has operated and instructed on the RAF Chinook HC2" but you chose to ignore him as is your want.
Why you continue to ask questions then ignore the answers given, even when they come from such experts in their field is beyond me >>
So I suppose I had better address what you have written:
I ignored your post #3313 as, at first reading, I thought it was inadequate and confusing; however, going through it again, I recognise that it was just very concise and someone experienced with the system should have understood your point clearly – I recognise that point now and I apologise for not responding earlier – the problem is one of confusing the course selector as a whole and the Course Deviation Indicator/Bar (CDI/CDB).
.
Your post #3326, again giving a confusing (to the layperson) description, showed that you have misread or misunderstood what I have written, the bit about there being no VOR or TACAN of use particularly illustrates this as it was a fundamental point that I was making (agreement!).
I reproduce those posts of yours below and follow them with a brief summary of how I believe the instruments work so that readers can compare and perhaps get a clearer understanding from the two versions – and perhaps you could contribute further understanding:
.
Post # 3313
<<Walter on the Chinook HC2 the CDB can be set by either pilot to any hdg regardless of any other outside stimuli (infact external sources cannot move the CDB), he can also manipulate the other pilots CDB. That the CDBs were on different hdgs would suggest to me that something may have nudged it, say some turbulence?.. or crashing at speed into a large cumulo-granite!>>
.
Post # 3326
<<As someone who has operated and instructed on the RAF Chinook HC2 and not just gleaned information from other uninformed opinions I'm confident that there is no embaressment on my side. The CDBs can only be moved by the pilots. They can be used to display cross track information from a variety of sources including a navigation computer, but are often used just to display to the Handling Pilot a desired heading set by the Non Handling Pilot. The reasons the CDB in this case was indicating what it was will never be known but it cannot have been 'dragged' around there by an external influence. If the HP/NHP had reason to doubt the nav computer they may have been looking for a known point to 'zero' it on, please note the use of the phrase 'may have'. The only other info the CDB can work on are TACAN or VOR indications, neither of which were situated on the Mull that day, at least they weren't when I was.>>
.
My version:
I recommend readers without an aviation background to get familiar with the functions and uses of Horizontal Situation Indicators (HSIs) by reading around – there are plenty of well illustrated descriptions available on the web – and perhaps play around with a PC flight simulator doing a bit of VOR nav – this would make it easier to follow the arguments.
.
COURSE SELECTOR DESCRIPTION
The course pointer has a head and tail, physically attached to each other within the instrument housing, and when they rotate about the instrument face, one moves with the other. It is moved around the face of the instrument, and therefore relative to the compass rose, by turning the knob on the lower right face of the HSI. The position of the pointer relative to the rose is repeated digitally in the top right corner of the HSI – this is the Course Indicator.
(Briefly) the rose is driven by the gyro compass and moves around as the a/c heading changes – the course pointer position on the rose is the desired course that is fed back to the nav computer/aid/whatever which returns the drive for the Course Deviation Indicator (CDI) / Bar (CDB), a bar which lies between the head and tail of the pointer and which indicates in what sense the a/c is on or off track and the alignment with the desired course.
The pointer head, CDI and the tail are collectively called the COURSE SELECTOR.
The course selector is used for navigation tracking in several modes including for example following a VOR radial or the track to a waypoint generated by a GPS/Doppler nav computer.
.
SLAVING
While in the a/c type of interest here each pilot may independently select different navigational modes for display on his HSI, it is usual in route navigation for the CDI, just the bar in the middle that is, to be slaved to the co-pilot/navigator’s HSI, such that the handling pilot just has to follow the CDI to keep on the planned track.
How this is done on the 47D is that the navigator presses a button on his HSI mode select panel (CMD SEL) which does two things:
If the AFCS is set accordingly, his HSI heading bug will demand the heading (no interest here);
His CDI position and orientation with respect to the compass rose will be duplicated by the other HSIs CDI – regardless of what position the handling pilot has his course selector pointer (and course indicator), moving his knob around will move his course selector pointer (and indicator) but will not affect the orientation of the CDI wrt the compass rose on his HSI.
However, there seems to be an area of confusion here – perhaps the HC2 is different in this respect and I would appreciate being put right if the following assumption is wrong:
The type of HSI fitted to a 47D of the time was an electro mechanical device which would not apparently support a servo type movement of the course selector pointer by an external source – just the knob seems to be the only way of moving it (I believe MasterofNone was making this point) – this is quite different to the CDI bar which is driven externally and therefore it is easy to understand how this is slaved.
Inspection of cockpit photographs of a 47D and an HC2 show what appears to be the same type of instrument (HSI).
Thus I am assuming that, even in the case where CDIs are slaved, the individual course pointers (along with their digital indicators) can have different bearings to each other – and these two values were preserved in ZD576 (028 and 035, evidence rated “positive”).
Had they been just doing normal route flying, the position of the CDI bars should have been in the same position – their positions were preserved by way of marks caused by first impact and were not the same (left/nhp 0,9 div left, right hp 1,5div left, evidence “positive” and “not highly positive” respectively). So the track bars were (assuming 1 div is equivalent to 5 deg) 3 deg different.
I believe it is the latter, the difference in the CDI bar positions, that MasterofNone was describing – not the whole course selector – when he was suggesting perhaps the impact had caused those positions.
(It is interesting that, from memory, Group Captain Pulford [was it?] did not make this distinction either when answering questions put by Lord Toombs at an inquiry.)
One should consider that the difference in bar positions, while not huge, was not to be expected (if slaved) from impact because of the positions of those instruments in the same plane on the front panel – they should have experienced the same dynamic force at initial impact.
As I have pointed out in previous posts, it is hard to see that the hp’s HSI selector could have been moved from 027 to 035 by impact.
If you consider that the last leg (pos of waypoint change to crash site) was on a track of 035 mag this suggests that the hp’s course selection of 035 was deliberate – it is just too much of a coincidence to have been otherwise.
The combination of the CDI bars being different and the Course Selector values being different could reasonably suggest that the HSIs were not slaved. I do not know how this is achieved in an HC2 but the HC2 Chinook has a few more options on its Mode Select Panels (lots more buttons than the 47D), the choice of feeds coming via the FDIC (Flight Display Interface Controller), and so I would welcome some comment on this from those who should know.
Just for interest, in later HC2s that were equipped with ARS6 was the usual practice to have the hp’s HSI working from ARS6 input whilst the nhp kept an eye on area nav on his HSI?
I agree with MasterofNone that there were no VORs/TACANS within range on a bearing of 035 and I add that none of the stored waypoints in the SuperTANS could have generated such a bearing – points I have made before when suggesting that they could possibly have been referring to a PRC112 that was supposed to be on that LZ I have described.
While my suggestion of this particular equipment is speculative – the only thing I can think of that could have misled them – there is plenty of evidence that, when summed together, points to their intention to land or closely approach that landing area; this should be addressed by the Mull group as it strongly indicates an extra task, thus far undeclared, that surely clears the pilots of blame.
SFFP dobbed you in as the expert in this area when he wrote:
<<Because I was never a Chinook avionics tech I cannot answer your question however Master of None in posts #3313 and #3326 DID answer your question and qualified his answer with "As someone who has operated and instructed on the RAF Chinook HC2" but you chose to ignore him as is your want.
Why you continue to ask questions then ignore the answers given, even when they come from such experts in their field is beyond me >>
So I suppose I had better address what you have written:
I ignored your post #3313 as, at first reading, I thought it was inadequate and confusing; however, going through it again, I recognise that it was just very concise and someone experienced with the system should have understood your point clearly – I recognise that point now and I apologise for not responding earlier – the problem is one of confusing the course selector as a whole and the Course Deviation Indicator/Bar (CDI/CDB).
.
Your post #3326, again giving a confusing (to the layperson) description, showed that you have misread or misunderstood what I have written, the bit about there being no VOR or TACAN of use particularly illustrates this as it was a fundamental point that I was making (agreement!).
I reproduce those posts of yours below and follow them with a brief summary of how I believe the instruments work so that readers can compare and perhaps get a clearer understanding from the two versions – and perhaps you could contribute further understanding:
.
Post # 3313
<<Walter on the Chinook HC2 the CDB can be set by either pilot to any hdg regardless of any other outside stimuli (infact external sources cannot move the CDB), he can also manipulate the other pilots CDB. That the CDBs were on different hdgs would suggest to me that something may have nudged it, say some turbulence?.. or crashing at speed into a large cumulo-granite!>>
.
Post # 3326
<<As someone who has operated and instructed on the RAF Chinook HC2 and not just gleaned information from other uninformed opinions I'm confident that there is no embaressment on my side. The CDBs can only be moved by the pilots. They can be used to display cross track information from a variety of sources including a navigation computer, but are often used just to display to the Handling Pilot a desired heading set by the Non Handling Pilot. The reasons the CDB in this case was indicating what it was will never be known but it cannot have been 'dragged' around there by an external influence. If the HP/NHP had reason to doubt the nav computer they may have been looking for a known point to 'zero' it on, please note the use of the phrase 'may have'. The only other info the CDB can work on are TACAN or VOR indications, neither of which were situated on the Mull that day, at least they weren't when I was.>>
.
My version:
I recommend readers without an aviation background to get familiar with the functions and uses of Horizontal Situation Indicators (HSIs) by reading around – there are plenty of well illustrated descriptions available on the web – and perhaps play around with a PC flight simulator doing a bit of VOR nav – this would make it easier to follow the arguments.
.
COURSE SELECTOR DESCRIPTION
The course pointer has a head and tail, physically attached to each other within the instrument housing, and when they rotate about the instrument face, one moves with the other. It is moved around the face of the instrument, and therefore relative to the compass rose, by turning the knob on the lower right face of the HSI. The position of the pointer relative to the rose is repeated digitally in the top right corner of the HSI – this is the Course Indicator.
(Briefly) the rose is driven by the gyro compass and moves around as the a/c heading changes – the course pointer position on the rose is the desired course that is fed back to the nav computer/aid/whatever which returns the drive for the Course Deviation Indicator (CDI) / Bar (CDB), a bar which lies between the head and tail of the pointer and which indicates in what sense the a/c is on or off track and the alignment with the desired course.
The pointer head, CDI and the tail are collectively called the COURSE SELECTOR.
The course selector is used for navigation tracking in several modes including for example following a VOR radial or the track to a waypoint generated by a GPS/Doppler nav computer.
.
SLAVING
While in the a/c type of interest here each pilot may independently select different navigational modes for display on his HSI, it is usual in route navigation for the CDI, just the bar in the middle that is, to be slaved to the co-pilot/navigator’s HSI, such that the handling pilot just has to follow the CDI to keep on the planned track.
How this is done on the 47D is that the navigator presses a button on his HSI mode select panel (CMD SEL) which does two things:
If the AFCS is set accordingly, his HSI heading bug will demand the heading (no interest here);
His CDI position and orientation with respect to the compass rose will be duplicated by the other HSIs CDI – regardless of what position the handling pilot has his course selector pointer (and course indicator), moving his knob around will move his course selector pointer (and indicator) but will not affect the orientation of the CDI wrt the compass rose on his HSI.
However, there seems to be an area of confusion here – perhaps the HC2 is different in this respect and I would appreciate being put right if the following assumption is wrong:
The type of HSI fitted to a 47D of the time was an electro mechanical device which would not apparently support a servo type movement of the course selector pointer by an external source – just the knob seems to be the only way of moving it (I believe MasterofNone was making this point) – this is quite different to the CDI bar which is driven externally and therefore it is easy to understand how this is slaved.
Inspection of cockpit photographs of a 47D and an HC2 show what appears to be the same type of instrument (HSI).
Thus I am assuming that, even in the case where CDIs are slaved, the individual course pointers (along with their digital indicators) can have different bearings to each other – and these two values were preserved in ZD576 (028 and 035, evidence rated “positive”).
Had they been just doing normal route flying, the position of the CDI bars should have been in the same position – their positions were preserved by way of marks caused by first impact and were not the same (left/nhp 0,9 div left, right hp 1,5div left, evidence “positive” and “not highly positive” respectively). So the track bars were (assuming 1 div is equivalent to 5 deg) 3 deg different.
I believe it is the latter, the difference in the CDI bar positions, that MasterofNone was describing – not the whole course selector – when he was suggesting perhaps the impact had caused those positions.
(It is interesting that, from memory, Group Captain Pulford [was it?] did not make this distinction either when answering questions put by Lord Toombs at an inquiry.)
One should consider that the difference in bar positions, while not huge, was not to be expected (if slaved) from impact because of the positions of those instruments in the same plane on the front panel – they should have experienced the same dynamic force at initial impact.
As I have pointed out in previous posts, it is hard to see that the hp’s HSI selector could have been moved from 027 to 035 by impact.
If you consider that the last leg (pos of waypoint change to crash site) was on a track of 035 mag this suggests that the hp’s course selection of 035 was deliberate – it is just too much of a coincidence to have been otherwise.
The combination of the CDI bars being different and the Course Selector values being different could reasonably suggest that the HSIs were not slaved. I do not know how this is achieved in an HC2 but the HC2 Chinook has a few more options on its Mode Select Panels (lots more buttons than the 47D), the choice of feeds coming via the FDIC (Flight Display Interface Controller), and so I would welcome some comment on this from those who should know.
Just for interest, in later HC2s that were equipped with ARS6 was the usual practice to have the hp’s HSI working from ARS6 input whilst the nhp kept an eye on area nav on his HSI?
I agree with MasterofNone that there were no VORs/TACANS within range on a bearing of 035 and I add that none of the stored waypoints in the SuperTANS could have generated such a bearing – points I have made before when suggesting that they could possibly have been referring to a PRC112 that was supposed to be on that LZ I have described.
While my suggestion of this particular equipment is speculative – the only thing I can think of that could have misled them – there is plenty of evidence that, when summed together, points to their intention to land or closely approach that landing area; this should be addressed by the Mull group as it strongly indicates an extra task, thus far undeclared, that surely clears the pilots of blame.