Brian << What about the possibility that there was an emergency of some sort, after the waypoint had been selected, and the aircraft had to turn right to head towards land, in order to land (slowing down in the process). Would that not offer an alternative reason for the suggested course of action?>>
It is difficult for me to go through the analysis each time in detail and so, when I reply briefly, please consider going back to the posts where I put in annotated maps and read the explanations.
If you guys got around a (large) table and did the chart work with my notes and the Boeing analysis as guides you would perhaps see just how much points to an intended approach to that landing area.
The course selector setting in particular would have an obvious connotation to any pilot – again very briefly, the handling pilot’s course selector up until the position of waypoint change, after 40 miles of hills in bad weather (Antrim) and sea crossing with the land ahead fuzzy with local cloud and mist, should reasonably be expected to have been on 027 as that position lay right on the 027 (mag) radial from Aldergrove, as did waypoint A which was directly ahead until that point. Boeing’s analysis (which you can easily replicate yourselves) discounts there being time for any deviation from that track on that long leg.
The nature of the knob which is turned to change the course selected on the HSI is such that a large change from 027 to 035 by impact seems unlikely and that the a/c held that track (035 mag) from waypoint change to the area of impact implies that this was not just a coincidental setting – that is to say, the handling pilot must have deliberately set that course and it would be an unlikely thing to be doing in an emergency (setting an aid that keeps you nicely on track).
The other implication of setting the course on an HSI is that there is no point unless the HSI has a navaid to work off: there was no known fixed navaid on that bearing (eg VOR or TACAN); another thing that could have given meaningful input to the HSI CDI could have been a waypoint in the SuperTANS but there was no stored waypoint between ‘A’ and Corran – this leaves the only obvious possibility being range and bearing data from an ARS6 working off a PRC112 that was on the ground in that direction; had there been such an arrangement, then had the PRC112 been on the LZ described previously, for which waypoint A was an obvious inner marker, then there would have been no change of course at the position of waypoint change – the a/c would have continued straight and the pilots would have known their proximity to it; had said PRC 112 been ˝ mile or so further up the hill than the LZ, then all that is known about this crash is explained.
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ShyTorque
<< Walter, perhaps you should ask the question why engine DECUs were, at that time, being swapped over from left to right to see if the reported faults transferred from one engine to the other.>>
What does this have to do with my pointing out to Cazatou that disturbing the connections of the equipment he referred to should not be undertaken lightly?
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<< If the crew were trying to land shortly after landfall, for whatever reason there is no way on this earth that they would have flown at at such a high speed, even in perfect weather conditions.>>
According to Boeing’s analysis, they had started to slow down (air speed had reduced significantly) and I would suggest that, as the engines powers were found to be matched, that the crew had left the power setting steady for a while showing an intent to continue slowing down; the Boeing analysis suggested that the slowing down in airspeed terms was masked by an increase in wind speed as the landmass was approached and crossed, such that the ground speed remained high.
I suggest that their problem was judgment of range to go, that something misled them, something that they would have trusted – had they had another ˝ mile or so to go over the sea, before the wind sped up, they may well have got their speed down to a sensible figure and that they would have initiated a final aggressive speed reduction using increased power or whatever the practice would be for a landing or close pass and wave off.
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<< Again, it really is time you began your own separate thread on your theories. Posting here does nothing one way or other for or against the campaign.>>
Some, at least, of the points I have raised over many posts I humbly suggest are relevant for any and all who would like to get as far as possible to the full truth as to what happened. There seems to be hostility to any suggestion that there has been a cover up of an undisclosed activity, something that I understand, as I have said in a recent post. What I cannot understand is the hostility towards clarification of such factors as weather, track, etc whilst endless debate is indulged in that is based on misconceptions of such factors. I have said it many times that you do not have to accept the whole “conspiracy” theory to advance understanding as far as is possible with the available data – but many of the points I have raised simply have arisen from my starting point that there was a possible motive for people with the means to arrange a convenient accident and in the circumstances of this crash it seems that an obvious way was to deceive them in some way as to their range to go to the landmass – one of the few systems that a helo pilot would trust in those conditions would have been DME of some sort, being intrinsically accurate and reliable – and that is the function of PRC112s that is used so much in support helo tasks.
If you can prove that they had an additional task on the Mull that has been so far undisclosed then not only do you get their names cleared but also there is a chance that whoever stuffed it up (whether by error or willful action) gets held responsible – real justice.