Nimrod crash in Afghanistan Tech/Info/Discussion (NOT condolences)
JFZ90
I’ve followed this thread from a distance but it seems pretty clear from some knowledgeable posts that there is a quite robust set of regulations governing airworthiness of military aircraft. The Secretary of State has acknowledged they were not implemented properly but so far hasn’t said what parts he is referring to, although from references to the inquest and various reports the list looks extensive.
JFZ90, I agree the forces are underfunded, but the last part of your post seems to suggest a partial implementation of the regulations would be acceptable. May I ask what parts you, or anyone here, think can be set aside?
I don't doubt the forces are underfunded, and this should be addressed by any govt, but the way this debate is going I fear there is a risk that a lot of resource that is badly needed elsewhere could be diverted to achieve a political level of airworthiness, rather than a risk based technical one that may already have been achieved.
I’ve followed this thread from a distance but it seems pretty clear from some knowledgeable posts that there is a quite robust set of regulations governing airworthiness of military aircraft. The Secretary of State has acknowledged they were not implemented properly but so far hasn’t said what parts he is referring to, although from references to the inquest and various reports the list looks extensive.
JFZ90, I agree the forces are underfunded, but the last part of your post seems to suggest a partial implementation of the regulations would be acceptable. May I ask what parts you, or anyone here, think can be set aside?
JFZ90, I agree the forces are underfunded, but the last part of your post seems to suggest a partial implementation of the regulations would be acceptable. May I ask what parts you, or anyone here, think can be set aside?
The problem comes in when you look at some of the things that seem to have gone wrong when relating to Nimrod - care is needed to separate regulations that were missed, or regulations that were followed but still allowed a safety issue to be missed. The investigation into what went wrong is no doubt looking into this, and speculation is probably not helpful to try and guess exactly where the mistakes were made.
Noting this caveat, as an example, you could pick the safety case process that was conducted several years ago. It is important to remember that conducting a safety case based review of Nimrod was in line with regulations and best practice. It should, in hindsight, have noticed & actioned the hot pipe ignition risk (this is easy to say of course). The question emerges - so what went wrong? As I say the investigation will probably find the real answers, but imagine for the sake of argument the following outcomes:
a) safety case process was OK, it was 'just' human error. No change to regs / process needed, but perhaps improve training etc.
b) safety case process broadly OK, no major change, but recommend more user involvement to pick up on op usage issues, better training.
c) safety case process failed and hence must be totally revamped
d) safety case process failed, total revamp, can't be left with MoD/contractor and must set up MAA, and new army of "checkers/auditors".
Now this is very simplistic and I'm mixing up issues, but to illustrate my concern, it is possible that a) or b) could be the right answer from an engineering safety perspective, but politically they don't create the desired "we've made a big change to airworthiness so from now on everything is OK". Hence there is a chance that c) and d) may be pursued for these reasons, even if safety won't actually be greatly improved.
It could be argued that a, b, c, and d and all in line with the "regulations" - so I hope you can see that cutting corners is not what I'm getting at - its more about avoiding the risk that we gold plate the solution to achieve political effect.
Lastly - I'm NOT saying that c & d aren't the right answer - it may turn out that bits of these ideas make up part of the right answer - all I'm saying is bigger (more expensive) changes should be justified on their merits and done for the right reasons, not just because 2 MPs are writing letters to each other to score points.
You're not so free of sneaky vitriol yourself you bloody hippocrite.
". No doubt they will follow now! It is clear that many posting here are under considerable pressure and strain. I am not, being retired, and feel genuine sympathy with them. However the "P" in PPrUNe, or one of them at least, stands for Professional. Neither stands for p****d. This is a complex situation with historical, immediate and long term ramifications. It is not helped by contributions such as above. Everyone presumably wants to ensure that the Nimrod and all other military aircraft meet the required prescribed regulations. This thread should be about how to get there. Can we please conduct it with mutual respect and consideration please?
Mighty Hunter AGE, Winco,
Many companies employ unlicensed engineers (fitters), I myself, with a Halton Apprenticeship, left the RAF after 12 years and joined a company as a fitter for a few months before I became a LAE. There are many that do not want the responsiblity of certifying aircraft and are happy enough to carry on as there are very many jobs that can be done as a fitter. Some fitters have been apprenticed and trained to licence standard but are too young to take a licence and are gaining the required experience to take it.
Regarding pressure checks on important systems, a fitter might very well install the necessary blanks and set up the test but a LAE would
physically check the results of the test, which normally require that a nominal pressure is held for a certain time. Winco is correct when stating it is a lot different outside the RAF, thankfully.
Many companies employ unlicensed engineers (fitters), I myself, with a Halton Apprenticeship, left the RAF after 12 years and joined a company as a fitter for a few months before I became a LAE. There are many that do not want the responsiblity of certifying aircraft and are happy enough to carry on as there are very many jobs that can be done as a fitter. Some fitters have been apprenticed and trained to licence standard but are too young to take a licence and are gaining the required experience to take it.
Regarding pressure checks on important systems, a fitter might very well install the necessary blanks and set up the test but a LAE would
physically check the results of the test, which normally require that a nominal pressure is held for a certain time. Winco is correct when stating it is a lot different outside the RAF, thankfully.
Last edited by Oldlae; 21st Jun 2008 at 15:43.
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JFZ90.
I do not believe that Angus Robertson raised the issue for "political effect". He, like many of us can not get our heads round the following:
(1) IPT tasked QinetiQ to carry out a Nimrod Fuel Systems Safety Report, the cost of which was some £147,000.
(2) QinetiQ produce a draft report "for comments" in Sept 2007. This was a most unusual step, because QinetiQ normally issue the report directly. As they did with the highly critical 2006 report, the Combustion Analysis Report, Fuel Seals Report, and several others.
(3) The report was adjusted, where the pharse "tolerbly safe" was added. MoD refuse to comment on this, because they claim the all copies of the draft report have beem destroyed.
(4) Issue 1 of the report was produced in Oct 2007, in which it is stated that the system is not ALARP, and can not be considered to be ALARP until 30 recommendations are complied with. MoD's Def Stan states, not ALARP then not safe.
(5) On 4th Dec 2007, Des Browne boasts "QinetiQ has conducted an independent investigation and confirm that, in light of the measures taken since the crash, the fuel system is safe to operate" - Wrong, wrong, so wrong. At the time none of recommendations had been implemented, and AAR was still in opertion at the time the report was written.
(6) On 5th Nov 2007 there had been another major fuel system incident involving, XV235, and AAR was stopped (probably for ever).
(7) In May of this year it was confirmed that, whilst the 30 recommendations are at various stages of consideration, none have been implemented.
(8) MoD stated at the inquest that hot air pipes in the engine bay areas are to be changed by the end of the year, and 300 seals will be changes at Major. (As recommended by BAe Systems in Jan 2005).
Now, on top of all that we have the inquest findings and statements from the IPT Leader. Who, by the way, was told by the coroner after his confusing statement, "If you came here today, hoping to give reassurance to the families, then you have failed to do so".
So, please tell me, what evidence, other than gusty feelings, and the fact the Des Browne made a "political" trip in a Nimrod, do you have that supports your belief that Nimrod is safe?
DV
I do not believe that Angus Robertson raised the issue for "political effect". He, like many of us can not get our heads round the following:
(1) IPT tasked QinetiQ to carry out a Nimrod Fuel Systems Safety Report, the cost of which was some £147,000.
(2) QinetiQ produce a draft report "for comments" in Sept 2007. This was a most unusual step, because QinetiQ normally issue the report directly. As they did with the highly critical 2006 report, the Combustion Analysis Report, Fuel Seals Report, and several others.
(3) The report was adjusted, where the pharse "tolerbly safe" was added. MoD refuse to comment on this, because they claim the all copies of the draft report have beem destroyed.
(4) Issue 1 of the report was produced in Oct 2007, in which it is stated that the system is not ALARP, and can not be considered to be ALARP until 30 recommendations are complied with. MoD's Def Stan states, not ALARP then not safe.
(5) On 4th Dec 2007, Des Browne boasts "QinetiQ has conducted an independent investigation and confirm that, in light of the measures taken since the crash, the fuel system is safe to operate" - Wrong, wrong, so wrong. At the time none of recommendations had been implemented, and AAR was still in opertion at the time the report was written.
(6) On 5th Nov 2007 there had been another major fuel system incident involving, XV235, and AAR was stopped (probably for ever).
(7) In May of this year it was confirmed that, whilst the 30 recommendations are at various stages of consideration, none have been implemented.
(8) MoD stated at the inquest that hot air pipes in the engine bay areas are to be changed by the end of the year, and 300 seals will be changes at Major. (As recommended by BAe Systems in Jan 2005).
Now, on top of all that we have the inquest findings and statements from the IPT Leader. Who, by the way, was told by the coroner after his confusing statement, "If you came here today, hoping to give reassurance to the families, then you have failed to do so".
So, please tell me, what evidence, other than gusty feelings, and the fact the Des Browne made a "political" trip in a Nimrod, do you have that supports your belief that Nimrod is safe?
DV
Last edited by Distant Voice; 21st Jun 2008 at 10:37.
JFZ90
Thank you for your considered response. Food for thought indeed. Perhaps the QC's review will end the speculation and state what specific failures there were and whether they apply elsewhere or just to Nimrod.
Thank you for your considered response. Food for thought indeed. Perhaps the QC's review will end the speculation and state what specific failures there were and whether they apply elsewhere or just to Nimrod.
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RAF Techie 101.
You said
That of course is correct, but vent line can contain fuel, and that is the reason we test then. Leaking air is not a problem, leaking fuel is.
Once again, going back to Group Captain Hickman's statement, he said that it was difficult to test all seals/couplings in the vent lines, because not all were accessible. So here is an idea; knowing that the real problem is not air leaks in vent lines, but fuel leaks, why do we not pressure test with fuel? Then we can see were the leak is, and those couplings that are not "accessble" to the human ear will most likely exhibit runs or drips that can be traced.
As KeepItTidy put it "when garages test your brakes for leaks they look for hydraulic fluid". They do not pressurise with air and listen for a whistle.
DV
You said
Vent lines contain air - hence the name
Once again, going back to Group Captain Hickman's statement, he said that it was difficult to test all seals/couplings in the vent lines, because not all were accessible. So here is an idea; knowing that the real problem is not air leaks in vent lines, but fuel leaks, why do we not pressure test with fuel? Then we can see were the leak is, and those couplings that are not "accessble" to the human ear will most likely exhibit runs or drips that can be traced.
As KeepItTidy put it "when garages test your brakes for leaks they look for hydraulic fluid". They do not pressurise with air and listen for a whistle.
DV
Once again, going back to Group Captain Hickman's statement, he said that it was difficult to test all seals/couplings in the vent lines, because not all were accessible. So here is an idea; knowing that the real problem is not air leaks in vent lines, but fuel leaks, why do we not pressure test with fuel? Then we can see were the leak is, and those couplings that are not "accessble" to the human ear will most likely exhibit runs or drips that can be traced.
As KeepItTidy put it "when garages test your brakes for leaks they look for hydraulic fluid". They do not pressurise with air and listen for a whistle.
As KeepItTidy put it "when garages test your brakes for leaks they look for hydraulic fluid". They do not pressurise with air and listen for a whistle.
The vent lines aren't under any pressure - they don't contain any liquid fuel as such, just the vapours from the tanks and any minor spillage which would become vapour instantly due to the high air-flow rate going through the lines during flight. You couldn't test them by filling with fuel - the pipes aren't designed to handle pressurised fuel (they aren't fuel pipes...), nor could you actually get the fuel in there to begin with.
I do not believe that Angus Robertson raised the issue for "political effect". He, like many of us can not get our heads round the following:
(1) IPT tasked QinetiQ to carry out a Nimrod Fuel Systems Safety Report, the cost of which was some £147,000.
(2) QinetiQ produce a draft report "for comments" in Sept 2007. This was a most unusual step, because QinetiQ normally issue the report directly. As they did with the highly critical 2006 report, the Combustion Analysis Report, Fuel Seals Report, and several others.
(1) IPT tasked QinetiQ to carry out a Nimrod Fuel Systems Safety Report, the cost of which was some £147,000.
(2) QinetiQ produce a draft report "for comments" in Sept 2007. This was a most unusual step, because QinetiQ normally issue the report directly. As they did with the highly critical 2006 report, the Combustion Analysis Report, Fuel Seals Report, and several others.
(3) The report was adjusted, where the pharse "tolerbly safe" was added. MoD refuse to comment on this, because they claim the all copies of the draft report have beem destroyed.
(4) Issue 1 of the report was produced in Oct 2007, it which it is stated that the system is not ALARP, and can not be considered to ALARP until 30 recommendations are complied with. MoD's Def Stan states, not ALARP then not safe.
(5) On 4th Dec 2007, Des Browne boasts "QinetiQ has conducted an independent investigation and confirm that, in light of the measures taken since the crash, the fuel system is safe to operate" - Wrong, wrong, so wrong. At the time none of recommendations had been implemented, and AAR was still in operation.
(6) On 5th Dec 2007 there was another major fuel system incident involving, XV235, and AAR was stopped (probably for ever).
(7) In May of this year it was confirmed that, whilst the 30 recommendations are at various stages of consideration, none have been implemented.
(5) On 4th Dec 2007, Des Browne boasts "QinetiQ has conducted an independent investigation and confirm that, in light of the measures taken since the crash, the fuel system is safe to operate" - Wrong, wrong, so wrong. At the time none of recommendations had been implemented, and AAR was still in operation.
(6) On 5th Dec 2007 there was another major fuel system incident involving, XV235, and AAR was stopped (probably for ever).
(7) In May of this year it was confirmed that, whilst the 30 recommendations are at various stages of consideration, none have been implemented.
(8) MoD stated at the inquest that hot air pipes in the engine bay areas are to be changed by the end of the year, and 300 seals will be changes at Major. (As recommended by BAe Systems in Jan 2005).
Now, on top of all that we have the inquest findings and statements from the IPT Leader. Who, by the way, was told by the coroner after his confusing statement, "If you came here today, hoping to give reassurance to the families, then you have failed to do so".
So, please tell me, what evidence, other than gusty feelings, and the fact the Des Browne made a "political" trip in a Nimrod, do you have that supports your belief that Nimrod is safe?
So, please tell me, what evidence, other than gusty feelings, and the fact the Des Browne made a "political" trip in a Nimrod, do you have that supports your belief that Nimrod is safe?
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Winco said:
What a stupid and totally incorrect thing to say, and you have shown your complete ignorance regarding civilian aviation. Do you really think that BA or any other large airline would even consider using unlicensed engineers?
Ha ha ha ha! That one made me smile.
Winco I suggest that you are nothing more than a Walt.
What are you, a retired ex-RAF acting Cpl Policeman or even better an ex-steward who heard the proper flyers talk about such things in the mess and decided to try it on?
You have shown your true colours by your complete lack of knowledge for someone pertaining to be an old sweat flyer and maybe now people on here will start taking note of just how little you know.
What a stupid and incorrect thing for you to say. Do you really think BA or any other large airline could AFFORD to have everyone in their employ licensed? You have just confirmed my guess that you have NO idea about what goes on engineering wise either in the civilian sector or in the military.
What world do you live in, imagine a disgusting world where 'unlicensed' engineers work on civilian aircraft, oh my god how could it happen.
You have just shown how out of touch and ignorant you indeed are on aviation engineering matters.
I am still in but actually work part time for an airline UNLICENSED at the moment as I am studying for my JAR66 and will be LICENSED by the time I leave the RAF next year.
Do you really think that everyone working on civvy aircraft is licensed? My my it must be great living in your world!!
I am currently in the US having brought one of Mr Boeing's big birds in last night, but when I return, I will talk to my 'unlicensed engineers' at BA and find out how they do pressure checks and look for possible leaks.
Well best you do and once you have can I suggest that you then get back in your box and let the big boys talk about things they understand i.e engineering and keep you ignorant opinions to yourself eh........
RAF Techie101
Thanks for the tips and comments mate. I do miss being on the Sqn but as you know, I was not happy with the way the fleet was going and decided to get posted and vote with my feet (pvr) as the RAF and Kinloss is run by buffoons and is now a shadow of what it was when we joined!
Keep the faith mate, the aircrew and everyone on here (that know what they are talking about) know how much hard work it takes to keep the Mighty Hunter in the air. Big respect to those guys and gals.
What a stupid and totally incorrect thing to say, and you have shown your complete ignorance regarding civilian aviation. Do you really think that BA or any other large airline would even consider using unlicensed engineers?
Ha ha ha ha! That one made me smile.
Winco I suggest that you are nothing more than a Walt.
What are you, a retired ex-RAF acting Cpl Policeman or even better an ex-steward who heard the proper flyers talk about such things in the mess and decided to try it on?
You have shown your true colours by your complete lack of knowledge for someone pertaining to be an old sweat flyer and maybe now people on here will start taking note of just how little you know.
What a stupid and incorrect thing for you to say. Do you really think BA or any other large airline could AFFORD to have everyone in their employ licensed? You have just confirmed my guess that you have NO idea about what goes on engineering wise either in the civilian sector or in the military.
What world do you live in, imagine a disgusting world where 'unlicensed' engineers work on civilian aircraft, oh my god how could it happen.
You have just shown how out of touch and ignorant you indeed are on aviation engineering matters.
I am still in but actually work part time for an airline UNLICENSED at the moment as I am studying for my JAR66 and will be LICENSED by the time I leave the RAF next year.
Do you really think that everyone working on civvy aircraft is licensed? My my it must be great living in your world!!
I am currently in the US having brought one of Mr Boeing's big birds in last night, but when I return, I will talk to my 'unlicensed engineers' at BA and find out how they do pressure checks and look for possible leaks.
Well best you do and once you have can I suggest that you then get back in your box and let the big boys talk about things they understand i.e engineering and keep you ignorant opinions to yourself eh........
RAF Techie101
Thanks for the tips and comments mate. I do miss being on the Sqn but as you know, I was not happy with the way the fleet was going and decided to get posted and vote with my feet (pvr) as the RAF and Kinloss is run by buffoons and is now a shadow of what it was when we joined!
Keep the faith mate, the aircrew and everyone on here (that know what they are talking about) know how much hard work it takes to keep the Mighty Hunter in the air. Big respect to those guys and gals.
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RAF Techie 101;
Here is a section from the QinetiQ Nimrod Fuel System Zonal Hazard Assessment Report, dated Sept 2007:
"High Risk: Inboard ram-air inlet downstream of water separator (Port and Starboard)
The vent pipes that normally convey ram air from the inboard intake to the vent system run through a particularly cluttered bay (on both sides of the aircraft) inboard of rib 1. Hydraulic pipes, flying control cables, fire detectors, anti-icing and bomb-bay heating ducts, electrical looms and terminal blocks, as well as other fuel system pipework and components are all present. Whilst the pipes would normally convey air, fuel can find its way into the vent lines folowing an overfill or during aircraft manoeuvres and potentially, could leak into this hazardous area"
The report also points out that another High Risk area is in the wing Root vent pipe couplings, and a Very High Risk is associated with the Tank 7 vent pipe connectors.
So, do you think you should be testing vent lines for air leaks, or fuel leaks? I am sure that you are well aware that FRS coupling seals behave differently for air and fuel. In fact the more you expose them to air, the bigger the problem because the dry out
DV
Here is a section from the QinetiQ Nimrod Fuel System Zonal Hazard Assessment Report, dated Sept 2007:
"High Risk: Inboard ram-air inlet downstream of water separator (Port and Starboard)
The vent pipes that normally convey ram air from the inboard intake to the vent system run through a particularly cluttered bay (on both sides of the aircraft) inboard of rib 1. Hydraulic pipes, flying control cables, fire detectors, anti-icing and bomb-bay heating ducts, electrical looms and terminal blocks, as well as other fuel system pipework and components are all present. Whilst the pipes would normally convey air, fuel can find its way into the vent lines folowing an overfill or during aircraft manoeuvres and potentially, could leak into this hazardous area"
The report also points out that another High Risk area is in the wing Root vent pipe couplings, and a Very High Risk is associated with the Tank 7 vent pipe connectors.
So, do you think you should be testing vent lines for air leaks, or fuel leaks? I am sure that you are well aware that FRS coupling seals behave differently for air and fuel. In fact the more you expose them to air, the bigger the problem because the dry out
DV
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you have to learn that your opinion is not necessarily shared by everyone and you can't force this on those that don't agree with you.
Here is a section from the QinetiQ Nimrod Fuel System Zonal Hazard Assessment Report, dated Sept 2007:
"High Risk: Inboard ram-air inlet downstream of water separator (Port and Starboard)
The vent pipes that normally convey ram air from the inboard intake to the vent system run through a particularly cluttered bay (on both sides of the aircraft) inboard of rib 1. Hydraulic pipes, flying control cables, fire detectors, anti-icing and bomb-bay heating ducts, electrical looms and terminal blocks, as well as other fuel system pipework and components are all present. Whilst the pipes would normally convey air, fuel can find its way into the vent lines folowing an overfill or during aircraft manoeuvres and potentially, could leak into this hazardous area"
"High Risk: Inboard ram-air inlet downstream of water separator (Port and Starboard)
The vent pipes that normally convey ram air from the inboard intake to the vent system run through a particularly cluttered bay (on both sides of the aircraft) inboard of rib 1. Hydraulic pipes, flying control cables, fire detectors, anti-icing and bomb-bay heating ducts, electrical looms and terminal blocks, as well as other fuel system pipework and components are all present. Whilst the pipes would normally convey air, fuel can find its way into the vent lines folowing an overfill or during aircraft manoeuvres and potentially, could leak into this hazardous area"
It appears that this assessment is looking at the "what if" of fuel getting into the wrong places, and what may happen. You would expect this in a zonal analysis to perhaps highlight issues/problems and hence lead to some decisions - e.g. perhaps stop AAR in this instance, or mitigate the hazard in other ways. It doesn't necessarily mean you should redesign the air vent pipe to handle fuel or test it with fuel in.
Would you test for leaks in your cars aircon air vent system with petrol? No. Is there a risk that a leaking fuel pipe in the engine bay may allow petrol into your air con air vent system? Possibly. What do you do about it? You would try and remove the risk of fuel getting into the air con system. You don't redesign the aircon air vent pipes to handle petrol just in case. In the Nimrod case you would probably opt to redesign the fuel tank venting solution so fuel could never enter such ducts to avoid the hazard above, which I assume applies during flight with AAR only.
So, do you think you should be testing vent lines for air leaks, or fuel leaks? I am sure that you are well aware that FRS coupling seals behave differently for air and fuel. In fact the more you expose them to air, the bigger the problem because the dry out
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JFZ 90
I do not think that I am. I have copies of several QinetiQ reports, each one contains an Administration page listing "Record of changes". Every report, except one, shows the first entry as being the "Initial issue". And why not? These are independent reports, compiled by a professional body and checked out by their own internal system. Why should they contact IPT, or anyone else and ask them "Does this seem OK"? The only report where that has happened is the "Des Browne" Fuel Systems report.
Simple answer is, no it is not right. There is no definition for "tolerably safe". Tolerable refers to a level of risk, not safety. The only other time that I have heard the phrase mentioned was during Group Captain Hickman's inquest statement. If you read the report, you will see that the statement, which only appears in the executive summary, does not "fit" with the rest of the report.
I assumes that the letters being referred to are those between Angus Robertson and SoS. The latest one that I know about is the one stating 21 recs are accepted and being implemented. Remember, Group Captain Hickman believes that he has until the end of the year.
That is correct. Do you think that it is right to fly around with hot air ducts in the engine bay areas that were declared life expired back in 2005. Remember, a similar duct with regards to age, caused the XV227 incident. I am sure that some form of external examination is being carried, but that tells you nothing about internal corrosion.
True, and you had better include QinetiQ as one of the "many", they wrote the report. Let me remind you, £247,000 was paid for this study, that's over £8,000 per recommendation, and only now are we starting to implement them with a back stop of the end of the year.
DV
I think you may be reading too much into this............What if the draft was wrong?
is it right that "tolerably safe" is in the report, or not?
Is this true? I think not from the letters?
This seems to mean in your eyes that it should not fly until these are fixed
Many are making much of these 30 recs
DV
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Some interesting comments about leadership on the thread. Can't say I have noticed too much leadership at the top of the RAF but there is always hope. What is required right now is a bit of clarity from the MoD and Chiefs of Staff. Angus Robertson's questions deserve to be answered properly. I doubt they will be, but you know, a real leader might say that the Nimrod is not airworthy but it is needed in Afghanistan.
The deafening silence is unfair on everybody especially those who fly and maintain the Mighty Hunter. I suspect the QC's Inquiry will drag and drag. I rather hope he has an occasional look at this thread or at least understands that it is imperative that his Inquiry is concluded with haste.
Some people here have slammed the Inquest for only taking 3 weeks to reach a stark conclusion. Perhaps the detractors should question the immediate rebuttal by the shop steward who hadn't bother to consult his Chiefs of Staff.
Those suggesting that I dislike the way the MoD operates should read the following. I wrote to the Defence Committee before the UK Deployment to Afg in 2006 stating my concerns that it would turn into another Vietnam type insurgency
.
I wrote specifically about the lack of equipment and support and the likely failure to bring European allies on board. The Chiefs of Staff new better agreeing to fight a war on two fronts. Have a read of Thomas Harding's article in today's Telegraph.
This is a snippet.
"However, the single greatest symbol of what is going wrong with our campaign is the lack of helicopters. At some point a senior commander is going to have to find the courage to mortgage his career and say in public what so many have said to me in private – that we are losing lives needlessly because there are not enough.
The eight RAF Chinooks are being flown relentlessly, and fatigue must be setting in. The Ministry of Defence says that the answer is to fly them for even more hours per month, but that's a stupid argument: we need more airframes, more spare parts and more pilots.
This is a refrain that occurs again and again in conversations with senior officers and seasoned NCOs. "Helicopters would put you in places where vehicles cannot," says one. Another says wistfully: "If I could get my hands on four Chinooks for two whole days…"
The reason why the US Marines were so successful in southern Helmand this spring was because they were able to land 600 troops in one lift in one night. In the two weeks I was with them, the Paras could only muster one air assault of two helicopters that had to go in three lifts, hugely increasing the risk of the enemy assembling an anti-aircraft team to attack them.
Then, as we pushed further into Taliban territory, we were forced to travel on foot alongside vehicles, because there were no helicopters available. The Taliban probably just laughed and walked off into the next valley.
Even when we detained a suspected roadside bomber – after slogging through the desert for hours – we almost had to release him because there was no helicopter to take him back to a legal holding facility for three days – the maximum detention time is four days.
The MoD knows that what we have is not enough, and has done for years. But the bean counters have never listened. "If the Government really cared about troops, they would pull their fingers out and get the resources out here," says one soldier.
We can win in Afghanistan, but to do so we will have to find the courage and resourcefulness shown by the enemy – not to mention a few of those long-prayed-for Chinooks."
Time for some leadership indeed.
The deafening silence is unfair on everybody especially those who fly and maintain the Mighty Hunter. I suspect the QC's Inquiry will drag and drag. I rather hope he has an occasional look at this thread or at least understands that it is imperative that his Inquiry is concluded with haste.
Some people here have slammed the Inquest for only taking 3 weeks to reach a stark conclusion. Perhaps the detractors should question the immediate rebuttal by the shop steward who hadn't bother to consult his Chiefs of Staff.
Those suggesting that I dislike the way the MoD operates should read the following. I wrote to the Defence Committee before the UK Deployment to Afg in 2006 stating my concerns that it would turn into another Vietnam type insurgency
.
I wrote specifically about the lack of equipment and support and the likely failure to bring European allies on board. The Chiefs of Staff new better agreeing to fight a war on two fronts. Have a read of Thomas Harding's article in today's Telegraph.
This is a snippet.
"However, the single greatest symbol of what is going wrong with our campaign is the lack of helicopters. At some point a senior commander is going to have to find the courage to mortgage his career and say in public what so many have said to me in private – that we are losing lives needlessly because there are not enough.
The eight RAF Chinooks are being flown relentlessly, and fatigue must be setting in. The Ministry of Defence says that the answer is to fly them for even more hours per month, but that's a stupid argument: we need more airframes, more spare parts and more pilots.
This is a refrain that occurs again and again in conversations with senior officers and seasoned NCOs. "Helicopters would put you in places where vehicles cannot," says one. Another says wistfully: "If I could get my hands on four Chinooks for two whole days…"
The reason why the US Marines were so successful in southern Helmand this spring was because they were able to land 600 troops in one lift in one night. In the two weeks I was with them, the Paras could only muster one air assault of two helicopters that had to go in three lifts, hugely increasing the risk of the enemy assembling an anti-aircraft team to attack them.
Then, as we pushed further into Taliban territory, we were forced to travel on foot alongside vehicles, because there were no helicopters available. The Taliban probably just laughed and walked off into the next valley.
Even when we detained a suspected roadside bomber – after slogging through the desert for hours – we almost had to release him because there was no helicopter to take him back to a legal holding facility for three days – the maximum detention time is four days.
The MoD knows that what we have is not enough, and has done for years. But the bean counters have never listened. "If the Government really cared about troops, they would pull their fingers out and get the resources out here," says one soldier.
We can win in Afghanistan, but to do so we will have to find the courage and resourcefulness shown by the enemy – not to mention a few of those long-prayed-for Chinooks."
Time for some leadership indeed.
Air vs Fuel
DV asks:
The simple answer to your question is that pressurising a pipe and coupling with air will find a leak a lot sooner than using a fluid (water or fuel). In the latter case, it can require up to twice the pressure to be applied due to the higher viscosity of liquids [Source - BAES testing of Nimrod FRS couplings]. The last thing you want it to have fuel leaking as a result of a pressure testing. Therefore, in engineering and safety terms, using air to test the vent and other fuel pipes is correct practice. As pointed out, the solution is to stop fuel entering the vent system. This will be addressed, I believe, on the MRA4.
Non engineers on this forum should stop making such ill informed comments. We would not dare tell pilots how to fly (especially those who drive big Boeing ones).
knowing that the real problem is not air leaks in vent lines, but fuel leaks, why do we not pressure test with fuel?
Non engineers on this forum should stop making such ill informed comments. We would not dare tell pilots how to fly (especially those who drive big Boeing ones).
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Can just see a lot of info that DV has posted here that some may get mixed up or confused.
Fuel lines on the Nimrod are pressure tested with fuel not air, as you know air in a fuel system is not good
i posted my previous comments on how the system is tested and used a few examples to clarify what I was meaning not meant to be taken serious like brakes checked on car (it was example only)
If the fuel system has a leak you can smell , hear or visualise the leak.
im not aware of any other way of checking for leaks maybe using a pressure guage and having a noticeable drop might do the trick but that method is not used on the Nimrod.
Fuel lines on the Nimrod are pressure tested with fuel not air, as you know air in a fuel system is not good
i posted my previous comments on how the system is tested and used a few examples to clarify what I was meaning not meant to be taken serious like brakes checked on car (it was example only)
If the fuel system has a leak you can smell , hear or visualise the leak.
im not aware of any other way of checking for leaks maybe using a pressure guage and having a noticeable drop might do the trick but that method is not used on the Nimrod.
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This isn't intended as an argument for one side, and against another, but I'd appreciate it if somebody more knowledgeable would correct where I'm wrong regarding airworthiness - my 'understanding' is as follows:
1) The RAF considers an aircraft airworthy provided the risks associated with operating it are reduced to ALARP.
2) The RAF asked Quinetic to report on the MR2, and were told there were 30 items to fix to make MR2 ALARP.
3) Out of those 30 items a few are contested - the RAF believes the Nimrod will be ALARP without them being fixed. I can understand this might in fact be so, although I think they ought to explain why this is so if they want to reduce the criticism level.
4) Some items are no longer requiring a fix, as they relate to AAR which is now cancelled - a procedural fix, again I can see how this is okay.
5) 21 (was it?) items have been agreed by the RAF as requiring a fix, but the fixes haven't been done yet - until these are fixed presumably Nimrod MR2 isn't ALARP?
In light of (1) and (5) how can the RAF describe the aircraft as anything other than non-airworthy? This isn't a rant, it's a genuine question - I'm not after opinions about whether it's safe, or needed in theatre here, I'm simply asking which bits I misunderstood because as I read it the aircraft is non-airworthy according to the RAF's own criteria... is (1) true or not, and is (5) true or not? If 1 and 5 are in fact correct, then the aircraft isn't airworthy. (For what it's worth I'd like it to be okay, I just don't see how anyone can say it is).
Pipe testing - I'm not an engineer, here comes the almighty 'but'....BUT I'd have thought the way to test for a leak in any systrem was to pressurise it and monitor the pressure - if the pressure drops you have a leak. Whether you use a liquid or a gas to pressurise it in any given circumstance I'll leave to wiser heads, although I suspect a gas would be better. (Gases tend to escape from confinement more readily than liquids).
Not wishing to offend any engineers with this, but a pressure drop will guarantee (provided temperature isn't changing) that the gas is escaping somewhere. (PV over T Kelvin is constant and all that).
Dave
1) The RAF considers an aircraft airworthy provided the risks associated with operating it are reduced to ALARP.
2) The RAF asked Quinetic to report on the MR2, and were told there were 30 items to fix to make MR2 ALARP.
3) Out of those 30 items a few are contested - the RAF believes the Nimrod will be ALARP without them being fixed. I can understand this might in fact be so, although I think they ought to explain why this is so if they want to reduce the criticism level.
4) Some items are no longer requiring a fix, as they relate to AAR which is now cancelled - a procedural fix, again I can see how this is okay.
5) 21 (was it?) items have been agreed by the RAF as requiring a fix, but the fixes haven't been done yet - until these are fixed presumably Nimrod MR2 isn't ALARP?
In light of (1) and (5) how can the RAF describe the aircraft as anything other than non-airworthy? This isn't a rant, it's a genuine question - I'm not after opinions about whether it's safe, or needed in theatre here, I'm simply asking which bits I misunderstood because as I read it the aircraft is non-airworthy according to the RAF's own criteria... is (1) true or not, and is (5) true or not? If 1 and 5 are in fact correct, then the aircraft isn't airworthy. (For what it's worth I'd like it to be okay, I just don't see how anyone can say it is).
Pipe testing - I'm not an engineer, here comes the almighty 'but'....BUT I'd have thought the way to test for a leak in any systrem was to pressurise it and monitor the pressure - if the pressure drops you have a leak. Whether you use a liquid or a gas to pressurise it in any given circumstance I'll leave to wiser heads, although I suspect a gas would be better. (Gases tend to escape from confinement more readily than liquids).
Not wishing to offend any engineers with this, but a pressure drop will guarantee (provided temperature isn't changing) that the gas is escaping somewhere. (PV over T Kelvin is constant and all that).
Dave