2007 Puma Crash, Enquiry and Inquest (Merged)
Below the Glidepath - not correcting
Jayteeto,
Many thanks for encapsulating this entire thread in one comment. May the dick dancing end here.
Unprofessional versus Dangerous - know the difference before you leave home.
Many thanks for encapsulating this entire thread in one comment. May the dick dancing end here.
There is more to breaking auths than wazzing. I have been known to carry pax who were not on the manifest and doing things like landing at RAF Carlisle for a shower (once or twice) during field conditions exercises. This wasn't professional, but it wasn't dangerous.
Join Date: Aug 2001
Location: United Kingdom
Posts: 1,797
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
In the hope that a high paid person is taking the time to filter the bollo* from this thread in the hope of gleaning something constructive; can I invite a little thread drift to see if anybody considers any part of UK airspace to be an accident in waiting.
I love flying the (Ross-on-) Wye Valley, but everytime I do it a little bit of me is expecting a Tucano to be coming the opposite way, and I swear that if it does not get a long overdue flow arrow soon, one day I will be regretting uttering the words "I knew it" or "I told you so". Especially as you already need eyes on stalking to avoid wires and birds in the valley. (As sadly an RN Gazelle, and in happier circumstances an RAF Puma have already proved).
Are there any others fantastic flying locations that deserve to be 'policed' to make them as much fun but a darn sight safer?
I love flying the (Ross-on-) Wye Valley, but everytime I do it a little bit of me is expecting a Tucano to be coming the opposite way, and I swear that if it does not get a long overdue flow arrow soon, one day I will be regretting uttering the words "I knew it" or "I told you so". Especially as you already need eyes on stalking to avoid wires and birds in the valley. (As sadly an RN Gazelle, and in happier circumstances an RAF Puma have already proved).
Are there any others fantastic flying locations that deserve to be 'policed' to make them as much fun but a darn sight safer?
Join Date: Mar 2005
Location: Falmouth
Posts: 1,651
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Totally agree with your remarks ref the Wye valley but if you think that a location should have flow arrows placed on it then don't wait for someone else to do it.....why don't you do it..?
If you need the address to write to the it can be found at the front of the UKLF Handbook or MILAIP or whatever it is called nowadays.
Remember that the crew of that RN Gazelle had spent the previous evening enjoying themselves
If you need the address to write to the it can be found at the front of the UKLF Handbook or MILAIP or whatever it is called nowadays.
Remember that the crew of that RN Gazelle had spent the previous evening enjoying themselves
Join Date: May 2008
Location: Somerset
Age: 81
Posts: 635
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
VVWHATSIT
What the hell has that got to do with a wirestrike................?
Remember that the crew of that RN Gazelle had spent the previous evening enjoying themselves
As an ex Chinook ground crew who used to fly rotortune test sorties in I will let you experts decide what heading the following would be deemed as:
returning back to base at 2000' when pilot decides when overhead to do the tightest spiral rapid descent possible in a Chinook which caused the positve g to make me very uncomfortable with the rotortune box on my lap, when I complained he laughed and said it was the quickest way to land.
I was on the first rotortune sortie post maintenance and the blades were not balanced at all well. Once I had got the figures and on the approach to the base the pilot said that he was going to do a auto rotate landing, when I pointed out that firstly it is not allowed with ground crew on board, secondly this manouvre was dependant on the blades being properly balanced. pilot said it would be no problem, aircraft promptly descended rather faster than designed, pilot recovered, just, and with a little laugh said 'I think the blades do need a bit off a tweak'.
On the ground trying to take the blade readings the aircraft developed a very bad case off ground resonance, the pilot asked me how long I would be to get a set off readings, when I told him he said I had about 30 secs before he shut down and i would have to best guess some adjustments before this aircraft would be started up again.
I know which was to me the most proffesional pilot but after the comments I have read on this thread, I look forward to hearing some peoples responses.
returning back to base at 2000' when pilot decides when overhead to do the tightest spiral rapid descent possible in a Chinook which caused the positve g to make me very uncomfortable with the rotortune box on my lap, when I complained he laughed and said it was the quickest way to land.
I was on the first rotortune sortie post maintenance and the blades were not balanced at all well. Once I had got the figures and on the approach to the base the pilot said that he was going to do a auto rotate landing, when I pointed out that firstly it is not allowed with ground crew on board, secondly this manouvre was dependant on the blades being properly balanced. pilot said it would be no problem, aircraft promptly descended rather faster than designed, pilot recovered, just, and with a little laugh said 'I think the blades do need a bit off a tweak'.
On the ground trying to take the blade readings the aircraft developed a very bad case off ground resonance, the pilot asked me how long I would be to get a set off readings, when I told him he said I had about 30 secs before he shut down and i would have to best guess some adjustments before this aircraft would be started up again.
I know which was to me the most proffesional pilot but after the comments I have read on this thread, I look forward to hearing some peoples responses.
Join Date: Mar 2005
Location: Falmouth
Posts: 1,651
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
VVWHATSIT
Quote:
Remember that the crew of that RN Gazelle had spent the previous evening enjoying themselves
What the hell has that got to do with a wirestrike................?
Quote:
Remember that the crew of that RN Gazelle had spent the previous evening enjoying themselves
What the hell has that got to do with a wirestrike................?
Ex-Rigger,
I understand your concerns from those times - but the problem with RAF pilots is that they "know it all" and you cant get them sacked! I dont know of any sucessful engineering complaint against a RAF pilots "performance".
As you may now know, commercial pilots can get sacked (ask Pablo Mason - re company procedures) and pilots can also get sacked for incompetence and flaunting safety too.
...and do we know each other?
Check your PMs
I understand your concerns from those times - but the problem with RAF pilots is that they "know it all" and you cant get them sacked! I dont know of any sucessful engineering complaint against a RAF pilots "performance".
As you may now know, commercial pilots can get sacked (ask Pablo Mason - re company procedures) and pilots can also get sacked for incompetence and flaunting safety too.
...and do we know each other?
Check your PMs
Rigga, thanks for the response and accept your point, one which I was well aware. My post was mearly to see what certain other posters would deem acceptable behaviour purely to match up what they have been posting to date on what is high spirits, required training or breaking rules as there does seem to be some doubt and contradiction on these points.
It is possible we know each other, I have sent a PM back.
It is possible we know each other, I have sent a PM back.
Gamekeeper
Join Date: Aug 2000
Location: South East
Age: 61
Posts: 215
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
CVR?
On the Jeremy Vine show Thursday they had an extract of the voice recorder just prior to the accident
. Was that officially released
Not sure I can agree with that
- whether military or civil surely such should just be left with the professional investigators...
PFR.
. Was that officially released Not sure I can agree with that - whether military or civil surely such should just be left with the professional investigators...PFR.
Join Date: May 2008
Location: Somerset
Age: 81
Posts: 635
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
VVwhatsit
Link please. Thanks.
PS is this "on thread"? I thought that we were all agreeing that on the evidence so far that this Puma crew, or some of them, cocked it up in spades, and none of us are condoning(?Spelling) that. What the thread should stick to, and it is fascinating, is how far a military pilot feels it is right and safe to push the boundaries taking into account skill at poling, experience, conditions at the time etc etc. Please do not confuse hours flown or on type as a marker as to the competance of the pilot. Experience not applied is deadly and we all know of the high hours merchants on their high horses with whom we would not be happy to fly with sitting down the back out of reach of the controls.
To NEVER diverge from your authorisation seems to me to be the problem with some SH operations to the detriment of the service to the Pongos without whom we would not need to be here.
Any Pongos out there like to comment? Borneo/Bosnia/ NI/ Kuwait/Iraq/ Afg et all. Even Suez if you are seriously aged!
PPS - I like the idea espoused by some that to have flown numpty hours with never an accident makes the more qualified to comment. Want to know my history?
Plenty. Have a look at the Accident report
PS is this "on thread"? I thought that we were all agreeing that on the evidence so far that this Puma crew, or some of them, cocked it up in spades, and none of us are condoning(?Spelling) that. What the thread should stick to, and it is fascinating, is how far a military pilot feels it is right and safe to push the boundaries taking into account skill at poling, experience, conditions at the time etc etc. Please do not confuse hours flown or on type as a marker as to the competance of the pilot. Experience not applied is deadly and we all know of the high hours merchants on their high horses with whom we would not be happy to fly with sitting down the back out of reach of the controls.
To NEVER diverge from your authorisation seems to me to be the problem with some SH operations to the detriment of the service to the Pongos without whom we would not need to be here.
Any Pongos out there like to comment? Borneo/Bosnia/ NI/ Kuwait/Iraq/ Afg et all. Even Suez if you are seriously aged!
PPS - I like the idea espoused by some that to have flown numpty hours with never an accident makes the more qualified to comment. Want to know my history?
Last edited by bast0n; 31st Oct 2009 at 20:40.
Join Date: Feb 2007
Location: Oxon
Age: 66
Posts: 1,942
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
I suspect that the behavour stated during air test is either a troll or a very rare misdemenour. Apart from boredom experienced during repetitive rotortunes, and knowing that a 100`agl hover is an uncomfortable place to be regarding avoid curves, the attitude of any airtest crew is that you are (legally) flying an 'unserviceable' aircraft. I have never seen anything other than what was asked by the rotor tune tech, unless weather or aircraft performance meant that a requested flight profile could not be achieved. Bottom line; the sooner the GCs get what they need, the sooner the cab is "S" and the crew stood down.
I am with you however in my younger days I do recall Air Tests that ended with an ILS or the like but never anything of the sort the Rigga Twins describe
I suspect that the behavour stated during air test is either a troll or a very rare misdemenour
I would happily fly with any off these professional pilots and with regards to the other type
Join Date: Mar 2005
Location: Falmouth
Posts: 1,651
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
As an ex Chinook ground crew who used to fly rotortune test sorties in I will let you experts decide what heading the following would be deemed as:
returning back to base at 2000' when pilot decides when overhead to do the tightest spiral rapid descent possible in a Chinook which caused the positve g to make me very uncomfortable with the rotortune box on my lap, when I complained he laughed and said it was the quickest way to land.
I was on the first rotortune sortie post maintenance and the blades were not balanced at all well. Once I had got the figures and on the approach to the base the pilot said that he was going to do a auto rotate landing, when I pointed out that firstly it is not allowed with ground crew on board, secondly this manouvre was dependant on the blades being properly balanced. pilot said it would be no problem, aircraft promptly descended rather faster than designed, pilot recovered, just, and with a little laugh said 'I think the blades do need a bit off a tweak'.
On the ground trying to take the blade readings the aircraft developed a very bad case off ground resonance, the pilot asked me how long I would be to get a set off readings, when I told him he said I had about 30 secs before he shut down and i would have to best guess some adjustments before this aircraft would be started up again.
I know which was to me the most proffesional pilot but after the comments I have read on this thread, I look forward to hearing some peoples responses.
returning back to base at 2000' when pilot decides when overhead to do the tightest spiral rapid descent possible in a Chinook which caused the positve g to make me very uncomfortable with the rotortune box on my lap, when I complained he laughed and said it was the quickest way to land.
I was on the first rotortune sortie post maintenance and the blades were not balanced at all well. Once I had got the figures and on the approach to the base the pilot said that he was going to do a auto rotate landing, when I pointed out that firstly it is not allowed with ground crew on board, secondly this manouvre was dependant on the blades being properly balanced. pilot said it would be no problem, aircraft promptly descended rather faster than designed, pilot recovered, just, and with a little laugh said 'I think the blades do need a bit off a tweak'.
On the ground trying to take the blade readings the aircraft developed a very bad case off ground resonance, the pilot asked me how long I would be to get a set off readings, when I told him he said I had about 30 secs before he shut down and i would have to best guess some adjustments before this aircraft would be started up again.
I know which was to me the most proffesional pilot but after the comments I have read on this thread, I look forward to hearing some peoples responses.
This is absolutely disgusting. Why didn't you raise this with your engineering team? Why didn't you put this in the Flight Safety Log? Why didn't you raise a flight safety report..? Do you guys use the "Anymouse" scheme or equivalent? As much as this is the aircrew to blame, you have to take some responsibility for allowing this incident to drift away .....
Join Date: Apr 2005
Location: France 46
Age: 77
Posts: 1,743
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Why the Rules are there - even if it does seem like overkill:
Back in 1968 I was a young Co-Pilot on 84 Sqn (Andovers) at RAF Sharjah. Those were the days when Dhows were built on the beach at Dubai and the only Hotel in Town had 12 Bedrooms and was built of wood.
It was about this time of year when we noticed cliques of Navigators, both from Sqns based at Sharjah and visitors, in corners in deep discussion which abruptly ceased when any member of the "Two Winged Master Race" ventured anywhere near. It was not until the following year that we found out the reason for this. It was the story of the RAF VC 10 which, heading west across the Atlantic, missed America; all of it - South, Central and North America.
The crew were tasked to fly from an airfield in the Midlands to Gander the VC 10 had positioned at that airfield the night before the Task. The Navigator did not sleep well that night partially due to a "Rock Band" performing in another Mess near to the Officers Mess.
At Flight Planning the Navigator found that the North Atlantic Planned Tracks were not available but the Minimum Time Track was so he decided to use that and also to use the Gyro/Grid Technique of Navigation although it was not Command Policy to use that Technique except when 2 Navigators were operating together, with one of them holding an A or B category.
Having routed via Airways to Tory Island and been cleared to fly at FL310 the Nav, having extracted the value of Earth Rate from the tables and added the Residual Transport Wander, set the product -11.8 Deg/hr on the Rate Corrector and switched to GYRO.
Unfortunately, the correct figure should have been +11.8 Deg/hr and the error had the effect of precessing the gyro at a rate of nearly 24 Deg/hr causing the aircraft to diverge slowly north of its intended track.
The first astro fix gave a position close to planned track. It was during the second astro fix that the Nav's attention was drawn to a large return on the CCWRwhich the crew concluded was a large amount of ice. They were correct - it was a large amount of ice, but it was ice attached to the Eastern coast of Greenland because the VC10 was now some 510 NM north of track still locked in a gentle turn to the right.
The second astro fix appeared to be hopelessly wrong so the Nav tuned in the Prince Christian NDB which confirmed his worst fears and an emergency was declared. Aftersome excellent work by USAF Air Defence radar operators the aircraft eventually land safely at Gander with considerably less fuel than intended.
What, however, would have happened if the CCWR had "gone on the blink" a couple of hours outbound? It would have been a "No-Go" item before departure but safely airborne and nearly half way across the Ocean with a benign Weather Forecast, would the crew have returned to the departure airfield or continued?
Back in 1968 I was a young Co-Pilot on 84 Sqn (Andovers) at RAF Sharjah. Those were the days when Dhows were built on the beach at Dubai and the only Hotel in Town had 12 Bedrooms and was built of wood.
It was about this time of year when we noticed cliques of Navigators, both from Sqns based at Sharjah and visitors, in corners in deep discussion which abruptly ceased when any member of the "Two Winged Master Race" ventured anywhere near. It was not until the following year that we found out the reason for this. It was the story of the RAF VC 10 which, heading west across the Atlantic, missed America; all of it - South, Central and North America.
The crew were tasked to fly from an airfield in the Midlands to Gander the VC 10 had positioned at that airfield the night before the Task. The Navigator did not sleep well that night partially due to a "Rock Band" performing in another Mess near to the Officers Mess.
At Flight Planning the Navigator found that the North Atlantic Planned Tracks were not available but the Minimum Time Track was so he decided to use that and also to use the Gyro/Grid Technique of Navigation although it was not Command Policy to use that Technique except when 2 Navigators were operating together, with one of them holding an A or B category.
Having routed via Airways to Tory Island and been cleared to fly at FL310 the Nav, having extracted the value of Earth Rate from the tables and added the Residual Transport Wander, set the product -11.8 Deg/hr on the Rate Corrector and switched to GYRO.
Unfortunately, the correct figure should have been +11.8 Deg/hr and the error had the effect of precessing the gyro at a rate of nearly 24 Deg/hr causing the aircraft to diverge slowly north of its intended track.
The first astro fix gave a position close to planned track. It was during the second astro fix that the Nav's attention was drawn to a large return on the CCWRwhich the crew concluded was a large amount of ice. They were correct - it was a large amount of ice, but it was ice attached to the Eastern coast of Greenland because the VC10 was now some 510 NM north of track still locked in a gentle turn to the right.
The second astro fix appeared to be hopelessly wrong so the Nav tuned in the Prince Christian NDB which confirmed his worst fears and an emergency was declared. Aftersome excellent work by USAF Air Defence radar operators the aircraft eventually land safely at Gander with considerably less fuel than intended.
What, however, would have happened if the CCWR had "gone on the blink" a couple of hours outbound? It would have been a "No-Go" item before departure but safely airborne and nearly half way across the Ocean with a benign Weather Forecast, would the crew have returned to the departure airfield or continued?
vecvechookattack, thanks for the post.
One can only assume that some of the posts here, in the Nimrod thread and others in the same vein have been missed, but you will see a pattern of people at the bottom of the career ladder and/or groundcrew complaining about aircrew/airworthiness/spares/tooling etc etc and that it has not been very effectively managed, or read ignored in most cases.
Who the hell cares when someone like me complained about those type of situations we found ourselves in, the management certainly did not, additionally we found that the head of the squadron supported his aircrew and came up with comments that I, and others, are just making it up/being a troublemaker/ exaggerating due to lack of knowledge of flying rules/limits/regulations.
As has been said before, the only time this sort of thing gets highlighted as being wrong is when there is a proper enquiry post an accident. No accident then it obviously is/was not a problem.
One can only assume that some of the posts here, in the Nimrod thread and others in the same vein have been missed, but you will see a pattern of people at the bottom of the career ladder and/or groundcrew complaining about aircrew/airworthiness/spares/tooling etc etc and that it has not been very effectively managed, or read ignored in most cases.
Who the hell cares when someone like me complained about those type of situations we found ourselves in, the management certainly did not, additionally we found that the head of the squadron supported his aircrew and came up with comments that I, and others, are just making it up/being a troublemaker/ exaggerating due to lack of knowledge of flying rules/limits/regulations.
As has been said before, the only time this sort of thing gets highlighted as being wrong is when there is a proper enquiry post an accident. No accident then it obviously is/was not a problem.
Join Date: Jan 2001
Location: Home
Posts: 3,399
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
I would just like to to interject that I believe that anyone who says they have never broken an auth or a limit is a either a liar or delusional.
I freely admit to having broken both on numerous occasions.
Sometimes for justifiable reasons which I have been happy to explain later to my superiors, and mostly because wazzing is fun.
I do, however, believe that my occasional flying of dubious legality has helped me perform more safely when the situation has required outside the envelope flying.
I also have always noticed that the "straight as a die" , "never explore the envelope" types are, almost to a man, poor pilots who are not really safe inside the auth/limits.
The simple fact is that the sort of person who is going to make a good operational pilot is the sort of person who has a high risk/arousal threshold and will waz.
You can fill your military with safe pilots, but they will be cr@p operationally.
I freely admit to having broken both on numerous occasions.
Sometimes for justifiable reasons which I have been happy to explain later to my superiors, and mostly because wazzing is fun.
I do, however, believe that my occasional flying of dubious legality has helped me perform more safely when the situation has required outside the envelope flying.
I also have always noticed that the "straight as a die" , "never explore the envelope" types are, almost to a man, poor pilots who are not really safe inside the auth/limits.
The simple fact is that the sort of person who is going to make a good operational pilot is the sort of person who has a high risk/arousal threshold and will waz.
You can fill your military with safe pilots, but they will be cr@p operationally.
Join Date: Jun 2007
Location: 119K East of SARDOT
Posts: 146
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Exrigger,
Who the hell cares when someone like me complained about those type of situations we found ourselves in, the management certainly did not, additionally we found that the head of the squadron supported his aircrew and came up with comments that I, and others, are just making it up/being a troublemaker/ exaggerating due to lack of knowledge of flying rules/limits/regulations.
All I can say is that your Station Flight Safety Officer was not on the ball, at all - to come away with that viewpoint suggests there were some serious failings within your Stn's Flight Safety culture - one option, clearly, was to submit a 'Condor', which is taken seriously at all command levels.
I don't know who the author is to the article below, but it gives balance to some of the recent replies - a parallel universe?
FLYING DISCIPLINE
Introduction
1. The subject of flying discipline is a complex area of aviation study that is far more wide reaching than would initially appear. On the surface, it could be considered as the study of how individuals conduct themselves in the air. While this is clearly an important aspect of the subject, it is only the final stage of a culture, or philosophy that begins before a new aviator even climbs into his first aircraft.
2. To properly examine the question of flying discipline would take a very long and in-depth study, which is outside the scope of this brief. However, this paper will address some of the key themes that, when taken as a whole, can be demonstrated to have a lasting impact on an aviator’s attitude towards flying discipline. Further, it will be argued that if the aviation oriented culture, or philosophy, is correct, then good flying discipline will naturally follow.
INDIVIDUAL FLYING DISCIPLINE
Flying Training
3. The Role of an Instructor. The basic role of an instructor in any skill is the same: to transfer the necessary skills, knowledge and understanding to a student in a comprehensible manner, and at a rate at which he can handle the information. Naturally, this applies to the physical skills of flying, but it also applies to the more subtle aspects of flying culture, which are not easily covered by formal lessons: attitude and responsibility. Whether he knows it or not, an instructor will leave a lasting impression on his students. He is their role model, their example of everything that they should aspire to be, as an aviator. He should instil in his students a sense of duty to themselves, to their colleagues and to the system as a whole. An undisciplined pilot can usually be demonstrated to be the product of poor training and poor individual instructors.
4. Setting a personal example is clearly important, but just as vital in the formation of a disciplined mindset is the practice of timely and accurate reporting, free from bias and cultural practices (i.e. we don’t like to fail a student as it insults his honour, so we would rather grade him as average and avoid confrontation!). Assessment is an integral part of training and learning; there may be a legal requirement or limitation on how an individual may be employed depending on his performance in the assessment. If the assessment does not accurately reflect the level of performance, or has been distorted, then an unstoppable decline in standards will begin. If left unchecked, sub-standard pilots will eventually get through the system to front line units, where they will sit like ticking Flight Safety time-bombs waiting to explode. Clearly, the quality of flying instruction has a direct impact on flying discipline.
5. Continuation Training. Beyond the sphere of academic flying training lies squadron level continuation training. The observations concerning the role of instructors are just as valid in front line squadrons as basic flying training. However, we now encounter the new problems of boredom and complacency. If training is repetitive, unchallenging and lacks focus, pilots, as intelligent individuals, will eventually become bored; boredom breeds complacency and flying indiscipline. A bored pilot rapidly becomes a dangerous pilot as he seeks to make his own entertainment or pushes his personal envelope beyond his level of competence.
6. To combat this problem, squadron training policy should accurately reflect its mission statement or assigned role. By providing a dynamic and challenging training syllabus that matches the unit’s requirements, commanders can not only consolidate and refine their capabilities; they can reduce the likelihood of boredom setting in. Additionally, if squadron instructors are encouraged to stimulate thought, and engender an atmosphere of discussion and exchange of ideas, a commander will prevent complacency. Instructors should strive to constantly develop the capabilities of pilots, and individual pilots should strive to match these expectations.
7. Structured Development. Once a pilot had converted to an operational type of aircraft, there is always a danger that he will drift and lapse into bad habits once the pressure of formal training has been removed. Naturally, all pilots require a period free from pressure to consolidate and develop their skills; however, they should undergo a continual process of structured development. A properly designed programme for development and qualification provides a sense of purpose and a measure of personal progress. It can also provide an essential management tool for squadron executives in the day-to-day running of a squadron. By highlighting potential problems at an early stage, commanders can employ remedial measures to prevent the situation developing to a point where an individual becomes a danger to himself and others.
5. Continuation Training. Beyond the sphere of academic flying training lies squadron level continuation training. The observations concerning the role of instructors are just as valid in front line squadrons as basic flying training. However, we now encounter the new problems of boredom and complacency. If training is repetitive, unchallenging and lacks focus, pilots, as intelligent individuals, will eventually become bored; boredom breeds complacency and flying indiscipline. A bored pilot rapidly becomes a dangerous pilot as he seeks to make his own entertainment or pushes his personal envelope beyond his level of competence.
6. To combat this problem, squadron training policy should accurately reflect its mission statement or assigned role. By providing a dynamic and challenging training syllabus that matches the unit’s requirements, commanders can not only consolidate and refine their capabilities; they can reduce the likelihood of boredom setting in. Additionally, if squadron instructors are encouraged to stimulate thought, and engender an atmosphere of discussion and exchange of ideas, a commander will prevent complacency. Instructors should strive to constantly develop the capabilities of pilots, and individual pilots should strive to match these expectations.
7. Structured Development. Once a pilot had converted to an operational type of aircraft, there is always a danger that he will drift and lapse into bad habits once the pressure of formal training has been removed. Naturally, all pilots require a period free from pressure to consolidate and develop their skills; however, they should undergo a continual process of structured development. A properly designed programme for development and qualification provides a sense of purpose and a measure of personal progress. It can also provide an essential management tool for squadron executives in the day-to-day running of a squadron. By highlighting potential problems at an early stage, commanders can employ remedial measures to prevent the situation developing to a point where an individual becomes a danger to himself and others.
COLLECTIVE/SYSTEM FLYING DISCIPLINE
8. Orders and Regulations. It can be argued that good flying discipline starts with clearly written orders that are correctly disseminated and correctly enforced. If regulations are unclear or contradictory, and there is no system to check their compliance, by default, flying discipline will be compromised. If a junior pilot is exposed to a culture of poorly drafted or out of date orders, or non-compliance with regulations, how is he expected to know which orders to follow and which he should safely ignore? There should be no room for doubt; compliance with all regulations should be mandatory, and the regulations should leave no room for differing interpretation. To ensure aircrew are fully apprised of the regulations, sufficient sets of orders should be readily available on squadrons for crews to refer to.
9. Direct Supervision. In an ideal situation, a squadron will have a flying supervisor who is charged with running the daily flying programme. Free from general administrative tasks that may divert his attention; he will ensure crews are properly briefed on their flying duties. In this way, thorough crew briefing and debriefing become an established part of unit flying culture, irrespective of the rank of the crew. By setting guidelines, or limits, to the sortie, the supervisor reduces the possibility that a crew may inadvertently commit breeches of flying discipline. However, by the act of actively supervising the crew, he will generate an atmosphere of compliance with regulations, as crews will feel less confident of ‘getting away’ with deliberately undisciplined flying. This should be the aim of all flying supervision as once the aircraft is airborne; there is little a supervisor can do to directly influence the subsequent course of events.
9. Direct Supervision. In an ideal situation, a squadron will have a flying supervisor who is charged with running the daily flying programme. Free from general administrative tasks that may divert his attention; he will ensure crews are properly briefed on their flying duties. In this way, thorough crew briefing and debriefing become an established part of unit flying culture, irrespective of the rank of the crew. By setting guidelines, or limits, to the sortie, the supervisor reduces the possibility that a crew may inadvertently commit breeches of flying discipline. However, by the act of actively supervising the crew, he will generate an atmosphere of compliance with regulations, as crews will feel less confident of ‘getting away’ with deliberately undisciplined flying. This should be the aim of all flying supervision as once the aircraft is airborne; there is little a supervisor can do to directly influence the subsequent course of events.
10. Flight Safety Culture. Flying discipline is an essential component of Flight Safety. The development of a culture of Flight Safety begins during basic training and continues throughout an individual’s flying career. It can be developed through unit policy and local initiatives to enhance awareness. From the very start of their flying career, aircrew should be encouraged to be ‘open’ about their flying experiences, sharing their ‘I learnt about flying from that’ stories freely with their colleagues. Similarly, aircrew should be encouraged to file Incident Reports (either open or confidential) free from an atmosphere of retribution. Failure to do so only obscure the truth distorts Flight Safety statistics and develops an attitude of deception and poor discipline. A zero accident/incident rate is impossible to achieve, even in the most sophisticated of air forces, as flying is an inherently dangerous business. A unit that claims it has no accidents/incidents probably does not have a system for reporting them; does not encourage open reporting; is hiding the truth, or never goes flying! Any of the above is an example of poor flying discipline within Flight Safety.
AA
Join Date: Mar 2005
Location: Falmouth
Posts: 1,651
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Couldn't agree more with AA..... as an example.
Last month a pilot on a Lynx Squadron had landed the aircraft safely and was preparing to shut the aircraft down. The Marshaller was monitoring the aircraft as well as keeping a careful eye on another aircraft on the spot behind his aircraft. That aircraft was in the middle of a Rotors running refuel.
Suddenly, the marshallers aircraft started the shutdown process without permission of the marshaller.
The marshaller was slightly disturbed at this and he consequently wrote a comment in the Squadrons Flight safety log.
The Squadron Senior pilot ordered the said pilot to report to his office and provided the pilot with a one way interview.... Bollocking over, the pilot apologised to the maintainer...
Last month a pilot on a Lynx Squadron had landed the aircraft safely and was preparing to shut the aircraft down. The Marshaller was monitoring the aircraft as well as keeping a careful eye on another aircraft on the spot behind his aircraft. That aircraft was in the middle of a Rotors running refuel.
Suddenly, the marshallers aircraft started the shutdown process without permission of the marshaller.
The marshaller was slightly disturbed at this and he consequently wrote a comment in the Squadrons Flight safety log.
The Squadron Senior pilot ordered the said pilot to report to his office and provided the pilot with a one way interview.... Bollocking over, the pilot apologised to the maintainer...