The ADF buys another Lemon
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The ADF Helicopter Imbroglio - Parts 3 & 4
Many thanks to Wiley for his assistance while I was under probation on the forum (chuckle). Parts 3 & 4 were belatedly posted by a moderator on Pages 7 & 8 and thus had been somewhat bypassed by ongoing dialogue. I will now bring them forward to the latest page for ease of reference and delete the previous insertions.
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The ADF Helicopter Imbroglio - Part 3
Long time now since I was involved in projects. About 30 years back, there was a mindset in Canberra that supposedly obsolescent military equipments had to be sold to reduce the project cost of replacement gear. In reality, they were usually shed for peanuts or even given away for historical display or whatever. Seemingly, this same wasteful practice is continuing today albeit the taxpayer has substantial investment in military hardware that would be better stored for contingency purposes as has been happening in the US for decades. There are of course costs involved in storing anything but these could be minimized by more flexible use of retired fossils to run aircraft engines or whatever.
The following self-explanatory extracts are from a letter I wrote to MinDef Joel Fitzgibbon in 2008, but I never received any response from his Canberra or Hunter offices:
'Except for some special operations capabilities, battlefield support helicopters generally perform pretty basic functions and well proven types such as the Chinook, Blackhawk, Iroquois, Kiowa are being upgraded for front-line operational service around the world to enable cost-effective military operations wherein some combat losses are always likely and need to be affordable. For example, Hotel model Iroquois can be upgraded to Huey II status – including glass cockpit and avionics/datalink upgrade options – for around $2million per aircraft and additional Hueys are available from US stored reserves. The ADF fleet of Iroquois could thus be expanded to say 50 aircraft improved to Huey II status at an approximate modest cost of about $100million (plus support costs). This Iroquois version has very low operating costs and high supportability for the foreseeable future.
Over decades, Australia has very foolishly forfeited replaced military assets (particularly aircraft) that would have been more wisely stored as reserve equipments, a la in the US, for potential refurbishment/upgrading and reactivation. While there would be overhead costs involved for dry climate storage of aircraft at say Woomera, these would be trifling compared with the prospective benefits of retaining wholly-owned usable military hardware at least until technically unsupportable.
I respectfully urge you Minister to curtail disposal of the Iroquois fleet in particular and to have these aircraft placed in reserve storage pending an objective cost-benefit analysis of their potential for re-activation in an upgraded helicopter gunship role and as an alternative to the hugely expensive MRH-90 if it is possible to back out of that non-justifiable $2.5billion contract with acceptable penalties – conceivably, a saving of $2billion might be achievable. The hugely costly MRH-90 is simply quite unsuited to performing basic battlefield support functions cost-effectively for which the Huey II would be ideal, also as a substitute for the Seasprite and in other fleet support roles.'
The figures quoted for Huey II are a bit elastic due to exchange rate variations and scope of desired options. The estimated unit project cost (terminology?) for MRH-90 has not been publicly revealed by Defence or DMO to my knowledge but may be around AUD54million per aircraft. Perhaps a forum participant will bravely provide this data!
The following self-explanatory extracts are from a letter I wrote to MinDef Joel Fitzgibbon in 2008, but I never received any response from his Canberra or Hunter offices:
'Except for some special operations capabilities, battlefield support helicopters generally perform pretty basic functions and well proven types such as the Chinook, Blackhawk, Iroquois, Kiowa are being upgraded for front-line operational service around the world to enable cost-effective military operations wherein some combat losses are always likely and need to be affordable. For example, Hotel model Iroquois can be upgraded to Huey II status – including glass cockpit and avionics/datalink upgrade options – for around $2million per aircraft and additional Hueys are available from US stored reserves. The ADF fleet of Iroquois could thus be expanded to say 50 aircraft improved to Huey II status at an approximate modest cost of about $100million (plus support costs). This Iroquois version has very low operating costs and high supportability for the foreseeable future.
Over decades, Australia has very foolishly forfeited replaced military assets (particularly aircraft) that would have been more wisely stored as reserve equipments, a la in the US, for potential refurbishment/upgrading and reactivation. While there would be overhead costs involved for dry climate storage of aircraft at say Woomera, these would be trifling compared with the prospective benefits of retaining wholly-owned usable military hardware at least until technically unsupportable.
I respectfully urge you Minister to curtail disposal of the Iroquois fleet in particular and to have these aircraft placed in reserve storage pending an objective cost-benefit analysis of their potential for re-activation in an upgraded helicopter gunship role and as an alternative to the hugely expensive MRH-90 if it is possible to back out of that non-justifiable $2.5billion contract with acceptable penalties – conceivably, a saving of $2billion might be achievable. The hugely costly MRH-90 is simply quite unsuited to performing basic battlefield support functions cost-effectively for which the Huey II would be ideal, also as a substitute for the Seasprite and in other fleet support roles.'
The figures quoted for Huey II are a bit elastic due to exchange rate variations and scope of desired options. The estimated unit project cost (terminology?) for MRH-90 has not been publicly revealed by Defence or DMO to my knowledge but may be around AUD54million per aircraft. Perhaps a forum participant will bravely provide this data!
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The ADF Helicopter Imbroglio - Part 4
Sagy 34; your comment re the irrelevance of Vietnam war-fighting experience is concerning and perhaps central to much that is wrong with Australian military capabilities planning and procurement. The lessons of war are timeless and should always be heeded – much of what was (or should have been) learned during the Vietnam War is applicable in Iraq, Afghanistan or wherever. Our defence planners need to be thinking closer to home and operations in our regional tropical jungle archipelago environment are likely to be quite similar in many respects to the Vietnam scenario.
Former Prime Minister John Howard approved MRH-90 and LPD (smallish aircraft carrier) acquisitions as a final act before Election 2007 and the connections between a former Minister for Defence in his government (who latterly worked for Tenix) and these projects are obvious. If our defence planners had objectively analyzed the lessons of warfare from amphibious operations during WW2, the Falklands War, aircraft carrier operations by the US Navy and RAN (particularly regarding the resources, operating costs and escort penalties involved), the acquisition of 2 x LPD could not have been justified for the small ADF. More about that in another part when I address combat air assault/airmobile operations.
The MRH-90 and LPD decisions seemed to me irrational so I did some probing in the capabilities area of Defence. I managed to make contact with a civilian officer - he might be termed a ‘military theorist’- who has a university degree, perhaps done a course or 2 at military training institutions but has nil military background and particularly no war-fighting experience. Many involved in so-called ‘think tanks’ patronized by Defence, also the Air Combat Capability Review and White Paper formulation teams, have similar qualifications.
First up, I queried the suitability of Tiger for intimate close air support activities in regional jungle scenarios, also mentioning the strong criticism of the project by the Australian National Audit Office which he ignored. When I outlined what is often necessary in casevac and ammo resupply situations in very high wet and dense jungle, he was emphatic that such accurate close quarters fire support could be provided with stand-off missilery and cannon. I disagreed explaining why and he told me I did not know what I was talking about although I had made him aware of my background.
The conversation moved to the MRH-90 and I pointed out the relatively small payloads frequently carried by utility helos in routine battlefield support for which the Iroquois is very cost-effective. The goose agreed that the MRH-90 will be too expensive to use at the coal-face of combat then flippantly advised that Defence had in mind to buy yet another type to replace the Iroquois!
Australian military capacity has declined significantly from 1974 and so has ADF helo operational effectiveness since 1989. Significant overspending on aviation by Army over the past 2 decades has disadvantaged the other fighting arms of that force and expenditure on the Fleet Air Arm has also been misdirected (Seahawk has never been adequately operational in ASW for which acquired and Seasprite failed).
Emergov defends the supposed aim of Project Air 9000 to rationalize the ADF helo force but it has hitherto proved farcical with 2 additional types being recently introduced that were not in the program. The burning question is just who determined that optimized Chinook, Blackhawk, Iroquois (Huey II), Kiowa versions would not be adequate for Australia’s helicopter needs for the foreseeable future? It seems to me that those 4 types (suitably equipped) would be quite adequate and supportable for all ADF needs, including gunship, recce, training and fleet support roles, perhaps to 2030 and beyond. The Navy really does not need anything more than the Huey II suitably adapted for particular roles. My gut feeling is the senior echelons of Army Aviation and the Fleet Air Arm will eventually further diminish their air arm capabilities through profligate spending on high tech expensive gear not well suited for combat roles.
Much mention is made of ‘risk management’ in capabilities planning and procurement discussion but virtually nil reference is made to ‘cost-benefit analysis’ or operating the ADF ‘cost-effectively’. If rigorous cost-benefit analysis had been applied to the following projects when they were first mooted, most might never have emerged: Collins submarine, Seasprite, Abrams tanks, Wedgetail, F/A-18A refurbishment, Super Hornet, MRTT, Tiger, MRH-90, LPD (and perhaps others).
The Howard Government pledged to increase the defence vote to 3 percent of GDP over the next decade and this was echoed by the Rudd Government. In my view, this was a very foolish commitment which has only encouraged ill-conceived projects and reckless spending. Realistically, Australia can only afford about 2 percent of GDP spent on defence which is closer to the worldwide average and we could have a pretty capable ADF for that money if it was spent wisely.
It behoves the Service Chiefs to maintain their respective force operational capabilities and to operate cost-effectively; yet invaluable Kiowa, Iroquois and eventually Blackhawk capabilities are being prematurely forsaken and similarly the B707 tanker! If it is acceptable to military leaders to shed an operational capability for a few years pending introduction of a replacement, then is the replacement capability really justifiable? Operational commitments can emerge at very short notice so any existing capabilities should be continually optimized and maintained until envisaged replacement equipments are of adequate operational status before being introduced into service, temporarily putting the new stuff into storage if necessary so manning can be transferred when appropriate.
A reality check: Australia is entering a likely protracted economic decline with critical social needs fast escalating so unfettered defence spending cannot be condoned. Lots of expensive hardware is really useless if unable to be manned to operational levels and operated cost-effectively so it seems probable that all 3 Australian armed forces will be forced into rationalizing their capabilities. The mindset of our defence planners therefore needs to change pretty quickly.
A few more bits to follow soon (with imagery) relating to lessons of warfare which may be of interest to forum contributors.
Former Prime Minister John Howard approved MRH-90 and LPD (smallish aircraft carrier) acquisitions as a final act before Election 2007 and the connections between a former Minister for Defence in his government (who latterly worked for Tenix) and these projects are obvious. If our defence planners had objectively analyzed the lessons of warfare from amphibious operations during WW2, the Falklands War, aircraft carrier operations by the US Navy and RAN (particularly regarding the resources, operating costs and escort penalties involved), the acquisition of 2 x LPD could not have been justified for the small ADF. More about that in another part when I address combat air assault/airmobile operations.
The MRH-90 and LPD decisions seemed to me irrational so I did some probing in the capabilities area of Defence. I managed to make contact with a civilian officer - he might be termed a ‘military theorist’- who has a university degree, perhaps done a course or 2 at military training institutions but has nil military background and particularly no war-fighting experience. Many involved in so-called ‘think tanks’ patronized by Defence, also the Air Combat Capability Review and White Paper formulation teams, have similar qualifications.
First up, I queried the suitability of Tiger for intimate close air support activities in regional jungle scenarios, also mentioning the strong criticism of the project by the Australian National Audit Office which he ignored. When I outlined what is often necessary in casevac and ammo resupply situations in very high wet and dense jungle, he was emphatic that such accurate close quarters fire support could be provided with stand-off missilery and cannon. I disagreed explaining why and he told me I did not know what I was talking about although I had made him aware of my background.
The conversation moved to the MRH-90 and I pointed out the relatively small payloads frequently carried by utility helos in routine battlefield support for which the Iroquois is very cost-effective. The goose agreed that the MRH-90 will be too expensive to use at the coal-face of combat then flippantly advised that Defence had in mind to buy yet another type to replace the Iroquois!
Australian military capacity has declined significantly from 1974 and so has ADF helo operational effectiveness since 1989. Significant overspending on aviation by Army over the past 2 decades has disadvantaged the other fighting arms of that force and expenditure on the Fleet Air Arm has also been misdirected (Seahawk has never been adequately operational in ASW for which acquired and Seasprite failed).
Emergov defends the supposed aim of Project Air 9000 to rationalize the ADF helo force but it has hitherto proved farcical with 2 additional types being recently introduced that were not in the program. The burning question is just who determined that optimized Chinook, Blackhawk, Iroquois (Huey II), Kiowa versions would not be adequate for Australia’s helicopter needs for the foreseeable future? It seems to me that those 4 types (suitably equipped) would be quite adequate and supportable for all ADF needs, including gunship, recce, training and fleet support roles, perhaps to 2030 and beyond. The Navy really does not need anything more than the Huey II suitably adapted for particular roles. My gut feeling is the senior echelons of Army Aviation and the Fleet Air Arm will eventually further diminish their air arm capabilities through profligate spending on high tech expensive gear not well suited for combat roles.
Much mention is made of ‘risk management’ in capabilities planning and procurement discussion but virtually nil reference is made to ‘cost-benefit analysis’ or operating the ADF ‘cost-effectively’. If rigorous cost-benefit analysis had been applied to the following projects when they were first mooted, most might never have emerged: Collins submarine, Seasprite, Abrams tanks, Wedgetail, F/A-18A refurbishment, Super Hornet, MRTT, Tiger, MRH-90, LPD (and perhaps others).
The Howard Government pledged to increase the defence vote to 3 percent of GDP over the next decade and this was echoed by the Rudd Government. In my view, this was a very foolish commitment which has only encouraged ill-conceived projects and reckless spending. Realistically, Australia can only afford about 2 percent of GDP spent on defence which is closer to the worldwide average and we could have a pretty capable ADF for that money if it was spent wisely.
It behoves the Service Chiefs to maintain their respective force operational capabilities and to operate cost-effectively; yet invaluable Kiowa, Iroquois and eventually Blackhawk capabilities are being prematurely forsaken and similarly the B707 tanker! If it is acceptable to military leaders to shed an operational capability for a few years pending introduction of a replacement, then is the replacement capability really justifiable? Operational commitments can emerge at very short notice so any existing capabilities should be continually optimized and maintained until envisaged replacement equipments are of adequate operational status before being introduced into service, temporarily putting the new stuff into storage if necessary so manning can be transferred when appropriate.
A reality check: Australia is entering a likely protracted economic decline with critical social needs fast escalating so unfettered defence spending cannot be condoned. Lots of expensive hardware is really useless if unable to be manned to operational levels and operated cost-effectively so it seems probable that all 3 Australian armed forces will be forced into rationalizing their capabilities. The mindset of our defence planners therefore needs to change pretty quickly.
A few more bits to follow soon (with imagery) relating to lessons of warfare which may be of interest to forum contributors.
Last edited by Bushranger 71; 22nd Jan 2009 at 07:19.
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I like the maths for the Super Huey, Bushranger 71, but after their recent experience with attempting to modernise another 40 year old airframe (Seasprite), I think you'd have a hard time selling the Super Huey to the pollies in Canberra - (and to Alan Jones!!).
I agree though that it would be the ideal airframe in many ways for a very large proportion of bread and butter Army support ops.
- and far more likely to be both available and still operational after two weeks in the field than the NH-90.
I agree though that it would be the ideal airframe in many ways for a very large proportion of bread and butter Army support ops.
- and far more likely to be both available and still operational after two weeks in the field than the NH-90.
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Seasprite Modernization
Hello Andu. The Seasprite in its original form as manufactured for the US Navy was a pretty good weapon system but quite expensive to operate so was therefore withdrawn from frontline service and operated by 2 Navy reserve squadrons.The original Seasprite version was also acquired by the Kiwis and operated satisfactorily.
Refurbishing most metal airframes is generally not a problem but a different story with more advanced aircraft that have composite material components - the life of the B-52 is being extended for a few more decades and many of the KC-135 (B707) tanker fleet have been given a significant upgrade and life extension. The re-engined C-47 Dakota is still flying around the world and simple airframes like Iroquois and Kiowa are routinely continually rebuilt and are virtually lifeless so long as adequate spares can be accessed or manufactured economically. The simplicity of the Huey II refurbishment/upgrade is explained on the Bell Helicopter and related websites and the USAF ordered 24 of them in 2005 with a glass cockpit option.
The problem Australia created for itself with the Seasprite was totally gutting the cockpit and avionics believing Australian defence science and industry had the capacity to develop a completely original flight management and weapons control system which was unique in the world - a similar story with the Collins submarine for which the entire dysfunctional weapons control system had to be recently replaced at huge cost. It took both Boeing and Airbus about 10 years to get the bugs out of computerized glass cockpit flight management systems even with the huge resources available to those companies. The problems with the Seasprite project were abundantly clear when I was invited to visit the complex at Nowra in the 1990s by a retired Navy friend who was involved in the project team but he resigned soon after due to cover-up issues.
Perhaps easier for Defence to kill the idea of refurbishing airframes by propagating spin re the Seasprite to cover up their own incompetence in attempting to build a unique flight control and weapons management system. Had Bell Helicopter been smart enough to offer good deals on the Huey II when replacement of the Iroquois and Blackhawk was being contemplated, the case for the MRH-90 might have been harder to justify. The big arms manufacturers will of course always lobby very hard to sell us highly expensive new hardware and talk us out of optimizing existing gear.
Kindly direct me to what Alan Jones might have had to say this topic so I can put him straight if he has an incorrect perspective.
Refurbishing most metal airframes is generally not a problem but a different story with more advanced aircraft that have composite material components - the life of the B-52 is being extended for a few more decades and many of the KC-135 (B707) tanker fleet have been given a significant upgrade and life extension. The re-engined C-47 Dakota is still flying around the world and simple airframes like Iroquois and Kiowa are routinely continually rebuilt and are virtually lifeless so long as adequate spares can be accessed or manufactured economically. The simplicity of the Huey II refurbishment/upgrade is explained on the Bell Helicopter and related websites and the USAF ordered 24 of them in 2005 with a glass cockpit option.
The problem Australia created for itself with the Seasprite was totally gutting the cockpit and avionics believing Australian defence science and industry had the capacity to develop a completely original flight management and weapons control system which was unique in the world - a similar story with the Collins submarine for which the entire dysfunctional weapons control system had to be recently replaced at huge cost. It took both Boeing and Airbus about 10 years to get the bugs out of computerized glass cockpit flight management systems even with the huge resources available to those companies. The problems with the Seasprite project were abundantly clear when I was invited to visit the complex at Nowra in the 1990s by a retired Navy friend who was involved in the project team but he resigned soon after due to cover-up issues.
Perhaps easier for Defence to kill the idea of refurbishing airframes by propagating spin re the Seasprite to cover up their own incompetence in attempting to build a unique flight control and weapons management system. Had Bell Helicopter been smart enough to offer good deals on the Huey II when replacement of the Iroquois and Blackhawk was being contemplated, the case for the MRH-90 might have been harder to justify. The big arms manufacturers will of course always lobby very hard to sell us highly expensive new hardware and talk us out of optimizing existing gear.
Kindly direct me to what Alan Jones might have had to say this topic so I can put him straight if he has an incorrect perspective.
Last edited by Bushranger 71; 22nd Jan 2009 at 20:26.
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Kindly direct me to what Alan Jones might have had to say this topic so I can put him straight if he has an incorrect perspective.
The Navy really does not need anything more than the Huey II suitably adapted for particular roles
Yes I think the Huey II would be great for some things but certainly won't do for Naval ops.
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People, we tend to forget...WE ARE NOT AT WAR!!! a Multirole helicopter will do us for the foreseeable future...we need to get soldiers to an excercise zone? I see them flying Qantas all the time, no big deal.
If we break out in all out war, yes, we will probably source cheap battlefield helos quick smart and send them out, but to equip our whole force with helicopters that their own country of origin no longer wants to fly because there are safer, more efficient models out there, is not the answer.
Yes, the Huey is a good machine, I have been in and out of it, very cramped, with gear on you can't even sneeze without knocking someone out, and its performace in hot humid conditions fully loaded is not the best. Plus, the original Vietnam Huey had a lot of vulnerabilities to small arms fire...the newer versions I believe are heavier to address this....an evolution, God Help us all!
If we break out in all out war, yes, we will probably source cheap battlefield helos quick smart and send them out, but to equip our whole force with helicopters that their own country of origin no longer wants to fly because there are safer, more efficient models out there, is not the answer.
Yes, the Huey is a good machine, I have been in and out of it, very cramped, with gear on you can't even sneeze without knocking someone out, and its performace in hot humid conditions fully loaded is not the best. Plus, the original Vietnam Huey had a lot of vulnerabilities to small arms fire...the newer versions I believe are heavier to address this....an evolution, God Help us all!
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Willo,
You better ask my son who has just returned from his third tour of Afghanistan, or Trooper Donaldson VC or the relatives of those who did not return from A'gan whether we are at war or not!!
GAGS
E86
You better ask my son who has just returned from his third tour of Afghanistan, or Trooper Donaldson VC or the relatives of those who did not return from A'gan whether we are at war or not!!
GAGS
E86
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Willoz, tell me you're not serious. "If we break out in all out war, yes, we will probably source cheap battlefield helos quick smart and send them out," Words fail me. Angus’ replacement will just drop down to Bunnings at Fyshwick and magically "source (love that word) cheap battlefield helos quick smart", and while he's at it, pick up TRAINED aircrews, groundcrew, spares, infrastructure, a training organisation - and all the innumerable other things required to operate an effective force.
What blows my mind is that your attitude is not without precedent in Canberra. In 1938 (? - it may have been earlier), Lawrence Wackett, against huge opposition from Canberra politicans who "knew" we could always rely on Britain, (translation: who were in the pockets of British manufacturers), finally got an order to build a small number of Wirraways for the RAAF. (I think it was for 80 aircraft.)
In the last days of August 1939, with that small production run almost complete, when the proverbial Blind Freddie could see there was a very real chance that the Empire would soon go to war, he caught the train to Canberra to see a the appropriate Minister, a Mr Casey - (the post WW2 Governor General) - to try to get an order for more aircraft, for he had literally hundreds of specialist employees he would have to let go if he could not extend the production run.
He was told that the decision to tool up and create an aircraft industry in Australia from scratch (as Wackett had just done) had been a commercial decision and there would be no further orders.
Within days, Germany invaded Poland - and Wackett received a call from Casey asking him for 400 more Wirraways poste haste. (My source for this tale is “Aircraft Pioneer” the biography of Lawrence Wackett, a highly recommended and very good read. Few would know that he was the man who virtually invented - and implemented - battlefield aerial resupply - in 1918.)
My big fear is that we don't seem to make Lawrence Wacketts in Australia any more, and in these days of Globalisation, where it has been decided by someone that we in Australia don't need a manufacturing industry, even if we had someone with Wackett's drive and vision, he'd have no factories or a trained workforce to draw on.
What blows my mind is that your attitude is not without precedent in Canberra. In 1938 (? - it may have been earlier), Lawrence Wackett, against huge opposition from Canberra politicans who "knew" we could always rely on Britain, (translation: who were in the pockets of British manufacturers), finally got an order to build a small number of Wirraways for the RAAF. (I think it was for 80 aircraft.)
In the last days of August 1939, with that small production run almost complete, when the proverbial Blind Freddie could see there was a very real chance that the Empire would soon go to war, he caught the train to Canberra to see a the appropriate Minister, a Mr Casey - (the post WW2 Governor General) - to try to get an order for more aircraft, for he had literally hundreds of specialist employees he would have to let go if he could not extend the production run.
He was told that the decision to tool up and create an aircraft industry in Australia from scratch (as Wackett had just done) had been a commercial decision and there would be no further orders.
Within days, Germany invaded Poland - and Wackett received a call from Casey asking him for 400 more Wirraways poste haste. (My source for this tale is “Aircraft Pioneer” the biography of Lawrence Wackett, a highly recommended and very good read. Few would know that he was the man who virtually invented - and implemented - battlefield aerial resupply - in 1918.)
My big fear is that we don't seem to make Lawrence Wacketts in Australia any more, and in these days of Globalisation, where it has been decided by someone that we in Australia don't need a manufacturing industry, even if we had someone with Wackett's drive and vision, he'd have no factories or a trained workforce to draw on.
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I'd wouldn't dismiss the Huey just yet. Sure, refurbs might not be a selling point given the Seasprite fiasco but the USMC seem rather pleased with their shiny new UH-1Y Venoms.
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Eagle, I meant no disrespect, I have done a tour myself, I know if bullets fly by, it is a friendly reception! What I meant is we are not in an all out war, we are co-participants in limited contained conflicts, where we are fortunate enough to be able to choose and time the introduction of battlefield equipment. Iraq, Afghanistan or even the Balkans did not see/do not see the need for Vietnam style helo resupply, the face of warfare is changing.
Wiley, what I meant was sourcing either more blackhawks or NH90s form surplus stocks, nothing out of this world in that!
Wiley, what I meant was sourcing either more blackhawks or NH90s form surplus stocks, nothing out of this world in that!
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Willoz - source aircraft from spare stocks?
Dream on buddy!!!!!
There has been some PM discussion between myself and Afghan. We have reached (I think) agreement. Afghan is a passionate officer who sees shortcomings with "the system". I'm an old head (who worked in the system) and agree with him in many aspects.
Bushranger - with respect - you lost me when you talked about cost effectiveness and then mentioned maintaining the B707 tankers.
Oh - and I said to Afghan - I have a personal friend who is probably unique in RAN cirlces in the he commanded both an O boat and a Collins - and I have never heard him say a bad word about the boats. So who do I believe about Collins? Guess.....
The B707 refuellers were NEVER an operational capability (despite us deploying them to support ops in Afghanistan) and cost the ADF an arm and a leg to continue operating. Same same F-111. The bird is still capable of flying. Can it survive in the modern battlespace? Questionable. The cost of being the ONLY operator of the type? Astronomical.
Sorry - but (with respect) you are a few years out of date.............
Dream on buddy!!!!!
There has been some PM discussion between myself and Afghan. We have reached (I think) agreement. Afghan is a passionate officer who sees shortcomings with "the system". I'm an old head (who worked in the system) and agree with him in many aspects.
Bushranger - with respect - you lost me when you talked about cost effectiveness and then mentioned maintaining the B707 tankers.
Oh - and I said to Afghan - I have a personal friend who is probably unique in RAN cirlces in the he commanded both an O boat and a Collins - and I have never heard him say a bad word about the boats. So who do I believe about Collins? Guess.....
The B707 refuellers were NEVER an operational capability (despite us deploying them to support ops in Afghanistan) and cost the ADF an arm and a leg to continue operating. Same same F-111. The bird is still capable of flying. Can it survive in the modern battlespace? Questionable. The cost of being the ONLY operator of the type? Astronomical.
Sorry - but (with respect) you are a few years out of date.............
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So if (huge 'if') we could find readily-available surplus NH-90s, they'd be incompatible with much of the kit on board the (incredibly expensive to achieve) 'Australianised' aircraft already in the inventory. Blackhawks? Possibly. A damn sight more likely than NH-90s anyway.
Bushranger, having landed a Huey on a ship at sea, I'd have to agree with the earlier poster's comment - skids with no oleos might be OK on really big carriers and the USN Marine assault carriers, but they're far from ideal if working of the small helideck of most RAN ships if there's any sort of sea running.
Having said that, I do like the idea of a relatively simple, affordable 'second tier' helo, which your Super Huey seems to go close to fitting.
Bushranger, having landed a Huey on a ship at sea, I'd have to agree with the earlier poster's comment - skids with no oleos might be OK on really big carriers and the USN Marine assault carriers, but they're far from ideal if working of the small helideck of most RAN ships if there's any sort of sea running.
Having said that, I do like the idea of a relatively simple, affordable 'second tier' helo, which your Super Huey seems to go close to fitting.
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I'd have to agree with the earlier poster's comment - skids with no oleos might be OK on really big carriers and the USN Marine assault carriers, but they're far from ideal if working of the small helideck of most RAN ships if there's any sort of sea running.
Huey II = stupid USMC mistake.
Huey II = stupid USMC mistake.
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Originally Posted by Rakshasa
I'd wouldn't dismiss the Huey just yet. Sure, refurbs might not be a selling point given the Seasprite fiasco but the USMC seem rather pleased with their shiny new UH-1Y Venoms
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Naval Helos
Hi Turkeyslapper (#168-23Jan09). The message I am trying to convey in all of the debate this thread is spending on military hardware will have to be constrained and we just have to accept a number of adequate capabilities rather than spend recklessly on the highly expensive stuff peddled by the major arms manufacturers.
Simple proven modular systems can be fitted to a number of different platforms to enhance multi-role versatility. I have done the research and number crunching on weapons systems and payload capabilities and there are feasible naval options for the Huey II considering the UH-1N is already in widespread service with multiple other navies. The Lynx of course can carry lightweight torpedoes or other bolt on weaponry.
Both the RN and RAN removed the ASW capability from Sea Kings but the dunking sonar was very speedily reinstalled by the RN when the Falklands War emerged. The Australian Seahawk has a very complicated ASW weapons system fit embracing a sonobuoy based detection system, acoustic processor, datalinking, magnetic anomaly detector, radar and an integrated navigation system; but it has never functioned adequately for ASW and like the Sea King, the Seahawk has been utilized primarily in other support roles.
The intended $350-400million upgrade for just 16 RAN Seahawks is aimed at refurbishment of the aircraft to improve reliability and apparently to restore yet another ill-conceived hybrid weapons system more toward the manufacturer's configuration. Whether it will then do an adequate job in the ASW role remains to be seen and (alarmingly) if Defence even bothers with an ASW capability. Consider these recent messages from the Minister for Defence, Joel Fitzgibbon:
DEFENCE Minister Joel Fitzgibbon has dumped a $300 million plan to fit anti-submarine torpedoes to the navy's Seahawk helicopters and the RAAF's AP3 Orion surveillance aircraft.
The European MU90 lightweight torpedo is being fitted to the navy's Anzac and FFG-class frigates, but the airborne phase of the $616 million project is now considered a high-risk integration challenge by the Government.
"I am pleased that we have been able to make the MU90 work off the navy's warships," Mr Fitzgibbon said. "However, I was not prepared to follow the previous government's practice of gambling with taxpayers' money by proceeding with the allocation of $300million to fit the torpedo to various aircraft while doubt remained that it would work properly in that role."
The Defence Department had planned to fit the torpedo to up to five separate platforms starting with the Anzac frigates, adding to the overall risk of the project.
Mr Fitzgibbon said the Government would need to be reassured via the upcoming defence white paper that an upgraded air-launched lightweight torpedo was essential for the defence force.
"A complicated systems-integration task involving old aircraft sets off several bright-red warning lights for me, especially when Australia would have been the only country attempting to make that aircraft and weapon combination," he said.
Note the continued spin regarding supposed old airframes whereas the main problem with many of the projects that have foundered has really been Australian defence science and industry generating costly hybrid on-board systems that have not been workable. We are going to see a lot more refurbishing/upgrading of aircraft worldwide to extend their life in the emerging economic climate.
Last edited by Bushranger 71; 25th Jan 2009 at 03:53.
Hey There BR71. I agree in full that tax payers dollars should be spent more wisely on proven, lower risk capabilities and I do understand that our Seahawk is certainly not the best ASW ship around - It is a pretty good Jack of all trades which as you said is what it is used for. All I was trying to convey is that the Seahawk family (or Lynx, NH 90, EH101 etc etc) is a far more suitable helicopter/weapons system for operating off small ships when compared to any of the Bell UH1 family. I did have a look at an Italian ASW version of the 212/UH1N once and there is no way that frame could perform the variety of tasks with the minimal reconfiguration that our Seahawk can (but yes it is a dipper).
I do also agree that a cheaper and relatively simple helicopter like the Huey II does have its place (AME, light utility and so forth) but I still stand by my earlier comment being that it isn't a suitable for what we need in a Naval helicopter.
Cheers
Turkey
I do also agree that a cheaper and relatively simple helicopter like the Huey II does have its place (AME, light utility and so forth) but I still stand by my earlier comment being that it isn't a suitable for what we need in a Naval helicopter.
Cheers
Turkey
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Huey Performance & Survivability
Hello Willoz269; you are a bit astray in your #169 of 23Jan09 (P9).
The US military fly what they are given being those equipments manufactured by the huge military industrial complex which of course revels in producing some overly sophisticated products for sale at inflated prices whereas much of the superseded gear wisely placed in reserve storage still does an adequate job if suitably enhanced.
Re aircraft performance; 9SQN RAAF carried 7 fully equipped troops in the Hotel model Iroquois - 5 across on the bench seat and 2 back to back on the floor - whereas the US Army only carried 6 troops. We also modified the aircraft to fit roof mounted hand rails either side for the outboard troops to hold and fitted emplaning steps either side. Never heard any complaints from troops re emplaning/deplaning difficulty.
Apart from sustained high temperature ops in Vietnam, we also operated the Hotel model Huey supporting all the major Army survey operations throughout PNG and Indonesia which embraced appreciable higher altitude operations. The Huey II of course does have markedly improved performance which is why the civil version is operated extensively in hot and high scenarios around the world.
Re supposed Huey vulnerability; see my #93 of 13Jan09 (P5) and just number crunch the statistics in para 2 for a rough idea on probabilities of battle damage. Survivability has a lot more to do with how aircraft are operated in combat than their characteristics. We did lose 1 aircraft when hovering among very large boulders during a firefight in mountains to extract casualties. An opposition soldier popped out from behind a rock and fired a burst into the engine at very close range causing it to quit and the aircraft fell on 2 advisors on the ground before bursting into flame. A medic got trapped and also perished in the inferno but all 4 crew escaped with some burns and minor injuries.
2 gunships did precautionary landings after taking hits in the transmission and fuel tank and another 2 aircraft were peppered by shrapnel when mines were detonated at landing sites but were able to be flown from the sceneof action for recovery by Chinook. No aircrew were injured in those incidents and I would call that pretty good battlefield survivability. Some armour plating around the engine and transmission would of course have been nice to have and the addition of armour is an option in the upgrade of Hotel model Iroquois to Huey II.
The US military fly what they are given being those equipments manufactured by the huge military industrial complex which of course revels in producing some overly sophisticated products for sale at inflated prices whereas much of the superseded gear wisely placed in reserve storage still does an adequate job if suitably enhanced.
Re aircraft performance; 9SQN RAAF carried 7 fully equipped troops in the Hotel model Iroquois - 5 across on the bench seat and 2 back to back on the floor - whereas the US Army only carried 6 troops. We also modified the aircraft to fit roof mounted hand rails either side for the outboard troops to hold and fitted emplaning steps either side. Never heard any complaints from troops re emplaning/deplaning difficulty.
Apart from sustained high temperature ops in Vietnam, we also operated the Hotel model Huey supporting all the major Army survey operations throughout PNG and Indonesia which embraced appreciable higher altitude operations. The Huey II of course does have markedly improved performance which is why the civil version is operated extensively in hot and high scenarios around the world.
Re supposed Huey vulnerability; see my #93 of 13Jan09 (P5) and just number crunch the statistics in para 2 for a rough idea on probabilities of battle damage. Survivability has a lot more to do with how aircraft are operated in combat than their characteristics. We did lose 1 aircraft when hovering among very large boulders during a firefight in mountains to extract casualties. An opposition soldier popped out from behind a rock and fired a burst into the engine at very close range causing it to quit and the aircraft fell on 2 advisors on the ground before bursting into flame. A medic got trapped and also perished in the inferno but all 4 crew escaped with some burns and minor injuries.
2 gunships did precautionary landings after taking hits in the transmission and fuel tank and another 2 aircraft were peppered by shrapnel when mines were detonated at landing sites but were able to be flown from the sceneof action for recovery by Chinook. No aircrew were injured in those incidents and I would call that pretty good battlefield survivability. Some armour plating around the engine and transmission would of course have been nice to have and the addition of armour is an option in the upgrade of Hotel model Iroquois to Huey II.
Last edited by Bushranger 71; 25th Jan 2009 at 04:13.
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Staying Abreast
Hi Scran; re your #174 of 23Jan09 (P9). Yes, I am somewhat fossilized at 71 which is why I use bigger font. But a few years out of date! - Hmmm.
I have a long military lineage with 3 family lost in WW1 and another survived after being badly gassed. Family members were involved in all Australian active operations ever since to the current day, except Korea. I can remember much about WW2, was involved in Confrontation, Vietnam (3 stints) and appreciable regional archipelago activities. Lived in Kuwait just after the Gulf War, have visited many other battlefields around the world and have always been a bit bent toward researching military history.
Being on the planet for beyond the biblical 3 score years plus 10 inclines you to become more objective than subjective and question many of the actions of governments; which may be the reason I was privileged to be invited in 2007 to joint a group comprising former Air Force pilots, engineers and a scientist addressing air combat capabilities. The group includes mainly 1 and 2 Star rankers with military service spanning from the 1950s until recently (but I did not reach their dizzy heights). We are well across what has been happening in Canberra and through defence industry contacts worldwide are arguably more abreast of aircraft technology and weaponry developments than most, particularly regarding Russian and Chinese hardware.
Re aerial refuelling tankers. Somewhere on the web is a USAF statistical summary for a few months of offensive air support in Iraq and Afghanstan during 2008 indicating about 10,000 hours flown requiring a staggering 4,000 or so hours of tanker support The USAF has near 500(?) mainly re-engined glass cockpit KC-135 as the core of their tanker fleet with airframe life of type potential to about 2040 although maintenance costs will progressively increase (see: KC-135 Stratotanker - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia).
As for most of the other aircraft types operated by the ADF, the RAAF B707s were not progressively optimized so did not have the capabilities of the KC-135R preceding their premature retirement from Air Force service. Our B707 were pretty low time airframes and had the aircraft been upgraded, operating costs would have been substantially reduced.
Yet again, Australia jumped in as a launch customer for an unproven type in the MRTT and I challenge the wisdom of this decision. 5 x MRTT may arguably only allow 3 available continuously for operations which is really a piddling capacity for activities that might require sustained tankering. While the MRTT can offload more fuel than the KC-135R, I feel it was acquired moreso as a people and freight transporter.
Years back when Qantas was government-owned, provision existed to sequester QF aircraft at short notice for auxiliary transportation of personnel in particular. Defence spending on airlift assets was then more wisely directed toward aircraft that could be utilized to quickly move personnel and equipment (including light armour) into the rudimentary airfields throughout the regional archipelago with C-130 and C-17 being the aircraft most suited for such needs today. Tanker/cargo aircraft are of course limited to airfields that can handle large airliners.
Had the RAAF B707 been upgraded to KC-135R standard, an adequate (albeit token) tanker capability - and a lesser pax/cargo function - could have been maintained pending downstream emergence and proving of a USAF tanker replacement with spending on the MRTT perhaps more sensibly diverted to additional C-17. The USAF tanker replacement project has been controversial and may yet become a US designed aircraft leaving Australia with more European sourced equipment.
Thorough fatigue testing proved the F-111 could have easily been sustained in service until around 2030 utilizing spares availability from stored assets in the US. Its systems could have also been optimized to make it extremely capable as a very long range maritime strike (and electronic warfare) deterrent against interference with Australia's trade routes and offshore assets. Although the airframe is not stealth technology, it has supersonic cruise capability and can deliver stand-off weaponry designed for internal carriage on the F-22 - the RAAF did some of the supersonic small diameter bomb flight testing for the USAF. The Super Hornet does not have comparable airframe performance and would require significant tanker support when laden with external weaponry - see the following link for a January 2008 cost comparison for acquiring the Super Hornet versus keeping the F-111 in service - NOTAMS and Media Releases. The former Chief Defence Scientist and Service Chiefs misinformed the Parliament in this regard which is all recorded in Hansard.
With respect Mate, I think you might be a victim of the 'group think' culture that prevails in Defence. The Minister has already publicly expressed his concern that our defence planners are too obsessed with futuristic notions for conduct of war-fighting rather than maintaining the operational capabilities of the ADF as they have existed. Hitherto, nobody has been held accountable for reckless defence spending but some heads might yet roll at the highest levels if a couple more of the ill-conceived projects fall over.
This link can provide you with months of very interesting reading on topical military issues: Air Power Australia - Home Page
I have a long military lineage with 3 family lost in WW1 and another survived after being badly gassed. Family members were involved in all Australian active operations ever since to the current day, except Korea. I can remember much about WW2, was involved in Confrontation, Vietnam (3 stints) and appreciable regional archipelago activities. Lived in Kuwait just after the Gulf War, have visited many other battlefields around the world and have always been a bit bent toward researching military history.
Being on the planet for beyond the biblical 3 score years plus 10 inclines you to become more objective than subjective and question many of the actions of governments; which may be the reason I was privileged to be invited in 2007 to joint a group comprising former Air Force pilots, engineers and a scientist addressing air combat capabilities. The group includes mainly 1 and 2 Star rankers with military service spanning from the 1950s until recently (but I did not reach their dizzy heights). We are well across what has been happening in Canberra and through defence industry contacts worldwide are arguably more abreast of aircraft technology and weaponry developments than most, particularly regarding Russian and Chinese hardware.
Re aerial refuelling tankers. Somewhere on the web is a USAF statistical summary for a few months of offensive air support in Iraq and Afghanstan during 2008 indicating about 10,000 hours flown requiring a staggering 4,000 or so hours of tanker support The USAF has near 500(?) mainly re-engined glass cockpit KC-135 as the core of their tanker fleet with airframe life of type potential to about 2040 although maintenance costs will progressively increase (see: KC-135 Stratotanker - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia).
As for most of the other aircraft types operated by the ADF, the RAAF B707s were not progressively optimized so did not have the capabilities of the KC-135R preceding their premature retirement from Air Force service. Our B707 were pretty low time airframes and had the aircraft been upgraded, operating costs would have been substantially reduced.
Yet again, Australia jumped in as a launch customer for an unproven type in the MRTT and I challenge the wisdom of this decision. 5 x MRTT may arguably only allow 3 available continuously for operations which is really a piddling capacity for activities that might require sustained tankering. While the MRTT can offload more fuel than the KC-135R, I feel it was acquired moreso as a people and freight transporter.
Years back when Qantas was government-owned, provision existed to sequester QF aircraft at short notice for auxiliary transportation of personnel in particular. Defence spending on airlift assets was then more wisely directed toward aircraft that could be utilized to quickly move personnel and equipment (including light armour) into the rudimentary airfields throughout the regional archipelago with C-130 and C-17 being the aircraft most suited for such needs today. Tanker/cargo aircraft are of course limited to airfields that can handle large airliners.
Had the RAAF B707 been upgraded to KC-135R standard, an adequate (albeit token) tanker capability - and a lesser pax/cargo function - could have been maintained pending downstream emergence and proving of a USAF tanker replacement with spending on the MRTT perhaps more sensibly diverted to additional C-17. The USAF tanker replacement project has been controversial and may yet become a US designed aircraft leaving Australia with more European sourced equipment.
Thorough fatigue testing proved the F-111 could have easily been sustained in service until around 2030 utilizing spares availability from stored assets in the US. Its systems could have also been optimized to make it extremely capable as a very long range maritime strike (and electronic warfare) deterrent against interference with Australia's trade routes and offshore assets. Although the airframe is not stealth technology, it has supersonic cruise capability and can deliver stand-off weaponry designed for internal carriage on the F-22 - the RAAF did some of the supersonic small diameter bomb flight testing for the USAF. The Super Hornet does not have comparable airframe performance and would require significant tanker support when laden with external weaponry - see the following link for a January 2008 cost comparison for acquiring the Super Hornet versus keeping the F-111 in service - NOTAMS and Media Releases. The former Chief Defence Scientist and Service Chiefs misinformed the Parliament in this regard which is all recorded in Hansard.
With respect Mate, I think you might be a victim of the 'group think' culture that prevails in Defence. The Minister has already publicly expressed his concern that our defence planners are too obsessed with futuristic notions for conduct of war-fighting rather than maintaining the operational capabilities of the ADF as they have existed. Hitherto, nobody has been held accountable for reckless defence spending but some heads might yet roll at the highest levels if a couple more of the ill-conceived projects fall over.
This link can provide you with months of very interesting reading on topical military issues: Air Power Australia - Home Page
Last edited by Bushranger 71; 25th Jan 2009 at 22:54.