The ADF buys another Lemon

[AFGAN]

Like a rabid dog, I am back again.

The problem Bushranger, is that the Minister will not find out until the game is absolutely up. DMO and the Senior serving officers on the respective project will find ways to bury any problems for as long as possible or until they muddle through with some half-baked capability (or they get posted and it becomes someone elses problem). Propping up bankrupt contractors and fudging contract benchmarks appears to be the norm these days (I could give examples but don't want to go near the line again). Guys at LtCol and Maj level push up the information but ultimately, little or nothing is done to hold the contractors to account as it may reveal another bad buy by defence procurement and dump ones mate or worse still, mentor, in the cow poop (what did Roy call it?). The reasoning is that if the supplier goes under than everyone is worse off. I disagree with this but even if it holds some water, why wasn't this forseen at the contract stage and safegaurds written into the contract to ensure that the supplier can deliver and is appropriately resourced? We allow the ultimate supplier eg EADS/Eurocopter, to have legal seperation from the entity set up in Oz, so that if required, it can be cut loose from the parent financially. Why?

WillOz,

if you have served, then you know the old saying: "We train as we fight". To suggest we set up for peacetime is absurd, especially so when we have troops in combat.

I thought the ADF had learnt its' lessons and would, whenever possible, buy proven aircraft and ones with a standard fit according to a military that operates a significant number of the type. We did this with Chinook but we have gone off the reservation with MRH, Tiger, and JSF.

MRH and Tiger are sucking the Army dry and the existing capabilities are hurting immensely. Unfortunately, we need the capability now. It needs to be proven and reliable, and it needs to be supportable in the field with our existing resources. Not in 10 years when it is mature. Either that, or more money needs to allocated to refurbish the BH capability and obtain a decent resupply of spares so that BH can continue to operate for some time to come

For heavens sake, we are not talking about stealth fighters here but a battlefield truck (I know I have used this line many times). There hasn't been any great technological breakthrough in helicopters that I am aware of in the last 20 years (except some stealth work which MRH doesn't have). This should have been the easiest aircraft replacement project the ADF has run in 20+ years!

EmerGov asked me what I want out of this thread (apart from a good bleat). Well, what I want may not be possible to achieve (and not from this thread), and even if it is, then it will take time and involve a lot of pain for the ADF and DMO as the dirty laundry is put out on the clothesline. But I hope that we can finally recognise that we are a small defence force. With few exceptions, we should never be involved in developing and proving new technology (and no, 650 aircraft on order, new to service, is not proven. 650 with 5 to 10 years in service in the exact config we have ordered, proven able to perform its intended roles, probably would be). We can't afford it and it is quite often a waste of taxpayer money. It is not the ADF's role to keep DSTO in business. In my opinion, we need to stick with buying proven capabilities that we know we can afford to maintain and operate properly. Sometimes, the cheapest option at the tender stage is not really the cheapest or best option. Contractors know the game and will promise the world. We need to see that as well and act accordingly. As I said to Scran, technology is seductive, especially to a Pilot. I know I love to have all the technology possible in my aircraft. But the people that are responsible for spending large amounts of taxpayers money need to see through this seduction and spend wisely. As you mentioned BR-71, a thorough cost benefit analysis should take care of this.

[Bushranger 71]

Defence Science & Personnel Ministry

Hi AFGAN; good stuff your #182 (P10).

Pre-Tange, the 3 Services had their own junior Minister and there was also one for Supply. These arrangements were shed when the military came under defacto public service control but a Minister for Defence Science & Personnel was created which gave DSTO much more clout and also took the prerogative for recruiting and manning away from the respective Service Chiefs.

When the Rudd Government came to power, 2 Parliamentary Secretaries were appointed unheralded, one for Defence Support who immediately began spending like a drunken sailor especially on helo related projects and the other PS appears to function more as a ministerial representative for the Army. The PS for Defence Support seems intimately tied to DMO approving projects expenditure which should really be the sole responsibility of the Minister for Defence.

The Service Chiefs now have lessened control over manpower and recruiting matters with these functions seemingly having been added to the Defence Science ministry to boost the strength of that department. I have a few friends who were involved in recruiting years back when it was under individual armed forces control - they really loved their job and managed to get good standard people onboard. Now we have a civilian mob in Canberra more or less deciding what types are suitable for military service!

We really need to get back to something like the pre-Tange framework to return some standing to the respective armed forces. Abolishing the Ministry for Defence Science & Personnel and the 2 recently created Parliamentary Secretary positions would seem a reasonable solution substituting PS appointments for each of the Services. DSTO and DMO should answer directly to the Minister for Defence. Not likely to happen though with a Prime Minister who was a bureaucrat.

[What Red Line?]

I've been following this thread with interest.

I vividly recall my father roundly and soundly criticising the Government's stupid mistake dropping perfectly good piston engined warplanes to replace them with those incredibly expensive jets. His reasoning was that with regular upgrades to the powerplants and weaponry, we could be damned sure that we could defend ourselves because we had proven equipment.

If I accept the wisdom being posted here, then my Pop's plan is beginning to make damned good sense. He also spent an extraordinary time complaining about the folks in DC not knowing Jack Sh*t about what the military really needed. Man, if he coulda got elected we would still have the skies filled with P47's, P51's, B29's and those fine Bell 47s fresh off their 95th upgrade would still be an affordable BF tool just like they were in the good ole days.

[Gundog01]

I have been reading this thread with interest, particularly BR71's and AFGAN's most informed posts. However, BR71, had i known your love (posibble affiliation) with airpower australia website and the Kopp, Goon show i would have read your posts with more than a grain of salt. I do visit the site occasionally when i need a laugh and some anti-ADF rhetoric.

You mention the F111 as being able to fly to 2030, but fail to mention just how futuristic this technologly was for it's time, and the amount of money if soked up during development. Perhaps we will see the same tech leap and sound operating system from MRH and Tiger. Like most defence purchases (and even wars) their relative value is often only evident in hindsight.

[Point0Five]

Sorry BR71, but most Carlo fans are 12 year old boys with wild imaginations.

Sadly, your credibility has now evaporated.

[Lost Again..]

Been watching this thread for a while. Nearly responded to AFGHAN's dig at DSTO 3 pages ago but sat on it. It's been deleted now anyway.

The following statement has to be a classic.

Our B707 were pretty low time airframes and had the aircraft been upgraded, operating costs would have been substantially reduced

One of the aircraft was ~39k hours but all the rest were 50,000+ by 2005. This info is avail open source at the DSTO online reports into B707 wing fatigue. Our B707 were at end of life.

[scran]

Bushranger - me in the group-think category? I proved AFGHAN wrong on that point in PM's. Not at all. I'm still on record as not agreeing with the JSF program when we did. Still on record as saying the RAAF needed to walk away from the Squadron concept (ie - is 24 C-130 too many for our needs?) and go with the total lift capability study (which has happened now - but only because C-130E's started to break). Operate the F-111 till 2030? Do you have ANY idea the costs associated with being the ONLY operator of a type? You even argue against it later when you discuss KC30 (A330 as against B767 Tankers).

Oh - and didn't A330 win the US competition? It's only political interference (the type you argue so strongly against) that is the issue in the US now.


Time to take your meds again.

Someone else has proven your B707 claims false. If you are indeed one of Carlos Kopps crew...........


Don't turn the 707 discussion around. In fact, I agree with you - the ADF should have gotten Tankers a LONG time ago.

I agree with you about the Parlimentary Secretaries - god help us when Kelly starts to interfere.....


Believe whatever you want.

I'm here to tell you right now - your beloved Huey's little son the UH1Y could not fulfill one of the most basic requirements the Army had - the ability to lift a section in patrol order in one aircraft. Why was that a requirement? Ask Afghan.


Oh - and for the record (not that it matters) my father served in WW2 - and I hope one day soon to visit the grave of my uncle in the Alexandria Commonwealth Wargraves Cemetery where he has laid since being killed in WW2..................

[grusome]

FWIIW, my grandfather joined the Victorian Engineers (Submarine Mining) in 1890 or thereabouts, was a foundation member of the Australian Corps of Signals just after Federation, kilted up for the Vic Scottish, was commissioned in the 52nd Bn and retired in 1923, but what the H... has that to do with this discussion?

I just want to place a couple of facts about the B707 in RAAF service into the argument. Firstly, when acquired, the initial aircraft had a very low cycle to hours relationship - about half if memory serves. Unfortunately, despite repeated attempts by the operators to enlighten the hierarchy, RAAF (Malcolm Fraser?) refused to consider a simulator as part of the program. Further, the then hierarchy from time to time refused to pay for travel to overseas simulators. So, circuit bashing became the norm. In very short order, the cycles count caught up with the hours, in the face of Boeing recommendations. This unfortunate situation was exacerbated by the "cheapest is best" decision to buy the Israeli wing tips. The simulator indecision was reversed by the absolutely unnecessary Sale event, but still took a couple of years to install. Result - the airframes were b-ggered. Replacing the centre section wing carry-through frames (cracking) would probably have cost a fortune, even if possible. The total hours are not the issue. Cycle numbers are.

So far as "upgrading" to KC135R, what is BR71 (I'm about the same age!) on about? The fundamental "upgrade' would be fitment of boom capability - and I'm writing with the advice of someone near and dear to me who spent a couple of years with USAF on just that model, refuelling Blackbirds and other interesting airplanes. We looked at booms when I was writing staff papers about tankers in the 70s. To retrofit a boom to a used 707 requires a rebuild of the back half of the airframe - and expert advice is that in the absence of the original jigs it would be hugely difficult and expensive to mate a brand new rear to an old front due to the in-service twisting and accommodations that all airframes go through.

The interesting aspect to all this is that had the hierarchy listened to the operators and brought a sim on line with the aircraft 25+ years ago, it might have been possible to re-engine and upgrade to modern glass with zoom zoom defensive kits and keep the old girls going for a while. But who listens to the operators?

I would also like to point out to Scran: "The B707 refuellers were NEVER an operational capability (despite us deploying them to support ops in Afghanistan)" that not only were they operational out of Kyrgyzstan, but also out of Kuwait (although the latter service was sadly never recognised as operational (warlike) due to some unfortunate politicking by SASR whom I otherwise admire). I suggest you ask Angus whether they were operational!

May I suggest that the next war is the one we should be equipping for. I spent half a lifetime (adult) working with the relics of the previous one or two wars. The one time I fell on my feet was to fly the 'Bou when it was brand new - and a new capability for RAAF and Army. I didn't believe in '64 that it would last ten years. God knows I was wrong then! But I don't think I'm wrong in saying that the best advice we can take is from those operators who served in the front line last week. Go figure.

Edited to add that I never figured out why RAAF refused to consider the USAF offer of 2nd hand KC135s during the 70s.

[Wiley]

gruesome, your excellent last post brought back all sorts of memories and frustrations for me.. reminding why I "walked the walk" and left Ron.

But back to the subject of the thread: is there anyone out there who doesn't believe that AAVN needs a "second tier", cheap to operate, simple to maintain in the field light helicopter to do the myriad mundane tasks it would be just plain stupid to employ a 54 million dollar very high tech airframe on?

While I accept the very valid arguments about the problems of yet another type in the ADF's rotary wing inventory, I just can't see the N-90, (and the Tiger, but let's not go there), in the limited numbers Australia will be able to afford both to buy and to operate**, providing even a small fraction of the air support that will be demanded of them.

**This, I believe, (cost), will be an increasingly important factor in Defence when you look at what's currently happening in the world, and if, like me, you don't believe this financail crisis will be short-lived.

[herkman]

Firstly I should say, that we the public owe a great deal to people like Bushranger, who have the experience and know what they are looking at.

The introduction of the UH1B and later models into war conditions, was done only several years after we received them into service, bearing in mind that previously the RAAF had no real large scale helicopter operational experience.

Partly understanding the limitations of all of the helicopters introduced since then, it appears except for the Blackhawk, that they have been a compromise of sorts, which may or may not be a problem in the future. This I am not qualified to say.

However the government has over the years, to put it bluntly has done too little and too late in regard to aircraft replacements, or upgrades.

Let us look into some of them.

In 1966 the USAF badly wanted to get their hands on our A model gunships, and offered a great deal if we traded them on E models. Nothing came of that (they wanted them to turn into gunships) and so they continued in service, long after their use by date. Yes we did have the E model on order and they arrived on time and gave good service. However once again we repeated the mistakes of the A model, and did not keep them up too scratch in regard to mod states and centre section replacements, until in the end it would be hard to justify the money to do so.

This buy the is the same reason, that most of the pre J model aircraft, are flying with restrictions with particularly every Air Force but especially the USAF.

Where are we and the RAF travelling, the same route as before, with fatique becoming a long term issue with both of these Air Forces aircraft, the J seeming to roll this problem forward, because of the increased HP.

Replacing the centre section I am informed is not a 5 minute job, and the lead time is likewise. Can old air frames be brought back again I am not able to say, but the fact that 6 of our E models are now front line aircraft with the PAF should indicate that planed correctly, upgrades can and should be succesfull.

The Caribou is another one in case, as long ago proposals have been made to re engine this aircraft and until the recent structual failure, the engine were considered to be the shortfall of the aircraft. None of the RAAF aircraft came with new engines, and the cost and difficulty of maintaining these old and tired engines has steadily increased. Whilst understanding the Army did not want to carry JP1 into the field at the time, today it is the 100 octane which is the problem to cart.

The 707 good aircraft as it was, received the attention of the bean counters and we had to loose good men, in an accident that should never have happened, before out polital masters did what should have been from day one bought a simulator. As result of penny pinching, the 707 was taken out of service, long before its replacement will be operational.

However in the meantime we no longer have an air to air refueling capacaity. My understanding is that in spite of the French and Singapore Air forces buying the KC135R, the decision was that we did not want to buy second hand. Boeing could have kept both the 707 and the KC135R in the air for a considerable time, but even after we have bought 5 KC30 we find our polital masters, lacking the guts to run the gaunlet of the press, have pinched and are going to convert at a cost of A$45M two of our tankers, so they can ride in comfort and carry all their hangers on and baggage.

About the only thing we can shout success at, is the C17 purchase, a great purchase and an even greater task of getting them into service quickly. However once again we have failed to understand, that just like the RAF, four are not enough, and knowing our politcal people, the line will be shut before we understand this. Four C17's do not make 12 C130J's.

What I am saying is that the government should keep out of the selection process, and should have confidence that the armed forces can make the right selection, or have to live with it. Why we have to Australianise every thing we buy almost I will never know.

The UH1 series, C130A, Caribou, C130E, C130H, Blackhawk have all performed well and were virtually standard military aircraft when they entered service.

Rant off

Regards

Col

[Magoodotcom]

But back to the subject of the thread: is there anyone out there who doesn't believe that AAVN needs a "second tier", cheap to operate, simple to maintain in the field light helicopter to do the myriad mundane tasks it would be just plain stupid to employ a 54 million dollar very high tech airframe on?

Isn't there a Phase 9 of Air 9000 that is being spun up to provide a light utility helicopter (LUH) for Army? All depends on the White Paper and Air Lift Study I guess, but looks possible once Phase 7 is done and dusted.

[scran]

Gruesome:

I'm not arguing that the B707's did a great job when they deployed - and it was (INHO) operational stuff.

HOWEVER, the AAR capability was developed for the birds as a training capability (officially) until the new tankers were acquired.

Subtle I know, but important in places like the Defence Capability Committee (arguing is it a REPLACEMENT capability or NEW capability) and Pink Book priorities/considerations etc.

Oh - and to whoever said it - Herkyman was it? - I'd argue about the S70A9's the ADF acquired being standard. I'm told that these aircraft have the best anti-icing system of ANY sub-type of Black Hawk. Correct me if I'm wrong AFGHAN. Oh - and how many times have you used it?

[Bushranger 71]

Longevity.....

Some of the recent dialogue this thread - since it was suggested to me I participate - has been constructive and enjoyable but the derogatory stuff from a few quite disappointing.

Longevity is not a bar to researching military stuff and questioning the worsening situation on the Australian defence scene since the Tange Re-organization in 1974. When my ability in this regard was challenged, I perhaps unwisely outlined my family military lineage and participation with Air Power Australia just to demonstrate that I do endeavour to stay in touch.

I was invited to participate in the APA forum and am somewhat a wild card challenging a fair bit of their thinking. Their mooting how the air combat components of the RAAF should be structured somewhat dilutes the effect of some of their fine analysis work regarding aircraft performance and weaponry that is very difficult to ascertain from other sources. But is it not good to have another think tank that functions somewhat outside the square than just be brainwashed by the plethora of such institutions that are patronized by Defence and the arms industry?

So I had duff gen on RAAF B707 airframe hours; but my point was there are abundant KC-135R that will probably be operating in the USAF for decades which could have perhaps provided an adequate upgraded capability in lieu of introducing yet another somewhat unique type!. Going down the MRTT track could mean it will now be very difficult to get funding for any more C-17 before the production line ends.

The Australian defence capabilities determination and procurement system has become progressively more broken necessitating significant organizational restructuring and this problem is hugely compounded by the influence peddling that goes on in Canberra. A colleague who retired a couple of decades back as a 1 Star gets a package around $500K per annum just to haunt offices and fete politicians and senior military personnel around the country. Nice work if you can get it so imagine what might be offered to former Ministers for Defence who take positions with major ‘arms bazaar’ players!

Little bundles of assets like 4 x C17, 5 x MRTT, 6 x Wedgetail will not be credible military capacities considering the likely continuous availability of about only half on line. The whole structure of the small ADF warrants rethinking to provide more viable functions and so hard decisions to shed (or place in reserve storage) equipments that cannot presently provide adequate operational capabilities due to supportability or manning considerations.

Some positives from the debate this forum seem to have been recognition that equipments in service should be progressively optimized to maintain credible operational status until replacement is justifiable; also, some ‘adequate’ modest cost capabilities that can be sustainably supported in harsh operating environments are essential in the military hardware mix.

Australia simply cannot afford the 50 percent increase in defence spending over the next decade that has been supported by both major political parties so ADF capabilities rationalization may be an outcome of the emerging Defence White Paper.

I prefer to exit now and will give contributing some historical stuff a miss which dedicated warriors may have found interesting as it would have embraced so-called airmobile operations and the mythical requirement for carriage of an infantry squad/section.

[scran]

Bushranger - (hey, here is a turn-up!!)

I agree with you!

Not arguing about the KC-135R's - yes the ADF SHOULD have acquired a truely operational AAR capability well before now. Probably as or even before we introduced the Hornet. Hell, I don't think we ever should have given the F4's back!!!!!!

Sorry, but your introduction of your linage did nothing to support your argument.........

You have some very good points that I agree with, some that I am quite opposed to (and not because I suffer from group think). For example, in your last post you discuss "equipments in service should be progressively optimized to maintain credible operational status" yet elsewhere you were critical of the Hornet Upgrade program. So, which is it?

I seem to remember seeing an argument by a 1 star (aircrew) in early 2002/03 that indicated in some ways it might be cheaper to replace an aircraft type every 10 years that upgrade an aircraft over a 30 year period. For example, buy 20 brand new F15E's in 2000, flog then hard till 2009 then replace them with 20 brand new F15E's in 2010 (assuming the production line was still open) and flog them till 2020 when a mature JSF or something was operational and proven. Oh - and one of his caveats - NEVER BUY THE A MODEL OF ANYTHING!!!! It was only early days in his research - but quite interesting.

A small defence force like the ADF cannot do everything. It's time we either dropped some capabilites (sorry - like the F-111) and concentrated on only doing a few roles really well, or took a leaf out of the Israeli/Singaporean book and became really tigerish in our acquisition policies.

Until we do - debates like this thread will continue and SOLVE NOTHING......


It's interesting. AFGHAN came on here and we discussed the need for utilising the experience of guys with current operational experience to help determine our requirements - yet you would have us believe that we need to listen to old heads who have studied history for years and can identify all the errors we made in the last 30 years...........

Who is right?

[BEagle]

Regarding the KC-30A, my analysis was as follows:


1. RAAF requirement for 65.4 tonne offload in 90 min at 400 nm from base:

Aircraft capabilities:

• A310MRTT 51.3 tonnes (Non compliant)
• A330MRTT 83.7 tonnes (Compliant)
• KC-767A 61.8 tonnes (Non compliant)

2. RAAF requirement for 54.5 tonne offload in 90 min at 900 nm from base:

Aircraft capabilities:

• A310MRTT 39.1 tonnes (Non compliant)
• A330MRTT 71.1 tonnes (Compliant)
• KC-767A 49.8 tonnes (Non compliant)

So, only the excellent KC-30A meets the specification needs of the RAAF and you can forget politics.

[Gundog01]

The Caribou is another one in case, as long ago proposals have been made to re engine this aircraft and until the recent structual failure, the engine were considered to be the shortfall of the aircraft.

Herkman, can still confirm that the engines are the biggest, but by no means the only, problem with the Caribou. Efogi findings are that there was no evidence of structural failure due to fatigue. It appears it was a 1 in a million set of circumstances that actually happened...s*$t bad luck.

Well summed up of the tanker side of things Beagle

I think to many people get wrapped up in how th ADF operates. Small regional conflicts eg Timor and as part of large coalitions (Iraq and the Gan). Can't see us needing a massive fleet of C17's when civil contracting is far easier and cheaper. And having more than an AEWC and a tanker airborne for a 24 hour ops is bordering on impossible. think of the number of frames required to provide protection to said force multipliers. You would quickly run out of knuck aircrew and frames to be available to provide any meaning sort of offensive or defensive air.

Lets face it if the Indo's ever come tearing across the straight in their 3 SU35s and launch an attack on Aus soil, ANZUS will be enacted so quick you'll wonder how a carrier can sail from Hawaii to Aus, before you can say "Here come the Indons". Might be narrow minded and extremely short sighted but i reckon there is a fair few Aus Pollies and ADF hierarchy hedging their bets that the yanks will save the day.

Personally, the more new kit brought on line the better, it should be fun to try them all out.....

[Wiley]

Well, Gundog, you have history on your side...

Your attitude was shared by "the Great and the Good" in Australia right up to... when was it? 1942? (Maybe some changed their opinion a tad earlier) - where they "knew" the Royal Navy could be relied upon to come steaming to Australia's defence should it ever be needed.

Believe it or not, back in those halycon days of Empire, the Mother Country appeared to many if not most to be even more all-powerful (and gurannteed to be relied upon) than the increasingly stretched USA does to many today.

[Going Boeing]

Someone likes the Merlin

The Magic of Merlin Helicopters

(January 29, 2009) -- Having proved itself in Bosnia, the latest addition to the RAF's helicopter family continues to shine in Iraq. The aircraft of choice when flying in low to pick up casualties in confined areas, Merlin is also used for moving troops and to supply the front line. Report by Neale Adams.

It is described as an aircraft for the 21st century and when you sit in the cockpit you can understand why.

In a way you feel like a goldfish in a bowl when sitting in the pilot's seat - with near all-round visibility and protection in the form of Kevlar. And with more computer screens and technical wizardry than you would find in most business IT (Information Technology) departments, Merlin is equipped to succeed.

Merlin packs a mean punch when it comes to protection - two 7.62mm General Purpose Machine Guns as standard, with a five-gun fit available. Self-protection is even better with a whole host of defensive aids including missile and laser warning systems and infrared jammers.

And to prove the Merlin's capabilities on operations even further, only last year, the first female to be awarded the Distinguished Flying Cross, Flight Lieutenant Michelle Goodman, was the pilot of a Merlin carrying an Immediate Response Team (IRT) which flew in low over rooftops at night and under heavy fire to save the life of a critically injured soldier in Basra City.

Based on the military utility version of the Anglo-Italian EH101, the Merlins Mk3 and Mk3a can operate by day and night, in hot, high or freezing conditions.

Powered by three Rolls-Royce Turbomeca RTM322 engines, the aircraft can carry three or four crew members and 24 fully-equipped troops at a range of over 1,000km and at a maximum speed of 167 knots.

Alternatively, under-slung loads of up to 4.2 tonnes can be moved. Squadron Leader Pip Harding, Second-in-Command of 78 Squadron, based at RAF Benson, said:

"As soon as Merlin went into theatre people realised how beneficial they would be for that climate and style of operations.

"They coped very well with the dust and sand, coped well with picking up troops, and taking them at speed from one place to another. They handled the IRT role with precision."

With anti-vibration mechanisms fitted, air-cooling and safe and comfortable seating in which troops can sit in their webbing, the helicopters can move troops, or the injured, in a greater degree of comfort. And with everything but the kitchen sink up the front, it is described as a pilot's aircraft.

Sqn Ldr Harding said: "Merlin is the next generation of helicopters - it's a 21st century aircraft. The cockpit is phenomenal."

MOD plans to move the Merlins to Afghanistan once they have completed their mission in Iraq.

Source : UK MoD

[Bushranger 71]

Gunships & Attack Helos

Viewers of this thread might also be interested in posting #29 of 03Feb09 (P2) on the new thread: 'A military pilot's view...utility or dedicated attack...'

[Tibbsy]

Flying?

Much MRH-90 flying going on yet?