Chinook - Still Hitting Back 3 (Merged)
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cazatou
Your last post cannot be read as anything other than an absolutely stunning condemnation of the RAF's record on flight safety. They're really not very good at it are they?
May I suggest that this is very possibly linked to their utterly unenlightened approach to accident investigation?
tucumseh's comment regarding the irrelevance of a 'potentially' similar incident merely confirms my view.
Incidentally. Precisely the incident referred to by Thud and blunder was NEVER ruled out by the president of the BOI.
And for extremely good reason!
In my time in the RAF there was one Aircraft Accident for approximately every fortnight I served- and I was in for more than 31 years. A total of 764 accidents with fatalities running into hundreds.
May I suggest that this is very possibly linked to their utterly unenlightened approach to accident investigation?
tucumseh's comment regarding the irrelevance of a 'potentially' similar incident merely confirms my view.
Incidentally. Precisely the incident referred to by Thud and blunder was NEVER ruled out by the president of the BOI.
And for extremely good reason!
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All these legal niceties – what are they worth? Has not history taught you that the powers that be will get a verdict they want/need?
Why would a man like Day make such a contentious decision unless he had a reason?
Imagine what it would have been like if this case had been left open – a dangerous can of worms.
Only a couple of weeks earlier, the other potential obstacle to the peace process had fortuitously ceased to be – the untimely death of John Smith (by all accounts a good and honest man) allowed the compliant closet Catholic Bliar to be in control of the Labour Party when it was tipped to get in by a landslide at the next election.
Unless this crash had been pronounced an accident with a verdict against the pilots that implied absolutely no doubt whatsover factions of the general public (and others) may have thought it just too much of a coincidence.
With the passage of time and the ensuing emasculation of the cultures and the collective memory, the powers that be should no longer be that bothered about this case – and so the push to get the pilots names cleared may well be successful now.
I personally think that, if there had been something going on that could have been willfully interfered with and any such possibility had not been explored then this may prove to be a hollow victory.
Why would a man like Day make such a contentious decision unless he had a reason?
Imagine what it would have been like if this case had been left open – a dangerous can of worms.
Only a couple of weeks earlier, the other potential obstacle to the peace process had fortuitously ceased to be – the untimely death of John Smith (by all accounts a good and honest man) allowed the compliant closet Catholic Bliar to be in control of the Labour Party when it was tipped to get in by a landslide at the next election.
Unless this crash had been pronounced an accident with a verdict against the pilots that implied absolutely no doubt whatsover factions of the general public (and others) may have thought it just too much of a coincidence.
With the passage of time and the ensuing emasculation of the cultures and the collective memory, the powers that be should no longer be that bothered about this case – and so the push to get the pilots names cleared may well be successful now.
I personally think that, if there had been something going on that could have been willfully interfered with and any such possibility had not been explored then this may prove to be a hollow victory.
Last edited by walter kennedy; 12th Feb 2008 at 19:32. Reason: spelling
their opinion was then rejected by a free vote of the whole House.
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pulse 1
How many contributors here have read the full BOI with all its annexes?
Tandemrotor
We are talking of an Air Force many times larger than we have today when units were on active service in the Middle and Far East and major re-equipment programmes and changes to Command Structures were in progress. These changes continued to occur at irregular intervals over the years as Governments and priorities changed.
What were you doing in 1967 when the first of these major upheavals occurred? Remember that the supply chain was several thousand miles long and that retraining was subordinate to operational requirements; particularly in the Far East where small detatchments would operate in isolation for weeks at a time.
Training ab initio pilots increases the risk of accidents and in those days the RAF had 6 Basic FTS's in operation - each one turning out some 60 new pilots a year. The accident statistics included Chipmunk AEF Units and ATC Glider Units.
Having said all that, the vast majority of accidents were down to "Human Error" due to inexperience, failure to follow briefed procedures and, in some cases, wilful disobedience and/or neglect.
How many contributors here have read the full BOI with all its annexes?
Tandemrotor
We are talking of an Air Force many times larger than we have today when units were on active service in the Middle and Far East and major re-equipment programmes and changes to Command Structures were in progress. These changes continued to occur at irregular intervals over the years as Governments and priorities changed.
What were you doing in 1967 when the first of these major upheavals occurred? Remember that the supply chain was several thousand miles long and that retraining was subordinate to operational requirements; particularly in the Far East where small detatchments would operate in isolation for weeks at a time.
Training ab initio pilots increases the risk of accidents and in those days the RAF had 6 Basic FTS's in operation - each one turning out some 60 new pilots a year. The accident statistics included Chipmunk AEF Units and ATC Glider Units.
Having said all that, the vast majority of accidents were down to "Human Error" due to inexperience, failure to follow briefed procedures and, in some cases, wilful disobedience and/or neglect.
Last edited by cazatou; 12th Feb 2008 at 20:29.
“The aim of a BOI is to find out what happened so that measures can be put in place to prevent it happening again. One must always remember, however, that no system is foolproof - fools are too ingenious”.
Quite right.
There has been much discussion of BoIs on the Nimrod thread, so I won’t repeat it, except to say they usually do a good job of finding out what happened, but the system falls flat when it comes to doing something about it.
Very few BoIs point the finger. Perhaps correctly, it is not their role. ACM Loader, to his great credit, did so when he commented in the Nimrod report, saying the MoD had not implemented its own Airworthiness Regulations properly. Despite clear evidence of PRECISELY the same failures on Chinook and other aircraft / equipment IN THE YEARS PRECEDING the Mull crash, what evidence is there that measures were put in place to prevent it happening again? None. In fact, when these failures were highlighted to the responsible 2* and 4* in MoD they made a point of condoning the failures. And did so repeatedly until their retirement, advising Ministers to do likewise. (I don’t mention the 3* as he didn’t actually reply to correspondence. At least the 2* and 4* had the courtesy to articulate, in writing, their support for those who refused to maintain airworthiness, regardless of what one may think of their abrogation. And Ministerial correspondence STILL refers to and upholds those original rulings, although hopefully this will soon change).
I’ve always held there are clear linkages at a managerial level between various fatal accidents over the last 15 years. Tornado / Patriot. Nimrod. Sea King. Hercules. The most damning thing I can say is that none of the “revelations” in the reports came as a surprise. All were advised to senior staffs, in precise detail, long before each accident. In two cases, by myself (hence my frustration over the deaths of people I knew). The BoIs merely hint at the underlying problems, but seldom spell out the necessary corrective action. Until ACM Loader’s intervention, those responsible have displayed nothing short of cowardice.
http://www.publications.parliament.u...-i/uc29502.htm
Read Q227 for an indication of the changes to come. Pity it took so long, but perhaps he’s just got round to reading correspondence from 10 years ago. Make no mistake, the comments relate DIRECTLY to the fact that poor management oversight (a term used by NAO when condemning the Chinook Mk3 saga) has permitted a degradation in core competences in MoD, leading to the situation that exists today whereby people are taught that airworthiness is optional.
Quite right.
There has been much discussion of BoIs on the Nimrod thread, so I won’t repeat it, except to say they usually do a good job of finding out what happened, but the system falls flat when it comes to doing something about it.
Very few BoIs point the finger. Perhaps correctly, it is not their role. ACM Loader, to his great credit, did so when he commented in the Nimrod report, saying the MoD had not implemented its own Airworthiness Regulations properly. Despite clear evidence of PRECISELY the same failures on Chinook and other aircraft / equipment IN THE YEARS PRECEDING the Mull crash, what evidence is there that measures were put in place to prevent it happening again? None. In fact, when these failures were highlighted to the responsible 2* and 4* in MoD they made a point of condoning the failures. And did so repeatedly until their retirement, advising Ministers to do likewise. (I don’t mention the 3* as he didn’t actually reply to correspondence. At least the 2* and 4* had the courtesy to articulate, in writing, their support for those who refused to maintain airworthiness, regardless of what one may think of their abrogation. And Ministerial correspondence STILL refers to and upholds those original rulings, although hopefully this will soon change).
I’ve always held there are clear linkages at a managerial level between various fatal accidents over the last 15 years. Tornado / Patriot. Nimrod. Sea King. Hercules. The most damning thing I can say is that none of the “revelations” in the reports came as a surprise. All were advised to senior staffs, in precise detail, long before each accident. In two cases, by myself (hence my frustration over the deaths of people I knew). The BoIs merely hint at the underlying problems, but seldom spell out the necessary corrective action. Until ACM Loader’s intervention, those responsible have displayed nothing short of cowardice.
http://www.publications.parliament.u...-i/uc29502.htm
Read Q227 for an indication of the changes to come. Pity it took so long, but perhaps he’s just got round to reading correspondence from 10 years ago. Make no mistake, the comments relate DIRECTLY to the fact that poor management oversight (a term used by NAO when condemning the Chinook Mk3 saga) has permitted a degradation in core competences in MoD, leading to the situation that exists today whereby people are taught that airworthiness is optional.
A really irritating PPRuNer
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Hi Mr Purdey,
yes, they should, indeed, have been in attendance. It was patently clear what had gone one. The debate in the Lords had been going on for several hours when, with some 20 minutes left prior to the vote, quite a few bleary eyed Labour peers decided to enter the Chamber in the small hours of the morning.
Coincidence? - I think not.
Shameful conduct on what was supposed to be a free vote? - I think so.
Regards,
Brian
"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook
yes, they should, indeed, have been in attendance. It was patently clear what had gone one. The debate in the Lords had been going on for several hours when, with some 20 minutes left prior to the vote, quite a few bleary eyed Labour peers decided to enter the Chamber in the small hours of the morning.
Coincidence? - I think not.
Shameful conduct on what was supposed to be a free vote? - I think so.
Regards,
Brian
"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook
Just a numbered other
their opinion was then rejected by a free vote of the whole House.
Lord Guthrie (Ex CDS) to his eternal shame, led a posse of Labour yes-men into the chamber at the end of the debate which none had attended and proceeded to derail the process by fixing the vote.
Utterly shameful, and indicative of how low this tawdry government will stoop.
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Chinook
Ark Royal. We have been here before, have we not? The self-appointed three-man committee ruled against the MOD finding, but then the Mull Lobby Champion, Lord Chalfont, insisted (against the strong advice of the whips) on dividing the House. This meant that all of the Lords with an interest, and not merely the three self-appointed so-called experts, could give their opinion. So, in a democratic society, just what is your complaint?
Brian Dixon. Bleary eyed or not, if they felt so strongly, or if the case were so clear, then why were they not present both for the debate and for the vote? The plain fact is that only very few of the Lords were persuaded that MOD had got it wrong. Can you offer any other explanation? Meanwhile, the arguments against he MOD verdict seem to me to becoming ever more desparate. Regards as always, JP
Brian Dixon. Bleary eyed or not, if they felt so strongly, or if the case were so clear, then why were they not present both for the debate and for the vote? The plain fact is that only very few of the Lords were persuaded that MOD had got it wrong. Can you offer any other explanation? Meanwhile, the arguments against he MOD verdict seem to me to becoming ever more desparate. Regards as always, JP
Last edited by John Purdey; 13th Feb 2008 at 16:24. Reason: another opinion to be refuted
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Mr Purdey,
The 'self appointed' three man Committee was, in fact a five man Committee. When it initially went to the vote as to whether or not the Committee should even sit, two of the five voted for, two voted against and one abstained. A fairly balanced Committee, I would suggest.
Not without committing libel, or 'whipping' up a problem!
How so? We have not deviated from our original stance - the burden of proof has not been met. I would suggest that the continual movement of the goalposts has been from those wishing to defend an indefensible position.
Kind regards,
Brian
"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook
The 'self appointed' three man Committee was, in fact a five man Committee. When it initially went to the vote as to whether or not the Committee should even sit, two of the five voted for, two voted against and one abstained. A fairly balanced Committee, I would suggest.
The plain fact is that only very few of the Lords were persuaded that MOD had got it wrong. Can you offer any other explanation?
Meanwhile, the arguments against he MOD verdict seem to me to becoming ever more desparate.
Kind regards,
Brian
"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook
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PKPF68-77
<<… The freak meteorological conditions that appear to have confronted both pilots are described in the following extract from a letter written to the editor of The Daily Telegraph (13 December 2000) by Sqn Ldr Donald Kinch:
“In light winds and high relative humidity, layers of fog and low cloud form adjacent to the Mull to obscure the high ground completely. There are occasions when a relatively calm sea and a grey sky of similar hue merge, so that in otherwise good visibility a pilot flying in accordance with Visual Flight Rules may be unaware that he is about to enter a fog/cloud bank.”
This is an extract from an article about a Neptune crash in October 1956, reportedly about a kilometre from the site of the Chinook crash. >>
Come now, you can have a much more direct input than just a reference like this.
Where you live and with your background, this Summer why not observe the Mull from the sea (do any fishing?) – in a spell of warm afternoons, choose a late afternoon/evening when it is forecast to have the usual southerly at reasonable strength.
Under these conditions, with profiles like the Mull slopes, the lower layer of the air mass gets compressed and therefore speeds up (hence the term for the phenomenon “speed-up”) and reaches the dew point in advance of the bulk of the air mass (which, at a certain altitude, forms the orographic cloud).
Check out the slopes beneath the oro cloud (at the time of the crash, the start of the oro cloud was about 800ft – roughly at the height the a/c crashed).
As the evening cools, the effect becomes more pronounced – and the stronger the onshore wind, the further down the slope from the base of the oro cloud the ground hugging layer of mist starts – and when the wind is very strong (as it was on the day of this crash) the layer can be quite thin, such that intermittently some ground texture can be seen through it. One witness on the ground the evening of the crash described the mist as a layer following the slope, with occasional breaks such that he could see that it was so and described the conditions as common with that wind after that sort of day (this was a local who was also the Procurator Fiscal who called the FAI).
When it extends sufficiently to obscure recognisable objects (eg on the day, the lighthouse was obscured apart from its lower wall) note how hard it is to judge the distance from the landmass – you can see where it is but judging distance off is the problem.
Understanding the local weather is fundamental to understanding this crash:
it eliminates the “official” scenario of pilot error in IMC conditions;
it gives the pilots significantly more time for action to avoid the Mull in the (unlikely, in my opinion) event of control problems as they would have had no doubt as to the direction of the landmass when they made the turn to the right at the position that the waypoint was changed (as opposed to blundering about in fog when problems may have occurred).
Anyone interested in this case has had 13 summers to check this out for themselves – don’t waste the coming one.
<<… The freak meteorological conditions that appear to have confronted both pilots are described in the following extract from a letter written to the editor of The Daily Telegraph (13 December 2000) by Sqn Ldr Donald Kinch:
“In light winds and high relative humidity, layers of fog and low cloud form adjacent to the Mull to obscure the high ground completely. There are occasions when a relatively calm sea and a grey sky of similar hue merge, so that in otherwise good visibility a pilot flying in accordance with Visual Flight Rules may be unaware that he is about to enter a fog/cloud bank.”
This is an extract from an article about a Neptune crash in October 1956, reportedly about a kilometre from the site of the Chinook crash. >>
Come now, you can have a much more direct input than just a reference like this.
Where you live and with your background, this Summer why not observe the Mull from the sea (do any fishing?) – in a spell of warm afternoons, choose a late afternoon/evening when it is forecast to have the usual southerly at reasonable strength.
Under these conditions, with profiles like the Mull slopes, the lower layer of the air mass gets compressed and therefore speeds up (hence the term for the phenomenon “speed-up”) and reaches the dew point in advance of the bulk of the air mass (which, at a certain altitude, forms the orographic cloud).
Check out the slopes beneath the oro cloud (at the time of the crash, the start of the oro cloud was about 800ft – roughly at the height the a/c crashed).
As the evening cools, the effect becomes more pronounced – and the stronger the onshore wind, the further down the slope from the base of the oro cloud the ground hugging layer of mist starts – and when the wind is very strong (as it was on the day of this crash) the layer can be quite thin, such that intermittently some ground texture can be seen through it. One witness on the ground the evening of the crash described the mist as a layer following the slope, with occasional breaks such that he could see that it was so and described the conditions as common with that wind after that sort of day (this was a local who was also the Procurator Fiscal who called the FAI).
When it extends sufficiently to obscure recognisable objects (eg on the day, the lighthouse was obscured apart from its lower wall) note how hard it is to judge the distance from the landmass – you can see where it is but judging distance off is the problem.
Understanding the local weather is fundamental to understanding this crash:
it eliminates the “official” scenario of pilot error in IMC conditions;
it gives the pilots significantly more time for action to avoid the Mull in the (unlikely, in my opinion) event of control problems as they would have had no doubt as to the direction of the landmass when they made the turn to the right at the position that the waypoint was changed (as opposed to blundering about in fog when problems may have occurred).
Anyone interested in this case has had 13 summers to check this out for themselves – don’t waste the coming one.
Just a numbered other
John
It is that they did not have the courtesy to even pretend to listen to the arguments put forward.
They were whipped in to stifle and crush any change from the status quo.
So, in a democratic society, just what is your complaint?
They were whipped in to stifle and crush any change from the status quo.
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Chinook
Brian Dixon. I was not referring to your views, which indeed have been consistent, but to some of the many other contributers and their theories. With continued good wishes.
Ark Royal. Are you really saying that these eminent and distinguished Lords had no minds of their own?
John Purdey
Ark Royal. Are you really saying that these eminent and distinguished Lords had no minds of their own?
John Purdey
JP,
After the recent murky events surrounding the issue of peerages, you may think that, but I couldn't possibly comment.
I think it might be more a question of what their minds were set on.
PKPF68-77,
While I'm on, I am sure that someone better qualified than I will come in to remind you that 2800' was well above the icing level. The Chinook Mk2 was not cleared for flight into icing conditions so climbing was apparently not an option.
Are you really saying that these eminent and distinguished Lords had no minds of their own?
I think it might be more a question of what their minds were set on.PKPF68-77,
While I'm on, I am sure that someone better qualified than I will come in to remind you that 2800' was well above the icing level. The Chinook Mk2 was not cleared for flight into icing conditions so climbing was apparently not an option.
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PKPF68-77,
I know you assessed my previous advice as some what "combatant" but the questions you are asking WILL be answered if you were to take the time and read this thread from page 1 through till now.
All the details with regards to lack of icing clearance and therefore why they were at low level are fully explained in the 150 plus pages which will clear up any doubts you may still have.
I know you assessed my previous advice as some what "combatant" but the questions you are asking WILL be answered if you were to take the time and read this thread from page 1 through till now.
All the details with regards to lack of icing clearance and therefore why they were at low level are fully explained in the 150 plus pages which will clear up any doubts you may still have.
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PKPF
I am really interested in your line of analysis concerning inadvertent entry in to IMC conditions, it could be considered that this is is the crux of the matter.?
John Purdey, what is your view?
rgds
SMK
John Purdey, what is your view?
rgds
SMK
Last edited by davaar lad; 14th Feb 2008 at 19:48. Reason: spolling mistook
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Chinook
Davaar Lad. As it happens, I recall more than once finding myself inadverently entering IMC at very low level, usually in mist over the sea off Sicily and several times over the N German plain in typically wintery conditions (admittedly fixed wing), and I did the obvious and sensible thing, which was to go straight onto instruments and make a steady rate one turn away! What would you have done? Regards JP
Last edited by John Purdey; 15th Feb 2008 at 13:46. Reason: incomplete account!
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IMC
Mr Purdey,
i'm glad we agree that inadvertent entry into cloud is in itself not a crime. As for what I would have done, well..it depends on the circumstances, my reaction to such a situation may well be different to yours; there can be no staff answer. You and I have discussed in this forum the merits or otherwise of immediately taking action on entering IMC conditions, that discussion was inconclusive. But would you agree with the sentiment in the article which PKPF dug out concerning the Neptune crash in the same area? The meridian between VMC and IMC is not always clear cut and the deceptive nature of those conditions can lead to, for want of a better word "disorientation" not only sensory but also in terms of depth perception and optical illusion. (I know these were areas covered in the Hol Inquiry, but in my opinion were not fully investigated).
So, to answer your question concerning what would I do? hmm... difficult. What I did when I approached the Kintyre peninsula that evening in my VFR helicopter was slow down, turn around and land on Arran and scratch my head before having another go by inching across Kilbrannan Sound to land at Carradale.Bear in mind also that I knew another helicopter had just crashed in the same area and I was not interested in suffering the same fate. But you see I was not at the site of the accident, en route somewhere else or in a Chinook. All I can say is that I had flown in that area many many times in poor weather and I was surprised and disorientated by the conditions.
SMK
i'm glad we agree that inadvertent entry into cloud is in itself not a crime. As for what I would have done, well..it depends on the circumstances, my reaction to such a situation may well be different to yours; there can be no staff answer. You and I have discussed in this forum the merits or otherwise of immediately taking action on entering IMC conditions, that discussion was inconclusive. But would you agree with the sentiment in the article which PKPF dug out concerning the Neptune crash in the same area? The meridian between VMC and IMC is not always clear cut and the deceptive nature of those conditions can lead to, for want of a better word "disorientation" not only sensory but also in terms of depth perception and optical illusion. (I know these were areas covered in the Hol Inquiry, but in my opinion were not fully investigated).
So, to answer your question concerning what would I do? hmm... difficult. What I did when I approached the Kintyre peninsula that evening in my VFR helicopter was slow down, turn around and land on Arran and scratch my head before having another go by inching across Kilbrannan Sound to land at Carradale.Bear in mind also that I knew another helicopter had just crashed in the same area and I was not interested in suffering the same fate. But you see I was not at the site of the accident, en route somewhere else or in a Chinook. All I can say is that I had flown in that area many many times in poor weather and I was surprised and disorientated by the conditions.
SMK