Nimrod crash in Afghanistan Tech/Info/Discussion (NOT condolences)
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Criticism of Andrew Walker
The Coroner has come in for severe criticism from some quarters on this thread. Listening to the families of the dead he is described as something of a hero. I was there in person when he said Nimrod was not airworthy. I believe him. He has been so effective, the Govt passed legislation last week enabling them to appoint their coroner of choice for sensitive inquests and the right to ban juries. The Coroner's representative body was not consulted. Those with the blinkers firmly attached, just carry on. Pretty soon, no information about the deaths of British servicemen will be made available to the public. A form of censorship is already happening with the deaths of special forces personnel.
Thought I would post up a summary of some of the cases he has presided over.
Andrew Walker: the coroner the MoD couldn't gag
(Gill Allen/The Times)
Andrew Walker was appointed as coroner only temporarily
Nico Hines
Andrew Walker, the Deputy Coroner for Oxfordshire, has been defiantly standing up to the military since lambasting US forces twice in 2003.
He first called for criminal charges to be considered against US servicemen involved in the “friendly fire” killing of the ITN reporter Terry Lloyd and then criticised Washington for refusing to co-operate in the inquest of Lance Corporal Matty Hull, another victim of American weaponry.
In the five years since, Mr Walker’s criticism has often been reserved for the Ministry of Defence. The coroner is responsible for dozens of inquests into the deaths of British servicemen killed in Iraq and Afghanistan because RAF Brize Norton, where many bodies arrive back in the UK, is within his remit.
In his verdicts, Mr Walker has labelled MoD behaviour as “inexcusable”, “a breach of trust”, “penny-pinching” and “unforgiveable”.
Des Browne, the Defence Secretary, became so infuriated with Mr Walker’s damning verdicts that he called unsuccessfully for a ban on coroners using phrases such as "serious failures" or "serious failings" for soldiers killed in active service.
In September 2006 Mr Walker became embroiled in another row with the MoD. He was accidentally given a raft of documents while investigating the deaths of 14 servicemen in an RAF Nimrod. When the ministry demanded the papers back the coroner refused, saying he could not trust that the material would be seen again if it were returned.
Mr Walker was originally drafted in to help clear the backlog of military inquests in Oxfordshire on a temporary basis in June 2006. To the chagrin of the MoD, he is still there.
Inquests heard by Andrew Walker
Steven Roberts, 33 Sergeant Steven Roberts was shot dead in Iraq in 2003 after giving his body armour to a colleague because of equipment shortages. Mr Walker blamed the Army for "serious failings" in ensuring that soldiers had the necessary supplies. "To send soldiers into a combat zone without the appropriate basic equipment is, in my view, unforgivable and inexcusable and represents a breach of trust the soldiers have in those in government,” he said.
Jason Smith, 32 TA Private Jason Smith died of heatstroke in Iraq in August 2003 after falling ill in temperatures of more than 54C. Mr Walker blamed his death on "a serious failure to recognise and take appropriate steps to address the difficulty he had in adjusting to the climate".
James Philippson, 29
Captain James Philippson of 7 Parachute Regiment Royal Horse Artillery, died in a gunfight with Taleban troops in 2006 in which British forces were “totally out-gunned”. Mr Walker said: “To send soldiers into a combat zone without basic equipment is unforgivable, inexcusable and a breach of trust between the soldiers and those who govern them.”
Sean Tansey, 26 Lance Corporal Sean Tansey died in August 2006. He was repairing a light tank in Helmand province, Afghanistan, when the supports beneath the vehicle slipped and he was crushed to death. Mr Walker said: "This court has heard evidence of the failure to provide basic equipment for the maintenance of vehicles, which has been described by one witness as amounting to a gross or serious failure."
Lee Hopkins, 35, Sharron Elliott, 34, Ben Nowak, 27, and Jason Hylton, 33 Mr Walker ruled that Warrant Officer Lee Hopkins, Staff Sergeant Sharron Elliott, Corporal Ben Nowak and Marine Jason Hylton were unlawfully killed on a river near Basra. He said that if the Royal Marines' boat had been fitted with an electronic counter measure it was "more likely than not" that the device would not have gone off in November 2006. The coroner concluded that the deaths amounted to "a really serious failure to follow basic procedure".
Matty Hull, 25 Mr Walker described the killing of Lance Corporal of Horse Matty Hull by a US pilot as "unlawful", not an "honest mistake" but a "criminal act". The Pentagon rejected his verdict. The inquest heard that L/Cpl Hull died because his unit was not supplied with Blue Force Tracker, an electronic device which could automatically have identified them as friendly forces.
Daniel Wright, 25 Mr Walker concluded that “MoD penny-pinching” resulted in Captain Daniel Wright dying a parachute accident at RAF Brize Norton because he was deprived of a £50 radio “Let there be no doubt — this tragedy happened for the want of a simple, inexpensive piece of equipment," he said.
Another Inquest verdict was heard last weekend just to show that Walker is not a lone trouble maker;
Armed Forces Minister apologises for 'avoidable' submarine deaths
IMAGE :1 of 2
Michael Evans, Defence Editor
A minister and the head of the Royal Navy made public apologies yesterday after a report into the deaths of two crew who were killed in an explosion on a nuclear submarine uncovered safety flaws and dangerously defective equipment.
Leading Operator Mechanic Paul McCann, 32, and Operator Mechanic Anthony Huntrod, 20, were killed on board HMS Tireless when an oxygen-generating device blew up as they activated it during a training exercise under the Arctic ice cap on March 20 last year.
Alan and Brenda Huntrod, parents of Operator Mechanic Huntrod, said the report by the Royal Navy board of inquiry showed “incredibly scant regard” for personnel safety. “We feel that if this was in any other walk of life, there would have been a prosecution for corporate manslaughter,” they said. “In our view the report sets out in clear detail overwhelming evidence of gross negligence, making the Ministry of Defence culpable for the death of our son, Anthony, and Paul.”
Bob Ainsworth, the Armed Forces Minister, sitting next to Admiral Sir Jonathon Band, the First Sea Lord, at a press conference, confessed that the failings that led to the deaths had been avoidable and that the ministry was responsible. “I would like to apologise to the families,” he said. The devices have been recalled.
Sailors killed in sub blast named
Two British sailors killed in submarine accident
More troubled waters for Navy after sub accident
The board of inquiry discovered that 996 of the “Scogs” (self-contained oxygen generators) had been defined as unserviceable and placed in a hazardous waste store. But they had been put back into service, regraded “A1” and the relevant paperwork had been changed. Royal Navy military police also found that the sodium chlorate briquettes in the containers, which had to be ignited to produce oxygen, had been removed from drying ovens too soon, which had led to cracks.
The board of inquiry report, drawn up by Captain Jake Moores, said it was possible, “but cannot be proved”, that a number of the defective Scogs were among those sent to Tireless. After his 15-month investigation he concluded that oil had probably seeped into the device while it was stored in the submarine, and that the canister had been damaged previously. The combination caused a “huge explosion”.
The maker of the devices had said in a leaflet that if oil seeped into the generator it could lead to an explosion. Captain Moores added that despite recommendations that they be stored in a “clean, dry environment”, the Scogs for Tireless sat uncovered on a jetty for two weeks.
And another Coroner reached a verdict this week. Walker is not alone in criticising the Govt.
Soldier died in vehicle lacking defence system
By Nigel Bunyan
Last Updated: 7:22PM BST 13/06/2008
A coroner has called for a change in Army policy after a soldier fighting in Afghanistan died in an armoured vehicle that had not been fitted with electronic equipment capable of disabling roadside bombs.
Guardsman Neil 'Tony' Downes, 20, from Droylesden, Greater Manchester, was blown 20 metres into a ditch when insurgents detonated a bomb by remote control.
The vehicle in front of him was equipped with an ECM (Electronic Counter Measure) and therefore survived the attack.
Guardsman Downes' mother, Sheryl, 44, told an inquest in Stockport: "In my opinion, having the ECM fitted on Tony's vehicle might have saved his life.
"I cannot understand why all vehicles do not have these systems fitted. It will be preying on my mind for the rest of my life. I just do not want other family to go through what I have."
Her husband, Ronnie, 60, said: "I would say that it should be fitted as standard to all vehicles because it obviously saves lives".
The south Manchester coroner, John Pollard, said he would be writing to the Ministry of Defence over the issue.
In recording a verdict of unlawful killing, he said: "It is my view that all vehicles used in this type of operation should be adapted to be able to carry their own ECM equipment.
"If some vehicles are not so equipped, then it should be clearly understood that the order of march should be arranged to afford protection at all times to those vehicles and that the order of march should not be deviated from, save in exceptional circumstances."
The inquest heard that Guardsman Downes, described by commanding officers as "resolute and steadfast", was on a six-month tour with the 1st Battalion Grenadier Guards.
On June 9 last year he was a gunner in an armoured vehicle that was among a convoy of 10 dispatched to investigate reports of gunfire.
His vehicle had not been fitted with ECM despite the fact that it was carrying more than 200 grenades.
The bomb that killed him was detonated by remote control. ECM might have saved him by either jamming or scrambling the bomb's detonation mechanism.
Thought I would post up a summary of some of the cases he has presided over.
Andrew Walker: the coroner the MoD couldn't gag
(Gill Allen/The Times)
Andrew Walker was appointed as coroner only temporarily
Nico Hines
Andrew Walker, the Deputy Coroner for Oxfordshire, has been defiantly standing up to the military since lambasting US forces twice in 2003.
He first called for criminal charges to be considered against US servicemen involved in the “friendly fire” killing of the ITN reporter Terry Lloyd and then criticised Washington for refusing to co-operate in the inquest of Lance Corporal Matty Hull, another victim of American weaponry.
In the five years since, Mr Walker’s criticism has often been reserved for the Ministry of Defence. The coroner is responsible for dozens of inquests into the deaths of British servicemen killed in Iraq and Afghanistan because RAF Brize Norton, where many bodies arrive back in the UK, is within his remit.
In his verdicts, Mr Walker has labelled MoD behaviour as “inexcusable”, “a breach of trust”, “penny-pinching” and “unforgiveable”.
Des Browne, the Defence Secretary, became so infuriated with Mr Walker’s damning verdicts that he called unsuccessfully for a ban on coroners using phrases such as "serious failures" or "serious failings" for soldiers killed in active service.
In September 2006 Mr Walker became embroiled in another row with the MoD. He was accidentally given a raft of documents while investigating the deaths of 14 servicemen in an RAF Nimrod. When the ministry demanded the papers back the coroner refused, saying he could not trust that the material would be seen again if it were returned.
Mr Walker was originally drafted in to help clear the backlog of military inquests in Oxfordshire on a temporary basis in June 2006. To the chagrin of the MoD, he is still there.
Inquests heard by Andrew Walker
Steven Roberts, 33 Sergeant Steven Roberts was shot dead in Iraq in 2003 after giving his body armour to a colleague because of equipment shortages. Mr Walker blamed the Army for "serious failings" in ensuring that soldiers had the necessary supplies. "To send soldiers into a combat zone without the appropriate basic equipment is, in my view, unforgivable and inexcusable and represents a breach of trust the soldiers have in those in government,” he said.
Jason Smith, 32 TA Private Jason Smith died of heatstroke in Iraq in August 2003 after falling ill in temperatures of more than 54C. Mr Walker blamed his death on "a serious failure to recognise and take appropriate steps to address the difficulty he had in adjusting to the climate".
James Philippson, 29
Captain James Philippson of 7 Parachute Regiment Royal Horse Artillery, died in a gunfight with Taleban troops in 2006 in which British forces were “totally out-gunned”. Mr Walker said: “To send soldiers into a combat zone without basic equipment is unforgivable, inexcusable and a breach of trust between the soldiers and those who govern them.”
Sean Tansey, 26 Lance Corporal Sean Tansey died in August 2006. He was repairing a light tank in Helmand province, Afghanistan, when the supports beneath the vehicle slipped and he was crushed to death. Mr Walker said: "This court has heard evidence of the failure to provide basic equipment for the maintenance of vehicles, which has been described by one witness as amounting to a gross or serious failure."
Lee Hopkins, 35, Sharron Elliott, 34, Ben Nowak, 27, and Jason Hylton, 33 Mr Walker ruled that Warrant Officer Lee Hopkins, Staff Sergeant Sharron Elliott, Corporal Ben Nowak and Marine Jason Hylton were unlawfully killed on a river near Basra. He said that if the Royal Marines' boat had been fitted with an electronic counter measure it was "more likely than not" that the device would not have gone off in November 2006. The coroner concluded that the deaths amounted to "a really serious failure to follow basic procedure".
Matty Hull, 25 Mr Walker described the killing of Lance Corporal of Horse Matty Hull by a US pilot as "unlawful", not an "honest mistake" but a "criminal act". The Pentagon rejected his verdict. The inquest heard that L/Cpl Hull died because his unit was not supplied with Blue Force Tracker, an electronic device which could automatically have identified them as friendly forces.
Daniel Wright, 25 Mr Walker concluded that “MoD penny-pinching” resulted in Captain Daniel Wright dying a parachute accident at RAF Brize Norton because he was deprived of a £50 radio “Let there be no doubt — this tragedy happened for the want of a simple, inexpensive piece of equipment," he said.
Another Inquest verdict was heard last weekend just to show that Walker is not a lone trouble maker;
Armed Forces Minister apologises for 'avoidable' submarine deaths
IMAGE :1 of 2
Michael Evans, Defence Editor
A minister and the head of the Royal Navy made public apologies yesterday after a report into the deaths of two crew who were killed in an explosion on a nuclear submarine uncovered safety flaws and dangerously defective equipment.
Leading Operator Mechanic Paul McCann, 32, and Operator Mechanic Anthony Huntrod, 20, were killed on board HMS Tireless when an oxygen-generating device blew up as they activated it during a training exercise under the Arctic ice cap on March 20 last year.
Alan and Brenda Huntrod, parents of Operator Mechanic Huntrod, said the report by the Royal Navy board of inquiry showed “incredibly scant regard” for personnel safety. “We feel that if this was in any other walk of life, there would have been a prosecution for corporate manslaughter,” they said. “In our view the report sets out in clear detail overwhelming evidence of gross negligence, making the Ministry of Defence culpable for the death of our son, Anthony, and Paul.”
Bob Ainsworth, the Armed Forces Minister, sitting next to Admiral Sir Jonathon Band, the First Sea Lord, at a press conference, confessed that the failings that led to the deaths had been avoidable and that the ministry was responsible. “I would like to apologise to the families,” he said. The devices have been recalled.
Sailors killed in sub blast named
Two British sailors killed in submarine accident
More troubled waters for Navy after sub accident
The board of inquiry discovered that 996 of the “Scogs” (self-contained oxygen generators) had been defined as unserviceable and placed in a hazardous waste store. But they had been put back into service, regraded “A1” and the relevant paperwork had been changed. Royal Navy military police also found that the sodium chlorate briquettes in the containers, which had to be ignited to produce oxygen, had been removed from drying ovens too soon, which had led to cracks.
The board of inquiry report, drawn up by Captain Jake Moores, said it was possible, “but cannot be proved”, that a number of the defective Scogs were among those sent to Tireless. After his 15-month investigation he concluded that oil had probably seeped into the device while it was stored in the submarine, and that the canister had been damaged previously. The combination caused a “huge explosion”.
The maker of the devices had said in a leaflet that if oil seeped into the generator it could lead to an explosion. Captain Moores added that despite recommendations that they be stored in a “clean, dry environment”, the Scogs for Tireless sat uncovered on a jetty for two weeks.
And another Coroner reached a verdict this week. Walker is not alone in criticising the Govt.
Soldier died in vehicle lacking defence system
By Nigel Bunyan
Last Updated: 7:22PM BST 13/06/2008
A coroner has called for a change in Army policy after a soldier fighting in Afghanistan died in an armoured vehicle that had not been fitted with electronic equipment capable of disabling roadside bombs.
Guardsman Neil 'Tony' Downes, 20, from Droylesden, Greater Manchester, was blown 20 metres into a ditch when insurgents detonated a bomb by remote control.
The vehicle in front of him was equipped with an ECM (Electronic Counter Measure) and therefore survived the attack.
Guardsman Downes' mother, Sheryl, 44, told an inquest in Stockport: "In my opinion, having the ECM fitted on Tony's vehicle might have saved his life.
"I cannot understand why all vehicles do not have these systems fitted. It will be preying on my mind for the rest of my life. I just do not want other family to go through what I have."
Her husband, Ronnie, 60, said: "I would say that it should be fitted as standard to all vehicles because it obviously saves lives".
The south Manchester coroner, John Pollard, said he would be writing to the Ministry of Defence over the issue.
In recording a verdict of unlawful killing, he said: "It is my view that all vehicles used in this type of operation should be adapted to be able to carry their own ECM equipment.
"If some vehicles are not so equipped, then it should be clearly understood that the order of march should be arranged to afford protection at all times to those vehicles and that the order of march should not be deviated from, save in exceptional circumstances."
The inquest heard that Guardsman Downes, described by commanding officers as "resolute and steadfast", was on a six-month tour with the 1st Battalion Grenadier Guards.
On June 9 last year he was a gunner in an armoured vehicle that was among a convoy of 10 dispatched to investigate reports of gunfire.
His vehicle had not been fitted with ECM despite the fact that it was carrying more than 200 grenades.
The bomb that killed him was detonated by remote control. ECM might have saved him by either jamming or scrambling the bomb's detonation mechanism.
Last edited by nigegilb; 14th Jun 2008 at 22:13.
Oldlae
Same here – a long time. But “in our day” we didn’t have extraordinary commercial pressures applied to our “business”. The boundaries of responsibility were clear and we did not have the complication of contractors working alongside whose management was not SENGO or AEO, but beancounters wanting to make as big a profit as they could. I simply can’t imagine what it must be like under these circumstances and I’m glad I laid my tools down long ago. But I do know what it’s like in the procurement side – beancounters from the same mould constantly cutting airworthiness and safety funding, and non-technical bosses making (and over-ruling) engineering design decisions, requiring precious time and money to track down and correct when they’re not looking. (And just praying you catch them all because the rules simply don't cater for such a ludicrous scenario).
If I may quote the QQ March 2006 report, which I’m sure most have read anyway;
“….overall control and quality of work was not helped by the loss of (Test Equipment/Ground Support Equipment), inadequate tooling and poor upkeep of the APs”.
“It is suggested that (up to date) documentation should be promulgated….”
“There is a lack of expertise and a critical loss of experienced personnel that has had a major impact upon efficiency…. “.
“No routine checks (or) examination for fatigue cracking, corrosion or damage” are conducted because there is “no contractual obligation”. FFS!!!!
While an obvious statement, I find this one particularly damning, as it (correctly) draws the MRA4 programme into the equation. It is easy for me to say this, but the fact remains if MRA4 hadn’t been 10 years late…………..
“The current fleet age is in excess of 30 years which is considerably beyond the initial design requirement for the aircraft. Furthermore, the replacement aircraft – Nimrod MRA4 – has a life expectancy of only 25 years which is representative of the expected performance of modern build standards”.
It's a long time since I certified military aircraft as serviceable to fly but I do not think that the principles have changed that much.
Same here – a long time. But “in our day” we didn’t have extraordinary commercial pressures applied to our “business”. The boundaries of responsibility were clear and we did not have the complication of contractors working alongside whose management was not SENGO or AEO, but beancounters wanting to make as big a profit as they could. I simply can’t imagine what it must be like under these circumstances and I’m glad I laid my tools down long ago. But I do know what it’s like in the procurement side – beancounters from the same mould constantly cutting airworthiness and safety funding, and non-technical bosses making (and over-ruling) engineering design decisions, requiring precious time and money to track down and correct when they’re not looking. (And just praying you catch them all because the rules simply don't cater for such a ludicrous scenario).
If I may quote the QQ March 2006 report, which I’m sure most have read anyway;
“….overall control and quality of work was not helped by the loss of (Test Equipment/Ground Support Equipment), inadequate tooling and poor upkeep of the APs”.
“It is suggested that (up to date) documentation should be promulgated….”
“There is a lack of expertise and a critical loss of experienced personnel that has had a major impact upon efficiency…. “.
“No routine checks (or) examination for fatigue cracking, corrosion or damage” are conducted because there is “no contractual obligation”. FFS!!!!
While an obvious statement, I find this one particularly damning, as it (correctly) draws the MRA4 programme into the equation. It is easy for me to say this, but the fact remains if MRA4 hadn’t been 10 years late…………..
“The current fleet age is in excess of 30 years which is considerably beyond the initial design requirement for the aircraft. Furthermore, the replacement aircraft – Nimrod MRA4 – has a life expectancy of only 25 years which is representative of the expected performance of modern build standards”.
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nigegilb.
I am not trying to criticise the coroner, but unlike you I'm not jumping on the 'everyone in the Mil is covering up' band wagon just because a 'deputy assistant coroner' with 3 weeks Nimrod experience, says so.
The BOI spent over a year looking at this case with some highly respected Nimrod people on the board. They also examined the same evidence as the Coroner including the expert witnesses. The board came to their findings in an effort to make the ac safer such that the terrible events of 230 are not repeated. I was at the coroners and from the start he appeared to want to find a different outcome to the board. Sorry nige i'm just not in the 'coroners fan club' just because he's slagging off the military.
If you wish to put your faith in the opinion of a 'deputy assistant coroner' so be it. You don't fly the jet. I will personally pay more heed to the board members who have a real 'expert' opinion.
I am not trying to criticise the coroner, but unlike you I'm not jumping on the 'everyone in the Mil is covering up' band wagon just because a 'deputy assistant coroner' with 3 weeks Nimrod experience, says so.
The BOI spent over a year looking at this case with some highly respected Nimrod people on the board. They also examined the same evidence as the Coroner including the expert witnesses. The board came to their findings in an effort to make the ac safer such that the terrible events of 230 are not repeated. I was at the coroners and from the start he appeared to want to find a different outcome to the board. Sorry nige i'm just not in the 'coroners fan club' just because he's slagging off the military.
If you wish to put your faith in the opinion of a 'deputy assistant coroner' so be it. You don't fly the jet. I will personally pay more heed to the board members who have a real 'expert' opinion.
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He cannot rule, confirm, or state airworthyness. Not his call.
If the ac is not airworthy it wouldnt be flying in British, or any body elses airspace.
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andgo, people in the military have been gagged. They may not have a voice, but they do have a choice. Nearly 1,500 army officers left in the 12 months to April, 50% more than joined. The voting with feet option is being exercised.
Cover up?-No. Blinkers on?-Yes.
The Govt fights 2 wars on the cheap, the least it could do is provide people who are willing to lay their lives down, decent equipment. It might even stem the exodus.
If you would take your blinkers off for a moment, you would see that on introduction to service, MRA4 will not be fit for purpose. This argument about Nimrod MR2 is not happening in isolation, it is just one example of severe under-funding. Please do not feel that critical voices are picking on you.
General Dannatt has criticised this Govt, he has been passed over. According to reports the PM would rather have either of the 2 most senior RAF officers as the supreme commander. Now why is that? Because they won't rock the boat?
Funny thing is, one of those senior RAF officers, would rather have a cushty little job in industry.
Says it all for me.
Cover up?-No. Blinkers on?-Yes.
The Govt fights 2 wars on the cheap, the least it could do is provide people who are willing to lay their lives down, decent equipment. It might even stem the exodus.
If you would take your blinkers off for a moment, you would see that on introduction to service, MRA4 will not be fit for purpose. This argument about Nimrod MR2 is not happening in isolation, it is just one example of severe under-funding. Please do not feel that critical voices are picking on you.
General Dannatt has criticised this Govt, he has been passed over. According to reports the PM would rather have either of the 2 most senior RAF officers as the supreme commander. Now why is that? Because they won't rock the boat?
Funny thing is, one of those senior RAF officers, would rather have a cushty little job in industry.
Says it all for me.
Last edited by nigegilb; 15th Jun 2008 at 13:05.
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Nigegilb
No blikers on, just trying to do a difficult job in very difficult circumstances.
You have done a great deal of good in the past bringing problems to the fore, I for one appreciate it. However We use the kit we have to, scaremongering the population into thinking that a Nimrod may just drop out of the sky is not helpful. XV230 was a tradgic accident, that could have been avoided. If people/organisations are found culpable then so be it.
The jet is safer today than it has been in years, more work is needed, and it is been done.
No blikers on, just trying to do a difficult job in very difficult circumstances.
You have done a great deal of good in the past bringing problems to the fore, I for one appreciate it. However We use the kit we have to, scaremongering the population into thinking that a Nimrod may just drop out of the sky is not helpful. XV230 was a tradgic accident, that could have been avoided. If people/organisations are found culpable then so be it.
The jet is safer today than it has been in years, more work is needed, and it is been done.
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AG, as a civvy now, I appreciate the job you are doing, I have watched Torpy closely, I don't think he is prepared to take too great a risk with Nimrod. For me, the clincher is his reaction to the kandahar mayday, and the cessation of AAR. The deision was not entirely logical and could be lifted at any time to improve in-theatre capability. The arguments presented by people such as yourself would justify such a decision. My reading of the refusal to reinstate AAR is that it is mainly political. Either by Torpy or his defence minister. My conclusion is that Nimrod MR2 is now safe enough, but I still firmly believe that Torpy and his ministers are being dishonest in claiming the aircraft is technically airworthy.
MRA4 will be pushed into service without war-going protection, but arguably, safer to fly that MR2. Hardly a ringing endorsement of RAF wartime leadership.
I hope Torpy is replaced soon with a war leader prepared to make tough decisions and push the Govt around, publically if necessary, to get what he wants.
In the mean time I will keep pushing in my own way but at the same time, making absolutely clear my support for the guys on the frontline doing a very difficult job.
All the best,
NG
MRA4 will be pushed into service without war-going protection, but arguably, safer to fly that MR2. Hardly a ringing endorsement of RAF wartime leadership.
I hope Torpy is replaced soon with a war leader prepared to make tough decisions and push the Govt around, publically if necessary, to get what he wants.
In the mean time I will keep pushing in my own way but at the same time, making absolutely clear my support for the guys on the frontline doing a very difficult job.
All the best,
NG
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Nige.
Agreed on most points.
AAR will not be re-introduced in part due to the fact that a serious fault could not be reproduced on the ground, and in part as you say politics, even if we could fix it.
AG
Agreed on most points.
AAR will not be re-introduced in part due to the fact that a serious fault could not be reproduced on the ground, and in part as you say politics, even if we could fix it.
AG
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andgo, a final point on your comment and without wishing to open up the hornets nest one more time. There is no difference between the Kandahar fuel leak and the previous fuel leaks that went before it. As fas as I know, it has never been possible to re-create the in-flight conditions. What was different about this incident was the massive publicity and the associated political fallout. Torpy was happy to take the risks on your behalf before Kandahar but not afterwards. Not sure if that should worry you or not. I heard a little rumour that some people criticised the captain for the Mayday into Kandahar. I hope they are not true. I fly a modern aircraft and modern aircraft do not leak fuel. Having spoken with some seniors at Kinloss there appears to be an acceptance that fuel leaks are OK and can be managed on the Nimrod. If you are happy with that, then again, you are in the military and you are all big boys. Nothing we say will change your mind.
The publicity and political fall out is not nice if you are in the middle of it and trying to do a bloody difficult job. All I can add, is that good things come of it in the end. I speak from experience on that.
It is now in the hands of the QC. Coroner Walker can say or recommend anything he wishes but the Govt does not have to comply. They will have no choice with the QC's recommendations. I guess we all now, need to be patient.
Barring anything new, I withdraw once more from the debate.
Safe flying.
The publicity and political fall out is not nice if you are in the middle of it and trying to do a bloody difficult job. All I can add, is that good things come of it in the end. I speak from experience on that.
It is now in the hands of the QC. Coroner Walker can say or recommend anything he wishes but the Govt does not have to comply. They will have no choice with the QC's recommendations. I guess we all now, need to be patient.
Barring anything new, I withdraw once more from the debate.
Safe flying.
Nigegilb
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/20373668/
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/m..._4/ai_n8642342
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Air_Transat_Flight_236
http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exer...74C72F9B6B.htm
http://technology.newscientist.com/article/dn8692
These are just a few with a simple google search.
and modern aircraft do not leak fuel
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/m..._4/ai_n8642342
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Air_Transat_Flight_236
http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exer...74C72F9B6B.htm
http://technology.newscientist.com/article/dn8692
These are just a few with a simple google search.
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For the pedantics out there, modern aircraft do not routinely leak fuel. If you think carrying 11 fuel leaks is normal than more fool you.
In 18 years I have seen one fuel leak on a 35 year old Hercules prompting an immediate RTB and fix by Lye eng wg.
You have been conditioned to think that it is normal to get leaks and that the response of removing ignition sources is perfectly adequate.
Nimrod is beyond it's sell by date, over-torquing joints and sending the problem further down the line is hardly best engineering practice.
"..if you're removing an aluminium bolt and replacing it with a steel one - itself a howler, explained very clearly by QQ. Think of something simple like the expansion bolts that hold your cylinder head and engine block together in your car. The manufacturer puts a matched set in, made from the same material, at the same torque setting for very good reason. What would happen if you took out half the bolts at random and replaced them with bolts of a dissimilar metal. The "expansion" characteristics change and you'd probably blow a gasket. You wouldn't do it in your car, so why do it in an aircraft in an area where the whole point is to seal fuel tanks."
Nice use of Al Jazeera though.
Boeing 787 will have fuel tank protection it arrives in the same year as MRA4, a military aircraft procured for the front line. MRA4 will not have fuel tank protection.
And it won't have a whole lot of other protection either. You might want to question your own CoC for that decision making.
In 18 years I have seen one fuel leak on a 35 year old Hercules prompting an immediate RTB and fix by Lye eng wg.
You have been conditioned to think that it is normal to get leaks and that the response of removing ignition sources is perfectly adequate.
Nimrod is beyond it's sell by date, over-torquing joints and sending the problem further down the line is hardly best engineering practice.
"..if you're removing an aluminium bolt and replacing it with a steel one - itself a howler, explained very clearly by QQ. Think of something simple like the expansion bolts that hold your cylinder head and engine block together in your car. The manufacturer puts a matched set in, made from the same material, at the same torque setting for very good reason. What would happen if you took out half the bolts at random and replaced them with bolts of a dissimilar metal. The "expansion" characteristics change and you'd probably blow a gasket. You wouldn't do it in your car, so why do it in an aircraft in an area where the whole point is to seal fuel tanks."
Nice use of Al Jazeera though.
Boeing 787 will have fuel tank protection it arrives in the same year as MRA4, a military aircraft procured for the front line. MRA4 will not have fuel tank protection.
And it won't have a whole lot of other protection either. You might want to question your own CoC for that decision making.
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Tofo,
not wishing to get too involved in arguing the toss here, but since when have we had that many airframes on the eng coord boards? As far as I am aware there were 35 MR2, one of which didn't last all that long unfortunately, and 3 R1, from 46 MR1's originally delivered. I think 30 aircraft actually doing the flypro out of 38 max for the past 30 years is a very generous estimate, in fact I'd be surprised if for most of that time we got much into double figures.
Dave
not wishing to get too involved in arguing the toss here, but since when have we had that many airframes on the eng coord boards? As far as I am aware there were 35 MR2, one of which didn't last all that long unfortunately, and 3 R1, from 46 MR1's originally delivered. I think 30 aircraft actually doing the flypro out of 38 max for the past 30 years is a very generous estimate, in fact I'd be surprised if for most of that time we got much into double figures.
Dave
Nigegilb, I was pointing out that your statement that modern aircraft do not leak fuel was not correct, you now add the word routinely which obviously changes your original statement quite considerably and I would not have posted my reply.
It is clear that modern aircraft do leak fuel, additionally, those I posted were just a small selection of those that have had leaks, I could have added quite a few more.
That aside, nowhere did I say that carrying leaks is normal, nor did I agree, disagree or give any indication of my views on the current discussion about the fuel leaks, wether I think the Nimrod is beyond its sell by date or for that matter fuel tank protection between Nimrod MRA4
(not getting apparently) and Boeing 787 (is getting apparently, by the way 707 do not have protection, but has starting to leak from wing spars and integral tank wing panels and are being carried as acceptable within Boeings maintenance procedures). I will state that I have never been conditioned into accepting anything that I do not believe as being correct and I am nobodys fool.
Your paragraph reference the aluminium bolt versus the steel bolt has no relevance to me in the context of my response to one part of your post.
It is clear that modern aircraft do leak fuel, additionally, those I posted were just a small selection of those that have had leaks, I could have added quite a few more.
That aside, nowhere did I say that carrying leaks is normal, nor did I agree, disagree or give any indication of my views on the current discussion about the fuel leaks, wether I think the Nimrod is beyond its sell by date or for that matter fuel tank protection between Nimrod MRA4
(not getting apparently) and Boeing 787 (is getting apparently, by the way 707 do not have protection, but has starting to leak from wing spars and integral tank wing panels and are being carried as acceptable within Boeings maintenance procedures). I will state that I have never been conditioned into accepting anything that I do not believe as being correct and I am nobodys fool.
Your paragraph reference the aluminium bolt versus the steel bolt has no relevance to me in the context of my response to one part of your post.
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I apologise for not pointing out the first time, that modern airliners do not routinely leak fuel, I thought the point I was making was obvious. We do, of course, have emergency procedures in the event that a fuel leak is discovered. But please, do not confuse MR2 with a modern aircraft. The first example you quoted was a 737 800, with a bolt pierced fuel tank. Design fault? "Continuously manufactured by Boeing since 1967 with over 7,800 ordered and over 5,600 delivered (as of 2008), there are over 1,250 of the type airborne at any given time. On average, a 737 departs or lands somewhere every five seconds." I am not surprised in the least that the odd one develops a fuel leak. Now, to bring us all back to reality, the Nimrod fragged to be flown down to Brize Norton at the beginning of the Inquest, reportedly had a fuel leak. If I asked every Nimrod pilot at Kinloss if they had flown in an aircraft with a fuel leak/weep what do you think the percentage of positive answers might be?
Ed Set, argued that the Captain of the Kandahar Nimrod did not need to divert, after all his serious fuel leak ceased when the ac stopped tanking. It is normal to have gallons of fuel swishing around the bomb bay, even if Torpy didn't see fit to tell front line crews that all sources of ignition had been removed. It is a Nimrod you see and it is designed to survive a fuel leak just like a modern airliner. The Captain should have flown back to base, hundreds of miles away.
Honestly, a reality caption is needed here. Sorry if you do not accept it as normal, exrigger, but I can assure you, many people at Kinloss do. It is even OK for the cabin to stink of fumes after the ac has been depressurized.
No need to ground evacuate old boy, it is just the air conditioning system, should have taxied her in.
I really will withdraw from the argument now, my head hurts from banging it against the wall.
Ed Set, argued that the Captain of the Kandahar Nimrod did not need to divert, after all his serious fuel leak ceased when the ac stopped tanking. It is normal to have gallons of fuel swishing around the bomb bay, even if Torpy didn't see fit to tell front line crews that all sources of ignition had been removed. It is a Nimrod you see and it is designed to survive a fuel leak just like a modern airliner. The Captain should have flown back to base, hundreds of miles away.
Honestly, a reality caption is needed here. Sorry if you do not accept it as normal, exrigger, but I can assure you, many people at Kinloss do. It is even OK for the cabin to stink of fumes after the ac has been depressurized.
No need to ground evacuate old boy, it is just the air conditioning system, should have taxied her in.
I really will withdraw from the argument now, my head hurts from banging it against the wall.
Last edited by nigegilb; 15th Jun 2008 at 20:23.
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nigegilb said:-
"If you think carrying 11 fuel leaks is normal than more fool you."
Here we go again with people trying to scaremonger, people with no idea of the facts!!!
The classification of fuel leaks is obviously unknown to "some people". FFS!, a one inch stain around a screw is classed as a fuel leak ( forming 2 hrs after refuel)! It is quite common for an aircraft ( Military or Civil) to "CARRY" many such leaks on the under/over side of the mainplanes where it will obviously does/or would not cause a problem ( i.e it would be "dried" by the airflow). Do you really expect any tradesman to allow any leaks in or around the fuselage or engine bays?!!
If you do, I for one would gladly stamp your coupon!
Sorry about the language... Just getting a bit fed up with "scaremongers" with no real grasp of whats been happening at ISK since that TRAGIC day..
Great to see the MR2 fly over a heavily populated area. Well done to all at ISK that made this possible. It made me feel proud.
RIP CXX/3
DS
"If you think carrying 11 fuel leaks is normal than more fool you."
Here we go again with people trying to scaremonger, people with no idea of the facts!!!
The classification of fuel leaks is obviously unknown to "some people". FFS!, a one inch stain around a screw is classed as a fuel leak ( forming 2 hrs after refuel)! It is quite common for an aircraft ( Military or Civil) to "CARRY" many such leaks on the under/over side of the mainplanes where it will obviously does/or would not cause a problem ( i.e it would be "dried" by the airflow). Do you really expect any tradesman to allow any leaks in or around the fuselage or engine bays?!!
If you do, I for one would gladly stamp your coupon!
Sorry about the language... Just getting a bit fed up with "scaremongers" with no real grasp of whats been happening at ISK since that TRAGIC day..
Great to see the MR2 fly over a heavily populated area. Well done to all at ISK that made this possible. It made me feel proud.
RIP CXX/3
DS
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http://www.sundaymail.co.uk/opinion/...8057-20607186/
A NIMROD flew over the Palace yesterday as part of the Queen's birthday party.
But this flag-waving show of military strength was no cause for celebration for the families of 14 servicemen killed in a Nimrod crash in Afghanistan two years ago.
The Ministry of Defence decision to include the Nimrod was crass and insensitive.
Sadly, anyone who has followed their conduct over this whole sorry affair will not be surprised.
2496 Incident reports on RAF Nimrod aircraft from 1987 to 2007, aircraft incidents are categorized as an occurrence involving an aircraft which results in the aircraft sustaining damage or a person receiving an injury or which discloses a flight safety hazard or potential hazard..
355 Incidents of Fumes/Smoke
78 Incidents of Fires
93 Incidents of Fire Warnings
377 Incidents of Leaks
184 Incidents of Parts Detached
229 Incidents of Equipment failed to operate
55 Incidents of Structural Damage
11 Incidents of Fuel Transfer Problems
32 Incidents of Fuel Contamination
8 FuelTX Probe Leaks
The list does not include 'potential incidents' as they are not recorded as a specific category of information and so I will not be able to provide this information to you. You should also be aware that the majority of incident reports are submitted by aircrew. Although ground crew can raise incident reports, faults identified while the aircraft is on the ground would normally be reported and rectified in accordance with laid-down maintenance and repair procedures, and therefore these faults would not form part of the aircraft incident records held by DASC
Obtained under the FOI act.
A NIMROD flew over the Palace yesterday as part of the Queen's birthday party.
But this flag-waving show of military strength was no cause for celebration for the families of 14 servicemen killed in a Nimrod crash in Afghanistan two years ago.
The Ministry of Defence decision to include the Nimrod was crass and insensitive.
Sadly, anyone who has followed their conduct over this whole sorry affair will not be surprised.
2496 Incident reports on RAF Nimrod aircraft from 1987 to 2007, aircraft incidents are categorized as an occurrence involving an aircraft which results in the aircraft sustaining damage or a person receiving an injury or which discloses a flight safety hazard or potential hazard..
355 Incidents of Fumes/Smoke
78 Incidents of Fires
93 Incidents of Fire Warnings
377 Incidents of Leaks
184 Incidents of Parts Detached
229 Incidents of Equipment failed to operate
55 Incidents of Structural Damage
11 Incidents of Fuel Transfer Problems
32 Incidents of Fuel Contamination
8 FuelTX Probe Leaks
The list does not include 'potential incidents' as they are not recorded as a specific category of information and so I will not be able to provide this information to you. You should also be aware that the majority of incident reports are submitted by aircrew. Although ground crew can raise incident reports, faults identified while the aircraft is on the ground would normally be reported and rectified in accordance with laid-down maintenance and repair procedures, and therefore these faults would not form part of the aircraft incident records held by DASC
Obtained under the FOI act.
From the BBC website:
What a load of old bo****ks!
mileandahalf:
Well said
In the opinion of one person and one person ONLY!
Graham Knight, whose son died in the crash, said: "We have gone through a three-week inquest in which the coroner said the planes were un-airworthy.
"Then they fly it over the most populated part of the country.
"It is like sticking two fingers up at the coroner and the MoD saying we can do what we want to do."
"Then they fly it over the most populated part of the country.
"It is like sticking two fingers up at the coroner and the MoD saying we can do what we want to do."
mileandahalf:
Well said
The Ministry of Defence decision to include the Nimrod was crass and insensitive.
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2496 Incident reports on RAF Nimrod aircraft from 1987 to 2007, aircraft incidents are categorized as an occurrence involving an aircraft which results in the aircraft sustaining damage or a person receiving an injury or which discloses a flight safety hazard or potential hazard..
355 Incidents of Fumes/Smoke
78 Incidents of Fires
93 Incidents of Fire Warnings
377 Incidents of Leaks
184 Incidents of Parts Detached
229 Incidents of Equipment failed to operate
55 Incidents of Structural Damage
11 Incidents of Fuel Transfer Problems
32 Incidents of Fuel Contamination
8 FuelTX Probe Leaks
355 Incidents of Fumes/Smoke
78 Incidents of Fires
93 Incidents of Fire Warnings
377 Incidents of Leaks
184 Incidents of Parts Detached
229 Incidents of Equipment failed to operate
55 Incidents of Structural Damage
11 Incidents of Fuel Transfer Problems
32 Incidents of Fuel Contamination
8 FuelTX Probe Leaks
Numbers without detail are purely used to scare those that don't know any better.
I am sorry TD, but your credibility is next to zero at ISK these days. You mean well but your constant misrepresentation of the facts and figures has done your case more harm than good amongst those that know the aircraft.
MadMark!!!
What a load of old bo****ks!
I am sorry TD, but your credibility is next to zero at ISK these days.
If he has zero credibility rating at an air station, then God knows what they think of the dangerous morons who stand against him. I suspect this attitude, if it exists, is borne out of embarrassment that it has taken a grieving father to shake up a world that is wholly unfamiliar to him. Who benefits? Not TD – he lost a son and will never forget. You can park it in some remote part of your brain, but it’s always there and the trigger for the rest of his life will be seeing a military aircraft flying overhead. The fact that the crew may feel safer will be largely down to him.
Reserve contempt for those who did nothing.
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And also reserve contempt for those who felt it necessary to keep sending up the Nimrod after massive in-flight fuel leaks when the test equipment was unable to recreate the fault on the ground.
NFF, we all know what that means.
Today's Times.
June 16, 2008
MoD rejected RAF's safety fears over Nimrod design
Michael Evans, Defence Editor
Vital safety features were left out of the design specification for Nimrod surveillance aircraft despite being requested by the Royal Air Force, an inquiry has revealed.
Fuel tank explosion protection and a ban on carrying fuel in the fuselage were both listed as “air staff requirements” (ASR) by the RAF. But they were among several items not included in the final design blueprint known as the “aircraft specification”. The RAF’s comments about the design criteria were rejected by the Ministry of Defence when it drew up the specifications for the aircraft.
The investigation was commissioned by the MoD after the death of 14 servicemen in a mid-air explosion on a Nimrod XV230 over southern Afghanistan in September 2006.
No fuel-protection system was fitted and the Nimrods were flown with fuel in the fuselage, according to the report drawn up by the defence research company QinetiQ.
The inquiry also discovered that the number of maintenance specialists at RAF Kinloss, where the aircraft is based, had been cut by nearly 24 per cent and that many workers were inexperienced on Nimrods. Meanwhile, operational demands were increasing.
“Low confidence in the safety of the Nimrod will have an impact on those who operate the aircraft. Occasions may arise when some operators may be reluctant to fly,” QinetiQ says.
The unpublished report, released to The Times under the Freedom of Information Act, makes 30 recommendations to improve safety, 21 of which are already being implemented. Six have been deferred because they relate to air-to-air refuelling and three others are still under consideration.
The report says that its investigators noted a number of differences between ASR and the final design. “The ASR required fuel tank explosion protection. This has not carried through to the aircraft specification,” it says. However, QinetiQ repeatedly highlights the dangers of a fire and explosion on the Nimrod.
The report says that no risk assessment had been undertaken concerning the presence of an explosive atmosphere in the fuel tanks “as the nature of this potential risk is not fully understood”. Further study should be instigated, QinetiQ says, adding: “The most significant risk presented by the fuel system is associated with fire/ explosion.”
MoD officials said that a fuel protection system consisting of explosive-suppressant foam around the tanks would not have prevented the Nimrod disaster in 2006. It has now been fitted to Hercules transport aircraft after a barrage of ground fire caused one to explode in Iraq in January 2005, killing ten military personnel. The Hercules was flying at low altitude, whereas Nimrods operate from high altitude, beyond the range of ground fire.
After a highly critical board of inquiry report into the Nimrod tragedy, published in December, the MoD said it had already ensured that the suspected cause — fuel leaking from a corroded coupling and igniting on contact with a hot-air pipe — had been addressed. The RAF’s top engineer announced that the Nimrods were safe.
However, the QinetiQ report highlights longstanding shortcomings that may have led to the Nimrod disaster, focusing particularly on the maintenance manpower shortages and huge pressure placed on the ageing aircraft.
A third inquiry into the Nimrod crash is still under way.
And guess what, fuel tank protection will not be on MRA4 either.
NFF, we all know what that means.
Today's Times.
June 16, 2008
MoD rejected RAF's safety fears over Nimrod design
Michael Evans, Defence Editor
Vital safety features were left out of the design specification for Nimrod surveillance aircraft despite being requested by the Royal Air Force, an inquiry has revealed.
Fuel tank explosion protection and a ban on carrying fuel in the fuselage were both listed as “air staff requirements” (ASR) by the RAF. But they were among several items not included in the final design blueprint known as the “aircraft specification”. The RAF’s comments about the design criteria were rejected by the Ministry of Defence when it drew up the specifications for the aircraft.
The investigation was commissioned by the MoD after the death of 14 servicemen in a mid-air explosion on a Nimrod XV230 over southern Afghanistan in September 2006.
No fuel-protection system was fitted and the Nimrods were flown with fuel in the fuselage, according to the report drawn up by the defence research company QinetiQ.
The inquiry also discovered that the number of maintenance specialists at RAF Kinloss, where the aircraft is based, had been cut by nearly 24 per cent and that many workers were inexperienced on Nimrods. Meanwhile, operational demands were increasing.
“Low confidence in the safety of the Nimrod will have an impact on those who operate the aircraft. Occasions may arise when some operators may be reluctant to fly,” QinetiQ says.
The unpublished report, released to The Times under the Freedom of Information Act, makes 30 recommendations to improve safety, 21 of which are already being implemented. Six have been deferred because they relate to air-to-air refuelling and three others are still under consideration.
The report says that its investigators noted a number of differences between ASR and the final design. “The ASR required fuel tank explosion protection. This has not carried through to the aircraft specification,” it says. However, QinetiQ repeatedly highlights the dangers of a fire and explosion on the Nimrod.
The report says that no risk assessment had been undertaken concerning the presence of an explosive atmosphere in the fuel tanks “as the nature of this potential risk is not fully understood”. Further study should be instigated, QinetiQ says, adding: “The most significant risk presented by the fuel system is associated with fire/ explosion.”
MoD officials said that a fuel protection system consisting of explosive-suppressant foam around the tanks would not have prevented the Nimrod disaster in 2006. It has now been fitted to Hercules transport aircraft after a barrage of ground fire caused one to explode in Iraq in January 2005, killing ten military personnel. The Hercules was flying at low altitude, whereas Nimrods operate from high altitude, beyond the range of ground fire.
After a highly critical board of inquiry report into the Nimrod tragedy, published in December, the MoD said it had already ensured that the suspected cause — fuel leaking from a corroded coupling and igniting on contact with a hot-air pipe — had been addressed. The RAF’s top engineer announced that the Nimrods were safe.
However, the QinetiQ report highlights longstanding shortcomings that may have led to the Nimrod disaster, focusing particularly on the maintenance manpower shortages and huge pressure placed on the ageing aircraft.
A third inquiry into the Nimrod crash is still under way.
And guess what, fuel tank protection will not be on MRA4 either.