Chinook - Still Hitting Back 3 (Merged)

[El Grifo]

Hats off to you people.

Now I believe more than ever

Justice has no expiry date

I thank you for that.

[PPRuNe Pop]

Yep! An excellent prog on Chanel 4 News. They say it will take 6-8 weeks for a decision. That is a pity but if we can wait 10 years......................................!

[Brian Dixon]

Hi everyone.

I agree that Channel 4 News did a very good job. I was a little disappointed with the 6-8 weeks possibility but, as PPRuNe Pop has said, we have waited this long (thirteen and a half shameful years, to be exact). Also, it's not a small document, so there's plenty for Mr Browne to read this evening in bed!

For those who didn't get to see the report you can view it here: http://www.channel4.com/news/article...amined/1338947

Your messages of support have been a great comfort to us all at this particular moment in time, in particular one from someone who lost his father in the accident.

Thank you always seems so inadequate, but there's little else I can say at the moment. It is, however, said from the heart.

My best, as always.
Brian

"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook

[South Bound]

Brian

I think you have that the wrong way around - it is we who should be thanking you for your efforts.

SB

[meadowbank]

Hear, hear!

[Brian Dixon]

You're too kind, gentlemen.

Let us agree that it has been a superb team effort.

The Glasgow Herald carried a very good article on the meeting yesterday:
http://www.theherald.co.uk/politics/...lots_names.php

Hopefully a decision will not bee too far away.

Regards, as always.
Brian

"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook

[Brian Dixon]

Hi all.

Apologies for posting twice in a row, but I thought you would like to see an e-mail received from Lord O'Neill:

Dear Brian,

Thanks, the meeting with Des Browne went quite well. He had been briefed and asked some quite perceptive questions. He did not appear negative and as a fellow advocate he tracked the arguments carefully, particularly in relation to the laws of evidence and the burden of proof.

We told him that in keeping with the wishes of the families, the [report] will not be posted on a website until the Secretary of State has made a decision, which we would imagine may not be until after Easter.

Thank our cyber-friends and make whatever use of this e-mail you want.

Yours aye,
Martin


Looks like we may have to wait for the Easter Bunny!

My best, as always.
Brian

"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook

[buoy15]

I'm confused that this new review is going to change anything - I think it gives false hope to the crusaders!

Sheriff Stephen Young in the Fatal Accident Inquiry said in 1996: "It has not been established...that the cause of the accident was the decision by the crew...to overfly the Mull of Kintyre..."

So who's decision was it? Chinook Capt - PM - SOS for Defence - CAS ?

The Sherrif is naieve as he was thrust into an area where he had no knowledge or experience

When they entered IMC they were well away from it - why didn't they go into the hover and climb and request Radar Control from SCATCMIL direct to Inverness, or, perform a safe escape heading right-about 180 degrees back into VMC conditions and work it out?

Why turn left into danger when in the clag?

If they were intending to land at Macrihanish, (as the the conspiracy theory would suggest) then it would have been more sensible to have turned earlier whilst in VMC and coasted in across the beach south of the SSA

Or did they put total trust in a portable TACAN placed in a dangerous location which is probably ok in good conditions?

This thread is so extensive it could be considered to be a surgical BOI. However, at the end of the day, without causing hurt or pain, I have to ask, why, these two experienced pilots, who were under some pressure to achieve their tasking, should have forgotten the basics of airmanship and failed to hear the bells ringing regarding the safety of the ac in IMC

Using the 6P's principle, I achieved 9630 hrs total (2000 night) and I'm still here

You brief for for best, you plan for the worst!

I wish you all the best for the outcome

Regards B15

[ShyTorque]

B15, this has all been covered before.

When they entered IMC they were well away from it - why didn't they go into the hover and climb and request Radar Control from SCATCMIL direct to Inverness, or, perform a safe escape heading right-about 180 degrees back into VMC conditions and work it out?

btw, How many hours of "IMC hover climbs" do you have?

[RTR]

Damn me! My intention was to say to Brian that he should relax now and let the waters flow. Then someone comes on and tries to light the fire again. It's old ground and nothing anyone can say now will make one iota of difference. Seemingly, all they want to do is to exercise their opinion and, sadly, say how good THEY were.

For the umpteenth time. NO-ONE-KNOWS-WHAT-ACTUALLY-HAPPENED and this campaign is to give back to the pilots their good name as they are entitled under RAF regs to have if proper cause cannot be found. Nothing was, has or will be so they cannot be denounced unless there was "no doubt whatsoever" that they were culpable. In spite of Wratten and Day.

Please stop this conjecture UNLESS and IF YOU know what actually happened. Fair enough?

Well done Brian and Martin O'Neill et al. We wait as before.

[buoy15]

ShyTorque - Non - Wer'e in trouble for shi*t sake - leap up and call for help
but when I think I'm in trouble, I might do the sensible thing and go back to where it looked ok

And I would still advise my flt deck on a safe escape heading

[Romeo Oscar Golf]

Hi Buoy 15, you didn't pop in as Courtney a while ago did you? You seem to share the same lack of understanding, a similarly large log book and no evidence at all, only opinion.
Congrats to you Brian and all those seriously involved.
By the way , I also have an opinion, but no evidence.

[walter kennedy]

B15
<< I'm confused that this new review is going to change anything - I think it gives false hope to the crusaders!>>
No disrespect to the efforts of all in this campaign, but to me it is like having a verdict against two victims falsely accused of their own manslaughter having that verdict’s status reduced to the equivalent of “not proven” while making no effort to establish who was really culpable lest this distracts from that outcome.
.
Regarding the other points you made, while others are correct to point out that much has been gone over before, there are still (after all this time) inputs relevant to this case – in particular, that most basic starting point, the weather.
It’s not surprising that you thought that they were in IMC at the critical time – this view has been pushed from the very beginning.
First please refer to my recent postings for a fuller description of what I believe it to have been like and why - Wx is one parameter that I am very confident about.
The very new stuff to me is that I now know that the best/obvious witnesses to the wx were not called to the BOI (or any subsequent inquiry for that matter) – it seems that the decision to paint a picture of aircrew error in bad wx had been decided upon before the hearing – I believe a deliberate misrepresentation.
.
Again referring to my previous descriptions of the Wx - they were under the thick cloud – they ran into IMC about 50 ft from the granite – they apparently just had time to react with an evasive manouevre (sort of diminishes the argument for controls jams,etc).

They had made a deliberate turn to the right and started to slow down (Boeing’s analysis) – they were somehow misled as to their range to go – that the handling pilot had his course selector on the track they followed (from turn to impact) suggests they had something to get range & bearing from.
If you refer to the track diagram I posted recently, it looks like they had planned to approach that landing area (by waypoint A) on 035mag (gets you the soonest clear line as you clear the high part of the shore) – if you imagine the thing they may have been referring to being not at that area but ½ mile or so up the hill, then the track to the impact makes sense – as does their misjudgement of the range to go.
I don’t know where the portable TACAN idea came from (apart from me some years ago as a possibility) but if you mean AN/TRN-26 or equivalent, would this needed to have been accessed via the TACAN CU? – if so, it was set for the MAC TACAN which was still operational that day and so I have discounted this piece of equipment from the equation.
.
<< Or did they put total trust in a portable TACAN placed in a dangerous location which is probably ok in good conditions?>>
I think you’ll find, if you ask operational pilots, that portable TACANS and, more recently, PRC112s (ubiquitous these days) do get placed in “dangerous” locations to allow insertion, extraction, resupply, etc and even sometimes are used to mark isolated hazards in temporary FAFs – although their use in such circumstances would be with a prior understanding of the location and, in the case of PRC112s, would be accompanied by voice guidance from the person on the ground (UHF guard – as was found to have been selected by the handling pilot of ZD576 that day?).
The relevance here is that Flt Lt Tapper had landed at that area on previous occasions and would have been familiar with it – without being somehow misled, they would have been able to land there in those conditions – other attending helos did that evening – if they had had a pinpoint reference on the landing area, they could have come in smartly, the downwash from the Chinook dispersing the ground mist as they settled – would have been quite an impressive sight – an impressive demonstration of one of the HC2’s capabilities, perhaps?
I really do wish the Mull group success in clearing the pilots' names - worthy in its own right - but I believe that there is more that can be done to pressure the MOD as to what really happened as, had there been another task that was open to accidental or wilful disruption, anyone else that could have been responsible needs to be held accountable for full justice to be done. I hope that a successful outcome to the Group's efforts will not close this case forever.

[ShyTorque]

B15, thought not.
I take it you are not a rotary wing pilot, then? An "IMC hover", climbing or not, is not a viable or safe "escape" manoeuvre; any rotary pilot knows this. A hover needs visual references because the aircraft instruments (ASI in particular) are not accurate enough to allow it, many are inaccurate below 30-40 kts. It can be done IMC in certain specialised situations but additional equipment needs to be installed. In addition, most military rotary pilots, SF or not, were not trained to hover on instruments alone at that time (I was one of the few who were, as it happens). The Mull of Kintyre situation we are concerned with was not one where this would be attempted by anyone!

without being somehow misled, they would have been able to land there in those conditions – other attending helos did that evening – if they had had a pinpoint reference on the landing area, they could have come in smartly, the downwash from the Chinook dispersing the ground mist as they settled – would have been quite an impressive sight – an impressive demonstration of one of the HC2’s capabilities, perhaps?

Walter, sorry but you are fantasising. No helicopter disperses ground mist by coming in smartly and "settling". The opposite usually occurs; a helicopter is much more likely to generate its own IMC conditions as it comes to a hover and no pilot with any experience would attempt this.

[Seldomfitforpurpose]

ShyT,

"a helicopter is much more likely to generate its own IMC conditions as it comes to a hover and no pilot with any experience would attempt this."

Another FACT that Wally will simply ignore...........mans an arse

Boyof15,

I may be wrong but if, as I think it is this is your first venture into this thread why wait till now?

[Argus]

Gentlemen

I've followed this thread with great interest, both from the point of view of an old and bold aviator who once flew helos around that area of the UK; and now, as a lawyer.

You can speculate as to the cause of this terrible accident until the cows come home. The issue now is the proper application of the correct legal test that applied at the time - that is "no doubt whatsoever".

Certainly, if one applied the civil test of "on the balance of probabilities", or possibly even the criminal test of "beyond reasonable doubt", some blame might attach itself to the pilots. But on my reading both of all that's been put here, and elsewhere in the public domain, I think that the admissable evidence doesn't quite measure up to the "no doubt whatsoever" threshold.

That might offend some here who argue from their own aviation experience that pilot error caused this terrible accident; because in their view, no competent pilot would have done what the pilots of ZD176 allegedly did that day. Maybe, but there's still some residual doubt, and in a country that adheres to the principle of the rule of Law, the deceased crew are entitled to the benefit of it.

[walter kennedy]

ShyTorque
Yes I was on the downwash bit - but did you get the point of approaching quickly a familair spot with some kind of local reference working?
I know you are very experienced - I am just pointing out some things that you may have missed because they are a bit out of the ordinary.
Try this bit of fantasy:
You've been there before; there's a blanket of fog but you know it isn't too thick - right on the ground, just hiding details, you can see intermittently the ground from some distance;
you have what you believe to be an accurate DME distance to that spot (let's go along with this for this little fantasy);
at what distance would you slow down significantly and start feeling your way along? - 2 miles, 1 mile, 1/2 mile, 100yds?
You would know better than me - I would have thought that you would not dither about, that you would get in close as smartly as you reckon is safe - a bit different to feeling your way through bad conditions to an unfamiliar site?
You see I have always maintained that it was not a question of them being in cloud but rather one of judging their distance from cloud - one of the few aspects that I can contribute strongly on here is the weather as I have been in that area in such conditions and, I humbly suggest, understand them well.
I do not believe, with the view of the ground I believe they had, that such an experienced and able crew would have trusted their visual judgment any closer in than the position of waypoint change - Flt Lt Tapper had reservations about the accuracy of the STANS and so I doubt if they would have even proceeded with waypoint A still selected - at the speed they were going at.
As it seems unlikely from their actions at waypoint change that they had (control, etc) problems, one can only conclude that they must have had some reference system in which they trusted at that point.
Otherwise, they would surely have exercised prudence.
I have been through this many times and still the only action that fits all the known parameters (and there are a lot) is that they had the intention of approaching a specific point for either a landing or a low pass and that something they had to have been referring to misled them, principally in terms of range to go - the one nav thing helo pilots do put a lot of trust in is a DME system (intrinsically accurate) - that is why I have suggested a candidate system.
Is there anything else that they could have been using - equipment or procedure (eg talkdown by a third party, anything)?
For those of you who stick to the "official" line of them just passing by the Mull en route, please refer to large scale maps, use a PC flight simulator, go on a flight there from Campbeltown on a clear day, take a boat trip around the Mull, look at the area with side perspective on Google Earth - the Mull is an area of low hills, of limited extent isolated in the broader area of low ground and sea - you'd have to try to hit it.
If you plot the position of waypoint change, let alone waypoint A, you'll find that following the direct bearing to Corran would have taken you over an even higher bit of the Mull than that they ran into - this gives rise to three possibilities:
1 they had already gone too close in to be just doing a route plan as per the STANS - so forget the significance of them switching waypoints to Corran - they had decided to visually fly up the shoreline with no navigation system set up to practically assist them;
2 as is the "official" line, they had decided to climb and continue as in IMC - despite knowing their proximity to the ground and in the direction of this limited extent of high ground;
3 they were heading for the landing area at waypoint A (for whatever reason).
.
Presumably, they then could have had the control problems suggested (by the Mull group) in any of the above scenarios to explain the crash - but my point here is that they had taken one of these options at a point when they had no such problems. Which one seems the most reasonable?
No. 3 seems to be shunned by reflex, no one had heard of such plans, etc, but so many parameters fit this: it has been the case that each individual parameter I have suggested as pointing to that action has been deprecated - however, when you get several parameters, however weak individually, pointing the same way you get a statistical correlation that makes that way extremely likely.
Likely enough, I suggest, for it to be at least worthy of constructive discussion - and it is this third option that allows the possiblity of a third party screwing up.

[meadowbank]

buoy15

So who's decision was it?

You are working from the premise (as, I believe were the 2 Air Marshals) that someone made a decision not to turn left towards the Corran waypoint, deciding instead to attempt to climb up, IMC, over the Mull.

The fact that the next waypoint was selected gives a very strong indication (Mr Spock would say that it is logical to assume) that the Captain had made a decision to turn to left, but the fact that the aircraft impacted the ground somewhat to the right of track indicates that something prevented him from turning the way he intended. Indeed, a number of different technical failures have been identified, which may have led to the aircraft failing to respond to a control input to turn left.

Before they do so again now, I will mention that supporters of the negligence finding have often pointed to the fact that the aircraft seems to have been manoeuvring under control when it impacted the ground, but the fact that the aircraft was in this extreme (for IMC) attitude suggests the opposite - particularly when the apparent position of the rudder pedals at impact is taken into account.

I accept the Air Marshals' apparent observation that highly-skilled and qualified pilots occasionally do stupid things that lead to accidents (hence ACM Wratten's letter to Station Commanders), but the fact that the aircraft struck the cloud-covered ground at (relatively) high speed provides no evidence whatsoever that this was the result of a conscious decision by the crew. That's why they should not have been found negligent and why so many of us have expended huge amounts of time and effort to getting this unjust finding overturned.

these two experienced pilots, who were under some pressure to achieve their tasking, should have forgotten the basics of airmanship and failed to hear the bells ringing regarding the safety of the ac in IMC

There is no evidence to show that they did not apply basic airmanship or that they intentionally entered IMC. However, we have at least two pieces of evidence that they intended to turn left and fly VFR just off the coast - their planned route and the selection of the Corran waypoint. Additionally, the Captain had asked for a Chinook HC1 to be retained in theatre because of its superior clearance in icing conditions. This, I believe, demonstrates that the Captain was all-too-aware of the risks associated with a climb into IMC over the Mull, making it far less likely that, as Air Marshals Day & Wratten have hypothesised, he made that decision. That this hypothesis (and that is all it is) has blackened the otherwise good names of the two pilots for the last 13 years is nothing short of shameful and the document that has now been submitted gives an opportunity for the MoD gracefully to redress this wrong.

[walter kennedy]

<<Before they do so again now, I will mention that supporters of the negligence finding have often pointed to the fact that the aircraft seems to have been manoeuvring under control when it impacted the ground, but the fact that the aircraft was in this extreme (for IMC) attitude suggests the opposite - particularly when the apparent position of the rudder pedals at impact is taken into account.>>
I am not a supporter of the negligence finding but would like to point out that the attitude and control positions as found were consistent with an emergency evasive manouevre – like they suddenly realised their predicament (like actually entering the ground mist which would have given them about 50 ft to go).
The large left “rudder” pedal position in particular was consistent with getting a large yaw quickly – the Chinook is unstable in the yaw axis (a complex control system tames this) and takes no energy to swing it broadside, the big fuselage slowing it down rapidly – this is a manouevre I am told is regularly practiced by special forces pilots – probably not at this speed but in such an emergency, an entirely appropriate manouevre.

[ShyTorque]

the one nav thing helo pilots do put a lot of trust in is a DME system (intrinsically accurate) - that is why I have suggested a candidate system.

Is there anything else that they could have been using - equipment or procedure (eg talkdown by a third party, anything)?

Walter,

In reply to your first statement - an RAF trained crew would be aware of the limitations of any fixed and published navaid, including DME. Regarding the possibility of a crew being misled by some sort of mobile DME, at the intention of others, is just plain silly.

In reply to your question re the crew being misled by a ground talkdown by a US Navy SEAL team (you have been told again and again), definitely NOT. The only agency a helicopter pilot would trust is an ATCO at an airfield, using a recognised approach.

I'm sorry to disappoint you again but you are completely misguided in pursuing this conspiracy theory of yours. I will now cease to respond to such questions because chasing fantasies ideas like this only detracts from the campaign. I'm being as polite as I can be, please take the hint....