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Chinook - Still Hitting Back 3 (Merged)

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Chinook - Still Hitting Back 3 (Merged)

Old 15th Feb 2008, 18:10
  #3201 (permalink)  
 
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The preceding discussion seems to mean that you can be flying VFR near to IMC conditions and you can inadvertently enter them.
I presume, JP, that when you entered IMC conditions inadvertently you could not judge the edge/boundary (or “meridian” as DL so well puts it)?
Davaar Lad’s trip was well down wind of the Mull and so he encountered fragmented muck. ZD576 was approaching the steeply rising landmass with the strong wind – the “weather” (as I have so often tried to describe) would have been right on the landmass ahead.
There would not have been much time to take action, would there, in the case of entering it inadvertently?
But why would they enter it inadvertently?
They knew where it was (on the landmass) – they had a SuperTANS GPS/Doppler nav computer and they could see the shoreline by all accounts (but not much else of use for distance judgment at their speed).
They were both experienced pilots who would have known of the problems of distance judgment in those conditions – Flt Lt Tapper for one was familiar with the area having landed there before.
And yet, less than a mile from it they dumped waypoint A which was still ahead, right on the shoreline on their track, and, in the absence of a local fixed nav aid, had it been left as the current waypoint in the SuperTANS it would have been the best and only reasonably accurate reference for distance to that shoreline (and therefore the boundary of those very local IMC conditions).
The handling pilot turned his course selector from 027m (which presumably it would have been on as their track for 40 miles to the position of changing the waypoint was exactly 027) to 035m and they then turned onto 035 which led directly to the area of the crash.
.
So what were they doing?
My theory is that they were intending landing at an area previously used by Chinooks (see my previous posts and pix).
Waypoint A was an obvious inner marker for that area.
According to Boeing’s “Analysis of Available Data” they had started to slow down on that final leg.
One of the RADALT warnings was set to minimum consistent with an immediate landing in unfavourable conditions.
The handling pilot’s baro altimeter had a setting which an RAF witness at one of the inquiries dismissed as being the QFI for Aldergrove – while many of you will realise that it should not have been left so when route flying in addition to it being unusual to have it set so for the aerodrome of departure in the first place, I would like to point out that the elevation of the landing area at waypoint A is near as dammit the same as that of Aldergrove.
.
Everything that is known about this crash fits the scenario of their intending to land at that landing area but somehow overestimating their range to go, overshooting with no room, and, having started to slow down but still at high speed being in a power setting region that denied them the agility of a Chinook (their being in a situation where the power just balanced the weight while travelling through clean air) – the turbine & FADEC lag would have only left them the stored energy in the blades for any sudden pull up (rotor RPM had dropped almost 10% by impact due, presumably, to that last emergency pull up manoeuvre).
.
If this was the case, the big question is why they dumped waypoint A.
A possible clue is the handling pilot’s course selector on his HSI being set on 035 – remember, their track from waypoint change to the area of impact was consistent with their following a course of 035 mag.
There were no fixed navaids of any use on that bearing.
My theory is that they were referring to a portable device of some kind as part of an exercise/demonstration that got its range and bearing to the HSIs via the CDU (hence the displacement of the expected waypoint).
This flight was referred to as an exercise by one of the RAF witnesses at one of the inquiries and the tactical call sign used was consistent with this.
One explanation of this crash is that something that they were referring to when approaching that landing area, which should have been on that landing area, was in practice somewhere higher up the hill.
If you refer to the detailed map (that I posted sometime previously #3095) you can see the track geometry fits this – up the hill ˝ a mile or so gives the track to the right of that straight to waypoint A.
.
Before the usual backlash at this suggestion, perhaps one of you in a position to do so could ask an HC2 pilot how the data got to the HSIs from the ARS6 module from 1995 onwards (when I know they were fitted to some HC2 Chinooks)? I am sure that enough detail to either confirm or rubbish this idea could be got across without causing any security problems – Oh! Of course, apart from this case!
We could then dismiss or confirm the relevance of the handling pilot’s course setting in this regard.

Last edited by walter kennedy; 15th Feb 2008 at 18:11. Reason: spelling
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Old 15th Feb 2008, 20:12
  #3202 (permalink)  
 
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Walter,

The first sentence of your Post 3216 would seem to come under the heading " Eggs (sucking) - lessons for Granny."

You are totally unable to accept that the equipment at the crux of your theory was NOT fitted to the aircraft and you ignore the fact that 2 avionics tradesmen worked in the avionics bay (where said equipment would have to have been installed) immediately prior to the departure of the aircraft on its fatal sortie without noticing anything unusual.

If the Pilots had agreed to carry out a "demonstration" of the equipment you describe on a passenger carrying sortie in the poor weather that had been forecast and in the certain knowledge that the equipment had NO Controller of Aircraft release for RAF use (let alone a Release to Service for use in the Chinook HC2) then all on this thread would have a united viewpoint in respect of the cause of the crash.

There is no evidence whatsoever - except in your imagination - of any such activity.
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Old 16th Feb 2008, 14:14
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Cazatou
The 1st sentence was tongue in cheek.
The "crux" of my theory is that, with evidence of an approach to that landing area, what could have misled them with regard to range, because this fits all that is known.
The equipment I specifically mention is my suggestion (for several reasons).
Got any other ideas?
At least get used to the idea that they were doing something there other than screwing up a simple ferry flight.
On the sequence of waypoints alone, if conditions were dubious at the Mull such that a flight to the area of the light house and then up the coast was not on, then the change of waypoint to Corran keeping them clear of the muck and the higher still ground further to the north of the lighthouse was required several miles earlier - check the charts with accurate track/brg plots.
The allegations that they were in a hurry also conflict with them going in as far as waypoint change - it was a significant dogleg in off a more direct line to Corran.
You all seem to get hung up on the whole "conspiracy" picture - try doing the nav, getting the procedures, etc and working out what they were doing - so many things are anomalous to a route flight just passing the Mull.
Perhaps unblinkered you can work something else out.
It is not just speculation - neither the official line nor the control jam theory of the Mull group hold up - the instrument settings as found do fit with a landing at a site used before yet not acknowledged despite a crash within a few hundred yards of it - why was the possibility of an emergency landing there not even considered? - was it so important not to acknowledge that landing area?
Just as it was important to keep the impression of unsuitable weather?
I suppose you would notice an extra module in a new a/c would you? - it ain't that big. The units supplied in 1995 were easy to move between HC2s - they were designed to be so - which sort of implies that they would have been easy to pop into one, don't it?
Anyway, forget the specific equipment - if you can't see that the instruments and speed reduction and heading change to the area suggested a landing there, for whatever reason, then, as they say, you can lead a horse to water but you can't make it drink.
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Old 16th Feb 2008, 18:52
  #3204 (permalink)  
 
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Thumbs up Chinook

Davaar Lad. Again, I must be missing something here. The yachtsman, our only witness looking at that self-same shore at about the same time from seaward, said that the horizontal vis was about one mile and that he could see the boundary wall of the lighthouse site below the cloudbase. I'm not clear why any possible ambiguity about the edge of the mist and the edge of the cloud really matters very much. The question is why anyone would have pressed on over those cloud-covered hills? I know that I would not have done so.
We will never know why this crew did so, but the only possible explanation is that they were off track but of course did not realise it, and I apologise to our regular contributers for saying yet again that the crew should not have been in that place in those conditions.
You say in your latest post "What I did when I approached the Kintyre peninsula that evening in my VFR helicopter was slow down, turn around and land on Arran and scratch my head before having another go" I trust you will not think me patronising when I say "Absolutely right, and that is why you are still with us!"
With all good wishes. John Purdey
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Old 16th Feb 2008, 19:17
  #3205 (permalink)  

 
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John Purdey, you missed something rather important out of your quote from Davaar Lad. He explained at least partly why he took the action he did -
Bear in mind also that I knew another helicopter had just crashed in the same area and I was not interested in suffering the same fate.
That knowledge was not something the crew of ZD576 had the benefit of.

You also say
I know that I would not have done so.
(referring to pressing on over those cloud-covered hills). I don't understand how you can say such a thing without any doubt, when there are ways in which you might have been misled into thinking that what you were doing was safe.

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Old 16th Feb 2008, 19:25
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Walter

For 14 (that is fourteen) YEARS I operated into and out of RAF Northolt on an almost daily basis - often more than once a day - and on the way into RAF Northolt we utilised exactly the same beacons that we would have used were we landing at Heathrow - with the exception of the ILS. We were using those beacons as en - route navigation aids.

From observing our visual approaches down the Northwest corridor into Northolt you could have been forgiven for assuming that it was our intention to land at the small airfield at Denham.

The fact that there was a landing strip in the vicinity of the Chinook's planned route does not repeat not signify an intention to land at that strip.
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Old 16th Feb 2008, 19:40
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airsound

I cannot speak for John Purdey - but for myself I would say Airmanship, Experience and a strong sense of Self Preservation would force that decision.
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Old 17th Feb 2008, 06:49
  #3208 (permalink)  
 
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JP
You wrote:
the only possible explanation is that they were off track but of course did not realise it
With no CVR and no survivors, I find it unsettling that you are able to reach this conclusion. Yes the hillside they hit was in cloud and yes the position of impact appears to have been a couple of hundred yards to the right of the original intended track, but that does not mean that the crew thought they were on track or that they had decided to fly over the Mull. Indeed, the fact that the Corran waypoint had been selected is significant evidence that they intended to make the necessary 7 deg turn to the left to fly VFR towards Corran. For some unidentified (and unidentifiable) reason, the aircraft did not make that minor course alteration to the left and there is, therefore, uncertainty surrounding the cause of the crash. The fact that the aircraft hit a cloud-covered hill whilst the crew was attempting to navigate VFR is not proof they flouted any rules or that they were negligent in any way. It is, I concede, possible that they were negligent, made a stupid decision to ignore the icing restrictions extant at the time, decided to cruise climb over the hills and didn't even manage to continue to fly in a straight line. However, it seems to me that, in a court of law, it would be impossible to prove this 'beyond reasonable doubt' let alone 'beyond any doubt whatsoever'. I've a feeling you're going to disagree, but a negligence finding in these circumstances (lack of evidence) is surely preposterous, unless one is trying to protect the reputations of Air Marshals.
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Old 17th Feb 2008, 07:59
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Mr Purdey

John Purdey,
I fear we are always going to disagee; but I suppose that the fact that you contribute to this forum so freely is a good thing, otherwise we would all agree, pat ourselves on the back and go home.
The evidence which Mr Holbrooke gave has been slightly undermined by his varying accounts but is nevertheless worth re visiting.
His recollection is based on a slow moving, sea level (of course)observation. He also had the benefit of 360 degree vision so that he could look both into the gloop and away. The advantages this would have given him in terms of SA were significant when compared to a fast moving helicopter. In my case there are two points I would like to bring to your attention. On the return flight looking away from the gloop there was a good horizon and it all became clear to me. Also when making an approach to my LZ at Carradale speed, height and distance were so difficult to judge that it was only when I made visual contact with a Land Rover that my visual cues were re orientated to give the correct picture;even though I was in good visual contact with the surface.
On a slightly different matter, probably been covered before but what I can't quite come to terms with is why if someone crashes into a mountain, other aircraft or sea in good weather conditions in a perfectly serviceable aircraft that it is either "a momentary lapse in concentration", "poor judgement" bad luck etc etc. But if two loyal, trusted, young men, serving their country to their best endevour, in an aircraft whose release to service is questionable are "Grossly Negligent" when crashing into a mountain in poor weather is beyond me, and clearly beyond most other contributers to this forum.
I can understand the sentiment of some of the more vitriolic contributors,
there has been a betrayal here, by the very people who should have been responsible for protecting the the good names of the Chinook crew.

rgds

SMK
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Old 17th Feb 2008, 09:48
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Chinook

Cazatou. d'Accord!! JohnPurdey
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Old 17th Feb 2008, 12:52
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Chinook

Davaar Lad.
You are right in saying that we will not agree, but as you also say we are entitled to voice our views. As to the numerous past cases of, as you say, "a momentary lapse in concentration", "poor judgement" bad luck etc etc, those verdicts may or may not have been justified. But in this particular case the crew were well outside the rules of sound airmanship in pressing on in those conditions. If they had been on any kind of emergency mission, as I am sure many of our gallant Helo crews will testify (and no-one admires their skill and dedication more than I do), then, yes, risks must be taken. But this was a simple VIP transit flight; no risk of any kind could possibly be justified.
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Old 17th Feb 2008, 13:27
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Cazatou
<<The fact that there was a landing strip in the vicinity of the Chinook's planned route does not repeat not signify an intention to land at that strip.>>
It was not just that it was nearby:
they had turned towards it:
they had started to slow down;
the had the right QFI for it;
a RADALT alarm was on min;
Chinooks had landed there before;
they had a tactical c/s consistent with a SAR exercise;
with the reduced power setting that was required for the slowing down (and as found matched at intermediate setting), as well as the other well discussed reasons by others on this thread (eg icing), overflight of the Mull was not intended.
.
You have the habit of many contributors on this thread of fixing on one aspect - you have to realise that so many factors fitting a practical scenario give a statistical correlation - enough factors fitting that even if any particular one is not absolutely determining the situation, the product of them all makes it highly probable.
.
And JP - let me repeat to you that when travelling with the strong wind such that the weather is on right on the landmass ahead, you don't get much chance for action if you inadvertently enter it by misjudging your distance to it.

Last edited by walter kennedy; 17th Feb 2008 at 13:29. Reason: spelling & correction
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Old 17th Feb 2008, 13:34
  #3213 (permalink)  
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fish

But in this particular case the crew were well outside the rules of sound airmanship in pressing on in those conditions
No John they were not!

If the intention was to remain below cloud, in sight of the surface, and turn left along the coast, they were operating within the rules and in a perfectly normal way for SH.

Why they didn't follow that course will never be known. That is why the finding is just plain WRONG.
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Old 17th Feb 2008, 14:01
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Cazatou and John Purdey,

The only thing you two bring to the party is an abstract thought process, which I, for one, have great difficulty in following.

John Purdey,

Version 1.

Davaar Lad. As it happens, I recall more than once finding myself inadverently entering IMC, usually mist over the sea off Sicily and over the N German plain in typically wintery conditions (admittedly fixed wing), and I did the obvious and sensible thing, which was to make a steady rate one turn away! What would you have done? Regards JP
Version 2.

Davaar Lad. As it happens, I recall more than once finding myself inadverently entering IMC at very low level, usually in mist over the sea off Sicily and several times over the N German plain in typically wintery conditions (admittedly fixed wing), and I did the obvious and sensible thing, which was to go straight onto instruments and make a steady rate one turn away! What would you have done? Regards JP
(AA's highlights)

I was waiting for Version 3; how you're still walking God's earth JP I'll never know.


Cazatou,

Your scratchings head off in in all sorts of directions, some totally irrelevant to the thrust of this thread.

Both of you, state your case that will convince us mortals that the finding of grossly negligent (beyond any doubt whatsoever) should be upheld.


AA
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Old 17th Feb 2008, 14:47
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But this was a simple VIP transit flight; no risk of any kind could possibly be justified
well someone decided that the risk of putting all those VIP's together in one military helicopter was justified.
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Old 17th Feb 2008, 16:43
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Chinook

Bertie Thruster. Absolutely agree, no-one has explained why this happened.
Ancient Aviator. Not clear what your problem is? I can only repeat that emotional invective is no substitute for rational argument. Do you not agree? John Purdey.
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Old 17th Feb 2008, 17:28
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cazatou, and, by accord cordial, John Purdey, you say
Airmanship, Experience and a strong sense of Self Preservation would force that decision.
Well, let’s exclude the last of those from the relevant arguments - I assume you’re not imputing any suicidal intent to the crew, are you?

And certainly, this was a highly experienced crew.

Which leaves us with airmanship. I have seen no evidence to the standard of ‘beyond reasonable doubt’, let alone ‘absolutely no doubt whatsoever’, to suggest that this crew was guilty of any lack of airmanship. Plenty of supposition, even extrapolation from the lack of any other believable cause - but no evidence to the standard required of this BoI. And as we know, absence of evidence is not evidence of absence.

Seems fairly simple to me. Not guilty of gross negligence.

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Old 17th Feb 2008, 17:41
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JP,

AA has a valid point which I believe needs a honest reply. You have clearly stated that

"I recall more than once finding myself inadvertently entering IMC"

Do you consider your actions in these cases to be grossly negligent or is it the fact that it was inadvertent that excuses you?

The hows and whys of the Chinook's inadvertent entry into IMC are not clear as there is enough conflicting evidence as to what was PROBABLY seen weather wise from the Chinook's flight deck windows to give sufficient doubt.

Should you choose to reply then please strip out all considerations about what should or should not have happened at the way point change and explain how the Chinook's crew INADVERTENTLY entered IMC as you have prior experience of this phenomena.

Last edited by Seldomfitforpurpose; 17th Feb 2008 at 18:07.
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Old 17th Feb 2008, 18:04
  #3219 (permalink)  

 
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Walter

I’m a bit puzzled. (Nothing new there) But on 15 Feb, you said in your post 3216
The handling pilot’s baro altimeter had a setting which an RAF witness at one of the inquiries dismissed as being the QFI for Aldergrove.
I thought - QFI, QFE, schmooFE, just a typo.

Then on 17 Feb, your post 3227 had a long list of things in support of the Chinook's heading for a landing strip, amongst which was
the had the right QFI for it
Now, call me pedantic if you like, but it couldn’t be, could it, that you don’t know the difference between a QFI and a QFE? (Answer, a QFI is tall, handsome and a steely-eyed wannabe killer - just ask one and they’ll tell you - whereas a QFE is just a collection of, well, millibars)

Anyway, I think we should be told.

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Old 17th Feb 2008, 19:53
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Walter,

Your post 3227.

"They had turned towards it" - orographic wind effect?

"They had started to slow down" - orographic wind effect?

"They had the right QFI for it" - see above post.

"radalt alarm was on MIN" - Planned to Fly visually at low level in undulating terrain.

"Chinooks had landed there before" - My Father once had a moderate (for 1949) win on the Pools; it doesn't mean I will.

"They had a tactical callsign consistant with a SAR exercise" Are you sure you mean "Search and Rescue"?

Last edited by cazatou; 17th Feb 2008 at 20:03.
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