The question is not so much whether the contractor is meeting the contractual requirements (which is of course important), but whether the materiel and financial provisioning (an “HQ” task) was, and remains, commensurate with the planned usage of the aircraft and all its components, support infrastructure, training, personnel etc etc.
In broad terms, these are called “Support Parameters” and it is the responsibility of the respective IPTs to ensure and demonstrate they are met. Critically, if insufficient provision has been requested or made by the Customers, the IPT MUST “renegotiate” the support parameters with them, thus redefining their task and agreeing what is possible within the provision available to them. From EdSett’s reply it would seem quite a lot is lacking in this (mandated) process. The same principle applies to, say, the aircraft. We talked of “fit for purpose”. If that purpose (or role) has changed, one would expect a new or updated Aircraft Specification and complementary (Whole Aircraft) Safety Case. I’ll leave it to others to say if the Nimrod MR2 roles have changed in recent years but as the designator remains “MR2” it would appear not.
This is nothing new; it applies to most aircraft and equipment and has done for years. In fact, the 3 Services have long since stopped making such provision routinely, despite it being a mandated requirement by PUS, the Chief Accounting Officer. In simple terms, if you don’t ask, you don’t get. If you don’t ask, don’t complain if you don’t have. If you don’t ask, you get what you got last year (if you’re lucky), regardless of the fact that your flying rate has quadrupled. If you ask, but don’t get, the liability rests above you. In this context “you” is at 2 Star level, but the principle applies from the bottom to top. For example, if you don’t have the test equipment to verify a repair, the repair is not complete and you push the problem upwards. A JENGO (or whoever) may issue a concession, but must also continue to push upwards and advise of the risk he has taken; and so on. It’s called an audit trail (and I assume one exists for Nimrod).
By addressing the problem at this level, or above, you get to the nub of the problem. Not to is to risk, YET AGAIN, focusing too narrowly on a specific component of Nimrod and missing the big picture. I cannot emphasise enough that ACM Loader’s comment (that the airworthiness regs were not implemented) was NOT a revelation; it is common knowledge and, because the most senior staffs have been warned about the risks on many occasions, it is effectively policy. Elsewhere this past week there is a thread about the Sea King AEW crash five years ago. The BoI report, issued later that year, reported PRECISELY the same thing. The Tornado/Patriot report alluded to it; they refrained from overt criticism but the meaning was crystal clear. Not only that, the BoI reports are almost word for word what he had been advised to the relevant 2 Star YEARS BEFORE. And, as I have said, this got to Ministerial level long before XV230 crashed. He denied there was a problem. Wrong.