"Correct, but note key word – engineering.
As I said, I’ve been INSTRUCTED to ignore safety problems, but ALWAYS by non-engineers who have authority but no commensurate responsibility, precisely because they are not engineers and therefore do not (cannot) sign for airworthiness, type approval and have no delegated Financial & Technical approval powers. (One hell of a list of limitations which means, by definition, they are of limited value to MoD and the real responsibility in these domains rests with lower grades/ranks). The problem is they are now the majority in an organisation whose job is to – acquire technology.
Don’t agree –re Mull. The aircraft was not airworthy. Full stop. MoD can’t answer the key questions on airworthiness and safety. There is no seamless audit trail. I strongly suspect this is one of the reasons why they are better prepared on this one, so think you are right linking Nimrod and Chinook. Look at the MoD family tree. Look at the common denominators. Look at their benchmark decisions. Maintaining safety is a waste of money. Airworthiness is optional. Wasting money is of no concern to them. Heads above the parapet are to be lopped off."
I'm surprised by this. Have you REALLY been instructed to ACTUALLY ignore real safety problems? Find this hard to believe, but if true worrying. My experience in these kind of areas has been one of universal caution in the UK when it comes to managing real airworthiness risks. I've never observed the "non-engineers" overrule engineers in cases where there is tangible risk of loss/incident. I have seen alot of pressure applied to FIX problems (i.e. restore safety), and weak/unsubstantiated safety concerns challenged - but this is quite different to ignoring valid safety issues.