Chinook - Still Hitting Back 3 (Merged)
A really irritating PPRuNer
Thread Starter
Join Date: Jun 2000
Location: Just popping my head back up above the parapet
Posts: 903
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Every Officer in the Command chain who reviewed the actions of the Pilots in accordance with the requirements of the BOI procedure found negligence by one or both of them.
In addition, you state that negligence was found, by all of these people, in one, or both of the pilots.
Surely this means that there is an element of doubt over the negligence verdict on at least one of the pilots?
Regards, as always.
Brian
"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook
Join Date: Feb 2007
Location: Oxon
Age: 66
Posts: 1,942
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Caz,
Gross -
" Flagrant - glaring - extreme - palpable -total "
Exaggeration
"to magnify beyond the limits of truth; overstate; represent disproportionately: to exaggerate the facts of a situation."
As Brian rather eloquently says best you stick to the facts if the case
Cheers
SFFP
Gross -
" Flagrant - glaring - extreme - palpable -total "
Exaggeration
"to magnify beyond the limits of truth; overstate; represent disproportionately: to exaggerate the facts of a situation."
As Brian rather eloquently says best you stick to the facts if the case
Cheers
SFFP
John Blakeley,
I can only repeat myself
I can only repeat myself
A climb into icing conditions is a brave decision, but it would have to be balanced against the alternative risks and the aircraft's known record in icing conditions ie did a previous mark have a clearance down to -6 deg and had there been changes made that would affect its performance.
Join Date: Oct 2006
Location: cornwall UK
Age: 80
Posts: 236
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Definitions of Negligence
Hi Brian
Many thanks. There's always an answer if you ask (or the question gets to) the right bloke.
My first impression was 'legal mumbo-jumbo' but on re-reading its actually quite a well-thought out summing-up of a matter that by its nature is not easy to pin down. Definition must be more difficult because of its military context where the extra demands of the services have to be taken into account.
Regards
Boslandew
Many thanks. There's always an answer if you ask (or the question gets to) the right bloke.
My first impression was 'legal mumbo-jumbo' but on re-reading its actually quite a well-thought out summing-up of a matter that by its nature is not easy to pin down. Definition must be more difficult because of its military context where the extra demands of the services have to be taken into account.
Regards
Boslandew
Join Date: Jul 2000
Location: Nova
Posts: 1,242
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
chinook240
It would appear the Boscombe Down test pilots were not happy to simply 'read across' with respect to the icing limitations of the Mk1 to the Mk2?
Maybe that's why you would regard such a decision by Flt Lts Tapper and Cook to be 'brave'? It contravened the rules.
FWIW, I, along with the Station Commander RAF Odiham, find that the 'guesstimates' used to propose the possible theory of a cruise climb, produce a combination of parameters which are unrecognisable as a chinook technique!
Let right be done.
A climb into icing conditions is a brave decision, but it would have to be balanced against the alternative risks and the aircraft's known record in icing conditions ie did a previous mark have a clearance down to -6 deg and had there been changes made that would affect its performance.
Maybe that's why you would regard such a decision by Flt Lts Tapper and Cook to be 'brave'? It contravened the rules.
FWIW, I, along with the Station Commander RAF Odiham, find that the 'guesstimates' used to propose the possible theory of a cruise climb, produce a combination of parameters which are unrecognisable as a chinook technique!
Let right be done.
Tandem,
I can only repeat myself, I not suggesting "simply reading across" or planning to break rules, faced with a choice:
Ah, Stn Cdr Odiham didn't recognise the technique, just remind me of his vast Chinook experience again?
I can only repeat myself, I not suggesting "simply reading across" or planning to break rules, faced with a choice:
balanced against the alternative risks and the aircraft's known record in icing conditions ie did a previous mark have a clearance down to -6 deg and had there been changes made that would affect its performance
Join Date: Jul 2000
Location: Nova
Posts: 1,242
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Forgive me for thinking my chinook experience allows me to agree with the statement he made, after his consultations with senior chinook operators.
If we were 'weighting' the outcome by relevant experience, Wg Cdr Pulford's position would have been supported, not overturned!
The nuts and bolts used in the 'construction', of the theory of a cruise climb, fall woefully short of the standard of proof required.
They form a 'model' of possible events, Not a record of flight!
Pulford knew that. Not everyone seems to.
Every independent review of this case, would appear to agree with Pulford's finding.
Let right be done.
If we were 'weighting' the outcome by relevant experience, Wg Cdr Pulford's position would have been supported, not overturned!
The nuts and bolts used in the 'construction', of the theory of a cruise climb, fall woefully short of the standard of proof required.
They form a 'model' of possible events, Not a record of flight!
Pulford knew that. Not everyone seems to.
Every independent review of this case, would appear to agree with Pulford's finding.
Let right be done.
Last edited by Tandemrotor; 30th Apr 2008 at 14:54.
Join Date: Nov 2005
Location: Norfolk England
Posts: 247
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Stn Cdr Odiham's Remarks
Whilst I am quite used to Cazatou ignoring what the AAIB really concluded about the possibility of a technical malfunction, and the proper legal definition of gross negligence, I have to wonder what Chinook240 is trying to achieve by resurrecting old and discredited arguments, and by trying to down play the Stn Cdr Odiham's experience (presumably at least as far as the Mk2 was concerned his experience was significantly greater than either of the two officers who reached the gross negligence verdict - and although I do not know I assume he was anyway a very experienced RW pilot). Can I yet again remind you of what the Stn Cdr Odiham actually said before his conclusions and recomendations became "disconnected" from his earlier comments - I have always wondered why! Incidentally the Stn Cdr Odiham does not use the word negligence at any time in his remarks - to support the earlier post from Brian Dixon.
The Board then opine, in making this profile dovetail with other evidence, that the crew, faced with the expected deteriorating weather, consciously elected to make a climb on track over high ground and in doing so used a speed and power combination that is unrecognisable as a Chinook technique. I find this difficult to believe; such actions would go against all the crew’s instincts and training. Moreover it is the very antithesis of the professionalism and careful planning that had gone before. Even taking into account the factors which the Board feel could have deceived the crew into believing a high speed cruise climb would have given them sufficient clearance over the Mull I, and the few, senior Chinook operators that I felt able to consult, find this suggestion incredible. I will take the 3 key factors cited by the Board in turn:
a. Precision of GPS The Board's view is that the crew could have placed inordinate reliance on GPS accuracy. It true that during visual navigation aircrew place great reliance on the GPS - it is rarely more than 200 metres in error. However, training and normal practice throughout the helicopter force is such that no crew would trust a GPS position close to a potentially dangerous obstruction unless at the very least, they had the opportunity to cross check with another aid. Furthermore, the Board suggests that GPS errors led the crew to underestimate the nearness of the land and caused them, in turn, to underestimate the ROC required. Although I accept the board's argument about the geometry of the tangential approach to land and the disproportionate effect on the closeness to land a small cross track GPS error would cause, I do not believe that any crew that close to a obstruction would be concerned about niceties of a few hundred metres. I find the concept that an undue reliance on the GPS would make the crew accept a cruise climb is stretching credibility too far.
b. Aircraft -Speed. Although not stated as such, the implication in the Board's findings is that the transit speed approaching the Mull of Kintyre was unusually high. I doubt this. An assessment based on a time/distance calculation, shows that the average groundspeed from take off to impact was, depending on the parameters used, in the range 135-155 kts which, when corrected for the forecast wind, gives an IAS of between 115-135 kts. In practice, I believe the crew adopted a cruise IAS of 135 kts, which is both range speed and is commonly accepted as the maximum speed for passenger comforts. However, the Board suggest that as the Mk I Chinook experienced high vibration levels above 135 kts, which are not so pronounced in the Mk II, the crew were seduced into accepting a higher speed than that and, as they were unfamiliar with flying at such speeds, this caused them to miscalculate the gradient of the climb that would be achieved. Again I believe this stretches credibility too far. I do not believe even the most junior crew would have selected a cruise climb technique that close to the Mull whatever the cruise speed. They would only have entertained such a profile by starting the climb well clear of the high ground and probably as they coasted out from Northern Ireland. The Board tacitly acknowledges this in para 44, where they accept that the crew’s general NVG training, enhanced by the specialist SF Flight training package, is such that "it (is) most likely that the crew would have adopted (the technique of a cyclic flare and max power climb) in the event of inadvertently entering cloud whilst aware they were directly approaching, and close to, high ground.
c. Distraction. The Board does not discount distraction during the decision making process. While I fully accept, and indeed agree strongly, that distraction may have been a factor in this accident, I do not accept the implication that the decision making process was a complex one and was thus particularly vulnerable to distraction. The decision to be made was relatively simple and the courses of action available when approaching high ground in poor weather would have been ingrained in this crew, and indeed all helicopter crews, since basic training. Those alternatives are to: slow down and if necessary stop; turn away from high ground and if necessary turn back and, if a climb is required, do so on a safe heading at full power at the maximum rate of climb speed to at least Safety Altitude (SA). Moreover, it is pertinent to note that as members of the SF Flight, this crew were given additional training in the techniques of making landfall from offshore both by day and by night and they practiced it regularly.
An Alternative View
2. In looking for alternative causes I have no new evidence to call upon, and all I can do is put a different emphasis on factors already considered by the Board. By working “forward” from the departure point, I conclude it is highly probable that rather than electing to climb over the Mull the crew saw the coast and decided to continue VFR to the west of the Mull Peninsular. The evidence of the yachtsman who saw the aircraft about 2 -3 nm SW of the Mull gives a good idea of the weather and the aircraft’s height and attitude just before the crash. At about 17-30, only 30 minutes before the crash, the yachtsman then about ¾ mile from the Mull reported that the lighthouse and the cloud covering the land behind the lighthouse were clearly visible. Just before the accident the same man, now 2 to 3 miles from the Mull, reported that the aircraft was straight and level at a height of between 2-400 ft well below cloud level. He assessed cloud cover as 80% and the visibility as about 1nm, limited by haze. He also reported the cloud as structured which, in aircrew terminology may mean layered. After the aircraft passed the yachtsman any deductions about what happened become more speculative but I believe that given the reported weather, the crew saw the Mull and it was this sighting that prompted the Waypoint (WP) change at 1.75 km.
3. This WP change is crucial in trying to understand what the crew intended to do. if they had intended to abort at this stage and climb over the Mull despite the difficulty, which would have been so obvious to them, of clearing the high ground they would not have selected the Corran WP. Firstly, it removed from them the only easily interpretable information about the location of the high ground. Secondly, it was of little practical value; the crew would not have been able to climb to SA on track to Corran, in the hope of reverting to low level VFR, because of the forecast level of the 4ºC isotherm. If they intended to climb over the Mull then only sensible option would have been to keep the lighthouse WP on until well clear of it and then to select the chosen diversion airfield. On the other hand, selection of the Corran WP was entirely appropriate if the intention was to follow the western coast of the Mull Peninsular and regain the planned track at the first convenient opportunity. In arriving at this alternative scenario I am now faced with the same problem that faced the Board - how did the aircraft get to around 500 ft, at 150 kts IAS with a ROC of approx 1000ft per minute, which are the computed starting parameters of the final 18 seconds of flight?
4. Whilst tackling this issue the Board were unable to totally discount the following factors:
a. Spatial disorientation or visual illusion.
b. An unregistered technical malfunction.
c. Human factors.
Any of these, or a combination of them, could, in my view, have sufficiently distracted the crew from the task of turning away from the Mull to cause them both to inadvertently enter cloud and then to fail to take the correct procedure for an emergency climb in a timely manner. The Board consider engine control system malfunctions and it is particularly relevant to note that at this stage of the Chinook Mk II's service spurious ENG FAIL captions, lasting on average 7-8 seconds, were an increasingly frequent occurrence. These are now well understood but at the time they were not. Had such an indication occurred it would have caused crew considerable concern particularly as they were over the water with no obvious area for an emergency landing. Such a warning would also have required an urgent and very careful check of engine instruments and FRCs.
Can I suggest, as has been done before, that unless you KNOW what happened you all stop misquoting facts to support your personal opinions - opinions which you are, of course, entitled to hold, but which have no relevance to what the Mull Group have been working for 13 years to achieve and which is on the bottom of every one of Brian Dixon's posts - justice!
JB
The Board then opine, in making this profile dovetail with other evidence, that the crew, faced with the expected deteriorating weather, consciously elected to make a climb on track over high ground and in doing so used a speed and power combination that is unrecognisable as a Chinook technique. I find this difficult to believe; such actions would go against all the crew’s instincts and training. Moreover it is the very antithesis of the professionalism and careful planning that had gone before. Even taking into account the factors which the Board feel could have deceived the crew into believing a high speed cruise climb would have given them sufficient clearance over the Mull I, and the few, senior Chinook operators that I felt able to consult, find this suggestion incredible. I will take the 3 key factors cited by the Board in turn:
a. Precision of GPS The Board's view is that the crew could have placed inordinate reliance on GPS accuracy. It true that during visual navigation aircrew place great reliance on the GPS - it is rarely more than 200 metres in error. However, training and normal practice throughout the helicopter force is such that no crew would trust a GPS position close to a potentially dangerous obstruction unless at the very least, they had the opportunity to cross check with another aid. Furthermore, the Board suggests that GPS errors led the crew to underestimate the nearness of the land and caused them, in turn, to underestimate the ROC required. Although I accept the board's argument about the geometry of the tangential approach to land and the disproportionate effect on the closeness to land a small cross track GPS error would cause, I do not believe that any crew that close to a obstruction would be concerned about niceties of a few hundred metres. I find the concept that an undue reliance on the GPS would make the crew accept a cruise climb is stretching credibility too far.
b. Aircraft -Speed. Although not stated as such, the implication in the Board's findings is that the transit speed approaching the Mull of Kintyre was unusually high. I doubt this. An assessment based on a time/distance calculation, shows that the average groundspeed from take off to impact was, depending on the parameters used, in the range 135-155 kts which, when corrected for the forecast wind, gives an IAS of between 115-135 kts. In practice, I believe the crew adopted a cruise IAS of 135 kts, which is both range speed and is commonly accepted as the maximum speed for passenger comforts. However, the Board suggest that as the Mk I Chinook experienced high vibration levels above 135 kts, which are not so pronounced in the Mk II, the crew were seduced into accepting a higher speed than that and, as they were unfamiliar with flying at such speeds, this caused them to miscalculate the gradient of the climb that would be achieved. Again I believe this stretches credibility too far. I do not believe even the most junior crew would have selected a cruise climb technique that close to the Mull whatever the cruise speed. They would only have entertained such a profile by starting the climb well clear of the high ground and probably as they coasted out from Northern Ireland. The Board tacitly acknowledges this in para 44, where they accept that the crew’s general NVG training, enhanced by the specialist SF Flight training package, is such that "it (is) most likely that the crew would have adopted (the technique of a cyclic flare and max power climb) in the event of inadvertently entering cloud whilst aware they were directly approaching, and close to, high ground.
c. Distraction. The Board does not discount distraction during the decision making process. While I fully accept, and indeed agree strongly, that distraction may have been a factor in this accident, I do not accept the implication that the decision making process was a complex one and was thus particularly vulnerable to distraction. The decision to be made was relatively simple and the courses of action available when approaching high ground in poor weather would have been ingrained in this crew, and indeed all helicopter crews, since basic training. Those alternatives are to: slow down and if necessary stop; turn away from high ground and if necessary turn back and, if a climb is required, do so on a safe heading at full power at the maximum rate of climb speed to at least Safety Altitude (SA). Moreover, it is pertinent to note that as members of the SF Flight, this crew were given additional training in the techniques of making landfall from offshore both by day and by night and they practiced it regularly.
An Alternative View
2. In looking for alternative causes I have no new evidence to call upon, and all I can do is put a different emphasis on factors already considered by the Board. By working “forward” from the departure point, I conclude it is highly probable that rather than electing to climb over the Mull the crew saw the coast and decided to continue VFR to the west of the Mull Peninsular. The evidence of the yachtsman who saw the aircraft about 2 -3 nm SW of the Mull gives a good idea of the weather and the aircraft’s height and attitude just before the crash. At about 17-30, only 30 minutes before the crash, the yachtsman then about ¾ mile from the Mull reported that the lighthouse and the cloud covering the land behind the lighthouse were clearly visible. Just before the accident the same man, now 2 to 3 miles from the Mull, reported that the aircraft was straight and level at a height of between 2-400 ft well below cloud level. He assessed cloud cover as 80% and the visibility as about 1nm, limited by haze. He also reported the cloud as structured which, in aircrew terminology may mean layered. After the aircraft passed the yachtsman any deductions about what happened become more speculative but I believe that given the reported weather, the crew saw the Mull and it was this sighting that prompted the Waypoint (WP) change at 1.75 km.
3. This WP change is crucial in trying to understand what the crew intended to do. if they had intended to abort at this stage and climb over the Mull despite the difficulty, which would have been so obvious to them, of clearing the high ground they would not have selected the Corran WP. Firstly, it removed from them the only easily interpretable information about the location of the high ground. Secondly, it was of little practical value; the crew would not have been able to climb to SA on track to Corran, in the hope of reverting to low level VFR, because of the forecast level of the 4ºC isotherm. If they intended to climb over the Mull then only sensible option would have been to keep the lighthouse WP on until well clear of it and then to select the chosen diversion airfield. On the other hand, selection of the Corran WP was entirely appropriate if the intention was to follow the western coast of the Mull Peninsular and regain the planned track at the first convenient opportunity. In arriving at this alternative scenario I am now faced with the same problem that faced the Board - how did the aircraft get to around 500 ft, at 150 kts IAS with a ROC of approx 1000ft per minute, which are the computed starting parameters of the final 18 seconds of flight?
4. Whilst tackling this issue the Board were unable to totally discount the following factors:
a. Spatial disorientation or visual illusion.
b. An unregistered technical malfunction.
c. Human factors.
Any of these, or a combination of them, could, in my view, have sufficiently distracted the crew from the task of turning away from the Mull to cause them both to inadvertently enter cloud and then to fail to take the correct procedure for an emergency climb in a timely manner. The Board consider engine control system malfunctions and it is particularly relevant to note that at this stage of the Chinook Mk II's service spurious ENG FAIL captions, lasting on average 7-8 seconds, were an increasingly frequent occurrence. These are now well understood but at the time they were not. Had such an indication occurred it would have caused crew considerable concern particularly as they were over the water with no obvious area for an emergency landing. Such a warning would also have required an urgent and very careful check of engine instruments and FRCs.
Can I suggest, as has been done before, that unless you KNOW what happened you all stop misquoting facts to support your personal opinions - opinions which you are, of course, entitled to hold, but which have no relevance to what the Mull Group have been working for 13 years to achieve and which is on the bottom of every one of Brian Dixon's posts - justice!
JB
A really irritating PPRuNer
Thread Starter
Join Date: Jun 2000
Location: Just popping my head back up above the parapet
Posts: 903
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Chinook240,
In answer to the HoL Select Committee, he replied: Since training, I have spent all my flying career on helicopters; mostly, I have to say, Wessex and Pumas. But prior to taking command of Royal Air Force Odiham I did the full conversion course to the Chinook HC1, the Mk I, and I flew it for a while before converting, carrying out full conversion to the HC2.
Which, if I recall correctly, still gives him more Chinook experience than the senior Reviewing Officer.
Kind regards,
Brian
"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook
Ah, Stn Cdr Odiham didn't recognise the technique, just remind me of his vast Chinook experience again?
Which, if I recall correctly, still gives him more Chinook experience than the senior Reviewing Officer.
Kind regards,
Brian
"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook
To answer the questions:
To ensure that the icing clearance of the Chinook HC Mk 2 was correctly represented following certain discussions by previous contributors regarding inadvertent (hope you like the use of bold) IMC. I don't believe I have misquoted any facts, indeed I hoped to highlight them. I also did not resurrect anything as the thread was already running along these lines.
I do disagree with:
But what do I know about the Chinook? PC obviously knows more.
I have to wonder what Chinook240 is trying to achieve by resurrecting old and discredited arguments,
I do disagree with:
used a speed and power combination that is unrecognisable as a Chinook technique
Join Date: Jul 2000
Location: Nova
Posts: 1,242
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
chinook240
Presumably you mean PC (Stn Cdr RAF Odiham) and the senior Chinook operators that he felt able to consult.
Who found the suggestion that the crew could have been deceived into believing a high speed cruise climb would have given them sufficient clearance over the Mull, was not credible.
But then it sounds as though you know better than all of them.
Matters of opinion are, by definition, not matters of fact.
Let right be done.
But what do I know about the Chinook? PC obviously knows more.
Who found the suggestion that the crew could have been deceived into believing a high speed cruise climb would have given them sufficient clearance over the Mull, was not credible.
But then it sounds as though you know better than all of them.
Matters of opinion are, by definition, not matters of fact.
Let right be done.
I did not claim the cruise /climb technique to be a fact, I said I do not agree with his (more bold) opinion that it was unrecognisable. I also don't claim to know more, but I do recognise the technique. Simple.
My entry to this discussion was spurred by comments like this from ShyTorque:
Just not true!
My entry to this discussion was spurred by comments like this from ShyTorque:
Presumably you have a lot of experience in flying rotary in icing conditions?
Most rotary pilots only try it the one time.
Most rotary pilots only try it the one time.
Join Date: Jul 2000
Location: Nova
Posts: 1,242
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
I think there are probably areas about which we can agree. Others perhaps less so.
When you used bold to highlight "his opinion". Whilst I accept he was the author, it seems pretty clear from the rest of his remarks, that this opinion was shared by other senior operators. In other words, it was their opinion.
To be honest, my greater concern, as I have stated, is that the construction of the theory itself, relies too much on 'modelling', simply because there are virtually no reliable FACTS!
'Models' are not 'records'. They are a hypothetical creation, not a fact.
I personally believe that the suggestion that they were involved in some kind of high speed, low rate of climb, IMC abort, to be stretching credibility to the limit!
It doesn't mean I have the answers. Which is precisely the position PC found himself in (though he does offer some thoughts). But that doesn't mean we have to jump to conclusions!
When you used bold to highlight "his opinion". Whilst I accept he was the author, it seems pretty clear from the rest of his remarks, that this opinion was shared by other senior operators. In other words, it was their opinion.
To be honest, my greater concern, as I have stated, is that the construction of the theory itself, relies too much on 'modelling', simply because there are virtually no reliable FACTS!
'Models' are not 'records'. They are a hypothetical creation, not a fact.
I personally believe that the suggestion that they were involved in some kind of high speed, low rate of climb, IMC abort, to be stretching credibility to the limit!
It doesn't mean I have the answers. Which is precisely the position PC found himself in (though he does offer some thoughts). But that doesn't mean we have to jump to conclusions!
Avoid imitations
Join Date: Nov 2000
Location: Wandering the FIR and cyberspace often at highly unsociable times
Posts: 14,576
Received 433 Likes
on
228 Posts
My entry to this discussion was spurred by comments like this from ShyTorque:
Quote:
Presumably you have a lot of experience in flying rotary in icing conditions?
Most rotary pilots only try it the one time.
Just not true!
Quote:
Presumably you have a lot of experience in flying rotary in icing conditions?
Most rotary pilots only try it the one time.
Just not true!
If it has an airframe icing clearance now, after the event, it still does not change the truth of my statement.
Shy,
Yes, well we'll just have to disagree on the definition of "most helicopter pilots" and "most helicopters". Certainly most Chinook pilots at the time of the accident would have.
Its a fact that the Mk 2 didn't have a clearance below +4 deg true at the time of the accident. I have tried to confine my comments to the alternatives on inadvertently entering IMC in the context of what was known about the Mk 1's clearance - at least what would have been my considerations.
Yes, well we'll just have to disagree on the definition of "most helicopter pilots" and "most helicopters". Certainly most Chinook pilots at the time of the accident would have.
Its a fact that the Mk 2 didn't have a clearance below +4 deg true at the time of the accident. I have tried to confine my comments to the alternatives on inadvertently entering IMC in the context of what was known about the Mk 1's clearance - at least what would have been my considerations.
Avoid imitations
Join Date: Nov 2000
Location: Wandering the FIR and cyberspace often at highly unsociable times
Posts: 14,576
Received 433 Likes
on
228 Posts
Yes, well we'll just have to disagree on the definition of "most helicopter pilots" and "most helicopters". Certainly most Chinook pilots at the time of the accident would have.
Avoid imitations
Join Date: Nov 2000
Location: Wandering the FIR and cyberspace often at highly unsociable times
Posts: 14,576
Received 433 Likes
on
228 Posts
Sarcasm isn't necessary. I was merely countering your reply which directly quoted a comment I made.
Join Date: Dec 2006
Location: wilts
Posts: 10
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Sorry, how stupid of me, thinking this was about Chinooks. Chinny240
How stupid indeed! This is actually about the reputations and lives of the crew and passengers. I have been reading your contributions to this forum and struggle to understand your motives and values. I also feel everyone has been very patient and polite in their dealings with you on an emotive subject. The very least you could do is afford them the same respect. You may feel confident in your aircraft today but i wonder how you would have felt if it had been you that day flying my father and his colleagues. Truth is no one really knows what happened that day perhaps just be thankful it wasn't you. I think the scottish procurator fiscal might have come nearest when he said ' it may have been something beyond our imagination.'
Good luck in your flying and please try and remember what this is all really about.
Good luck in your flying and please try and remember what this is all really about.