The ADF buys another Lemon
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Optimist? Me?
I am under no illusions that everything will just right itself. There is a great team of hard working engineers, aircrew and project managers going hammer and tongs to hold the manufacturer to account and deliver the best capability possible, as soon as possible. But there's the rub. How to balance the added delay that will come from a hard-line no-exceptions approach against having something to work with sooner?
Weather radar was added to the aircraft specifically for 171's mission; their requirements are one of the highest priorities for the Project. Black Hawk can not be retained indefinitely. It will not be one of our battlefield helicopters under AIR 9000.
If I am optimistic, it's because I have faith in the people who are working hard to see this project through. It is easy, and quite unfair to dismiss the work they are doing on this aircraft just because the timeframes and complexity are difficult to neatly encapsulate in an email on a public forum.
Weather radar was added to the aircraft specifically for 171's mission; their requirements are one of the highest priorities for the Project. Black Hawk can not be retained indefinitely. It will not be one of our battlefield helicopters under AIR 9000.
If I am optimistic, it's because I have faith in the people who are working hard to see this project through. It is easy, and quite unfair to dismiss the work they are doing on this aircraft just because the timeframes and complexity are difficult to neatly encapsulate in an email on a public forum.
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Wait a minute..
AFGAN, I just re-read your last post.
It's a shame Army lost someone as impassioned and switched on as you. I'm sure the project could use your previous experience. Why don't you offer up some time as a reservist and help out? Hell, you'd even get paid.
You might just be the one to bravely turn it all around.
131901. Give it a call.
It's a shame Army lost someone as impassioned and switched on as you. I'm sure the project could use your previous experience. Why don't you offer up some time as a reservist and help out? Hell, you'd even get paid.
You might just be the one to bravely turn it all around.
131901. Give it a call.
Last edited by emergov; 16th Jan 2009 at 12:22. Reason: remove excess sarcasm
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The Adf Helicopter Imbroglio - Part 2
Hello again Men. The forum moderators graciously allowed my lengthy initial contribution this thread so herewith some more input that may benefit the debate.
Sorry AFGAN; I inadvertently only mentioned Chinook, Iroquois, Kiowa (missed Blackhawk) in this observation from my preceding bit:
'Except for some special operations capabilities, battlefield support helicopters generally perform pretty basic functions and versions of well-proven types such as the Chinook, Iroquois, Kiowa are being utilized in front-line operational service around the world to enable cost-effective military operations wherein some combat losses are always likely and need to be affordable.'
I perhaps did not make the point well enough that military hardware should be progressively optimized to ensure its continued adequacy for operations and to capitalize on the initial taxpayer investment so a bit more history in that regard.
Post-Vietnam, joint capabilities planning aimed to establish 1 x MLH and 3 x utility helo squadrons. Most in the RAAF preferred the versatile Sikorsky HH-53/CH-53 but Air Force chiefs sided with Army and ordered 12 x CH-47C Chinook. More Iroquois were progressively acquired to equip 3 utility squadrons. Army pushed hard for the Hueycobra to replace the ‘Bushranger’ gunship but Air Force preferred the more versatile version of the UH-1H which had performed very creditably in combat.
The Charlie model Chinook was a technical nightmare and sans engine rebuild and testing equipments so the RAAF ultimately considered that model not operationally viable. Army Aviation did not want the CH-47C post-1989 arguing that the external load capability of the Blackhawk would suffice. Shortly thereafter, Army had a change of heart and acquired 4 Charlie model Chinooks from the 11 ex-Air Force aircraft awaiting disposal (1 of the original 12 was lost in an accident). Those 4 were rebuilt to CH-47D and another 2 Delta models acquired making 6 en toto; but 12 optimized aircraft are really necessary to provide a credible military capacity for that capability.
Comparing aircraft capabilities is akin to considering horses for courses so contemplate this scenario which was pretty common during 9SQN RAAF Iroquois operations in the Vietnam conflict. An ammunition resupply for an infantry company engaged in a brawl in jungle up to 150 feet high. About 10 metres between the adversaries with friendlies being unable to move about due to the fierceness of the contest so need to drop ammunition virtually over their gun muzzles. Doorgun suppression essential almost vertically downwards while dropping ammo and the din of continuous gunfire on the ground very loud causing raised voices on intercom. ‘Thanks Albatross, right where we want it, can you take out casualties?’ ‘Sure’. More careful manoeuvring needed with doorgun suppression during extended winching.
Point of the anecdote? We had modified the standard UH-1H XM-23 sub-system doorgun mounts by straightening a bend in the pintle post and fitting a rotating 600 round 7.62mm ammunition bin to eliminate M60 doorgun stoppages due to ammunition chute flexing, both mods optimizing the field of fire to enable near vertically downwards and rearwards firing just clearing the stabilizer. The external doorgun stations of the Iroquois allow gunners to stand somewhat outside the cabin enhancing their field of view and arcs of firing. Compare this gun station design with the internally mounted situations of Chinook, Puma, MRH-90, Blackhawk or whatever. Some special operations versions of Blackhawk have alternative weaponry mounted elsewhere in an open cabin configuration to improve fields of view and firing.
A bit more re supposed helo vulnerability.
So-called ‘nap-of-the-earth’ helo ops derived from belief it is essential to operate down in the weeds to enhance survivability but this is not really valid in all warfare scenarios and was the cause of numerous incidents/accidents for Army Aviation post-1989. If you tied a helo to a pole and had it fly around at a constant height and airspeed, the weapon aiming picture to hit the aircraft would remain unchanged; but the sighting solution is never constant in reality so it is actually quite difficult to hit a moving aircraft with non-radar predicting gunfire as statistics for previous conflicts (properly analysed) reveal. Anti-aircraft missilery also has acquisition and tracking limitations albeit such weapons will doubtless become more sophisticated over time. Getting on the ground with the grunts in Vietnam proved just how difficult it is in jungle to determine from which direction a helo may be approaching and to acquire sufficient visual contact to engage.
Operating around 1,500 feet AGL to avoid 7.62mm or 3,500 feet plus for 12.7mm ground-fire risk of course increases potential exposure to guided anti-aircraft missilery where such a threat might exist. During Vietnam ops, it was safer in my view to mostly operate at low level which for me was about 50 to 100 feet above ground or treetops. Having sufficient height above obstacles to quickly diminish forward speed in the event of power loss is imperative for enhancing survival prospects in a helo prang; also being adequately above treetops to avoid protruding large dead trees that are often difficult to see in murky weather conditions. If ground tracking over open terrain is slightly varied, the risk of being hit by ground-fire is pretty low, even at 100 feet above ground level.
In the Vietnam scenario, navigation was by Mark 1 eyeball during daylight utilizing excellent pictomaps with prudent operators usually varying routing to track over vegetation as much as practicable. A different story at night where it was mainly dead reckoning over the inky blackness of jungle often with a complete absence of any recognizable fixed lighting features. Enhancement of the Iroquois or whatever type with a GPS-based nav system of course makes low level ops a whole lot easier.
A couple of lessons from war-fighting to illustrate these points.
One fine day, we made a gentle straight-in approach to the edge of a 100 metre wide clearing to insert a SAS patrol. When virtually stationary and just touching down, 4 of the opposition stood up from behind fallen timber in the middle of the clearing and began engaging us with automatic weapons. Swift reactions and good teamwork from our Crewman with his M60, our SAS friends on board and supporting US Army Charlie model gunships dealt with the threat within 3 or 4 seconds, but not before the enemy had collectively got away up to 100 rounds at a stationary Iroquois side-on and in clear view at less than 50 metres range. Not a single round hit the aircraft.
Another day, we were awaiting US Army Charlie model gunships for a SAS job but only one aircraft belatedly arrived. They had been transiting from their nearby base Blackhorse to Nui Dat at low level and overflew a large clearing on a steady heading. One gunship was able to be tracked from dead astern by opposition in the treeline who fired an RPG that by fluke impacted in the tailpipe of the Huey which crashed at forward speed killing all 4 crew including 2 RAN. The possibility of an aircraft being downed by unguided missilery is very remote although it happened in that instance - arguably because they flew a steady track over an open area - but they were extremely unlucky.
Some may ask why a gentle approach as mentioned for the first incident? All aircrew and troops on board should focus on the landing area surrounds as they approach to detect any signs of opposition activity. They cannot do this effectively if apprehensive about the manner in which the helo is being operated and are just hanging on with concern about their survival in the event of a prang. Better to just operate the aircraft sedately while giving any opposition present opportunity to engage before putting troops on the ground so a more controlled abort and/or a measured reaction can be effected, as happened in the outlined action. Both the Townsville and HMAS Kanimbla accidents painfully demonstrated the folly of abnormal aircraft operating practices and extreme manoeuvring during special operations activities.
Some other perspectives to be offered soon in Part 3.
Sorry AFGAN; I inadvertently only mentioned Chinook, Iroquois, Kiowa (missed Blackhawk) in this observation from my preceding bit:
'Except for some special operations capabilities, battlefield support helicopters generally perform pretty basic functions and versions of well-proven types such as the Chinook, Iroquois, Kiowa are being utilized in front-line operational service around the world to enable cost-effective military operations wherein some combat losses are always likely and need to be affordable.'
I perhaps did not make the point well enough that military hardware should be progressively optimized to ensure its continued adequacy for operations and to capitalize on the initial taxpayer investment so a bit more history in that regard.
Post-Vietnam, joint capabilities planning aimed to establish 1 x MLH and 3 x utility helo squadrons. Most in the RAAF preferred the versatile Sikorsky HH-53/CH-53 but Air Force chiefs sided with Army and ordered 12 x CH-47C Chinook. More Iroquois were progressively acquired to equip 3 utility squadrons. Army pushed hard for the Hueycobra to replace the ‘Bushranger’ gunship but Air Force preferred the more versatile version of the UH-1H which had performed very creditably in combat.
The Charlie model Chinook was a technical nightmare and sans engine rebuild and testing equipments so the RAAF ultimately considered that model not operationally viable. Army Aviation did not want the CH-47C post-1989 arguing that the external load capability of the Blackhawk would suffice. Shortly thereafter, Army had a change of heart and acquired 4 Charlie model Chinooks from the 11 ex-Air Force aircraft awaiting disposal (1 of the original 12 was lost in an accident). Those 4 were rebuilt to CH-47D and another 2 Delta models acquired making 6 en toto; but 12 optimized aircraft are really necessary to provide a credible military capacity for that capability.
Comparing aircraft capabilities is akin to considering horses for courses so contemplate this scenario which was pretty common during 9SQN RAAF Iroquois operations in the Vietnam conflict. An ammunition resupply for an infantry company engaged in a brawl in jungle up to 150 feet high. About 10 metres between the adversaries with friendlies being unable to move about due to the fierceness of the contest so need to drop ammunition virtually over their gun muzzles. Doorgun suppression essential almost vertically downwards while dropping ammo and the din of continuous gunfire on the ground very loud causing raised voices on intercom. ‘Thanks Albatross, right where we want it, can you take out casualties?’ ‘Sure’. More careful manoeuvring needed with doorgun suppression during extended winching.
Point of the anecdote? We had modified the standard UH-1H XM-23 sub-system doorgun mounts by straightening a bend in the pintle post and fitting a rotating 600 round 7.62mm ammunition bin to eliminate M60 doorgun stoppages due to ammunition chute flexing, both mods optimizing the field of fire to enable near vertically downwards and rearwards firing just clearing the stabilizer. The external doorgun stations of the Iroquois allow gunners to stand somewhat outside the cabin enhancing their field of view and arcs of firing. Compare this gun station design with the internally mounted situations of Chinook, Puma, MRH-90, Blackhawk or whatever. Some special operations versions of Blackhawk have alternative weaponry mounted elsewhere in an open cabin configuration to improve fields of view and firing.
A bit more re supposed helo vulnerability.
So-called ‘nap-of-the-earth’ helo ops derived from belief it is essential to operate down in the weeds to enhance survivability but this is not really valid in all warfare scenarios and was the cause of numerous incidents/accidents for Army Aviation post-1989. If you tied a helo to a pole and had it fly around at a constant height and airspeed, the weapon aiming picture to hit the aircraft would remain unchanged; but the sighting solution is never constant in reality so it is actually quite difficult to hit a moving aircraft with non-radar predicting gunfire as statistics for previous conflicts (properly analysed) reveal. Anti-aircraft missilery also has acquisition and tracking limitations albeit such weapons will doubtless become more sophisticated over time. Getting on the ground with the grunts in Vietnam proved just how difficult it is in jungle to determine from which direction a helo may be approaching and to acquire sufficient visual contact to engage.
Operating around 1,500 feet AGL to avoid 7.62mm or 3,500 feet plus for 12.7mm ground-fire risk of course increases potential exposure to guided anti-aircraft missilery where such a threat might exist. During Vietnam ops, it was safer in my view to mostly operate at low level which for me was about 50 to 100 feet above ground or treetops. Having sufficient height above obstacles to quickly diminish forward speed in the event of power loss is imperative for enhancing survival prospects in a helo prang; also being adequately above treetops to avoid protruding large dead trees that are often difficult to see in murky weather conditions. If ground tracking over open terrain is slightly varied, the risk of being hit by ground-fire is pretty low, even at 100 feet above ground level.
In the Vietnam scenario, navigation was by Mark 1 eyeball during daylight utilizing excellent pictomaps with prudent operators usually varying routing to track over vegetation as much as practicable. A different story at night where it was mainly dead reckoning over the inky blackness of jungle often with a complete absence of any recognizable fixed lighting features. Enhancement of the Iroquois or whatever type with a GPS-based nav system of course makes low level ops a whole lot easier.
A couple of lessons from war-fighting to illustrate these points.
One fine day, we made a gentle straight-in approach to the edge of a 100 metre wide clearing to insert a SAS patrol. When virtually stationary and just touching down, 4 of the opposition stood up from behind fallen timber in the middle of the clearing and began engaging us with automatic weapons. Swift reactions and good teamwork from our Crewman with his M60, our SAS friends on board and supporting US Army Charlie model gunships dealt with the threat within 3 or 4 seconds, but not before the enemy had collectively got away up to 100 rounds at a stationary Iroquois side-on and in clear view at less than 50 metres range. Not a single round hit the aircraft.
Another day, we were awaiting US Army Charlie model gunships for a SAS job but only one aircraft belatedly arrived. They had been transiting from their nearby base Blackhorse to Nui Dat at low level and overflew a large clearing on a steady heading. One gunship was able to be tracked from dead astern by opposition in the treeline who fired an RPG that by fluke impacted in the tailpipe of the Huey which crashed at forward speed killing all 4 crew including 2 RAN. The possibility of an aircraft being downed by unguided missilery is very remote although it happened in that instance - arguably because they flew a steady track over an open area - but they were extremely unlucky.
Some may ask why a gentle approach as mentioned for the first incident? All aircrew and troops on board should focus on the landing area surrounds as they approach to detect any signs of opposition activity. They cannot do this effectively if apprehensive about the manner in which the helo is being operated and are just hanging on with concern about their survival in the event of a prang. Better to just operate the aircraft sedately while giving any opposition present opportunity to engage before putting troops on the ground so a more controlled abort and/or a measured reaction can be effected, as happened in the outlined action. Both the Townsville and HMAS Kanimbla accidents painfully demonstrated the folly of abnormal aircraft operating practices and extreme manoeuvring during special operations activities.
Some other perspectives to be offered soon in Part 3.
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Nice to see you back joining the debate, BD.
If I can use a fixed wing analogy, the RAAF these days employs the Hawk as a 'lead in' fighter, i.e., aspiring F18 drivers do a tour learning the skills they will require on the F18 on a 'cheap and cheerful' aircraft with lesser capabilities than an F18 before they move on to the 'top shelf', or front line aircraft.
If the RAAF ever went to war in northern Australia, by necessity, I'd be guessing that the Hawk be be pressed into active service, quite obviously with limitations, like F18 support if enemy air was a factor. (I hear horrified cries of 'shades of the Wirraway' from some quarters.) It would probably prove to be quite an asset in that, if pressed, it could operate from forward bases with minimum support (or at least a lot less ground support than an F18) and offer some air support to land units that would otherwise receive none, as they were too far down the 'food chain' to warrant F18 support.
Can anyone see where I'm going with this analogy? At the cost of another type in service, surely there's an argument for a cheap, 'second line' helicopter - one we could afford to buy and operate in large numbers - like the Super Huey? Such an aircraft would be able to do probably 90% of the mundane tasks land units demand of helicopters and at a far cheaper price, allowing the F18-equivalent NH-90 to be used (when we eventually get them!!) for the relatively few tasks that demand the high tech kit.
It's been said by others in this thread that the Army considers the helo an airborne truck. From my time flying Army support, a very high percentage of such trips could be considered just that - mundane transport ops. Having only a very high tech (and very expensive, and very hard to maintain in the field) single type available to do all these 'bread and butter' ops is a bit like putting a flatbed ute tray on the squatter's Roller.
...and hoping the Roller continues to work.
If I can use a fixed wing analogy, the RAAF these days employs the Hawk as a 'lead in' fighter, i.e., aspiring F18 drivers do a tour learning the skills they will require on the F18 on a 'cheap and cheerful' aircraft with lesser capabilities than an F18 before they move on to the 'top shelf', or front line aircraft.
If the RAAF ever went to war in northern Australia, by necessity, I'd be guessing that the Hawk be be pressed into active service, quite obviously with limitations, like F18 support if enemy air was a factor. (I hear horrified cries of 'shades of the Wirraway' from some quarters.) It would probably prove to be quite an asset in that, if pressed, it could operate from forward bases with minimum support (or at least a lot less ground support than an F18) and offer some air support to land units that would otherwise receive none, as they were too far down the 'food chain' to warrant F18 support.
Can anyone see where I'm going with this analogy? At the cost of another type in service, surely there's an argument for a cheap, 'second line' helicopter - one we could afford to buy and operate in large numbers - like the Super Huey? Such an aircraft would be able to do probably 90% of the mundane tasks land units demand of helicopters and at a far cheaper price, allowing the F18-equivalent NH-90 to be used (when we eventually get them!!) for the relatively few tasks that demand the high tech kit.
It's been said by others in this thread that the Army considers the helo an airborne truck. From my time flying Army support, a very high percentage of such trips could be considered just that - mundane transport ops. Having only a very high tech (and very expensive, and very hard to maintain in the field) single type available to do all these 'bread and butter' ops is a bit like putting a flatbed ute tray on the squatter's Roller.
...and hoping the Roller continues to work.
Last edited by Wiley; 17th Jan 2009 at 03:32.
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Wiley - good post. I tend to agree a little in that there is now no aircraft to be the "General's" fast transport (like Kiowa could be).
HOWEVER - balancing your point, having several squadrons of other Helo's means additional logistic support (spares etc), fuel etc on or around the battlefield. Also, you need to consider the FIC (Fundamental Inputs to Capability) issues associated with having all these extra aircraft - that is, the true cost in operating them (extra pilots, maintainers, facilities and the costs associated with all these extra things). In other words - great idea but VERY expensive. Note now that Army is having problems manning both Tiger and NH90 (despite having notice of the need for additional aircrew etc as far back as 2003).
Another example, previously in Pprune there was a lot of discussion about the F-18's and the fact that the ADF could only field 3 squadrons (54 aircraft) on line - and how could this be if we had 71 of the things. Well, the answer was that the RAAF was funded for that level of warfighting aircraft (three squadrons) and kept enough pilots opersational to meet that need. The RAAF had many more than 54 Hornet pilots - and if the Goverment wanted (we argued) - we could give you more - but that meant extra costs - such as flying hours for those extra guys to keep them current, costs associated with that (fuel etc) and of course the increased maintenance costs for the increased utilisation of the jets, therefore increasing fatigue accummulations etc etc etc.
It's very easy to say lets have 50 Hueys to run around the battlefield - making it happen considering the FULL cost of doing that is another matter.
Afghan - I bet the aircraft operating off the LPA's will also enjoy having WX Radar - you see, ADF trooplift operations are not just around the battlefield.............................
Trojan - not having a dig at you earlier - happy to answer your question.
HOWEVER - balancing your point, having several squadrons of other Helo's means additional logistic support (spares etc), fuel etc on or around the battlefield. Also, you need to consider the FIC (Fundamental Inputs to Capability) issues associated with having all these extra aircraft - that is, the true cost in operating them (extra pilots, maintainers, facilities and the costs associated with all these extra things). In other words - great idea but VERY expensive. Note now that Army is having problems manning both Tiger and NH90 (despite having notice of the need for additional aircrew etc as far back as 2003).
Another example, previously in Pprune there was a lot of discussion about the F-18's and the fact that the ADF could only field 3 squadrons (54 aircraft) on line - and how could this be if we had 71 of the things. Well, the answer was that the RAAF was funded for that level of warfighting aircraft (three squadrons) and kept enough pilots opersational to meet that need. The RAAF had many more than 54 Hornet pilots - and if the Goverment wanted (we argued) - we could give you more - but that meant extra costs - such as flying hours for those extra guys to keep them current, costs associated with that (fuel etc) and of course the increased maintenance costs for the increased utilisation of the jets, therefore increasing fatigue accummulations etc etc etc.
It's very easy to say lets have 50 Hueys to run around the battlefield - making it happen considering the FULL cost of doing that is another matter.
Afghan - I bet the aircraft operating off the LPA's will also enjoy having WX Radar - you see, ADF trooplift operations are not just around the battlefield.............................
Trojan - not having a dig at you earlier - happy to answer your question.
HOWEVER - balancing your point, having several squadrons of other Helo's means additional logistic support (spares etc), fuel etc on or around the battlefield. Also, you need to consider the FIC (Fundamental Inputs to Capability) issues associated with having all these extra aircraft - that is, the true cost in operating them (extra pilots, maintainers, facilities and the costs associated with all these extra things). In other words - great idea but VERY expensive
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Helo Combat Assault
Hi MODERN ELMO; will get back soon with more stuff on trooplifting now that I have learned how to get some imagery up on the forum.
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Trojan - I'd argue about the "relatively" cheap comment - If we follow Afghan's point of the battlefield being a dangerous place requiring specialist skills - you just can't turn it on at a moments notice. 
AFGHAN - I'm not going ot bother trying to explain it to you. No point really. You bang on about the battlefield requirement - well, if we were a large defence force and constantly getting into that kind of op - fine, but the ADF is not. The ADF can't afford to have very specialised aircraft in a number of roles - by that I mean 7 types that can only do 7 roles (AEW&C is probably one of the few). Even the new tankers are multi-role. You come across as the typical narrow minded individual who can't see the big picture. Prove me wrong and fess up to your qualifications here (PM if you need to) or give up.
If you just want to do battlefield support in a Black Hawk - go join the US Army.....................................
NH90 was purchased as a multi-role aircraft - needing to be capable of doing several roles - NOT just carting troops around the battlefield. The last time the ADF did that was Vietnam - ask Bushranger about it.
Oh - and if you are wondering who put in the requirement for Weather Radar - it would have come from the guys in Capability Development, and at least one (if not two) of the guys who worked there when I was on FASCIR's staff were EX Black Hawk - and the definitive one I know who was there was an ex Black Hawk Captain. Also of interest, around the time of the overseas visit in 2001, the LTCOL who headed the team of Army guys in Capability Development had the initials AD - is he still Commander 16 BDE?
AFGHAN - I'm not going ot bother trying to explain it to you. No point really. You bang on about the battlefield requirement - well, if we were a large defence force and constantly getting into that kind of op - fine, but the ADF is not. The ADF can't afford to have very specialised aircraft in a number of roles - by that I mean 7 types that can only do 7 roles (AEW&C is probably one of the few). Even the new tankers are multi-role. You come across as the typical narrow minded individual who can't see the big picture. Prove me wrong and fess up to your qualifications here (PM if you need to) or give up.
If you just want to do battlefield support in a Black Hawk - go join the US Army.....................................
NH90 was purchased as a multi-role aircraft - needing to be capable of doing several roles - NOT just carting troops around the battlefield. The last time the ADF did that was Vietnam - ask Bushranger about it.
Oh - and if you are wondering who put in the requirement for Weather Radar - it would have come from the guys in Capability Development, and at least one (if not two) of the guys who worked there when I was on FASCIR's staff were EX Black Hawk - and the definitive one I know who was there was an ex Black Hawk Captain. Also of interest, around the time of the overseas visit in 2001, the LTCOL who headed the team of Army guys in Capability Development had the initials AD - is he still Commander 16 BDE?
Last edited by scran; 19th Jan 2009 at 21:45.
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No - not getting emotional.
You are the one who called the aircraft a lemon - and thats your opinion (to which you are entitled) so good luck to you.
The guys in CAPDEV were a Major and (from memory) Captain - IIRC the Major came to us direct from 5AVN.
No, I'll not ring 5AVN - not my place.
No idea who COMD 16 BDE is - am neither ex-army or particularly interested.
OPSEC - yeah - right. Am I the one who plastered the supposed shortcomings of the aircraft on here?
And finally - not in Black hawk's they ain't - the Chinooks are doing that...............................
Goodbye
You are the one who called the aircraft a lemon - and thats your opinion (to which you are entitled) so good luck to you.
The guys in CAPDEV were a Major and (from memory) Captain - IIRC the Major came to us direct from 5AVN.
No, I'll not ring 5AVN - not my place.
No idea who COMD 16 BDE is - am neither ex-army or particularly interested.
OPSEC - yeah - right. Am I the one who plastered the supposed shortcomings of the aircraft on here?
And finally - not in Black hawk's they ain't - the Chinooks are doing that...............................
Goodbye
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I know what BF means. Oh...and you want 60M's now? What happened to the L love affair.
No, not Army
over 30 years Air Force
4 years on FASCIR staff
Your experience? No, don't bother
First you talk down the aircraft, no you turn on your own (Army) because you with 20/20 hindsight are so much smarter and could do a better job (in YOUR opinion).
CA better watch his back - you are headed places!!!!!!
Bye
No, not Army
over 30 years Air Force
4 years on FASCIR staff
Your experience? No, don't bother
First you talk down the aircraft, no you turn on your own (Army) because you with 20/20 hindsight are so much smarter and could do a better job (in YOUR opinion).
CA better watch his back - you are headed places!!!!!!
Bye
Last edited by scran; 20th Jan 2009 at 02:24.
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Some things MRH 90 does better
There are several things MRH 90 does better:
More range (650NM on internals)
18 seats
More cabin capacity
Faster
More fuel efficient
When more mature, it will be more reliable
At the beginning of its developmental and service life
Full-spectrum HUMS
Ramp
Crashworthiness
Climate controlled cabin
Ballistic Protection
EWSP
FLIR
Manual Blade Folding
New engines with FADEC - better responsiveness and Hot & High performance
Marinised
13 years of parts and spares support in the contract
Fully integrated Ground mission planning and management system
Rotor tip lights
Fully configurable MFDs for both pilots
Auto hover, auto approach, (auto land and take-off if you want)
There is no 'problem' with the ramp. You just have a weight limitation while it is in transit or fixed half-way up. It's not a Chinook.
There is a FRRD system purchased with the aircraft. Let's actually try using it before we say 'never'.
The aircraft is not a Black Hawk. We will have to do some things differently. But no matter which specific, yet-to-be-overcome issues you might focus on, the MRH 90 is in most areas a significant step up from our current aircraft, and is better than the alternative. In support of scran, the vast majority of an aircraft's service life is not spent being filled full of holes by bad guys, and I'm sure you are well aware that Hueys, Chinooks and Kiowas have soaked up many many more rounds than Black Hawks in Australian service. Making an argument based on the Black Hawk's assumed supreriority when there are RPGs flying around ignores the years of work that went into defining our requirements.
It would be nice to operate 9 aircraft types, but we can't afford it. It would be great to have a stack of Super/ Ultra / Huey II's in our back pocket, but we can't afford it. It would be lovely to keep Black Hawks, but we bought a better aircraft for our needs. It will be great.
More range (650NM on internals)
18 seats
More cabin capacity
Faster
More fuel efficient
When more mature, it will be more reliable
At the beginning of its developmental and service life
Full-spectrum HUMS
Ramp
Crashworthiness
Climate controlled cabin
Ballistic Protection
EWSP
FLIR
Manual Blade Folding
New engines with FADEC - better responsiveness and Hot & High performance
Marinised
13 years of parts and spares support in the contract
Fully integrated Ground mission planning and management system
Rotor tip lights
Fully configurable MFDs for both pilots
Auto hover, auto approach, (auto land and take-off if you want)
There is no 'problem' with the ramp. You just have a weight limitation while it is in transit or fixed half-way up. It's not a Chinook.
There is a FRRD system purchased with the aircraft. Let's actually try using it before we say 'never'.
The aircraft is not a Black Hawk. We will have to do some things differently. But no matter which specific, yet-to-be-overcome issues you might focus on, the MRH 90 is in most areas a significant step up from our current aircraft, and is better than the alternative. In support of scran, the vast majority of an aircraft's service life is not spent being filled full of holes by bad guys, and I'm sure you are well aware that Hueys, Chinooks and Kiowas have soaked up many many more rounds than Black Hawks in Australian service. Making an argument based on the Black Hawk's assumed supreriority when there are RPGs flying around ignores the years of work that went into defining our requirements.
It would be nice to operate 9 aircraft types, but we can't afford it. It would be great to have a stack of Super/ Ultra / Huey II's in our back pocket, but we can't afford it. It would be lovely to keep Black Hawks, but we bought a better aircraft for our needs. It will be great.