Some interesting comments about leadership on the thread. Can't say I have noticed too much leadership at the top of the RAF but there is always hope. What is required right now is a bit of clarity from the MoD and Chiefs of Staff. Angus Robertson's questions deserve to be answered properly. I doubt they will be, but you know, a real leader might say that the Nimrod is not airworthy but it is needed in Afghanistan.
The deafening silence is unfair on everybody especially those who fly and maintain the Mighty Hunter. I suspect the QC's Inquiry will drag and drag. I rather hope he has an occasional look at this thread or at least understands that it is imperative that his Inquiry is concluded with haste.
Some people here have slammed the Inquest for only taking 3 weeks to reach a stark conclusion. Perhaps the detractors should question the immediate rebuttal by the shop steward who hadn't bother to consult his Chiefs of Staff.
Those suggesting that I dislike the way the MoD operates should read the following. I wrote to the Defence Committee before the UK Deployment to Afg in 2006 stating my concerns that it would turn into another Vietnam type insurgency
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I wrote specifically about the lack of equipment and support and the likely failure to bring European allies on board. The Chiefs of Staff new better agreeing to fight a war on two fronts. Have a read of Thomas Harding's article in today's Telegraph.
This is a snippet.
"However, the single greatest symbol of what is going wrong with our campaign is the lack of helicopters. At some point a senior commander is going to have to find the courage to mortgage his career and say in public what so many have said to me in private – that we are losing lives needlessly because there are not enough.
The eight RAF Chinooks are being flown relentlessly, and fatigue must be setting in. The Ministry of Defence says that the answer is to fly them for even more hours per month, but that's a stupid argument: we need more airframes, more spare parts and more pilots.
This is a refrain that occurs again and again in conversations with senior officers and seasoned NCOs. "Helicopters would put you in places where vehicles cannot," says one. Another says wistfully: "If I could get my hands on four Chinooks for two whole days…"
The reason why the US Marines were so successful in southern Helmand this spring was because they were able to land 600 troops in one lift in one night. In the two weeks I was with them, the Paras could only muster one air assault of two helicopters that had to go in three lifts, hugely increasing the risk of the enemy assembling an anti-aircraft team to attack them.
Then, as we pushed further into Taliban territory, we were forced to travel on foot alongside vehicles, because there were no helicopters available. The Taliban probably just laughed and walked off into the next valley.
Even when we detained a suspected roadside bomber – after slogging through the desert for hours – we almost had to release him because there was no helicopter to take him back to a legal holding facility for three days – the maximum detention time is four days.
The MoD knows that what we have is not enough, and has done for years. But the bean counters have never listened. "If the Government really cared about troops, they would pull their fingers out and get the resources out here," says one soldier.
We can win in Afghanistan, but to do so we will have to find the courage and resourcefulness shown by the enemy – not to mention a few of those long-prayed-for Chinooks."
Time for some leadership indeed.