2007 Puma Crash, Enquiry and Inquest (Merged)
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Couldn't agree more. This was nothing to do with the airworthiness of the aircraft. This was all to do with C2, supervision and pure good sense.
B Word is entirely correct. The reason those words have been misplaced in JSP 553 is purely to save the SofS's bottom....so that he can blame someone.
Training, Supervision, Experience, Competence have got nothing what so ever to do with the airworthiness of an Aircraft. Airworthiness is for engineers only.
JSP553 - Military Airworthiness Regulations
Quote:
Training, Supervision, Experience, Competence, Suitability etc of all concerned, including aircrew and their entire management hierarchy.
A duty not to intentionally or recklessly misuse ........
Whilst this is technically correct, IMHO, this should never have been put into 553 - again, IMHO, I believe this is the "airworthiness empire" trying to take over the world and treading on other people's toes uneccessarily.
Airworthiness should be about engineering issues, that is all. The certificate of airworthiness for my puddle jumper has nothing to do with "Training, Supervision, Experience, Competence" in any way whatsoever of the people who fly it - only the people engineering it.
Our civil brethren don't mix airworthiness with operations and training; so why the hell should we???
The B Word
Quote:
Training, Supervision, Experience, Competence, Suitability etc of all concerned, including aircrew and their entire management hierarchy.
A duty not to intentionally or recklessly misuse ........
Whilst this is technically correct, IMHO, this should never have been put into 553 - again, IMHO, I believe this is the "airworthiness empire" trying to take over the world and treading on other people's toes uneccessarily.
Airworthiness should be about engineering issues, that is all. The certificate of airworthiness for my puddle jumper has nothing to do with "Training, Supervision, Experience, Competence" in any way whatsoever of the people who fly it - only the people engineering it.
Our civil brethren don't mix airworthiness with operations and training; so why the hell should we???
The B Word
Training, Supervision, Experience, Competence have got nothing what so ever to do with the airworthiness of an Aircraft. Airworthiness is for engineers only.
V
You are of course entitled to your opinion as to what the regulations should say, but until they do.............
The reason why all these components are lumped together is because airworthiness is about Safety. Engineers contribute to that safety.
If you are still "in", raise a MF765 (Unsatisfactory Feature Report) on JSP553 suggesting your proposed changes.
But, and I'll give you this gladly, your stance is far better than the MoD(PE) 2 Star who said "This is of no concern to MoD(PE)".
Training, Supervision, Experience, Competence have got nothing what so ever to do with the airworthiness of an Aircraft. Airworthiness is for engineers only.
The reason why all these components are lumped together is because airworthiness is about Safety. Engineers contribute to that safety.
If you are still "in", raise a MF765 (Unsatisfactory Feature Report) on JSP553 suggesting your proposed changes.
But, and I'll give you this gladly, your stance is far better than the MoD(PE) 2 Star who said "This is of no concern to MoD(PE)".
Below the Glidepath - not correcting
Tucumseh,
The main problem with JSP 553 mixing Airworthiness with the Operational aspects is that it conveniently overlooks the means of rectifying such defects. The budgetary authority to make safety of flight aircraft mods is seldom if ever linked to the budgetary authority to enforce any shortfalls in training, tactics, techniques, and procedures - ie the Operational domain. The net result is 553 implies it has a level of influence and control over the safe operation of aircraft that probably isn't true.
This appears to be a fundamental failure to ensure that MoD policy is underpinned by an effective means of implementation, rather than an unsatisfactory feature of a publication.
The main problem with JSP 553 mixing Airworthiness with the Operational aspects is that it conveniently overlooks the means of rectifying such defects. The budgetary authority to make safety of flight aircraft mods is seldom if ever linked to the budgetary authority to enforce any shortfalls in training, tactics, techniques, and procedures - ie the Operational domain. The net result is 553 implies it has a level of influence and control over the safe operation of aircraft that probably isn't true.
This appears to be a fundamental failure to ensure that MoD policy is underpinned by an effective means of implementation, rather than an unsatisfactory feature of a publication.
Twos In
Couldn't agree more. I think about 80% of my posts say the same thing!!! This is precisely what ACM Sir Clive Loader said in his coruscating comments in the Nimrod BoI report.
MoD was in complete denial, constantly briefing Ministers to say the regulations are applied properly. But Des Browne finally listened and appointed the QC to conduct his Review.
It is not clear if ACM Loader knew he was wholly contradicting Adam Ingram, who had been given the opportunity to do something when told the same thing, in writing, long before the accident, but stuck his head in the sand. I do hope the report makes the same point. And I hope those serial liars in MoD who briefed successive Ministers received their Salmon letters.
As to funding for fault investigation and rectification, the system demands that unless adequate materiel and financial provision is made up front, and maintained through-life, the "requirement" fails scrutiny. If insufficient funding exists, this immediately undermines the evidence supporting airworthiness. Again, numerous audits and reports over the last 15 years have severely criticised MoD for not implementing this mandated policy.
That does not necessarily mean an aircraft or equipment is not airworthy, but it removes one of the crucial defences in depth and requires a conscious decision and written justification from the RTSA to continue flying. Again, I doubt if any RTSA does this (if only because it is career limiting, but I also suspect because few if any would know what I'm talking about). The BoI into a 2003 fatal accident actually made this very point, stating that the final defence had been effectively removed (by a Service Deviation which had not been thought through, or tested and trialled for safety - again, despite previous recommendations to do so).
A common thread runs through these cases - none of what "emerges" is new.
This appears to be a fundamental failure to ensure that MoD policy is underpinned by an effective means of implementation, rather than an unsatisfactory feature of a publication.
MoD was in complete denial, constantly briefing Ministers to say the regulations are applied properly. But Des Browne finally listened and appointed the QC to conduct his Review.
It is not clear if ACM Loader knew he was wholly contradicting Adam Ingram, who had been given the opportunity to do something when told the same thing, in writing, long before the accident, but stuck his head in the sand. I do hope the report makes the same point. And I hope those serial liars in MoD who briefed successive Ministers received their Salmon letters.
As to funding for fault investigation and rectification, the system demands that unless adequate materiel and financial provision is made up front, and maintained through-life, the "requirement" fails scrutiny. If insufficient funding exists, this immediately undermines the evidence supporting airworthiness. Again, numerous audits and reports over the last 15 years have severely criticised MoD for not implementing this mandated policy.
That does not necessarily mean an aircraft or equipment is not airworthy, but it removes one of the crucial defences in depth and requires a conscious decision and written justification from the RTSA to continue flying. Again, I doubt if any RTSA does this (if only because it is career limiting, but I also suspect because few if any would know what I'm talking about). The BoI into a 2003 fatal accident actually made this very point, stating that the final defence had been effectively removed (by a Service Deviation which had not been thought through, or tested and trialled for safety - again, despite previous recommendations to do so).
A common thread runs through these cases - none of what "emerges" is new.
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MOD or RAF? The difference needs to be stated as I would not wish to see the RN or AAC coloured by this discussion - all the current issues appear to apply to the RAF rather than the others.
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Bismark:
Ok, I'll bite, Mein Count. Which current issues are those? If you mean the subject accident of this thread, it is clearly an RAF one and subject to an RAF Inquiry. Discussion has opened out though to Airworthiness Provision by the UK Military Airworthiness Authority. Bad news old boy, all UK Military Airworthiness come under its jurisdiction and it is of course that monstrous creation, the Ministry of Defence. As far as colouring the RN and the AAC goes, I'm sure that the RAF would join you in wishing to have that millstone lifted from all your necks. Ain't goin to happen though, so next best option is to get it reformed from top to bottom, and in particular to have Military Airworthiness removed to an independent and professional authority. Accident Investigation would seem to be a bone of contention, and given that the RN has retained Air Accident Inspectors and tried to keep Investigations apart from the CoC I can see their point. As has been suggested, could they not form the nucleus of a similarly independent and professional MAAIB? Not sure about the AAC Investigation process, anyone help? I'm sure that we all agree that every accident is bad, and a fatal one is tragic. Every lesson must be learned so that some good may emerge and perhaps an avoidable accident thus avoided. If there are Military Airworthiness aspects to this accident it is surely our duty, whatever colour our uniform, to investigate, learn from, and if necessary correct them. That has not been a pattern of some past RAF BoI's I fear. May this one prove to be the exception?
MOD or RAF? The difference needs to be stated as I would not wish to see the RN or AAC coloured by this discussion - all the current issues appear to apply to the RAF rather than the others.
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Differences
You rightly point out there are differences in the way investigations are carried out between the services, and there are also differences in the way the RTS is produced and authorised. Recognising each others differences in processes, personnel and procedures is a sure fire way of understanding how to do this, and learning from mistakes. Civil and military organisations both make mistakes, independance has nothing to do with it if the learning culture exists.
As for Bismarks comments, I totally agree. Ever heard of RAF Culdrose, or RAF Prestwick. Apparently the Beeb have, as they report from there every time there is a SAR story! Well all suffer from the inaccuracies of the press.
El Colonel!
As for Bismarks comments, I totally agree. Ever heard of RAF Culdrose, or RAF Prestwick. Apparently the Beeb have, as they report from there every time there is a SAR story! Well all suffer from the inaccuracies of the press.
El Colonel!
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Accident Investigation
Chug,
Bismark is 100% right. The RN and AAC have long established Accident Investigation (AI) organisations with recognised "independent" lines of responsibility to enable them to comment on shortcomings in systems and procedures. Furthermore, they are manned by "passed over" officers that dont care about their non-existant future promotion. Plus, they tie AI to Flight Safety by having those that do the AI teach FS on FS courses etc. in a (successful) attempt to drive down accident rates. There is nothing like walking into the RNFSAIC or AIEFSO hangars to focus your FS attention!
In your desire to form a MAAIB you may (or may not) solve the RAFs AI problems but you will certainly break two other highly successful AI & FS systems, thus increasing the likelihood of RN & Army accidents. This cannot be acceptable.
Bismark is 100% right. The RN and AAC have long established Accident Investigation (AI) organisations with recognised "independent" lines of responsibility to enable them to comment on shortcomings in systems and procedures. Furthermore, they are manned by "passed over" officers that dont care about their non-existant future promotion. Plus, they tie AI to Flight Safety by having those that do the AI teach FS on FS courses etc. in a (successful) attempt to drive down accident rates. There is nothing like walking into the RNFSAIC or AIEFSO hangars to focus your FS attention!
In your desire to form a MAAIB you may (or may not) solve the RAFs AI problems but you will certainly break two other highly successful AI & FS systems, thus increasing the likelihood of RN & Army accidents. This cannot be acceptable.
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So then Mick, it sounds like there is a cause to keep the sharp end on the accident investigatives, model the RAF one along these lines and have them all roughly umbrella'd under an independant authority. Makes sense to me. the authority could then tell MOD to "ram it, and get the damn things properly airworthy" to an equivalent level of standard as a civil type but with obvious military need, ESF, tank inerting etc etc.
Toodle pip I'm off for a three course corporate schmooze and a watch of some fairy pigskin kickers (what the hell - it's free)
Fly Safe
Toodle pip I'm off for a three course corporate schmooze and a watch of some fairy pigskin kickers (what the hell - it's free)
Fly Safe
Mick Strigg:
Has the AAC trained professional accident investigators who conduct Accident Investigations, rather than merely advise ones that are effectively conducted by amateurs as is the case with the RAF? There seems to be two issues here, professional and independent. You tell me that the RN achieves both, if so much respect. The RAF achieves neither in my book. So where is the AAC in this? I am not trying to establish more quangos for no good reason, goodness knows we have enough. I am aware of great deficiencies in RAF AI and look for a solution so that more lives are not needlessly lost. I am also aware that UK Military Airworthiness Regulation enforcement is a scandal, and that affects the RAF, the RN and the AAC equally. RTS may be different, CAR is not. That is why I call for a separate MAA, because the MOD has shown that it cannot be trusted with such awesome responsibility.
The RN and AAC have long established Accident Investigation (AI) organisations with recognised "independent" lines of responsibility to enable them to comment on shortcomings in systems and procedures.
Vevechookattack
You display yourself as someone who has absolutely zero knowledge in terms of why and how aircraft accidents occur. Your comment belongs in the all time top ten of complete and utter aviation bolleux statements on PPRuNe. I really hope you are not at the sharp end of flying, I can't be bothered to check your profile to see if you are. If you are, then you thoroughly deserve not to be!
I'd like to believe that it is because of the RNFSAIC that this accident wouldn't have happend in the RN.
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this accident wouldn't have happend in the RN.
Cirrus
Nice one, but I think you are banging your head against a brick wall. People that actually fly realise that accidents occur in every organisation for reasons that are well cataloged, the people on here that seem to believe that one service is superior to another or indeed immune are utter plonkers.
Nice one, but I think you are banging your head against a brick wall. People that actually fly realise that accidents occur in every organisation for reasons that are well cataloged, the people on here that seem to believe that one service is superior to another or indeed immune are utter plonkers.
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Army AI
Chug,
Both the Army and the Navy have Cranfield trained AI teams, being trained on the same course as the AAIB. The RN teams are at RNFSAIC and the Army team is AIEFSO. Furthermore, the Army have Standing SI(BoI) Presidents that are AI trained and thus not the "gifted amateurs" that preside over RAF and Navy SIs.
If it ain't broke, don't fix it!
Both the Army and the Navy have Cranfield trained AI teams, being trained on the same course as the AAIB. The RN teams are at RNFSAIC and the Army team is AIEFSO. Furthermore, the Army have Standing SI(BoI) Presidents that are AI trained and thus not the "gifted amateurs" that preside over RAF and Navy SIs.
If it ain't broke, don't fix it!
Below the Glidepath - not correcting
As well as the BOI members the Army has (had?) the permanent AIFSO office, which comprised an SO1 Engineering Officer with a WO Assistant, both of whom had done the AAIB Course, usually with 40 years plus of aviation experience between them.
PS. Not only could this accident have happened to any of the services, it already has on numerous occasions - sadly this is nothing new and it won't be the last.
PPS. Qualified supervising officers are essential, but when Mate A and Mate B strap in and lift off, all bets are off. If they do not have the discipline and rigour to associate what the Authorisation was with what they decide to do on the day, there is nothing the Authorising Officer can do.
PS. Not only could this accident have happened to any of the services, it already has on numerous occasions - sadly this is nothing new and it won't be the last.
PPS. Qualified supervising officers are essential, but when Mate A and Mate B strap in and lift off, all bets are off. If they do not have the discipline and rigour to associate what the Authorisation was with what they decide to do on the day, there is nothing the Authorising Officer can do.
Mick Strigg:
A sentiment with which I would normally concur, and indeed abide by. Flight Safety though needs to be continuously reviewed and revised, for that is the very essence of the process. Perhaps not throwing out babies with bath water might be a more apt entreaty? From what you tell me there would appear to be a pecking order of professionalism:
AAC deux points (Investigations led by a fully trained Accident Inspector)
RN un point (Fully trained Accident Inspectors but not leading AI)
RAF nul points (No trained Accident Inspectors on boards at all)
Logic would seem to suggest that both the RN and the RAF should emulate the AAC arrangements. Indeed I would further suggest an economy of scale by having a Tri-Service Accident Investigating Unit, what I have called elsewhere an MAAIB. Now we come to independent. If the AAC has the prototype arrangement how is it independent of the CoC?
The Scruggs Battlebomber has just suffered a serious fatal accident. This is now the second crash in which the tailplane has detached and already there is a serious question mark over the design integrity of the type. The SI/BoI is promulgated and immediately the nominated President (Lt Col) is summoned before General Melchett who reminds him of the cost and embarrassment to the Army and the AAC in particular if all the Scruggs BB's were grounded until rebuilt along recommended lines. It might be as well for the Board to bear that in mind when calling witnesses! How does the President resist such pressures, other than simply manning up and being a stout chap? If he were not a Lt Col but plain Mr in a Military section of the AAIB he has no problem there. How is the problem overcome in the AAC?
If it ain't broke, don't fix it!
AAC deux points (Investigations led by a fully trained Accident Inspector)
RN un point (Fully trained Accident Inspectors but not leading AI)
RAF nul points (No trained Accident Inspectors on boards at all)
Logic would seem to suggest that both the RN and the RAF should emulate the AAC arrangements. Indeed I would further suggest an economy of scale by having a Tri-Service Accident Investigating Unit, what I have called elsewhere an MAAIB. Now we come to independent. If the AAC has the prototype arrangement how is it independent of the CoC?
The Scruggs Battlebomber has just suffered a serious fatal accident. This is now the second crash in which the tailplane has detached and already there is a serious question mark over the design integrity of the type. The SI/BoI is promulgated and immediately the nominated President (Lt Col) is summoned before General Melchett who reminds him of the cost and embarrassment to the Army and the AAC in particular if all the Scruggs BB's were grounded until rebuilt along recommended lines. It might be as well for the Board to bear that in mind when calling witnesses! How does the President resist such pressures, other than simply manning up and being a stout chap? If he were not a Lt Col but plain Mr in a Military section of the AAIB he has no problem there. How is the problem overcome in the AAC?
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Qualified supervising officers are essential, but when Mate A and Mate B strap in and lift off, all bets are off. If they do not have the discipline and rigour to associate what the Authorisation was with what they decide to do on the day, there is nothing the Authorising Officer can do.
Not forgetting Mate C, who also has a voice and may be the last line of defence.
Last edited by Fat Chris; 24th Oct 2009 at 18:38. Reason: bad england