Future Carrier (Including Costs)
.N_A_B, I did wonder if you were being a bit disingenuous about the Pompey dock wall: Daring and Dragon are in refit, Lancaster is the forward deployed ship, Iron Duck is just out of LIFEX, Argyll is in LIFEX and Westminster should be in LIFEX. I agree 59% availiblity is pretty good. Regarding the crewing I thought at least Lancaster of the T23s and some of the T45s have Port and Starboard crews (and two captains)?.
AFAIK there's only Lancaster and the MCMV in Surflot that operate dual crews. The point wrt crewing was more about pinch point gapping preventing ships going to sea, which was an issue not too long ago.
The following users liked this post:
I think I'm right in saying the F35B has range similar to the F18 and manoeuvrability similar to the F16, coupled with superlative sensors and a degree of stealth.
BAE released renders of the Type 83 concept. Interesting thing is that they they CEFAR radar masts and not the SAMPSON. Wonder if the a CEFAR is AUKUS agreement Renders also have 128 VLS tubes
To me looks like a panic proposal from BAE to compliment / replace the a hunter class disaster in the making. Naventia proposed another 3 hobart AAW destroyers and 6 alpha 3000 corvettes for the less than 8 hunters in price. 10 billion if navantia builds them in spain. While hunter budget has blown out to an expected 45 billion and still going for 8 ships. (also note for people who dont know its a not a fair apple to apple budget comparision as hunter class is using whole life accounting while the a navantia is using only initial purchase and not including life costing )
So the CEFAR radar is either a AUKUS program and actually aimed at the UK or a desperate attempt to keep the type 26 hunter class program alive
To me looks like a panic proposal from BAE to compliment / replace the a hunter class disaster in the making. Naventia proposed another 3 hobart AAW destroyers and 6 alpha 3000 corvettes for the less than 8 hunters in price. 10 billion if navantia builds them in spain. While hunter budget has blown out to an expected 45 billion and still going for 8 ships. (also note for people who dont know its a not a fair apple to apple budget comparision as hunter class is using whole life accounting while the a navantia is using only initial purchase and not including life costing )
So the CEFAR radar is either a AUKUS program and actually aimed at the UK or a desperate attempt to keep the type 26 hunter class program alive
Ecce Homo! Loquitur...
The suggestion I have seen elsewhere is that, after batch 1, the next batch is built alternately as ASW/AWD and then additional AWD as the current ships are retired.
Arguments being economy of scale, commonality of spares etc.
Arguments being economy of scale, commonality of spares etc.
Thread Starter
It is often suggested that because land based MPA can support task groups, it is practical to do the same with land based fighters - despite the obvious difference in range. How many fighters and tankers do you need to maintain a CAP plus aircraft on alert? If the aircraft are not on CAP, can they get to an incoming raid of hostile aircraft carrying anti ship missiles before they get to missile firing range?
Little's Theorem: N =λT
N = average number of items in a queuing system
λ = average number if items arriving at the system per unit of time
T = average waiting time an item spends in the system
Quoting Appendix A of Data Communications For Engineers by Duck, Bishop, and Read:
The usefulness of this theorem is that it applies to almost every queuing system. Everyday examples spring to mind. For example, slow moving traffic (large T) generates crowded streets (large N), a fast food restaurant (small T) needs fewer tables (small N) than a normal restaurant for the same customer arrival rate (λ).
If you are operating a task group a distance away from a friendly air base and are relying on land based fighters to put a CAP in front of your task group, then you have a large transit time (large T), so the same level of CAP cover (λ) results in a large N - you need more fighters than you would if they were operating from a carrier.
Likewise if you want to do more than operate a single CAP, and/or want to push fighters forward (as in the 'outer air battle') then you simply need more of them - quantity counts as well as quality. This in turn means larger carriers, a point not understood by many critics.
On the following page of the same discussion:
New Technology and Medium Navies by Norman Friedman (1999)
Alternatively, it might be said that the use of external sensors in combination with shipboard assets can leverage the considerable investment the ships represent. For example, during the latter part of the Cold War the U.S. Navy planned to fight an Outer Air Battle to destroy the Soviet naval bombers (mainly 'Backfires') which would otherwise have destroyed NATO shipping. It was quite clear that existing NATO frigates, which were optimized for anti-submarine warfare, could not deal with the 'Backfire' threat. At best they might have fended off some of the missiles the bombers launched, without dealing with the bombers at all. The bombers would simply have come back, and destroyed the surface units whose weapons had been depleted...
FIGHTING DMO, PT. 7: THE FUTURE OF THE AIRCRAFT CARRIER IN DISTRIBUTED WARFIGHTING - CIMSEC
Air Defense and Shooting Archers:
Aside from critical information functions, there is a vital kinetic role for naval aviation to play. Naval aviation will be sorely needed to preserve the survivability of the broader surface fleet. This dependency is best illustrated through the severe tactical challenges surface warships face in defending themselves against missile salvos...
After discussing the problems involved in engaging low altitude anti ship missiles with only shipborne systems, the article discussed the launch platforms:
Naval aviation is also critical for defending against bombers, which are one of the most flexible and lethal platforms for anti-ship attacks. Because of their long range and the size of their magazines, bombers can launch substantial volume of fire against warships at distances that are well beyond the warship’s ability to launch anti-air weapons. These features make it especially difficult to destroy archers before they can fire their arrows when it comes to bombers. Aviation is the main asset that can find and intercept bombers and impose last-ditch firing dilemmas upon them before they are able to fire upon warships.
The large deck and hangar provides a platform for ASW helicopters. Although the low frequency towed array equipped sonars normally can support a Merlin or similar, with the dipping sonar providing the resolution to go with the towed array's detection range, experience shows that putting them on the same ship simplifies coordination, maintenance, logistics, and crew stopping, and allows them to fly in worse sea conditions.
But as well the maths of Queuing Theory, the physics of electromagnetic wave propagation, the geography of a non flat planet, and the history of Second World War, the Cold War, and so on, you are not allowed to bring personal experience of operations or exercises in here!
Originally Posted by A56
Let's be honest - if someone proposed buying two carriers for the RN today what would be the reaction?
Last edited by WE Branch Fanatic; 10th Jun 2023 at 21:27.
Ecce Homo! Loquitur...
Depends on the threat from stand-off bombers.
In the Atlantic the threat was from Soviet bombers and it was considered cheaper to close the GIUK gaps with fighters and tankers based in Iceland, the UK and Norway. The USN carriers could then deal with any that got through.
Bigger threat was submarine launched missiles than bombers. The SHar was more a “hack the shad” (Bear D ) asset in the outer ASW defence ring than a counter to a stand-off bomber raid.
In the Atlantic the threat was from Soviet bombers and it was considered cheaper to close the GIUK gaps with fighters and tankers based in Iceland, the UK and Norway. The USN carriers could then deal with any that got through.
Bigger threat was submarine launched missiles than bombers. The SHar was more a “hack the shad” (Bear D ) asset in the outer ASW defence ring than a counter to a stand-off bomber raid.
The following users liked this post:
BAE released renders of the Type 83 concept. Interesting thing is that they they CEFAR radar masts and not the SAMPSON. Wonder if the a CEFAR is AUKUS agreement Renders also have 128 VLS tubes
To me looks like a panic proposal from BAE to compliment / replace the a hunter class disaster in the making. Naventia proposed another 3 hobart AAW destroyers and 6 alpha 3000 corvettes for the less than 8 hunters in price. 10 billion if navantia builds them in spain. While hunter budget has blown out to an expected 45 billion and still going for 8 ships. (also note for people who dont know its a not a fair apple to apple budget comparision as hunter class is using whole life accounting while the a navantia is using only initial purchase and not including life costing )
So the CEFAR radar is either a AUKUS program and actually aimed at the UK or a desperate attempt to keep the type 26 hunter class program alive
To me looks like a panic proposal from BAE to compliment / replace the a hunter class disaster in the making. Naventia proposed another 3 hobart AAW destroyers and 6 alpha 3000 corvettes for the less than 8 hunters in price. 10 billion if navantia builds them in spain. While hunter budget has blown out to an expected 45 billion and still going for 8 ships. (also note for people who dont know its a not a fair apple to apple budget comparision as hunter class is using whole life accounting while the a navantia is using only initial purchase and not including life costing )
So the CEFAR radar is either a AUKUS program and actually aimed at the UK or a desperate attempt to keep the type 26 hunter class program alive
Thread Starter
Depends on the threat from stand-off bombers.
In the Atlantic the threat was from Soviet bombers and it was considered cheaper to close the GIUK gaps with fighters and tankers based in Iceland, the UK and Norway. The USN carriers could then deal with any that got through.
Bigger threat was submarine launched missiles than bombers. The SHar was more a “hack the shad” (Bear D ) asset in the outer ASW defence ring than a counter to a stand-off bomber raid.
In the Atlantic the threat was from Soviet bombers and it was considered cheaper to close the GIUK gaps with fighters and tankers based in Iceland, the UK and Norway. The USN carriers could then deal with any that got through.
Bigger threat was submarine launched missiles than bombers. The SHar was more a “hack the shad” (Bear D ) asset in the outer ASW defence ring than a counter to a stand-off bomber raid.
The plan called for the forward deployment of carriers into the Norwegian Sea and amphibious forces to Norway during a period of tension, and allied contributions included the forward deployment of British SSNs up North, an ASW group centred one or two of our ASW carriers in the Eastern Atlantic, and amphibious forces being sent to Norway. Other non US contributions included a Spanish ASW group further to the South and a French carrier in the Mediterranean.
Source: U.S. Naval Strategy in the 1980s: Selected Documents
As for CVS/Sea King/Sea Harrier - you are right. The RN led ASW group was meant to be operating behind air cover from the USN Tomcats, if and when it went forward into the Norwegian Sea. This is why arguments saying that we should have built new carriers the same size as the Invincible class were not sensible.
As for the SSGN menace - see Kamikazes - The Soviet Legacy
SSGNs were evidently considered in the West to be the safest asset of the Soviet Navy during an attack, but it was not the case. The problem was hiding in the radio communications required: two hours prior to the launch, all the submarines of the PAD were forced to hold periscope depth and lift their high frequency-radio and satellite communication antennas up into the air, just to get the detailed targeting data from reconnaissance assets directly (not via the staffs ashore or afloat); targeting via low- or very-low-frequency cable antennas took too much time and necessarily involved shore transmitting installations, which could be destroyed at any moment. There was little attention paid to buoy communication systems (because of the considerable time under Arctic ice usual for Soviet submarines). Thus the telescoping antennas in a row with the periscopes at the top of the conning tower were the submarine’s only communication means with the proper radio bandwidth. Having all ten or fifteen boats in a PAD at shallow depth long before the salvo was not the best way to keep them secure. Also, the salvo itself had to be carried out in close coordination with the surface fleet and MRA divisions.
So that was two hours in which the Bear could be intercepted, and two hours in which the submarines were at periscope depth with masts up, and vulnerable to detection by airborne radars.
Last edited by WE Branch Fanatic; 11th Jun 2023 at 17:24.
Ecce Homo! Loquitur...
Given crew shortages, it has been decided RFA Wave Ruler and RFA Wave Knight will be permanently decommissioned.
Potentially could be sold to Brazil or Chile.
WR laid up in Seaforth Dock April 2018.
WK laid up in Portsmouth March 2022.
Potentially could be sold to Brazil or Chile.
WR laid up in Seaforth Dock April 2018.
WK laid up in Portsmouth March 2022.
Ecce Homo! Loquitur...
As news breaks indicating defence cuts will force a 30% cut in RFA tanker numbers, Pinstripedline blog asks whether the Royal Navy is still a true 'blue water navy' and concludes that no, it is not.
https://tinyurl.com/yxpe3azs
https://tinyurl.com/yxpe3azs
As news breaks indicating defence cuts will force a 30% cut in RFA tanker numbers, Pinstripedline blog asks whether the Royal Navy is still a true 'blue water navy' and concludes that no, it is not.
https://tinyurl.com/yxpe3azs
https://tinyurl.com/yxpe3azs
Read pinstripped, kinda drivel really. France, less carriers, less submarines, less fleet support than the RN buts its a blue water navy. Seems to be comparing the RN to the USN. No **** sherlock, RN is not going to be as good. Next you will say the British army is smaller than the PLA.
The following users liked this post:
I wonder what happened to the £110m set aside to reactivate the Waves in 2028-31. 
Update: NavyLookout has issued a 'correction' on the website but not tw@tter
I don't always agree with 'Sir Humphrey' but I think his/her point is la Royale has overseas territory bases in the Americas, the Pacific and Indian Oceans as well as a presence in Africa and the Gulf. The RN has HMNB Gibraltar and Mare Harbour plus HMS Juffair, BDSSU, UKJLSB, Al Duqm in 'friendly' states. The point being that the RN needs floating support to fulfil the strategy HMG has indicated it wants* free from dependence on it's hosts. The French can support their strategy mainly from their own facilities.
(*subject to the refresh and the next general election),
Update: NavyLookout has issued a 'correction' on the website but not tw@tter
Apologies - correction to this information. RN official line is that the Wave class ships are still in extended readiness and will remain part of the 'on-paper' strength of the fleet for the foreseeable future. It is however, very unlikely they will return to sea anytime soon https://t.co/3WmOuXpQAG
(*subject to the refresh and the next general election),
Ecce Homo! Loquitur...
https://www.navylookout.com/not-enou...is-is-brewing/
Not enough sailors – another Royal Navy personnel crisis is brewing
….Every senior officer will say “people are our greatest asset” yet there still seems to be a kind of disconnect between investment in people and in shiny new kit. Besides pay issues, improving “the offer” may include changes to career structures, better incentives, more predictable deployment cycles and increased family support.
The Haythornthwaite Review of Armed Forces Incentivisation is due to report very soon and may point the way to more radical changes which are needed. Implementation of the recommendations will almost certainly require substantial new funding.
More than any other issue if not addressed quickly, a lack of the right people will undermine the ability of the RN to fight and win.
Not enough sailors – another Royal Navy personnel crisis is brewing
….Every senior officer will say “people are our greatest asset” yet there still seems to be a kind of disconnect between investment in people and in shiny new kit. Besides pay issues, improving “the offer” may include changes to career structures, better incentives, more predictable deployment cycles and increased family support.
The Haythornthwaite Review of Armed Forces Incentivisation is due to report very soon and may point the way to more radical changes which are needed. Implementation of the recommendations will almost certainly require substantial new funding.
More than any other issue if not addressed quickly, a lack of the right people will undermine the ability of the RN to fight and win.
The following users liked this post:
I do wonder, given the technical demands of many RN branches and the high participation rates in Higher Education if an incentive of reimbursing student loan deductions and writing off a proportionate amount of the remainder and the basis of return of service should be added to sponsorship/cadetship. Even in the dark ages when I joined some tiffies were better qualified than officers on entry. I wonder how widespread the message that entry can be up to 39 depending on role and the starting salary for an accelerated apprenticeship (start as probationary leading hand) is above the UK median salary. There's even direct entry POET(ME) for those with relevant experience, personally and I suspect I'll be seen as a heretic, I think late recruitment at a higher rate/rank on probation for those with transferable skills with a 'Navalization' course has to be seriously considered.
Ecce Homo! Loquitur...
The Ministry of Defence (MoD) has confirmed that the Royal Fleet Auxiliary vessels, Wave Knight and Wave Ruler, will remain in Extended Readiness until 2028.
https://ukdefencejournal.org.uk/?p=44899
The Ministry of Defence (MoD) has confirmed that the Royal Fleet Auxiliary vessels, Wave Knight and Wave Ruler, will remain in Extended Readiness until 2028.
This confirmation is in response to reports that suggested the two ships were to be permanently decommissioned.
In a written question session on 15 June 2023, John Healey, the Shadow Secretary of State for Defence, queried the Secretary of State for Defence about the plans for the future of RFA Wave Knight and RFA Wave Ruler. “To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, what plans he has for the future of (a) RFA Wave Knight and (b) RFA Wave Ruler,” Healey inquired.
James Cartlidge, the Minister of State, Ministry of Defence, responded by stating that both ships were placed into Extended Readiness in 2022 and 2017 respectively. He further mentioned that the option to reactivate them is being reviewed. “Both RFA Wave Knight and RFA Wave Ruler were placed into Extended Readiness in 2022 and 2017 respectively. The option to re-activate is kept under review,” Cartlidge said.
Addressing another question by Healey regarding the expected out-of-service date for both ships, Cartlidge provided further details. “Both Royal Fleet Auxiliary (RFA) Wave Knight and RFA Wave Ruler are programmed to be in Extended Readiness until 2028 in His Majesty’s Naval Base Portsmouth and Liverpool respectively, under the care and custody of RFA cluster management,” he clarified.
Cartlidge declined to disclose the individual out-of-service dates for the ships, citing the need to preserve the operational security of the fleet, which is odd given that the department routinely does disclose this information.
https://ukdefencejournal.org.uk/?p=44899
The Ministry of Defence (MoD) has confirmed that the Royal Fleet Auxiliary vessels, Wave Knight and Wave Ruler, will remain in Extended Readiness until 2028.
This confirmation is in response to reports that suggested the two ships were to be permanently decommissioned.
In a written question session on 15 June 2023, John Healey, the Shadow Secretary of State for Defence, queried the Secretary of State for Defence about the plans for the future of RFA Wave Knight and RFA Wave Ruler. “To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, what plans he has for the future of (a) RFA Wave Knight and (b) RFA Wave Ruler,” Healey inquired.
James Cartlidge, the Minister of State, Ministry of Defence, responded by stating that both ships were placed into Extended Readiness in 2022 and 2017 respectively. He further mentioned that the option to reactivate them is being reviewed. “Both RFA Wave Knight and RFA Wave Ruler were placed into Extended Readiness in 2022 and 2017 respectively. The option to re-activate is kept under review,” Cartlidge said.
Addressing another question by Healey regarding the expected out-of-service date for both ships, Cartlidge provided further details. “Both Royal Fleet Auxiliary (RFA) Wave Knight and RFA Wave Ruler are programmed to be in Extended Readiness until 2028 in His Majesty’s Naval Base Portsmouth and Liverpool respectively, under the care and custody of RFA cluster management,” he clarified.
Cartlidge declined to disclose the individual out-of-service dates for the ships, citing the need to preserve the operational security of the fleet, which is odd given that the department routinely does disclose this information.
The following users liked this post:
I noticed in the week that RFA Tidesurge was operating with Chinooks SE of the Isle of Wight, she appears to have been doing a lot of aviation related serials recently 'Teamtidesurge providing platform training to RN Aviators and Aircraft Controllers', prior to that some armament practice with 'our FOST gunner' presumbably preparation for deployment as according to a vessel tracker site she's now off Portugal on route to Al Jubayl.
HMS Defender tied up in HMNB Portsmouth today prior to an upkeep refit, not sure if this will include a concurrent PIP like Dragon but it does mean we are back to 3 until Daring is back in service late next year.
HMS Defender tied up in HMNB Portsmouth today prior to an upkeep refit, not sure if this will include a concurrent PIP like Dragon but it does mean we are back to 3 until Daring is back in service late next year.
Once upon a time NATO started to see the GIUK Gap as being like the Maginot Line, which would have put NATO on the back foot and almost abandoned Norway. I am talking about the 1980s plans to put the carriers forward into the Norwegian Sea to fight the Bears and Backfires.
The plan called for the forward deployment of carriers into the Norwegian Sea and amphibious forces to Norway during a period of tension, and allied contributions included the forward deployment of British SSNs up North, an ASW group centred one or two of our ASW carriers in the Eastern Atlantic, and amphibious forces being sent to Norway. Other non US contributions included a Spanish ASW group further to the South and a French carrier in the Mediterranean.
Source: U.S. Naval Strategy in the 1980s: Selected Documents
As for CVS/Sea King/Sea Harrier - you are right. The RN led ASW group was meant to be operating behind air cover from the USN Tomcats, if and when it went forward into the Norwegian Sea. This is why arguments saying that we should have built new carriers the same size as the Invincible class were not sensible.
As for the SSGN menace - see Kamikazes - The Soviet Legacy
SSGNs were evidently considered in the West to be the safest asset of the Soviet Navy during an attack, but it was not the case. The problem was hiding in the radio communications required: two hours prior to the launch, all the submarines of the PAD were forced to hold periscope depth and lift their high frequency-radio and satellite communication antennas up into the air, just to get the detailed targeting data from reconnaissance assets directly (not via the staffs ashore or afloat); targeting via low- or very-low-frequency cable antennas took too much time and necessarily involved shore transmitting installations, which could be destroyed at any moment. There was little attention paid to buoy communication systems (because of the considerable time under Arctic ice usual for Soviet submarines). Thus the telescoping antennas in a row with the periscopes at the top of the conning tower were the submarine’s only communication means with the proper radio bandwidth. Having all ten or fifteen boats in a PAD at shallow depth long before the salvo was not the best way to keep them secure. Also, the salvo itself had to be carried out in close coordination with the surface fleet and MRA divisions.
So that was two hours in which the Bear could be intercepted, and two hours in which the submarines were at periscope depth with masts up, and vulnerable to detection by airborne radars.
The plan called for the forward deployment of carriers into the Norwegian Sea and amphibious forces to Norway during a period of tension, and allied contributions included the forward deployment of British SSNs up North, an ASW group centred one or two of our ASW carriers in the Eastern Atlantic, and amphibious forces being sent to Norway. Other non US contributions included a Spanish ASW group further to the South and a French carrier in the Mediterranean.
Source: U.S. Naval Strategy in the 1980s: Selected Documents
As for CVS/Sea King/Sea Harrier - you are right. The RN led ASW group was meant to be operating behind air cover from the USN Tomcats, if and when it went forward into the Norwegian Sea. This is why arguments saying that we should have built new carriers the same size as the Invincible class were not sensible.
As for the SSGN menace - see Kamikazes - The Soviet Legacy
SSGNs were evidently considered in the West to be the safest asset of the Soviet Navy during an attack, but it was not the case. The problem was hiding in the radio communications required: two hours prior to the launch, all the submarines of the PAD were forced to hold periscope depth and lift their high frequency-radio and satellite communication antennas up into the air, just to get the detailed targeting data from reconnaissance assets directly (not via the staffs ashore or afloat); targeting via low- or very-low-frequency cable antennas took too much time and necessarily involved shore transmitting installations, which could be destroyed at any moment. There was little attention paid to buoy communication systems (because of the considerable time under Arctic ice usual for Soviet submarines). Thus the telescoping antennas in a row with the periscopes at the top of the conning tower were the submarine’s only communication means with the proper radio bandwidth. Having all ten or fifteen boats in a PAD at shallow depth long before the salvo was not the best way to keep them secure. Also, the salvo itself had to be carried out in close coordination with the surface fleet and MRA divisions.
So that was two hours in which the Bear could be intercepted, and two hours in which the submarines were at periscope depth with masts up, and vulnerable to detection by airborne radars.
WEBF, this was 43 years ago! Hardly relevant to 2023, it was a different world.
The following users liked this post:
the amount of potential "trade" is pretty small - TBH the Russian navy isn't that much bigger than the RN these days if you look at post 1990 vessels and that's the whole fleet - including those in the Black Sea, the Baltic the Med and the Far East
The following users liked this post: